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Towards Cognitively Inclusive Digital Media Products 
John Charles Vines 
This thesis is situated in a moment when the theory and practice of inclusive design appears to be 
significantly implicated in the social and economic response lo demographic changes in Western 
Europe by addressing the need to reconnect older people wilh teclinology. In light of claims that 
cognitive ageing results in an increasing disconnection from novel digital media in old age. inclusive 
design is apparently trapped in a discourse in which digital media products and interfaces are designed 
as a response to a deterministic decline in abilities. 
The thesis proceeds from this context to ask what intellectual moves are required within the 
discourses of inclusive design so that its community of theorists and practitioners can both 
comprehend and afford the enaction of cognitive experience in old age? Wliilst influential design 
scholarship actively disregards reductionist cognitive explanations of human and teclinological 
relationships, it appears that inclusive design still requires an explanation of temporal changes to 
human cognition in later life. Whilst there is a burgeoning area of design related research dealing with 
this issue—an area this thesis defines as 'cognitivcly inclusive design"—the underlying assumptions 
and claims supporting tliis body of research suggests its ihcorists and practitioners are struggling to 
move beyond conceptualising older people as passive consumers suflering a deterioration in key 
cognitive abilities. The thesis argues that, by revisiting the cognitive sciences for ahemalive 
explanations for the basis of human cognition, it is possible to relieve this problem by opening up new 
spaces for designers lo critically reflect upon the manner in which older people interact wilh digital 
media. In taking a position that design is required lo support human cognitive enactment, the thesis 
develops a new approach to conceptualising temporal changes in human cognition, defined as 
'senescent cognition'. From this new critical lens, the thesis provides an alternative 'senesccntechnic' 
explanation of cognitive disconnections between older people and digital media that eschews 
reductionism and moves beyond a deterministic process of deterioration. In reassessing what ageing 
cognition means, new strategies for the future of inclusive design are proposed that emphasise the role 
of creating space for older people to actively explore, reflect upon and enact their own cognitive 
couplings with technology. 
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Introduction 
Question: What intellectual moves are required within the inclusive design discipline so that 
its community of theorists and practitioners can both comprehend and ajford the enaction of 
cognitive experience for older people interacting with digital media interfaces? 
Contextual terminologies 
To support the flow of reading this document, this short section provides contextual isati on for 
the terminologies that are used most frequently throughout this thesis. This thesis is 
contextualised at the intersection of interaction design, gerontology and cognitive science, 
intervening upon design practice and theory that has made attempts to incorporate knowledge 
from the cognitive science of ageing into the design of digital media products. In particular, 
the thesis examines the manner in which different accounts of temporal change in human 
cognition are conceived have subsequent implications on the design of novel digital media 
products that are inclusive of older people. 
Throughout the thesis, the use of the term novel is made in reference to digital media 
products and their associated interfaces that a person has no prior experience of The thesis 
distinguishes digital media from digital technologies. Here, the term digital refers to media 
artefacts that are comprised of numerical representations.' As such, a digital technology 
comprises a combination of hardware and software components that enables the digital 
representation and manipulation of media. The notion of representation here is key, as it will 
be argued that the manner in which digital representations are conveyed in product interfaces 
are heavily implicated in a cognitive disconnection between older people and digital media.^ 
Cognitive disconnection, as it is used here, is not to suggest a physical disconnection between 
older people and digital media', but that a combination of factors leads to an insufficient 
interaction between the cognition of older people and the design of the digital media product. 
As such, in line with the arguments of Manovich (2001, p. 144) and Zics (2008), interaction 
' Digital media, as it is described here, can be taken to be similar to Manovich's (2001) description of new 
media, Manovich (2001) defined that a 'new media object can be described formally (mathematically)' and that 
a 'new media object is subject to algorithmic manipulation' (Manovich, 2001, p.27). 
' This argument will be expanded in chapler one of the thesis. 
' This is not to suggest that there may noi be a physical disconnection between older people and digital media as 
well. Primarily, however, this thesis examines the cognitive connections and disconnections between older 
people and digital media products, services and iiiierfaces. 
here is understood not purely in terms of a physical exchange between people and media, but 
also in terms of cognitive phenomena. The thesis implicates that part of the problem that 
results in cognitive disconnection between older people and digital media lies in the 
prevailing understanding of product, which suggests a closed package designed to be 
consumed by users. Rather, in line with the arguments of Redstrom (2005), Punt (2000) and 
Thompson (2008), the thesis defines digital media products as open-ended and in a 
continuous dynamic flux with those using it, who arc active participators in the construction 
of what they consume.^ 
Particularly relevant to this thesis is an area of design specialising in inclusive design, 
which, as defined in chapter one, is here understood as an informal community where 
designers come together to discuss issues related to older people being disconnected from the 
design of digital media products. Inclusive design is often considered as being a significant 
component of the social and economic response to the ageing population of many Western 
European nations (Coleman el al., 2007). As a consequence, this thesis deals with the issue of 
ageing and inclusive design in terms of a highly localised context. Therefore, such a 
discussion would not be relevant in nations where exclusion from digital technologies occurs 
on a widespread level/' Similarly, whilst this research acknowledges the economic and 
market-driven imperatives of inclusive design (as discussed by Coleman et a!. (2007)), the 
thesis does not attend to these dimensions of design activity, except for moments where they 
are directly attached to the attended problematic. 
For reasons of simplicity, the thesis makes use of the term older people throughout. 
This term and categorisation, however, is rather problematic. In some disciplines related to 
this thesis, such as gerontology and cognitive psychology, the term older people is used to 
identify the chronological age al which certain functions, abilifies, or behaviours manifest or 
disappear. In line with this theme, further distinctions can be made between 'old old', 'frail 
* II is necessary to highlighl dial what may comprise cognitive phenomena is determined upon the ontological 
perspective of a particular research project. Although there may be many ways of describing what may or may 
nol belong to the realm of the cognitive, this thesis refers to Iwo main paradigms of cognitive .science; 
cognitivism and the enaclive, embodied cognitive sciences. These two differing ontological paradigms of 
conceiving of human cognition are used within Ihe opposing accounts of cognitively inclusive design and 
senescentechnics, as defined in this section and throughout the thesis. 
' Although this thesis understands products in terms of open-ended ness, during chapter one, Iwo and tlirce, 
where contemporary argumcnis are explained, the prevailing understanding of a product as a finalised design 
output is used. The alternative understanding of digital media products, as presented here in the contextual 
terminologies, will be discussed in chapters seven, eight and in some of Ihe examples presented in chapter nine. 
" A study performed in 2007 highlighted how only approximately 19% of the Earth's population has access to a 
fixed telephone line, and 5 out of 100 African people were approximated to be users of the internet 
(International Telecoms Union, 2007). These statistics highlighi profoundly how the issue of older people being 
disconnected from digital media is, in light of the wider worldly context, rather a Western-centric issue. 
old', 'active old', 'third agers' and more. As Stuart-Hamilton observes, however, 'there is no 
single point at which a person becomes 'old', and [...] chronological age is in any case an 
arbitrary and not very accurate measure, so the use of a single figure for the threshold would 
give a speciously objective status' (Stuart-Hamilton, 2006, p.25). A traditional people or 
user-centred approach to design requires a similar process of categorisation, identifying the 
particulars of the physical, social, emotional, behavioural, economic and political make-up of 
a certain group of older people. This thesis builds upon work that highlights the limitations of 
such design approaches (such as Redstrom (2005)), whilst also acknowledging the usefulness 
of having concrete reference points with which to bring together an intellectual community. 
As such, the thesis uses the term older people to aid the reading of the text and to give a 
reference point with which to conceive ideas, whilst also leaving this category open for future 
negotiation. 
Within this thesis, two fundamentally distinct, but potentially co-existive. approaches 
to conceptualising cognitive interactions between older people and digital media have been 
defined; cognitively inclusive design and scncsccntcchnics (defined below). Both of these 
approaches have been defined in reference to, until now, disparate paradigms for conceiving 
of the temporal changes occurring to the cognition of older people. Temporal here refers to 
'of or relating to time' (Hornby, 1995, p. 1230). Cognition is defined as the mental activities 
of human beings that describe the "acquisition, storage, transformation and use of knowledge' 
(Matlin, 2005, p.2). Therefore, through the diverging paradigms of cognitively inclusive 
design and senescentechnics, this thesis examines alternative explanations as to how, over the 
latter period of a person's life, the manner in which people acquire, store, transfonn and 
apply knowledge changes. 
Cognitively inclusive design is defined within this thesis by bringing together under 
the same term a number of attempts to incorporate knowledge from the scientific study of 
ageing human cognition into design methods and tools that have, until now, been rather 
This emphasises somewhat the disparate nature of the .sludy of human ageing in a range of disciplines. 
LesnotT-Caravagiia notes that'[r]esearchers have confounded their studies by dividing older persons into 
amorphous categories such as the "young old,'" "llic old old," "the oldest old," "the frail elderly," "the well 
elderly," and "ihe long-living" [,.. whilst] others have facetiously referred to older age groups as "the slow go," 
"the no-go," and "Ihe go-go;" or simply "the risky" and "(he frisky"'(Le8noff-Caravaglia, 2007. p. 17). 
Highlighting Ihe difficulty of categorising older people, especially based upon poorly informed assumption, 
Lesnoff-Caravaglia (2007) suggest categorising people into age-groups—an approach that is just as problematic 
(Stuart-Hamilton, 2006). 
' For example, the older person that this thesis references might be somewhat categorised in terms of being 
contextual ised within a Western European cultural selling, and being of a generation in a moment of discomfort 
between the digitally connecled and the digitally disconnected. 
loosely aligned. Ageing, here, is understood as a mullifaceted process of temporal change 
that occurs to human beings that results in a gradual deterioration in certain cognitive 
functioning. This cognitive functioning is reduced to a series of discrete information-
processing capabilities, which are understood in isolation from the physiology and 
environment a person is interacting with. Cognitive functioning is understood to change 
significantly later in a person's life, wherein certain key ftinctions deteriorate in such a 
manner that, it is argued, makes connecting with novel digital media products somewhat 
problematic. 
Senescenlechnics is a new term proposed by this thesis through a synthesis of a body 
of evidence from cognitive science and associated disciplines that are excluded from ageing 
discourse. " Scnenscentechnics proceeds from an alternative understanding of ageing lo that 
of cognitively inclusive design, distinguishing between ageing and senescence as a 
conceptual basis for understanding temporal changes to cognition. Although the term 
senescence is often used interchangeably with ageing within gerontology literature, it is also 
used in the biological sciences in reference to cellular changes to organisms that occur after a 
moment of maturity. Using senescence in terms of its biological definition is useftil as it 
highliglits the manner in which temporal changes to organisms, such as human beings, are in 
certain ways inseparable from the environments and technologies that are interacted with. 
This is used as inspiration within this thesis to develop an understanding of temporal changes 
to human cognition as part of an older person's Umwelt. The terra Umwelt is drawn from the 
work of the biologist Jakob von Uexkiill (1957), and is used to highlight the mutuality and 
co-dependence of a particular agent and their experiential environment. The consequence of 
taking this approach is a subsequent emphasis within definitions ofcognition of the notions 
of embodiment, ecology and enaction, which are defined in detail in chapter five. As such, 
senescentechnics develops an account of cognitive experience rather than cognitive 
functioning. 
At moments, the thesis refere to the notion of a human being. The concept of a 
human being may appear to be so familiar within contemporary design literature that it 
requires little explanation. Thompson (2008) argues it may be the case that the unquestioned 
status of the human being, bounded by a physical skin that is described within design 
literature theory and practice, leads to an inability to deal with ideas that technology can be 
'' Cognitively inclusive design is developed through chapters one, two and three. Chapter four examines the 
inadequacies ofcognitively inclusive design as a resolution to ihe cognitive disconnection between older people 
and digital media. 
'" Hie basis of senescentechnics is developed throughout chapter's five, six and seven. 
incorporated into the enaction of cognitive experience. The thesis recognises this as a 
problem that is particularly evident within design theory and practice that acts as a response 
to scientific knowledge of human ageing, where the notion of the older person whose 
cognition expands beyond the skin of the body is somewhat ineffable. As such, 
senescentechnics is introduced in order to develop an account of older people interacting with 
digital media in such a manner that, both in moments of real-time and over the course of long 
term interactions, the artificial becomes embedded in the cognitive experience of the 
senescent human being. Returning to the biological understanding of senescence, the 
senescentechnic human is not so much bounded by their skin and cognitive functioning, but 
unbounded, restricted instead by the manner in which the designer has attended to the 
subtlety of senescent cognition in the design of digital media products. 
To the reader 
It is useful to alert the reader to some of the underlying narratives that inform this thesis. The 
research documented within this thesis emerged from questions arising from the author's past 
experience working on a number of design projects exploring the design of digital and 
computational media for, and with, groups of older people. These projects explored aspects of 
older people interacting with mobile communication devices, digital music players, digital 
photograph storage devices, and physical computing systems. Through these various 
projects, the author observed that there appeared to be certain mental, psychological and 
cognitive issues that severely limited the ability for older people to understand the somewhat 
abstract interfaces of these digital media products. In particular, complex graphical interfaces, 
such as those found on personal computers and mobile communication devices, appeared to 
be highly problematic. It appeared that, for the most part, any discussion of cognition, or the 
*mind', was ignored within design theory and practice as it related to human ageing. The 
result of the initial design projects was the development of a theoretical framework for the 
design of "cognitively inclusive' digital media products; that is to say, they were designed in 
a manner to include the cognitive abilities of certain groups of users, in this case people 
between the age of 65 and 80.'^ 
These projccls were documented by ihe aulhor m a number of unpublished repcirls and a conference paper 
completed prior lo this current research. Sec Vines (2007a) and Vines and Thompson (2007), 
" A.specis of this later project, which was led by Iheoreiically-informed praclice, have been published in Vines 
and Thompson (2007). 
The doctoral research set out to develop these earlier design projects, clarifying the 
theoretical underpinnings, ensuring the project met with the latest knowledge from the 
cognitive psychology of ageing. It was envisaged that useable design guidance for cognitive 
inclusion would be developed in the form of a series of guidelines, principles and tools, 
evidenced in the user-testing and in proofs of concepts and design prototypes, It was hoped, 
building upon the positives of the previous studies, that the doctoral research would add a 
small brick of knowledge into the wall of research attempting to resolve the problems of 
designing technologies in a period of a statistically-ageing population. 
The thesis presented here, however, is rather different to the one imagined at the 
beginning of the PhD. The research proceeded with a greater examination of the cognitive 
psychology of ageing literature than that which formed the basis of the previous study. The 
cognitive psychology of ageing provided an abundant array of knowledge on changes to 
human cognition; a body of information accumulated over a period of more than 50 years. As 
the research developed, however, there was an increased awareness of the difficulties of 
incorporating knowledge from the cognitive psychology into digital media design practice. 
These issues have been highlighted by research within interaction design, where certain 
scholars have argued at length to marginalise cognitive psychology from the theory and 
practice of designing digital media systems. Whilst there has been an array of arguments for 
this discouragement, the most timdamental of all appeared to be the impoverishment of 
human agency, culture and meaning as a result of applying cognitive research straight to 
design.'^ The arguments from certain quarters of interaction design were profound and clear; 
cognitive psychology, formed upon a cognitivist philosophy of mind, was deeply problematic 
when applied both theoretically and practically in the design of digital media products and 
interfaces. 
Just as problematic, however, was the inflexibility of the claims research cognitive 
psychology made about the functioning of the ageing cognitive system. Whilst the literature 
within cognitive psychology of ageing is useful in its disciplinary context, it becomes highly 
limiting once absorbed into design theory and practice. By using the cognitive psychology of 
ageing and associated concepts such as working memory within both the analysis of human-
technological relationships, and, subsequently, altering the design of digital media products 
as a result, the designer immediately appeared to restrict the possibilities of action for the 
older individual. At its most severe, cognitive psychology research presents a situation where 
" Arguments relaied to this issue will be unpacked in chapter four, where the thesis particularly draws upron the 
work ofSuchman (1987; 2007), Dourish (2001) and Rcdsirom (2005). 
older people cannot make sense of digital media, interfaces and products. Consequentially, 
any design response is automatically restricted, in some sense, to simplify and historicise 
novel products and interfaces. It appeared the thesis was now provided with a somewhat 
impossible question to answer without some obscure paradoxical reasoning; designing the 
novel for people who, it is claimed, cannot reason about the novel. 
Just as cognitive psychology appeared to be highly questioned in design theory and 
practice, it was also noted that the claims of the cognitive psychology of ageing were 
becoming questioned by members of that dtscipline's research community.'"* Whilst cognitive 
psychology research suggests that people above certain ages would likely have significant 
losses in crucial cognitive functions, more critical members of the cognitive science 
community have questioned if this is so, as a great many older people appear to be perfectly 
cognitivcly capable and enjoy relatively active lives for their age. Although the case for a 
digital divide between younger and older people has resonance, and there might be a 
cognitive disconnection between older people and digital media, it appeared that the temporal 
changes occurring to human beings require a more subtle response from designers than those 
that currently prevail. 
The manner in which this research started to question the cognitive psychology of 
ageing was further provoked by debates within cognitive science as to the fundamental basis 
of human cognition. Not only did cognitive psychology of ageing appear to lack applicability 
to experiential aspects of ageing, but the disciplines mode of study appeared to be founded 
upon an increasingly outmoded understanding of the human mind. Alternative models that 
examined the role of ecology, embodiment, neural dynamics, dynamic interactions and 
emergence were all revealing, yet somewhat distant from any sort of discussion about human 
ageing. There appeared to be usefulness in expanding these discussions into the realm of 
ageing in order to provoke an allcniative perspective on the temporal changes to human 
cognition in later life; that of senescentechnics. 
Historically, cognitive science and computer science have related well with one 
another. The disciplines had shared terminologies, methods, tools and a generally 
sympathetic mode of thinking about the world. Over the past two decades, many researchers, 
theorists, practitioners and scholars fi-om human-computer interaction and interaction design 
have argued against this tiglit relationship with the cognitive sciences. Most of the arguments 
" This refers lo the emerging cognitive ncurosclence research ihai is noting the highly plastic and reconfiguring 
physiology oflhe ageing human brain. This research, found in studies by Park ci til. {Goh & Park, 2009; Park & 
Goli, 2009; Park & Reuter-Lorenz, 2009) and Cabeza (2002) is discussed in chapter six. 
10 
against the use of cognitive science research in the design of technological systems can be 
more specifically considered an argument against the older, cognitivist, models of cognition. 
Many areas of cognitive science have moved far beyond these models. Despite this, large 
areas of current interaction design ranges from the indifferent to the unfounded in their 
disregard for anything coming fix)m cognitive science and its sub-disciplines. This thesis 
argues that issues emerging at the intersection of cognifive science, interaction design, and 
gerontology, would benefit from integrated conversation that transcends the boundaries of the 
individual disciplines and reintroduces aspects of cognitive science into theoretical and 
practical aspects of design research. In particular, a transdisciplinary'^ approach to this 
problem appears to profoundly highlight that one of the most commonly cited problems for 
designers of novel digital media products for older people—that of the failure of critical 
cognitive fimctions in old age—is rather false. Instead, it would seem the failure is that of 
designers of inclusive technologies who are 1) are not critical of the knowledge they draw 
upon from disciplines outside of their own and, 2) are unable to move beyond the traditions 
of the design disciplines and its tools and methods. 
Why this thesis is important (and timely) 
Building on the underlying narrative, this thesis provides a significant contribution of 
knowledge within an area of expertise that transcends the disciplines of inclusive design, 
interaction design, cognitive science and gerontology. The thesis brings together and 
synthesises knowledge from these disciplines in order to identify the underlying issues as to 
why design practitioners and theorists have struggled to connect older people to the design of 
digital media products and interfaces. Subsequently, the thesis opens the space for future 
'* Transdisciplinary is distinguished from multidisciplinary and inlerdisciplinary in Ihis thesis through 
definitions provided by Basarab Nicolescu. Nicolcscu slates tbal'Muhidisciplinarity concerns itself wilh 
studying a research topic in not jusl one discipline only, but in several at the same time. Any topic in question 
will ullimalely be enriched by incorporaling Ihe perspectives of several disciplines. Mullidisciplinarity brings a 
plus to Ihe discipline in question, but this "plus" is always in the exclusive service of the home discipline. In 
olher words, ihe mullidisciplinary approach overflows disciplinary boundaries while its goal remains limiled to 
the framework of disciplinary research. Inteifiisciplinariiyhas a differeni goal than muitidisciplinarity. h 
concerns the transfer of methods from one discipline lo another. Like multidisciplinarity, interdisciplinarity 
overflows (lie disciplines, bul ils goal still remains within the framework of disciplinary research. 
Inierdisciplinarily has even the capacity of generating new disciplines, like quantum cosmology and chaos 
theory. TransdiscipUnarity concerns thai which is at once between the disciplines, across the differeni 
disciplines, anA beyond aW discipline, lis goal is the understanding of the present world, of which one of the 
imperalives is the unity of knowledge' (Nicolescu, 2006, p.145). Transdisciplinary is defined in greater detail in 
the following pages. 
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designers to develop resolutions to the problem through an alternative way of conceiving 
human cognitive interactions in old age. 
The thesis is particularly important in its timeliness. The thesis is situated in a 
moment where the theory and practice of inclusive design appears to be significantly 
implicated in the social and economic response to demographic changes in various 
Westernised nations."' Inclusive designers, it appears, are thought to have some of the skills 
required to reconnect older people to digital media. At the same time, new ways of thinking 
about digital media teehnologies and human beings are being constructed that describes each 
as increasingly distributed, granular, dynamic and contingent. Problematically, inclusive 
design and critical conversations about human ageing are not just isolated from these debates 
but due to the theories, practices and assumptions underpinning ageing discourses, such 
radical discussions appear to be difficult to sustain. 
The thesis provides an alternative interpretation of temporal cognitive change in order 
to open up new conversations about the problem of ageing human cognifion and interactions 
with digital media products, This new way of thinking is argued to be necessary. Without it, 
inclusive design would confinue to be trapped within a discourse that portrays the older 
people as requiring simplifications and nostalgic versions of digital media that, in normal 
circumstances, might be primarily designed for teenagers or middle-class white males. The 
thesis illustrates this by examining a contemporary strand of inclusive design—eognitively 
inclusive design—-which can only respond to claims that older people are cognitively 
disconnected from digital media by constructing highly reduced models of their physical and 
cognitive abilities. 
Beyond opening up a new perspective on human cognitive ageing, the thesis develops 
new synergies between the cognitive sciences and design fields. Although cognifive science 
and the design of technological systems has historically been a well-integrated field, in recent 
years design-orientated approaches to the development of technological systems have 
avoided entering discussions with those who scientifically study the human and artificial 
mind. This has most reeenUy been evidenced in the growing issue of design scholarship 
actively eschewing the use of cognitive-esque models in design, instead reverting to 
traditional elements of designing.'^ This thesis does not oppose such critiques, but does 
"" This is made in reference to the monumental evidence thai populations in many westernised and industrialised 
nations are ageing, and that in many of these nations centres of design research and practice have been set up 
with a primary aim of developing products, services and goods that are better suited to this growing market. 
Some examples of such design research, usually contextualised within post-cognitivist theory and practice of 
interaction design, include (but are not limited to) Suchman (1987; 2007), Kaptetinin and Nardi (2006), Bannon 
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suggest that there is productivity in renewing the conversations between design (in particular 
inclusive design as it related to digital media) but not without a process of continual critical 
reflection upon the theories and practices of both disciplines. As tliis thesis suggests, design 
offers as much to cognitive science and the study of ageing cognition, as these fields offer 
insight to design. 
Methodological approach 
The methodological strategy of this thesis is that of transdisciplinarity, as defined by 
Nicolescu (2002; 2006). 'Transdisciplinarity concerns that which is at once between the 
disciplines, across the different disciplines, and beyond all discipline. Its goal is the 
understanding of the present world, of which one of the imperatives is the unity of 
knowledge' (Nicolescu, 2002, p.44 - emphasis in the original). Nicolescu (2002) determined 
that a transdisciplinary approach to research requires the removal of boundaries between 
disciplines, with knowledge being understood in such a manner that it can manoeuvre fluidly 
fi'om one discourse to the next. Nicolcscu (2002) defined that transdisciplinarity was formed 
of three axioms. 
i. The ontological axiom: There are, in Nature and in our knowledge of Nature, 
different levels of Reality and, correspondingly, different levels of percepdon. 
ii. The logical axiom: The passage irom one level of Reality to another is insured by 
the logic of the included middle. 
iii. The complexity axiom: The structure of the totality of levels of Realily or 
perception is a complex structure: every level is what it is because all the levels exist 
at the same time, (Nicolescu, 2006, p. 148) 
The implication of Nicolescu's axioms is that the distinguishing of clear boundaries between 
disciplines, ideas and sources of knowing are only temporary. Therefore, in trying to 
understand a particular problem, it is not always sufficient to centralise one's study with a 
particular mode of thought or, as Nicolescu terms it, reality. There are many ways to describe 
similar phenomena—similarly, very different phenomena can be described as one and the 
(1991), Bannon and Badker (1991), Gaver (2009), Dourish (2001). and McCarthy and Wrighl (2004). Some of 
these authors offer critiques of cognitive-csque models of human being interacting with digital media system, 
whilst others provide alternative models and conceptions that arc considered to afford more agency to the user. 
Rather than considering this thesis as a critique of these works, ihe argument developed lo inform 
senescentcchnics should be considered somewlial extending and developing Ihe arguments provided by these 
numerous authors. 
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same. Different perspectives on related problems can exist alongside one-another and be 
navigated by a researcher sensitive to the differing ontological and epistemological contexts 
that infonn certain research trajectories. This is emphasised by Nowotny el al. (2003, p.l86), 
who propose that transdisciplinary means the: 
mobilization of a range of theoretical perspectives and practical methodologies lo 
solve problems. But, unlike inter- or multi-disciplinarity, il is not necessarily derived 
from pre-existing disciplines, nor does it always contribule lo the fonnation of new 
disciplines. The creative act lies just as much in the capacity to mobilize and manage 
these perspectives and methodologies, their 'extemal' orchestration, as in the 
development of new theories or conceptualisations, or ihe refinement of research 
methods, the "intemar dynamics of scientific creativity. In other words, 
[transdisciplinary] knowledge is embodied in the expertise of individual researchers 
and research teams as much as, or possibly more than, it is encoded in conventional 
research products such as journal articles or patents. 
Drawing upon the proposals of Nicoleseu (2002; 2006) and Nowotny et al. (2003) 
perspectives, a transdisciplinary perspective on the problem of the cognitive disconnect 
between older people and digital media, therefore, provides a rather different mode of 
knowledge output to research that would be fiilly situated within a design discipline. In terms 
of this thesis, using a lens developed through research with cognitive science, philosophy of 
mind, and gerontology, as well as design, provides a basis with which new questions are 
raised for ftiture design practice and theory to reflect upon. 
Although used as a strategy for completing this research, the basis of transdisciplinary 
also appears to be sympathetic to the problems that have emerged as this study has 
progressed. As will become clear throughout the text, an increasing discontent is developing 
within areas of design research, the cognitive sciences and associated disciplines with 
approaches that focus on closure.'" Although this discontent is becoming increasingly wide-
spread and holistic and fluid discussions are opening up within these disciplines, rationalistic, 
duahstic and linear frameworks and models can still be found in much contemporary 
literaUire. This is particular evident within areas of design that have dealt with the co-
development of knowledge between inclusive design and the cognitive psychology of ageing. 
As this research has developed, it became increasingly clear that the boundaries between 
disciplines are frequently a point of friction in the development of explanations of problems. 
In terms of the interactions between inclusive design and cognitive psychology, it often 
appears that designers misinterpret, simplify or are critically unaware of the implications of 
'^  This will be discussed at various points throughout chapters five, six, seven and eight. 
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the knowledge they transfer from the sciences, or the cognitive scientists' attempt to become 
the designer. Rather than attempting to attain the closure thai both the contemporary methods 
these fields appear to employ, this thesis argues that openness is usefijl both in terms of 
creative approaches to the design of novel digital media products and as a way of conceiving 
the temporal changes to the cognition of older people. 
Rather than attempting to locate this thesis' analysis in terms of primarily design or 
cognitive science, this research navigates a middle-way between the two, whilst also not 
discounting connections to related ideas and discourses. Literature has been surveyed as a 
result of its relevance to the problems inclusive design practitioners and theorists encounter 
when dealing with the issues of ageing human cognition, and also for its relevance to 
providing a possible route out of the problem. Most of the literature used within this thesis 
can be concretely situated within the broad design discipline, gerontology or the cognitive 
sciences. Literature and ideas from other disciplines are integrated into the conversation in 
order to add depth and support transactions from one moment to the next. 
The study has operated in terms of a continuous reflective and creative practice 
{Moon, 2004) in which theories and practices are surveyed and analysed in reference to the 
situational moment of the study in order to provide insigiit and add to or take away from the 
conversation developed thus far. Whh each development in this conversation, questions are 
answered and new questions emerge that require the continuation of the narrative. Therefore, 
this thesis is not an intervention directly into design, although it is possible to read it as one. 
Building upon Nicolescu's framing, this thesis is equally an intervention in gerontology, 
cognitive science and the philosophy of mind, situated in a nexus between these traditions 
and design. Consequentially, the response to the issue of human cognitive ageing and the 
design of digital media products within this thesis is distant in its form to a thesis within 
which the intervention is completely situated in design, cognitive science or gerontology. 
As noted in the previous section, this thesis was initially considered a more traditional 
design doctoral thesis. The problem had been identified; the literature surrounding this 
problem context had been surveyed; a possible theoretical route out had been identified. All 
that was necessary was the execution of the practice element of the study, which was to 
'^  Although this thesis argues In favour of openness and interpretation, at the same time it is a doctoral thesis 
embedded within the institutional framework of a western liuropean academic system founded upon the English 
language. There are certain points where closure and concrete terms, in relation to the argument documented in 
this thesis, are required. In the final chapter tlie thesis more specifically focuses upon the relevancy of ihe theory 
developed in this research to the wider inclusive design community, suggesting a study intervening solely on 
this subject area. Whilst this thesis inter\'enes specifically within a small area of inclusive design, it is important 
to highlight how the understanding of cognition, interaction and ageing developed throughout is always an 
interactive process between relevant disciplines. 
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explore the theoretical framework through an iterative process of designing technological 
prototypes. Although the thesis presented here is rather different to this earlier iteration, the 
manner in which it is structured resembles on some levels what may be expected of a 
practice-based design thesis, albeit with the word-count requirements of a theoretical 
endeavour. As documented in this thesis, chapters one, two and three can be read as what 
would typically constitute the contextualisation of the problem domain and a review of 
literature within the identified relevant fields and an examination of practices that have gone 
before. At this point, this thesis diverges from what might constitute a traditional practice-
based design thesis. In terms of a traditional thesis, chapter four might explain the 
methodological approach of the following practice, whilst any following chapters might be 
documentations of this practice, its successes, its failures, and its conclusions, and a short 
final chapter may summarise the overall conclusions and provisions for future research. This 
thesis diverges from this tradition having outlined the problem domain. Instead, chapter four 
provides a critical reflection upon the contemporary research within the interacting 
disciplines of inclusive design and cognitive psychology to highlight how what is often 
assumed to be a problem is instead an inevitable flaw in the knowledge base and 
methodologies of contemporary inclusive design and cognitive practice. The chapters that 
follow this open up new discussions for future designers, cognitive scientists and 
gerontologists—or those from a transdisciplinary in-belween—to build upon. 
The thesis in outline 
This thesis is divided into eight chapters with an appendix. Within the main text each chapter 
is introduced through a question and brief summaries of the component sub-sections. 
Chapter one contextualises the thesis within Western European society where 
inclusive approaches to design are implicated as part of a strategic response to claims that 
older people are somewhat disconnected from the adoption of digital media products. Whilst 
many older people are apparently willing to engage with digital media, the methods and 
processes of inclusive design are limited in providing a thorough account as to why this 
disconnection continues to exist. Chapter one explains how designers of digital media 
products arc drawn to scientific analyses of human ageing as it relates to technology. A 
significant corpus of knowledge that examines the problems older people appear to have 
when interacting with digital media products and interfaces is provided by the field of human 
factors. Human factors studies have been usefijl for designers of digital media in providing 
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evidence of the problems older people have connecting with particular types of computing 
technology and associated media, along with explanations as to why these problems occur as 
a result of age-related changes to human beings. Chapter one concludes by explaining how 
human factors studies often repeat the significance of temporal changes to cognition 
occurring in old age in the inability on the part of older people to connect to digital media 
products and interfaces. 
Chapter iwo brings together a number of loosely affiliated research projects into an 
approach that is defined within this thesis as eognitivcly inclusive design. Cognitively 
inclusive design specialises in providing a response to the claims that temporal changes to 
cognition make it difficult for older people to connect with digital media. Returning to the 
human factors literature, the chapter explains how attempts have been made to provide 
assistance to designers in the form of guidelines, specifications, methods and tools in order to 
alter complex digital media products and interfaces to be better suited to ageing cognitive 
functions. Although the advice provided by the human factors literature is concrete and 
robustly evidenced, the thesis argues that this approach is lacking in regards to designing 
completely novel digital media products. The limitations of the human factors literature is 
reflected in four design-orientated projects dealing with the issue of designing eognitively 
inclusive digital media. The recurring theme within the four discussed projects is that in order 
to ameliorate the cognitive disconnection between older people and novel digital media, it is 
necessary to reference historical forms of interaction. The examples of recent design research 
are used to highlight the problems designers appear to have in developing responses to 
cognitive ageing that do not focus upon harnessing past models of interaction. These four 
examples provide a number of concepts, tools and methods that exploit the principle that 
older people are a storehouse of long term memories, which can be harnessed to compensate 
for the deteriorations in working memory and fluid intelligence. Chapter two concludes by 
summarising the key principles of cognitively inclusive design through an example of the 
authors past digital media design practice. 
Chapter ihree examines in more detail what the term 'cognition' refers to in 
contemporary cognitively inclusive design literature. The chapter begins by providing a 
historical context for the cognitive psychology of ageing research that is used within 
cognitively inclusive design. The chapter establishes how much of this research applied in 
cognitively inclusive design is founded upon the cogniiivist philosophy of mind. Cognitivism 
became thedominant theory of mind during the formative years of the cognitive sciences in 
the mid-twenfieth century. Cognitivism, which developed in a virtuous circularity with early 
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computational science and artificial intelligence research, is based upon the primary principle 
that the human mind is a processor of infonnation. Therefore, much of cognitivist psychology 
has historically focused upon identifying, defining and elaborating the functional systems of 
cognition where certain processing is performed. The study of human memory is used as a 
key example of how an information processing perspective on the mind leads to the reduction 
of cognition into modular, discrete sub-systems. The cognitive study of human memory is 
particularly important in informing the claims that older people are disconnected from novel 
dighal media. The prevailing claims of the cognitive psychology of ageing suggest that 
functional systems such as working memory and fluid intelligence—which are instrumental 
to the encoding and retrieval of complex memories, and are required to transform short-term 
memories^—reduce in efficiency in old age. Chapter three concludes by arguing that the 
prevailingclaimsof the cognitive psychology of ageing present a situation where older 
people, in general, are understood to be poor processors of novel information; they are, 
however, powerfiil storehouses of long term knowledge. Reflecting upon the findings in 
chapter two and three, it appears that reductionist cognitivist philosophy underlying some of 
the work within the cognitive psychology of ageing are absorbed verbatim into cognitively 
inclusive design. 
Chapter four examines cognitively inclusive design in light of the broader context of 
research on interactions between people and complex digital media systems. TTie thesis 
argues that a central theme of cognitively inclusive design is a process of predicting the 
(co^itive) behaviours of older people, inscribing these predictions into a designed outcome, 
and subsequently concretely prescribing how an older user interacts with a digital system. 
The process of prediction, inscription and prescription is problematic within the context of 
interaction design at both a practical and pragmatic level. Observations of digital media 
systems in-use appear to highlight how prescriptions made by designers based upon cognitive 
modelling of people fail to account tor the emergent, contingent and situated nature of the 
everyday use of technologies. These practical failings are often a result of the philosophical 
stance of the designer, who has traditionally been considered as a manager of the couplings 
between people and technology in an a priori fashion. The fascination with prediction, 
inscription and prescription within cognitively inclusive design is established to be a result of 
a broader fascination in design to construct models of users in order to generate design 
outcomes. In the design process these constructions of the user become somewhat fixed, 
which reduces the agency of the user to objective properties to be designed for. The history of 
digital media, however, overwhelmingly suggests that individuals and communities of people 
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are dynamic agents, appropriating and reforming technologies in ways that are unpredictable 
and surprising to experts such as designers. The inability of cognitively inclusive design to 
move beyond concrete constructions of older people is interpreted to be the result of 
designers requiring fixed points of reference with which to resolve the issue of cognitive 
disconnection. Temporal changes to cognition, however, require a response from design that 
is sensitive to the provisional and transient nature of human cognition in later life; in this 
context, fixed points of reference are highly problematic. As it stands, cognitively inclusive 
design struggles to deal with the limitations identified in this chapter as a result of drawing 
heavily from the cognitive psychology of ageing, which is the dominant domain of 
knowledge on changes to the ageing mind. Chapter four closes by defining five statements 
with which to begin exploring an alternative to cognitively inclusive design that moves 
beyond a discourse of cognitive deterioration and the impoverishment of the agency of older 
users of technology, an approach that is coined senesccntechnics by this thesis and developed 
in the following chapters. 
Chapter five returns to the cognitive sciences in order to identify alternatives to the 
cognitivist information processing paradigm that are useful in developing an account of 
senescent cognition, TTiis chapter begins by arguing that it is possible to conceive of human 
cognition as inseparable from the human body and environment, encompassed within a 
particular individual's Umwell (von Uexkiill, 1957). In considering the inseparability of these 
systems, cognition comes to be understood as an experiential component of the pragmatic 
interactions of the human body within ecology. James Gibson's ecological psychology and 
theory of affordances is introduced as an influential alternative to cognitivist information 
processing that emphasises the dialogical nature of human perception and action with the 
environment. Although the theory of afibrdances has been used at length within design theory 
and practice, it is argued that these discussions are unliclpfiil as a consequence of its distance 
from Gibson's original ideas. Following this, it is proposed that it is useful to develop these 
concepts from their original defmifions rather than as it is popularised by design literature. 
The chapter goes on to use Gibson's concepts as an entry point to understanding robotics and 
artificial intelligence research, which exemplifies how there is a necessity for coherence 
within the Umwell in order for an economy of cognitive fijnctioning to emerge. The 
arguments made by a number of robotics researchers are best understood in terms of an 
enactive approach to understanding human cognition. Enactivism, as developed by Varela ct 
al. (1991), defines cognition as a dynamic capacity of human beings to bring forth a world 
based upon a historical network of structural couplings between brain, body and world. The 
19 
enactivist perspective places new demands on Gibson's original definition of affordances and 
the manner in which it is applied in design literature. As a consequence ofthis discussion, the 
chapter draws upon recent developments of the theory of aftbrdances that proposes 
afTordances to be dynamic, relational, and primarily experiential aspects of human cognition 
that are in continual flux. The chapter concludes by arguing that whilst the dynamic account 
of human cognition appears to offer a useful alternative to traditional cognitivist accounts, it 
is still necessary to examine how this understanding relates to moments when the Umwell is 
not coherently enacted, and the relevancy this has to the cognitive disconnections older 
people appear to encounter with digital media, which is attended to in chapter six. 
Chapter six introduces the concept of senescent cognition, which is used to provide an 
alternative description of the cognitive disconnections between older people and digital 
media through a dynamic and cnactive account of temporal changes to cognition. The chapter 
opens by discussing phenomenological accounts of individuals encountering moments of 
disruption in their embodied abilities to coherently enact their Umwell. Through the work of 
Shaun Gallagher and Alva Noe, this chapter shows how subtle changes to the structure of 
human embodiment have subsequently subtle, yet significant, consequences on the manner in 
which the dynamics of brain, body and world are integrated. Gallagher and Noe's research 
highlight the fragile nature of the integrative systems of human cognition, which might 
nomially be considered as rather robust, and provide a basis for understanding cognitive 
disconnections in a senescent account of cognition. The critical lens provided by Gallagher 
and Noe is used as an entry point to reinterpreting more traditional cognitive psychology 
research that has examined the interconnections between cognitive, sensory and physical 
ageing. These studies, still influenced by the cognitivist tradition, have attempted to identify 
the components of the ageing body and brain that deteriorate and how other components 
compensate for this. If understood in terms of what this thesis defines as senescent cognition, 
however, the observations made by these studies highlight how one consequence of human 
senescence is the sudden decoupling of previously highly integrated and dynamic systems 
that bring coherence to cognitive experience. This alternative explanation maintains that older 
people, when understood in terms of senescence, enter a process of subtle yet continual 
experiential blindness in terms of how experience is cognized. The thesis acknowledges that 
it is difficult to take this argument seriously as a result of the dominant prevailing claims thai 
the ageing human being, and their brain, is in a state of sudden and continual deterioration. 
This assumption, however, has been questioned by emerging neuroscience research, which 
has observed that the brain and central nervous system actively reorganises itself as a result 
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of perturbations to its system—^evcn in old age. Chapter six closes by providing an example 
of a senescentechnic explanation of cognitive disconnection that highlights the limitations of 
the contemporary cognitively inclusive design approach defined in chapter two. Rather than 
dwelling on limitations to information processing functions and harnessing storehouse 
metaphors of long term memory, senescent cognition requires a response from designers that 
harnesses the agency and potential abilities ofthe embodied and enacting older person. 
Chapter seven examines the implications that a senescent account of cognition has on 
the stance ofthe designer and how affordances are conceived in a design process. It is argued 
that, as a result ofthe discussion in the previous two chapters, the concept of affordances 
when used in reference to senescent cognition requires the eschewing of closure, as far as it is 
feasible, in the design outcome. If designers arc to afford the reintegration of cognitive 
experience—to afford the continued enactment of a coherent Umweli—then it is necessary to 
move away from design activities that focus upon the construction of concrete users 
interacting with concrete products. Instead, designers must explore the broader and dynamic 
spaces that affordances emerge and disappear in, passing certain questions about the details 
of usage to the user. Chapter seven proceeds to explain four broad spaces for the design of 
fumre digital media products that allow older users to explore localised atTordances that 
support the continued enaction of senescent cognition; aftbrdances of self-perception, 
affordances of ongoing co-design, aftbrdances of balanced self-efUcacy, and affordances of 
self-(re)organisation. The chapter closes by arguing that senescentechnics requires designers 
to have a sensitivity to the agency of older people as having intentional control over both 
their embodiment and interactions with digital media products; designers must consider the 
ongoing process of wear between people and technology, and how digital media wears with 
older people rather than treating older people as wearing out. 
Chapter eight reflects upon the argument of the thesis within the broader context of 
inclusive design and design research. The chapter touches upon how the problems identified 
within cognitively inclusive design are rephcated on a meta-level within the practice and 
theory ofthe broader discipline of inclusive design. It is noted how inclusive design, although 
considering more experiential models ofthe use of technology, continues to be restricted to 
constructing a fit between people and technological media. The chapter goes on to briefly 
touch upon examples of current design research that support bridging the gap between current 
inclusive design practice and theory, and the senesccntechnics approach developed within the 
thesis. Following this, the thesis is concluded by reflecting upon these negotiations in light of 
the senescentechnic approach to understanding the problem ofthe cognitive disconnection 
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between older people and digital media products, highlighting the relevancy of 
transdisciplinary investigations to examining design-related problems, and providing 
speculation for the direction of future research. 
An appendix is provided comprising papers presented and published during the period 
in which this research was perfonned. 
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Chapter 1 
Ageing, digital media and the cognitive disconnect 
Question: Is there evidence of a disconnection between older people and novel digital media 
products and interfaces, and, if there is a disconnection, how might a designer proceed? 
J.l. Although laden with contradictions, there is research suggesting that older people appear to be 
somewhat disconnected from the adoption of novel digital media-based products and services, despite 
showing a willingness to engage with them. 
1.2. Inclusive design can be understood as an informal community for designers to discuss issues 
related to older people being disconnected from the design of digital media products, yet is limited in 
providing a resolution to the problem. 
1.3. Beyond traditional design disciplines, the human factors community appears to be particularly 
useful to designers of digital media technologies due to providing evidence as to both the problems 
older people have connecting with technology and why these occur. 
1.4. Temporal changes to human cognitive functioning appear to be significantly implicated within 
the problems older people are observed as having connecting to digital media products and 
interfaces. 
1.1. Human ageing and disconnection from digital media 
Although laden with contradictions, there is research .suggesting that older people appear to be 
somewhat disconnected from the adoption of novel digital media-based products and services, despite 
showing a willingness to engage with them. 
Whether there is a relationship between human ageing and a disconnection with digital media 
appears to be a rather polemical discussion. On the one hand, there is evidence that digital 
media is increasingly used and interacted with by groups of older people; on the other hand, 
there is research suggesting a digital divide between young and old in many Westernised 
nations. For example, recent government statistics within the United Kingdom have 
documented that between 2008 and 2009, 'the largest increase in the proportion of those 
accessing the Internet was in the oldest age group' (National Statistics, 2009). This view is 
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repeated by a study performed by Microsoft in the United States, suggesting that the use of 
digital media technologies in old age is the result of generational population characteristics. 
People who range from 55 to 64 years old today currently use compulers in the 
workplace at a higher rate tlian people in their 60s and 70s did a! earlier ages. As 
current 55- to 64-year-oIds mature into their 60s and 70s, they will continue to use 
computers. Therefore, in 10 years, there will be 2.5 limes as many aduhs who range 
from 65 to 74 years old using computers as there are today. (Microsoft, 2003) 
The above argument prevails in the earliest studies of the adoption of digital media and 
technologies, such as personal computers^", by older people in the United States. Adler 
observed that although there were significant differences in the numbers of middle-aged and 
older people adopting computing technologies, it was predicted that 'within a few years, 
penetration of PCs among older adults will be virtually indistinguishable from that in the 
general population' (Adler, 1996). The view prevailing in studies such as these is that 
although there is an apparent disconnection, or digital divide, between older people and 
digital media, it is a generational characteristic. As such, the problem of disconnection from 
digital media in old age no longer manifests once the problematic generation cease to be. 
One of the limitations of this generational perspective appears to be the lack of 
consideration of current generations ofolder people as active participators with both well-
established and novel digital media technologies. The generational perspective is contended 
by Fisk el al. (2009, p.241) who argue that: 
[ojlder adults are active users of technology, and designers should ihink of them as a 
viable user group. (...] Older adults are willing users of technologies if [...] the 
benefits are clear to ihem, [...] they receive adequate instruction about how to use the 
system, and [...] the system itself is easy to use. 
Fisk et al. (2009) argue that not only are older people active users of digital media but they 
are active learners of technologies they have not previously experienced. Fisk et al. concede, 
however, that there are significant barriers for an older person attempting to incorporate 
Many of the studies discussed in this chapter focu-s upon the use and adoption of personal computers and by 
older people. These studies are particularly importanl in terms of understanding some of the issues related to 
human ageing and the disconnection from digital media products. Personal compulers and networked 
information and communication lechnologics (ICT) are useful to this tliesis due to their prevalence as an object 
of study and their complex, representational, design. At the same time, il is important to highlight how this 
thesis is not focusing primarily on personal computing and associated technological infrastructures (such as 
broadband internet and wireless neiworkiiig) or media (such as email clients or digital media players). 
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digital media into their everyday activities?' 'There is always going to be new technology 
and there are always going to be age-related changes' to human beings beyond huge medical 
breakthroughs (Fisk el al, 2009, p.245). 'Even future older aduH cohorts will be faced with 
learning to use new technologies because it is not possible to foresee what the future will 
bring in terms of technology changes in the next few decades", whilst the '[ejxperience with 
today's technology may not transfer at all to theuseof tomorrow's technology' {Y'xsVetai, 
2009, p.245). 
A perspective on the disconnection between older people and technology based upon 
generational determinism is difficult lo take forward if older people are to be understood as 
active participators with technology, and technology itself is conceived of in terms of a 
continuously altering state. This is not to argue that there is no relationship between human 
ageing and technological disconnection. As Fisk el al. (2009) allude to, there appears to be a 
relationship with certain processes of ageing that makes connections between older people 
and digital media somewhat complicated. Some of these complications are highlighted by the 
comments of older users of personal computers in a study performed by Goodman e( al. 
(2003). 
Sometimes I get into difficulties such as not underelanding certain terms or which 
butlons to touch. [...] I dislike the amount of information you need lo digest in order 
to do quite simple things. [...] I find it now too complicated. [...] Little support for 
older person like me to gain help. My son is fed up with me phoning for help, so 1 try 
not to bother him, (Goodman et a!., 2003, p.3) 
Goodman el al. (2003, p.3) noted that the problems detailed above were seemingly related to 
the complexity of the computer applications people used, a problem heightened by the use of 
'too much jargon and inadequate support, both during learning and on-going use". For 
Goodman el al. (2003) the confusion resulting Irom complexity of dighal media provided a 
significant barrier to successfully incorporating the computer interface into everyday 
activities.^^ 
"' Although Fisk el al. (2009) refer to leclinologies during Iheir text, ihey specifically focus upon the role of 
information and computing technologies, highlighting some of the implications of older people interacting with 
digital media. 
^^ The observations made by Goodman ei al. (2003) have been noted by many. For example, Fairwealher (2008) 
observed that older people had a tendency to get lost in more complex websites when attempting lo find specific 
information than younger people. Fairwealher suggested that piirl of this issue was the result of an inability to 
track the hyperlinks Ihey had entered during their lime on the website. Similar observations were made by 
Ncerincx ei al. (2001), whom noted older people were more likely to become disoriented by complex 
navigations on internet browsers. Zajicek (2007) and Chadwick-Dias el al. (2007) suggest thai digital media 
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Despite some of the earlier predictions that older people being disconnected from the 
uptake and use of digital media would erode over time, more recent studies have highlighted 
how there still appears to be a digital divide between young and old—for example, accessing 
broadband internet from home (Ipsos MORI, 2009; Jones & Fox, 2009). It has also been 
noted that older people that do use digital media and technologies tend to restrict their 
participation to relatively basic activities, such as simple web-searches and sending emails 
(Hanson e( a/., 2010; Jones & Fox, 2009). Although the literature examining the relationship 
between human ageing and digital media is polemic, there appears to be weight to the claims 
that some processes associated with ageing are related to a discormeclion between older 
people and digital media products. Before attempting to reconnect older people with digital 
media, designers may find it useftil to understand more fully the underlying reasons for this 
disconnect. The polemic nature of the evidence, however, makes it complicated for designers 
to proceed. Opportunistically, however, design communities have developed over the 
previous decade that attempt to provide the tools and methods for designers to reconnect 
older people and technology. 
1.2. Inclusive design communities 
Inclusive design can be understood as an informal community for designers to discuss issues related 
to older people being disconnected from the design of digital media products, yet is limited in 
providing a resolution to the problem. 
A designer attempting to examine the reasons why contemporary digital media products 
appear to be disconnected from older people may initially look towards their own discipline's 
corpus of knowledge in order to find an explanation. Over the past ten years, design 
practitioners and theorists have come together to form a community referred to as inclusive 
design." This community, in terms of design sub-disciplines it serves, is highly broad; the 
conference series and web resources^'' that support this community comprise of product 
design, graphic design and visual communication, architecture, interaction design and 
delivered through dynamic web technologies and web 2.0 may increase the problems older people have 
navigating and coming to terms with complex web interfaces. 
" Inclusive design is the common name for this philosophical approach lo designing in the United Kingdom. In 
continental Europe and the United Stales the same approach is often called universal design, whilst the tenn 
design-for-alI is also used (liresias.org, 2009). 
^ Although tlie inclusive design coniniunily is not particularly Ibmialised, conferences such as llie biennial 
Include conferences (Helen Hamlyn Centre, 2010a), web resources such as the inclusive design toolkit 
(www.inclusivedesigntoolkit.com) and organisations such as the Helen Hamlyn Centre (Royal College of Art, 
London, UK} and The Centre for Universal Design (NC Slate University, Raleigh, NC) provide points where 
this conununity of designers becomes more grounded. 
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human-computer interaction, fashion design, and morc.^' The ideas underpinning inclusive 
design have become increasingly popularised in recent years within design literature as a way 
of avoiding the exclusion of older people in the decisions made in the design process. 
In order to more fully understand inclusive design it is necessary to recognise what it 
is an intellectual response to. Central to inclusive design is an approach known as people-
centred design.^* People-centred design is founded upon understanding the individuals that 
are intended to experience the designed product or service on a regular basis (Department of 
Trade and Industry, 2004). The people-centred approach is not a design method as such but a 
critical move to ensure that the needs and requirements of people are considered from the 
start of the design process, rather than being an afterthought of technological innovation and 
styling (Department of Trade and Industry, 2004). 
The people-centred approach to design is not ii novel approach; for example, 
Redstrom (2005) suggests that the shift towards focusing on aspects of the user in the design 
of consumer products is most dramatic in early modernism, whilst Krippendorff (2006) 
characterises that the design discipline, in general, has evolved with an increased 
attentiveness to human rather than technological concerns. It is often the work of Henry 
Dreyfuss, however, that is used as evidence of a poini of departure in industrial design history 
where people became centralised as the focal point ofdesign. It appeared that, before 
Dreyfuss, people were an incidental component of interactions with designed technologies 
(Miller (?/ o/.. 2004). For Dreyfuss (1955 [2003]), the key component of all his design 
activities was that they were to be used by people; cars are driven, radios are listened to, 
buildings are walked around. 
If the point of contact between the product and the people becomes a point of friction, 
then the industrial designer has failed. If, on the other hand, people are made safer, 
more comfortable, more eager lo purchase, more eftlcieiit -orjusl plain happier-the 
designer has succeeded. (Dreyfuss, 1955 [2003], pp.22-23) 
*^ This list could continue as long as there arc fragmented design disciplines to note down. It is suggested within 
literature thai inclusive design is nol yet another fragmenlalion ofdesign but rather a mela-perspeciive that 
should be incorporated into any specific design approach (Coleman el ai, 2007a). 
''' An examinalion ol'lhe Helen Hamlyn Centre website provides numerous references to people-centred design 
as the key component to an inclusive philosophy lo designing. Witliin their literature, however, people-centred 
design is never explicitly defined. Problematically, people-cenlrcd design is somelinies referred to in literature 
(bul not by Uie Helen Hamlyn Centre) as human-centred and user-centred design. In some cases, the distinction 
is merely semantic. As Buchanan (2001) highlights, however, lliere are crucial differences between design for 
people, humans, or users. This issue is complicated further by there being a myriad of possible definitions of 
people, humans and u-sers. 
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Drcyfuss' (1955 [2003]) introduced Joe and Josephine as typifications ofthe male and female 
human body to be considered in the design of any industrial product to be used by people. 
Drcyfuss (1955 [2003]) signalled a move towards constructing representations and models of 
what constitutes human beings, with the design process acting in response to this knowledge. 
In understanding the constituting elements of human beings, it was suggested that designers 
can develop products and interfaces to be less intrusive and provide greater support to what it 
is to be human. ' 
In terms ofthe philosophy of inclusive design, however, the values that Joe and 
Josephine appear to represent are problematic. As Miller ct al. illustrate: 
[l]he way ihey created Joe and Josephine was to make thousands of measurements of 
Americans and then simply come up with an average figure for everything from size 
to reach, strength to agility. At the time this was a great leap forward - actually 
designing objects around people was a novelty, with most machines designed by 
engineers more interested in what was easy to make rather than what was easy to use. 
But the process of designing for ihe middle, the average person, has driven mass 
marketing and mass consumerism ever since. (Miller el al, 2004, pp.55-56) 
As such, Dreyiiiss' archetypes appear to 'imply that people come in standard sizes and 
proportions and are all healthy and able-bodied' (Porter et al., 2004, p.250). Human beings, 
however, do not come in slandard forms, and the discourse surrounding inclusive design is an 
attempt at broadening this perspective beyond the typical white, middle-class user of a 
technology. Miller et al. (2004) recall a discussion with then Helen Hamlyn Centre co-
director Jeremy Myerson, who explains the concept of inclusive design. 
He draws two circles - one inside the other - in his notebook. 'Instead of designing 
products for this tiny group of people who arc "average",' he points to the smaller 
circle in the middle, 'you design iheni for everyone.' He moves his pen out and taps it 
on the far larger circle, (Miller el al., 2004, p.54) 
" Somewhat problematically, the concept that designers can somewhat design for human beings requires a 
specific understanding of what il might mean to use ihe word 'human". This is highlight by Richard Buchanan's 
(2001) alternative interpretation of uscr/human/people-centred design. Buchanan (2001) argues that designers 
should not centre the human as the focal poimof their design iniemi.sof usage or experiences, bul instead in 
terms of human dignity. Buchanan's argument highlights how il is possible to design in response lo knowledge 
about human beings without necessarily improving the lives of those who may use or inleracl with ihe resulting 
products and services. Using Ihe example of Robben Island, Buchanan notes how designing based upon daia 
about people may be critically and clfiically flawed if not grounded in a primary principle ihal heightens 
awareness to the necessity lo improve the dignily of people. Allhough this thesis does not specifically develop 
Buchanan's account, it will be highlighted in chapter four how allhough some designers developing inclusive 
digital interfaces may be improving certain a.'ipecis of usability for older users of digital media, a broader 
perspective highlights how the dignity of the user is lacking any consideration. 
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Ahhough people-centred design may be a key theme of inclusive design, the philosophy of 
inclusivity appears to reach beyond reductions to specific types of users. A more formal 
definition of this attribute of inclusive design is found on the Helen Hamlyn website: 
Design of mainstream products and/or services that are accessible lo, and usable by, 
people with the widesi range of abilities within ihe widest range of situations without 
the need for special adaptation or design. (i lelen Hamlyn Centre, 2010b) 
This research focus of the Helen Hamlyn Centre has lead to the development of a British 
Standard tor inclusive design in 2005, which 'provides a strategic framework and associated 
processes by which business executives and design practitioners can understand and respond 
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to the needs of diverse users without stigma or limitations' (Bntish Standards Institute, 
2005). This standard has been augmented by the provision in the public domain of an 
'inclusive design toolkit' to support designers in the development of inclusive products and 
services.^' The broader philosophy of inclusive design, then, is that designers are required to 
construct a broader picture of the type of people they are designing for and ensure that their 
designs are as usable to as many people as feasibly possible. 
How might such an inclusive approach be implemented? Within the inclusive design 
toolkit, it is suggested that the designer may proceed from the identification of a perceived 
need resulting from a "newly identified market opportunity', the 'availability of a new 
technology* or a 'requirement to update or repackage an existing product or service' 
(i~design, 2008a). From this, the designer can go through a series of phases in order to 
accomplish an inclusive design. These are laid out as four key stages: 
Discover: The systematic exploration of die perceived need lo ensure the right design 
challenge is addressed, with due consideration of all stakeholders; leading to the first 
output, an understanding of the real need 
Translate: The conversion of this understanding into a categorised, complete and well 
defined description of the design intent; leading to the second output, a requirements 
specification 
Create: The creation of preliminary concepts that are evaluated against Ihe 
requiremenls; leading to the third output, concepts. 
Develop: The detailed design of the final product or service, ready to be manufactured 
or implemented; leadmg to the final output, solutions. (i~design, 2008b) .10 
*^ Bristish Standard code BS 7000-6:2005. 
" Tlie full inclusive design toolkit, cited also wilhin the text, can be tbund at www.inclusivcdcsiBiitoolkii.com. 
'"This isjusl a brief explanation of (he inclusive design process. The inclusive design loolkil webpage provides 
a more detailed, slep-by-step guide lo this process. 
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The above quotation portrays inclusive design as a cohesive and systematic approach to 
developing design solutions to the needs of large groups of people. It appears, however, that 
in actual examples of inclusive design projects this portrayal of a cohesive methodology for 
inclusive design is somewhat false. An examination of the proceedings of the biennial 
Include conferences suggests that inclusive design can be observed instead as an informal 
network of individually specialised research projects. Rather than focusing upon inclusive 
projects that consider as many stakeholders as is feasibly possible, inclusive design 
publications are characterised by focusing mostly upon issues related to older people or 
certain groups with disabilities (Donahue & Gheerawo, 2009). As such, inclusive design, as it 
is practiced and documented, has a tendency to be rather un-inclusive. Donahue and 
Gheerawo (2009) note how in the cases where designers have examined more closely older or 
disabled users, standardised images of all people from that group are still formed and 
translated into the designer's solution. 
HI Bw hoiwi-Ma 
"^  L 
. \ 
O&0 000 ^^•"•"iii,, 
-^^^m^. 
Figure 1 BT Big BuHon 100 Phone © 2006 Brillsh Telecom 
TTie British Telecom Big Button phone (Figure 1) is an often referred lo example of 
good inclusive design practice. The large buttons mean it is easier to dial a number; the red 
light visually alerts someone when it is ringing, rather than relying purely on audible 
perception; the larger buttons lead to larger printed numbers with high contrast, making them 
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easier to read. If we take inclusive design as a response to Joe and Josephine, however, the 
Big Button phone is just as problematic. The phone is Ihe designed response to an averaged 
account of the tactile, visual and aural competencies of a certain group of older or physically 
impaired people. In a rather tautological manner, the inclusive designer attempts to resolve 
the problems of traditional people-centred design through the very same process of designing; 
in their attempt to distance their practice from the heritage of Joe and Josephine, the designer 
commits to the same reductions. 
Thompson (2008) highlights how design communities form in order to bring a level 
of solidity to a shared problem that may actually be somewhat uncertain. Whilst the inclusive 
design community acknowledges a shared problem in developing products and services for 
people of differing levels of ability, its individual members appear to struggle in managing 
the chasm between the generality of inclusive design and the idiosyncrasies of projects 
emphasising the needs, requirements, and abilities of specific groups of people. One would 
expect to find that the individualised nature of inclusive design projects presents 
opportunities for a designer to understand why older people appear to be discormected from 
digital media products. An examination of this literature, however, appears to be lacking any 
critical conversation on this matter. As a communhy, inclusive design is uscftil to this thesis 
since it brings attention to the issue of designing for groups of people, such as older people, 
who may nomially be neglected by designers. At the same lime, inclusive design is limited in 
providing knowledge as well as tools to greater interrogate the disconnection between older 
people and digital media. As highlighted within the inclusive design toolkit, many designers 
often assume: 
that the perceived need accurately represents Ihe true problem. However, experience 
shows ihis is not always the case, it being easy to provide a solulion to meet the 
wrong need. A thorough exploration of the design context will uhimateiy lead to the 
identification of the real need, (i-design, 2008a) 
Whilst the inclusive design toolkit suggests that designers often jump to conclusions 
regarding the identification of problems to be resolved, it may be that the tools and methods 
of inclusive design are somewhat restrictive in providing a fijUer examination of the 
disconnection between older people and digital media. One way to interpret inclusive design 
is as a hysterical reaction to the changing social milieu of Westernised nations. Rather than 
examining the underlying reasons for disconnections between marginalised groups of people 
and the design of digital media products, inclusive design reaffirms a common process of 
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designing. The inability of the inclusive design community to provide a comprehensive 
account of human ageing and the disconnection with digital media has led designers of digital 
media products to look elsewhere for instruction. In particular, some designers have 
proceeded to draw upon examinations of the points of friction between older people and 
digital media interfaces, somewhat continuing the legacy of Dreyfuss" (1955 [2003]) Joe and 
Josephine. 
1.3. The human factors of ageing and digital media 
Beyond traditional design disciplines, the human factors community appears to be particularly usefiil 
10 designers of digital media technologies due to providing evidence as lo both the problems older 
people have connecting with technology and why these occur. 
An established body of research that designers refer to when dealing with the disconnection 
of older people from digital media is the discipline of human factors, Rogers and Fisk (2003, 
p.2) state that '[h]uman factors researchers aim to match the demands of a system to the 
capabilities of the user' (illustrated in schematic form in Figure 2). ' Rogers and Fisk 
continue to comment that: 
The system imposes certain demands on the user as a function of the characteristics of 
the hardware, software, and instructional support that is provided for it. The operator 
of the system has certain sensory/perceptual, cognitive, and psychomotor capabilities. 
The degree of fit between the demands ol'the system and the capabilities oflhe user 
will determine performance on the system as well as altitudes, acceptance, usage of 
the system, and seif-efficacy beliefs about ones own capabilities to use ihal system. 
(Rogers & Fisk, 2003, p.2) 
Human factors research provides an abundant body of knowledge of key issues related to the 
relationships between older people and digital media. Human factors researchers investigate 
the underlying issues that cause the difficulties certain groups of older people are observed as 
having interacting with digital media products and interfaces. Frank Schieber (2003, p.42) 
notes that human factors research often means understanding, among others, the 
'anthropometry, biomechanics, sensory process, and cognitive psychology" of the specific 
user group. The human factors approach to understanding ageing and technology has 
•" A large conlribulor to the human factors study of older people is the research performed at the Center for 
Research on Aging and Teclinology Enhanccmenl (CREATE). CREATE is formed Ihrough a consortium 
formed by the University ofMiami, Florida Slaic University, and the Georgia Insliiuic of Technology. 
' Human factor^ t approaches to discussing the problems older people encounter when interacting wiili digital 
media are, typically, communicaled in a manner that is more focused upon the scientific basis from which 
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specific methods of identifying the limitations in the 'person-environment interaction' 
(Schieber, 2003, p.42). In Dreyftiss' terminology, the human factors approach proceeds from 
a claim that there are certain points of friction between people and certain technologies that 
lead to disconnections between the two systems. By understanding how the properties of the 
technology cause friction with the human user, it is possible to redesign technology to be 
better suited to specific groups of people. Rooted in the heritage of Dreyfliss' Joe and 
Josephine, here technology is conceived as implicitly antagonistic to the people who have to 
use it, and can be amended to closer fit human capabilities. 
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Figure 2 Schematic diagram of the human Tactors approach to understanding human - lechnolot>lcal interactions.' 
Adapted from Rogers and Fisli (2003), 
certain knowledge is drawn. Within the inclusive design literaliire, however, il is common to only provide very 
brief and concise references lo how certain changes to people ns they age have implications to the design of new 
products and services. For example, Roberts and Warburton (2009, pp.4-5} state that' [b]etween the ages of 60 
and 90 tlicre is a vast range of cognitive and physical ability, inlerests and altitudes to hfe' but fail lo explain In 
more detail what these may be formed of, although il is suggested Ihe effects of such changes include 
'navigation difficuhies, hand movement problems, comprehending and conceptualisalion difficullies'. It can be 
stated, therefore, thai designers of digital media interfaces thai are inclusive ofolder users may be inclined lo 
draw upon human factors studies in order to more fully engage witli understanding age-related issues for older 
people interacting with digital media, whilst avoiding having lo read and interrogate the primary scientific 
literature. 
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Rogers and Fisk (2003) determine three main approaches that are central to 
understanding the problems older people have with digital media products and associated 
interfaces; task analysis, user observations and design manipulations. Before discussing the 
insights human factors research provides regarding the possible reasons for disconnections 
between older people and digital media, it is worth explaining these three methods. 
Task analysis is used both as a way of predicting the problems and errors people will 
have with a specific interface, and also as a way of prescribing interventions to reduce such 
problems and errors (Rogers & Fisk, 2003). Task analysis does not require the observation of 
users but rather the researcher identifies the stage-by-stage manoeuvres a user of a specific 
digital system needs to perform in order to complete a set task (Rogers & Fisk, 2003). The 
usefulness of task analysis appears to be in identifying those products which, whilst 
appearing to be rather simplistic, have unnecessary complications and stages the user has to 
go through to complete a specific task. Rogers and Fisk (2003) use the specific example in 
which the analysis of a blood glucose meter, advertised as being as "easy to use as 1,2, 3", 
highlighted how it in fact required up to 52 sub-stages to complete one task." 
User observations take task analysis one stage further by incorporating potential users 
into the analysis of the interaction observation process. As Rogers and Fisk (2003, p.5) note, 
the "observation of users interacting with an existing system provides valuable information 
about how to improve (i.e., redesign) that system and how to develop future systems." In the 
context of studying older people interacting with digital media, it is usefijl to compare the 
observations of the older user to younger users and analyse the differences between one 
group to another"''* (Rogers & Fisk, 2003). For example, a consistent observation made by 
human factors researchers is that older people learning a novel interface take longer to 
establish interactions that appear to be fluent in their manner. Czaja and Sharit (1998) 
compared groups of younger (20-39 years of age), middle-aged (40-59) and older (60-75) 
" This refers to a study performed by Rogers ef <i/. {2001, p.6)ona blood glucose meter Ihai was advertised as: 
'It's as easy as 1, 2, 3 [...] Simply set up the meter, check the system, and test your blood'. In performing an 
analysis of this simple task, however, Rogers el al. counted as many as 52 individual components of the task 
thai the user had to perform before compleling the operation. In (he case of this device, as is the process of much 
human factors research, the team analysed each component of the task in relation to the capabilities (physically 
and cognitively) of the typical user, and established where potential problems may occur for (he user. As is 
documented by Rogers £/fl/. (2001), this leads to a subsequent list of usability improvements for the analysed 
device. 
" Although this approach is logical in trying to observe the differences that occur with age, taking small cross-
sections of age groups to compare abilities with one another is a problematic method. This is highlighted in the 
field of experimental psychology by Stuart-Hamilton but is of equal relevance in the study of ageing and 
technology. '[IJf the researcher finds an age group difference, he or she cannot be sure how much of an age 
group difference is down to age per .vt', and how much is due to the effects of different educalional and socio-
economic backgrounds. [...] a difference due to generational differences in background and upbringing rather 
than ageing per se is called a cohort effect' (Stuart-Hamilton, 2006, p.53). 
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adults in their performance on a simulated computer data entry task. The older age group 
produced significantly less work during the three day period that the study was performed 
and took longer to improve their performance on the task compared to the younger age 
groups (Czaja & Sharit, 1998). Despite the slower time it took to leam the task and increase 
speed, the older group still displayed an ability to comprehend and complete the set task, 
albeit at a slower pace than the younger groups (Czaja & Sharit, 1998). Other studies have 
also identified that older people take longer to leam the fundamentals of new workplace 
technologies they are not familiar with, for example word processing (such as Elias ei a!. 
(1987)). 
The third human factors method of analysing the problems takes user observation a 
stage further by comparing the differences between similar groups of users in performing 
operations on ditTerent interface or training designs (Rogers & Fisk, 2003). Examples of the 
use of this method can be observed in the various studies performed by human factors 
researchers in attempting to identify whether there are training methods and techniques that 
are particularly useful to older people in comparison to younger people. Rather than 
redesigning the interface, it is proposed instead that it is possible to provide instruction and 
tintion in such a way that older people are able to leam the interface in a manner that is more 
suitable to their particular abilities. Many of the studies performed in this area compare 
groups of young and old against each other using different forms of training or different 
levels of instructional support built into the technological system {Czaja (2001) and Chamess 
and Czaja (2005) provide a useful overview of these training studies)." 
Although the above methods of analysing interactions between people and technology 
are central to the human factors approach, such methods are always performed in reference to 
a corpus of scienHfic knowledge on the capabiliHes of human beings. In the context of 
*^ Human factors researchers liave gone lo great lengths to compare dilTerent training techniques between older 
and younger people lo see whal may be more beneficial for the older user of a technology. I-or example. Gist et 
at. (19S8) compared a siep-by-step interaclive tutorial loaded from a diskette, where the trainees had to 
complete certain tasks in order to proceed with the session, to a method involving the trainees observing a 
videotape willi a model demonstrating the computer program through describing it verbally and then enacting 
each procedure himself. In comparing young and old using these different techniques, however. Gist c/ ai. 
(1998) noted thai although tliere were improvements for all using the second method, the older group still had 
much slower performance and made more errors, Weslerman and Davies (2000) argue that studies such as Gist 
etal. (1988) are problematic in thai they imply lliat the types of skills used in one training method (such as 
procedural, systemaiic, conceptual) for u particular technology (word-processing, ATM machines, drawing 
packages) are comparable with one another across scenarios. In simple terms, what might work in one situation 
may not be the case for another. Westerman and Davies (2000, p.480) argue that by looking at the evidence 
there is little to suggest that the 'pattern of performance disadvantage for older adults can be modified 
substantially by the adoption of specific training regimes'. This has not stopped human factors researchers 
providing guidelines and principles for the design of instruction material for novel digital media products, 
services and interfaces specifically for older people, as described at length in Fisk el ai (Fisk el ai.. 2009). 
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designing for older people, task analysis, user observations and comparisons between 
ditTerent age groups and system types arc augmented by scientific understandings of human 
ageing. Through combining these methods and the associated knowledge, human factors 
researchers identify certain points of friction between certain properties of the interface and 
certain properties of specific groups of people. As will be highlighted in chapter two, for a 
designer dealing with the issues of the disconnection between older people and digital media 
products, human factors research appears to be particularly usefiil in providing concrete 
guidance. More specifically, however, human factors studies have repeatedly identified that 
there is a relationship between temporal changes to the human mind later in life and the 
complexity of interacting with digital technologies; an area often overlooked by the inclusive 
design community. 
1.4. Cognition, human ageing and disconnection with digital media 
Temporal changes to human cogniiive JUncliuning appear to he significantly implicated within the 
problems older people are obsen'ed as having connecting to digital media products and interfaces. 
An inspection of the human factors literature from the initial study of older people using early 
computer technologies in the 1980s, through to more recent discussions, highlights how there 
is growing support of claims that limitations on the part of the mental capabilities of older 
people are key factors resulting in disconnections with digital media. For example, Rogers 
and Fisk (2003, p.7) suggest that '[o]lder adults exhibit declines in abilities shown to be 
important for learning and skill acquisition" and highlight cognitive systems such as working 
memory and fluid intelligence for specific attention.'^ Similarly, Sara Czaja (2001, p.556) 
argues that 'declines in working memory may make it difficult for older adults to leam new 
concepts, such as those associated with computer technologies, or recall complex and/or 
uncommon operational procedures'. More recently, Fisk et a!. (2009) suggest that cognitive 
declines with age significantly influence an older person's ability to interact with digital 
media; again highlighting working memory for particular attention. 
One of the mosi common and pervasive changes is a decline in working memory - the 
ability to keep information active and available for processing. Working memory is an 
important component of many activities; hence, declines in working memory lead to a 
wide range ofperfomiance ditTiculties, (Fisk et al., 2009, p.242) 
* Definilions of working memory and fluid intelligence will be provided in chapter two, which focuses upon the 
prevailing understanding of ageing cognition from the discipline of cogniiive psychology of ageing, 
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The human factors literature alludes to the relative incompatibility of contemporary digital 
media interfaces and the cognitive functioning of most older people. There are inherent 
features of modem interfaces that require greater cognitive excursion on the part of the user. 
This may be an issue for younger people, but their relatively capable cognitive abilities 
possibly mean they can work through these problems. For older people, however, the abstract 
representations and complex layering of modem graphic interfaces are too much for their 
cognitive abilities to handle. 
The human factors research provides a substantial body of evidence that supports the 
importance of understanding how cognition changes on a temporal level when designing 
digital media products to be inclusive of older people. If the role of cognitive capabilities in 
the acquisition of certain technological skills is of great importance, then it appears to be 
useftil for the designer of such technologies to have a solid understanding of what cognitive 
abilities alter with age. Primarily, the human factors community refers to the abundance of 
cognitive psychology of ageing literature in order to define the specific fiinctions of the 
ageing mind that are problematic in interactions with digital media. Therefore, it is seemingly 
useflil for designers to more fully explore the claims and knowledge emanating from this 
discipline in order to better understand the causes of the cognitive disconnections with novel 
digital media, whilst also identifying strategies to redesign technological systems to be more 
cognitively inclusive. Although it is utiwise to suggest designers can develop digital media 
products for older people based purely on an understanding of cognition^^, based upon the 
claims of the human factors community il is possible to suggest a deeper understanding of 
cognition in later Hfe may allow designers to make novel technologies more inclusive of this 
group of people. 
It is the above logic that prevails within many contemporary accounts examining the 
relationship between human ageing and the design of digital media products and interfaces. 
The potential usefulness of designing in reference to the limitations of the ageing mind has 
not gone unnoticed, with various attempts having been made to redesign contemporary digital 
" Allhou(;h designing purely based upon knowledge of human cognition may be unwise, approaches have been 
developed by both cognilive and computer scieniists in ihe past thai have used cognitive models of human 
beings as both a way of analysing human-compuler interactions and, subsequently, as a tool for the redesign. A 
prominent example ofauchan approach is that of Card elal. (!')83). Card crw/.'s (1983) approach has been 
heavily criticised within literature surrounding human-conipulcr interaction and information technology (see, for 
example, Suchman (1987; 2007), Coyne (1995) and Agre (1997)), Despite these arguments, the methods 
described by Card el al. appear to slill influence contemporary areas of inclusive design as it relates to 
developing digital media products for older people, which will be discussed at length in chapters two and three. 
Chapter four will present some of the problems of approaches liiat appear to be rooted to the Card ei id. as it 
relates to the issue of cognitive disconnections between older people and digital media. 
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products based upon the observations of the shared knowledge of the human factors 
community and the cognitive psychology of ageing. Perhaps unsurprisingly, much of the 
design guidance and development of new design strategies has been developed by the very 
human factors researchers who initially identified the problems related to ageing cognition. 
For example, Fisk et al. (2009) provide a chapter-length, although still rather brief, taxonomy 
of the cognitive changes that occur with age and the manner in which designers may avoid 
the subsequent limitations on cognitive capabilities. Fisk et al.'s (2009) commentary on these 
issues, plus attempts by designers to implement such insights into the design process will be 
discussed in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 2 
Designing for cognitive inclusion 
Question: How have inclusive designers dealt with the claims of cognitive disconnections 
between older people and digital media products and interfaces? 
2J. Human factors researchers have provided guidelines to designers of digital media products, 
suggesting older people require interactive systems that present less information and harness long 
term memories. 
2.2. Recent digital media design research has examined the relationship between an older person's 
lifetime experience of technologies and ihetr cognitive disconnection with current interface styles. 
2.3. It is possible to design intuitive digital media products that are inclusive of groups of older 
people by going thmugh an iterative process of identifying the metaphors of prior experiences that 
can be mapped onto new digital products, reducing the effects of cognitive dysfunction in later life. 
2.4. It is possible to remove cognitive friction from digital media products through a process of 
cognitively inclusive design. 
2.1. Removing cognitive friction from digital media 
Human factors researchers have provided guidelines to designers of digital media products. 
suggesting older people require interactive systems that present less information and harness long 
term memories. 
This chapter will examine in more detail what moves have been made within research related 
to the design of digital media to deal with those changes occurring to the ageing human mind. 
This chapter will weave together a number of loosely aligned design-oriented research 
projects into an approach that this thesis has defined as cognitively inclusive design. In 
chapter one the thesis introduced how human factors studies of older people interacting with 
computing systems have frequently observed that cognitive limitations related to human 
ageing were a significant cause of the disconnection between older people and digital media. 
To begin with, this chapter will continue discussing the human factors literature, identifying 
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the guidance this community provides for designing cognitively inclusive digital media 
products. 
In analysing the properties of the digital systems in relation to the properties of older 
people, human factors researchers not only attempt to provide insight into the problems older 
people have with interacting with digital media, but also provide information for designers to 
help ameliorate these difficulties. One popular way of communicating this information to the 
design community has been in the form of guidelines. For example, in a chapter titled 
'Compensating for Age-Related Deficits in Memory', Frank Schieber (2003, pp.70-71) 
provides guidelines for designers of digital interfaces that can be implemented to attune the 
products interface to better fit ageing memory. For example: 
1. Minimize the need to manipulate or transfomi inlbrmation in shorl-temi memory. 
Age-related decrements in the capacity of working memory increase dramatically 
when "in-line" transformations are required. Tasks can be redesigned or augmented 
via technology interfaces to off-load such demands. [...] 3. Leverage recognition 
memory, which is relatively robust in old age, to redesign tasks that rely upon recall 
memory. [...] 8. Avoid (or control) stimulus "pacing" effects, which can interfere 
with encoding and response selection during both the acquisition and relrieval phases 
of memory operations. Technological interfaces need to be carefully designed to 
algorilhmicaJly optimize the rate of stimulus presentation or impjcmenl user-paced 
input/output strategies, [..,] 9. Explore the potential of multisensory/muUimcdia 
presentation formats for improving the encoding and retention of to-be-remembered 
information. (Schieber, 2003, pp.70-71) 
The above guidelines provided by Schieber's (2003) are formed after an extensive review of 
cognitive psychology of ageing literature (the general claiins of which will be discussed in 
detail in chapter three) and outlines the various changes that occur to human memory in later 
life. A key theme argued by Schieber is that designers of digital media systems need to take 
into account of the significant limitation on an older person's working memory abilities by 
presenfing "visual information in smaller "chunks'"^* both in terms of the amount of 
information and its spatial distribution (2003, p,61). Therefore, as little irrelevant "clutter" 
should be presented as possible, and information should be removed from interfaces "as soon 
as its usefulness has expired' (2003. pp.61-62). The point made by Schiebcr is that designers 
can make digital information systems more comprehendible to the cognitive ilmcfions of 
older people by feeding information slowly, in smaller chunks, in such a manner that it can be 
suitably processed. 
• This is a direct reference to studies discu,sscd in the following chapter that have identified older people as less 
efficient al chunking' information compared lo younger people. 
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The guideHncs Schieber (2003) provides can be difficult to reaHse in the design of a 
novel digital media product. The guidcHnes are somewhat rooted within ihe technical 
language of cognitive psychology and concepts of different types of memory are conflated 
and ill-defmed for the uninitiated reader (for example. Schieber (2003) interchangeably uses 
recognition and recall memory in design guidelines, despite defining them as distinct types of 
memory earlier in the text). Certain guidelines, instance "leverage intact automatic memory 
processes (such as semantic priming) to support or off-load volitional memory processes' 
(Schieber, 2003, p.71), whilst potentially relatively simple to realise on a practical level, are 
difficult to translate into design due to being layered in the terminology of the cognitive 
psychologist. There is little reference to designing; the closest references being the occasional 
detailed discussion of interaction troubles resulting from Ihe cognitive study of a human 
intbrmation-processor who is sat at a computer in a psychology laboratory. As such, beyond 
broad references to 'multi sensory/multimedia presentation formats' and '[t]he growing 
pervasiveness of embedded computer systems', (Schieber, 2003, p.71) the guidelines only 
specifically relate to the traditional desktop computer which is likely to be found in the 
cognitive psychologists/human factors laboratory. 
Fisk et al. (2009) observe that such guidelines are difficult to translate into effective 
designs and have made attempts to integrate such guidelines into information that is more 
easily interpretable by designers and traditional design methods. In a similar vein to Schieber 
(2003), Fisk el al. (2009) provide an overview of the main findings from the cognitive 
psychology of ageing, again identifying the significant role of deteriorations in working 
memory, but discuss these observations in language less grounded in cognitive psychology. 
An of^en repeated and broad suggestion based upon a summary of these observations is that 
'it is important that design limits demands on working memory and attention. One should 
also design to make use of previous experience' (Fisk el al., 2009, pp.26-27). Fisk cl al. 
elaborate upon this as: 
[gjencrally, people perceive and respond rapidly lo things thai they expect on the 
basis of past experience. People generally respond much more slowly lo those things 
thai are unexpected compared lo things that arc expected. One of the roles of the 
designer is to understand, predict, and capitalize on what people will expect. Another 
role of the designer is to understand thai when people are faced wilh using a novel 
product or experiencing a new environment, they will try lo make their task 
manageable by relating what is new to what ihey already know. If design does not 
capitalize on relevant semantic memory, problems can and oflen do arise. (Fisk era/., 
2009, p.27) 
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What Fisk el al. (2009) proposes is a direct transferral of the cognitive psychology of ageing 
research into the design of digital media products. All design, in Fisk e( al.'s (2009) 
definition, works in the realm of making sense of the novel in terms of what has gone before. 
In the context of older people and their cognitive functions, this feature of designing is 
elaborated further due to the greater reliance on long term memory than the dynamic sense-
making transformations of working memory. Whilst Fisk ct o/.'s (2009) guidance does not 
focus primarily upon cognitive ageing—they are interested in a great variety of factors that 
alter with age—many of the guidelines appear to incorporate the theme of harnessing past 
experience in the design of the new. For example, in the case of designing interfaces for 
novel digital media products, Fisk el al. suggest two key themes that appear to emphasise the 
prevailing cognitivist understanding of ageing cognition. 
(I) capitalize on the knowledge and capabilities of the user group, and (2) provide 
environmental support for the limitations of the user group. [...] Understanding the 
labels that users have for ftinclions, the ways in wliich they organize infonnalion, 
their expectations about how systems work, and their experience with similar systems 
will all contribute to the development of systems llial are usable by thai user group, 
[...] Environmental support involves providing information such as cues, reminders, 
or system tools to support the intended action of the user. This notion is analogous to 
the idea of putting the needed information for a task in the world, rather than 
requiring the infonnalion to be in the head of the user. (Fisk et al., 2009, p.87) 
Fisk et o/.'s response to the observations of cognitive ageing focus upon exploring the 
experiences of older people accumulated over their lifetime. If past experiences are 
impleiTiented in the design of novel digital media products, as argued by Fisk el al. (2009), 
there is a lowered requirement for intensive cognitive information processing and the use of 
working memory. For interactive tasks that still require the older user to process large 
amounts of information, Fisk et al. suggest the designer externalises or distributes this 
information into the environment or around the interface of the product. 
As was highlighted in chapter one, Fisk et al.''& (2009) approach, and that of human 
factors studies in general, is based upon the designer understanding the task that an older 
person is engaging in when interacting with a specific product or service. In understanding 
the task, the designer can proceed with analysing the procedures that an older person will be 
going through in order to complete certain goals. Fisk et al. (2009) extend the analysis of the 
task to incorporate a method of human-computer analysis known as Goals, Operators, 
Methods, and Selection Rules (GOMS). The GOMS approach, introduced by Card el al. 
(1983), was originally introduced as a practical extension of cognitivist information-
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processing psychology to the design of computer interfaces. In the original, and then 
influential, text. Card e/fl/. (1983, p.24) provided an exemplar of'the model human 
processor', which could be described as a synthesis ofthe information processing literature of 
the time into an idealised model ofthe human information processor (Figure 9). 
The Model Human Processor [...] can be described by (1) a set of memories and 
processors together with (2) a sel of principles, hereafter called the "principles of 
operation." [...] The Model Human Processor can be divided into three interacting 
subsystems: i\) ihc perceptual system, {1) Ihe motor system, and (3) the cognitive 
system, each with its own memories and processors. (Card el ai, 1983, p.24) 
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Figure 3 The Model Human Processor, taken from Card el at. (1983, p.26). 
The GOMS method proceeds to suggest that the various components ofthe human cognitive 
system can be attributed with certain variables, and that these variables can be linked to 
certain aspects of a digital media interface. Fisk et al. (2009) highlight that the GOMS 
approach is more useful to situations where procedures are repeated and well-learnt, such as 
workplaces, rather than the learning of a novel digital interface. They argue, however, thai it 
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is possible to use GOMS analysis as a way to simulate how efficient individuals will interact 
with an interface designed in a certain way. GOMS and task analysis, as key features of the 
human factors approach to designing, are essentially procedures of predicting digital interface 
use by a specific group of people. In understanding how a task will be approached by an older 
person and their cognitive functioning, Fisk el al. (2009) argue that it is possible to predict 
how the features of specific tasks (and the media that comprise them) may result in cognitive 
disconnection. In this model of human-technological interaction, both systems are considered 
to be information processors operating on difTerent levels of symbolic representaUons. In 
order to attune the interaction for a better exchange of information (as the human information 
processor is somewhat flawed, especially so in the case of older people) the digital interface 
can be designed to send information in less intensive ways. 
Some human factors research, as it relates to ageing, is complicated for designers to 
implement as a result of being layered with the language of cognitive psychology and, at best, 
computer science. Fisk el al. (2009) provide an attempt to bridge the gap between the human 
factors of ageing and inclusive design by providing more general advice, but do so without 
moving beyond the traditional methods and tools of human factors. The themes that dominate 
the guidance provided by the human factors literature, however, appears to be illustrative of 
the claims emerging from design-oriented research examining the relationship between 
ageing cognition and the development of methods and tools for designers to use in response; 
an area of design research that is here defined as "cognitively inclusive design'. The 
following section brings together a number of these loosely affdiated design research 
projects. 
2.2. Cognitive disconnect as a symptom of the history of technology and generational 
experience 
Recent digital media design research has examined the relationship between an older person's 
lifetime experience of technologies and their cognitive disconnection with current interface styles. 
A number of post-human factors, design-orientated research projects have emerged during 
the past decade that have explored similar themes to that of Schieber (2003) and Fisk el al. 
(2009), Although these design-orientated projects do not belong to the human factors 
approach to designing digital media products and interfaces, they are rather synergetic in their 
overall argument. As will be highlighted throughout the remainder of this chapter, the 
influence ofcognitive psychology and human factors analysis of ageing can be observed in 
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these projects common portrayal of the necessity to remove stimulus and to-be-processed 
information from digital media interfaces and to harness the long term memory of older 
people. 
One of the central findings of the cognitive psychology of ageing is that as people age 
aspects of long term memory (such as semantic and procedural memory, see chapter three) 
are apparently not affected by the process of human ageing. What this suggests is that there 
are certain aspects of long term memory related to language, concepts and technical 
knowledge that older people can bring to bear in their interactions with people and 
environments. This is evidenced within the guidance lor designers developed by the human 
factors researchers discussed above, where it is agreed across much of the literature thai 
emphasising aspects of prior experiences of older people is a useful strategy to offset Ihe 
deterioration in the capacity to develop new knowledge and memories in old age. This theme 
is developed fiirther by Milli Docampo Rama (2001), whose doctoral thesis investigates the 
importance of examining prior experience in order to reduce technological complexity. 
Whilst Docampo Rama's (2001) thesis is not a tlilly published work, and she has not 
developed her work in an academic context since, her argument appears to resonate in more 
recent works and is therefore significant to this study.' 
The crux of Docampo Rama's (2001) argument was in the development of a 
theoretical framework for designers termed 'Technology Generations'. She questioned 
whether the reasonable observation that interfaces from the eariy to mid 20'^ century have 
little in common with the interfaces of the latter 20 century was a significant factor in older 
people struggling to learn novel digital media products. Based upon an interrogation of 
cognitive psychology and sociological literature, Docampo Rama argued that all people go 
through a formative period between the ages of 10 and 25, during which lime many of the 
values and experiences appear to inform the rest of an individual's life. From this, it was 
argued that: 
^ Although this thesis refers to her doctoral thesis in the main lexi, Docampo Rama's research was disseminated 
inanumbcrofanicles(suchas Docampo Rama and van derKaaden( 1998) and Docampo Rama (1997)). 
Docampo Rama's (2001) thesis was part of a project entilles 'Technology Generations' commissioned by Philips 
Design. Although the research has not been furthered by the original authors in an academic context, it is 
plausible to assume thai the research has had some impact within the decisions made in the design process of 
Philips' consumer product.s, 
*" Docampo Rama (2001) makes a useful connection between literature within cognitive psychology of ageing, 
(such as Rubin et al. (1998)) that highlights how older people tend to recollect experiences from an early 
adulthood most reliably, and sociological literature (such as Sroufe and Cooper (1988) and Glenn (1974)) that 
suggests the period between the ages of 10 and 25 is the most significant in the development of norms, values 
and skills that they take forward for the remainder of their lives. Although this connection is insightful, it is also 
problematic as it suggests the cognitive literature and tlie sociological literature are co-extensive and describe 
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[u]ser interface developments imply that users need to constantly adapt to new user 
interfaces and learn to operate them; aller their fonnative period too. Therefore, it 
might be the case thai technology generations can be distinguished based on the type 
of user interface experience during the formative period. Technology generations thai 
did not grow up wHh present-day user interfaces are expected to have most difficulties 
dealing with present-day devices. They need to learn to understand new procedures of 
present-day user interfaces, which might be much more difficult to manage after the 
formative period. (Docampo Rama, 2001, p.5) 
Docampo Rama (2001) examined material related to the design of telephones, televisions and 
video cassette recorders from throughout the 20''' century in order lo identify profound shifts 
in the interface style of these products. Through this analysis, three types of interface style 
were categorised in her study; electro-mechanical style (between 1930 and 1980), display 
style (between 1980 and 1990) and the menu style (1990 onwards). Further analysis of 
diffusion data allowed Docampo Rama to claim that by 1955 the majority of the Dutch 
population would have experienced types of electro-mechanical style interfaces, by 1985 for 
the display style and 1995 for the menu style. 
Based upon these finding, Docampo Rama devised a model with which to classify 
the population into specific technology generations that could aid designers of novel digital 
media products and interfaces (see Figure 10). The electro-mechanical generation was 
identified as being bom between 1930 and 1960, the display generation 1961 and 1970, and 
the menu generation 1971 and beyond. Docampo Rama also identified an earlier generation 
she called the mechanical generation, whom would have been ages beyond their formative 
period before the proliferation of electro-mechanical devices such as the telephone. Although 
on the surface she appears to suggest rather concrete dates and boundaries between the 
diflusion of novel interface styles and the correlating technology generation, Docampo Rama 
(2001, p. 16) notes that 'the introduction of the new style can only be expressed in terms of 
fuzzy periods'. 
similar phenomena. This is not to argue that both arguments are not coextensive however; after all, this thesis' 
approach is one of identifying the synergies between knowledge from normally disparate disciplines. 
Problematically, however, Docampo Rama does nol explicitly discuss how the knowledge from these two fields 
relates to one another, apart from the occasional sentence tliroughout the text. 
•" Docarapo Rama realised thai the time at which a certain product or interface style went to market did not 
necessarily accurately represent the moment when people experienced these products for the first time. 
Although Docampo Rama (2001) goes to great lengths to makeadetailedaccounlof product distribution and 
adoption in The Netherlands, her statistical data on certain types of interfaces adoption arc still limited. It is also 
problematic thai her studies focused upon primarily functional components and properties of the technological 
interfaces, disassociating the function from the fomi and content of the devices. These limitations of Docampo 
Rama's (2001) specific studies are not attended to in this thesis, but form pan of the critique of the cognitively 









Figure 4 "Overview of inicrsction styles and Icchnotofty generations. The del at the Inll-end of thearrovi ilepicisat 
which point In time it is hypothesized that the diffusion of an Interaction style has reached the 20 percent diffusion 
rate. The arrow indicates when a new technology generation starts. The vertical band between two technology 
generations indicates the fu7^y generallunal boundary.' (Docampo Rama, 20DI p.18) 
Docampo Rama's (2001) further analysis of the use of new interaction styles in a 
particular cohort's formative years led to the reduction of these four generations into two; the 
electro-mechanical and menu style generations. She differentiates between electro-
mechanical and menu style interfaces around the notion of layering within the design of the 
interface. It appeared from her study of product interlaces over the 20''' century that the 
earlier style 'was organized in breadth, such that all functionality was directly visible to the 
user, whereas the latter style is hierarchically organized, and temporarily less relevant 
functionality is often hidden' {Docampo Rama, 2001, p.27). She added that 'most input and 
output devices of multi-layered consumer products have many functions depending on their 
mode, and have been implemented without providing direct feedback about their state' 
(Docampo Rama, 2001, p.27). It is at this stage that Docampo Rama links these important 
differences in the interaction of electro-mechanical and software technologies to the observed 
changes in the cognitive study of older people. 
Much of Docampo Rama's (2001) thesis was a series of usability studies set at a 
single workstation. These studies explored the effects of various ranges of visuo-cognitive 
abilities and an individual's technological generation on their use of digital media interfaces 
of varying levels of complexity and layering. Having established a division between those 
potential users who were of the 'electro-mechanical' and 'software' generation, she observed 
that the strategies used by individuals from different technology generations differed greatly 
when trying to learn a novel interface. It appeared that as a result of their fundamentally 
different formative experience with technological interfaces, older people brought to bear 
conceptual knowledge of interactions with technologies that was incompatible with the 
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design of contemporary interface styles. Docampo Rama (2001) did not necessarily suggest 
that the disconnection between older people and digital media is purely generational—she is 
seemingly aware that current generations of older people are capable of leaming digital 
media products—^however, she recognises that this can take considerably more cognitive 
effort. This increased cognitive effort is made all the more difficult tor many older people as 
a result of the claimed limitations in their working memory and information processing 
capabilities (discussed in chapter three). Designers, Docampo Rama (2001) claims, can make 
life easier for older people leaming to use digital media products by ensuring that interfaces 
better relate to their technological generation. This requires that the designer adapts 
contemporary and novel interfaces to reflect the history of technological interactions for a 
particular age group. 
Docampo Rama (2001) did not further these ideas, h is notable that even though her 
thesis was entitled 'Technology Generations handling complex user interfaces', by the end 
there was little reference as to how to apply technological generations in practice. In the 
conclusion, it is suggested that: 
[e]ase-of-use software style devices could be improved by re-introduction of electro-
mechanical style concepts such as the one-lo-one relation between function and 
button, understandable direct-feedback aboul the slate of the device and increase of 
affordance (i.e. the user's perception about the applicability of the device) [...] for a 
straightforward interaction. (Docampo Rama, 2001, p.]08) 
The fleeting references to concepts such as affordance (this concept will be explained in more 
detail in chapter five) and direct-feedback (both of which require a greater critical 
understanding than Docampo Rama provides) highlights a lack of sensitivity to design related 
issues in comparison to the knowledge gained from observing older users. The lack of 
incorporation of the detailed historical analysis of interface styles that was provided earlier in 
her thesis also suggests an inlierent difficulty in transferring the 'interface style" of one 
generation to the next, 
At this point, it is evident that the researchers discussed thus far in this chapter deal 
primarily with how designers can deal with the effects of cognitive ageing in order to make 
certain products easier, or simpler, to learn. As Docampo Rama (2001) highlighted at length, 
the role of past experience appears to be critical to making the leaming process as smooth and 
seamless as possible, which is particularly important for older people due to the claims that 
they struggle to process novel information and increasingly rely on already learnt procedures. 
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It follows, then, that prior experience has become implicated with design research as key to 
making the learning digital media in old age a more implicit process. 
Figure 5 Digital (button) and analouue (dial) based microwave interfaces. 
Research conducted by Tim Lewis, Patrick Langdon and John Clarkson (Langdon, 
Lewis & Clarkson, 2007; Lewis, 2007; Lewis, Langdon & Clarkson, 2008) attempted to 
understand how significant an impact the combined prior experiences with products has on 
how a user performs with a new product. 
Prior experience is determined by a user's ability to acquire, store and retrieve 
relevant information in their long term memory (LTM). A human information 
processing approach to cognition can model these processes and considers carefully 
the roles played by both working memory [...] and LTM. (Lewis el al., 2008, p.%) 
Lewis et al. (2008) grounded their definition of prior experience as a cognitive ability of the 
user and, as with the human factors researchers, draw upon the cognitivist infonnation-
processing paradigm of the mind. Lewis et al.''s research highlighted the key role that 
measurable declines in cognitive ability appear to have in the difficulties certain users 
encounter when interacting with ceriain products. In an initial study of digital cameras, it was 
observed that the more experienced a user was with a particular style of interface then the 
quicker they perform set tasks (Langdon ct al., 2007). Following this, Lewis et al. (2008) 
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compared the use of two microwaves by a group of people of differing ages in an attempt to 
identify whether different types of interfaces resulted in different levels of performance. The 
microwaves differed primarily in the nature of their type of interaction. One microwave had 
an interface formed of two analogue dials; the other had an interface based on a numerical 
keypad and menu buttons and a digital display (Figure 11). Based upon these differing 
interaction styles and the assumption "that the more experience a user has of similar products, 
the quicker they will learn the operation of a new one" (Lewis et ai, 2008, p.96), it was 
hypothesised that the older participants would perform better using the dial microwave rather 
than the button microwave. The subsequent research identified that the dial interface led to 
better performance for all, an effect that was all the more pronounced with the older 
participants (Lewis et ai, 2008). 
Going by these observations, and in line with the claims of Docampo Rama (2001), a 
greater familiarity with dial interfaces rather than button interfaces for the older group could 
be a fundamental reason behind the emphasised gap between the ability to perform quickly 
with the differing interaction styles. Lewis el al. (2008) noted that in general, however, an 
individual's prior experience did not necessarily relate to their performance with either 
microwave.''^ Instead, it was noted that the participants identified as having higher cognitive 
information-processing abilities were those that performed better in the use of the button 
interface. Lewis et al. (2008) postulate that it miglit be the case, then, that interfaces such as 
dials, down in part to their analogue as opposed to discrete and sequential style of interaction, 
are less cognitively and perceptually demanding. 
The online presence of this research project comments that 'the guidance on how to 
design to include users with cognitive disabilities needs to be that much more extensive and 
in a form the designers will use" (Cambridge EDC, 2009), eluding that past research has not 
provided information that is useable in design terms. In an article describing the microwave 
study, Lewis el al. {2008} argue that designers have a preference for more generalised and 
concise advice to shape their designs rather than specific guidelines. In reading Lewis's ei 
a/.'s study, however, there is little advice with which a designer can work. It is asserted that 
prior experience may be an important feature in an older person's performance with certain 
new forms of product interaction, whilst at the same time suggesting that the microwave 
This could be down to limitations in ihe method ol'acquiring infomialion about each participant's previous 
experience with microwave interfaces in the past, which appeared to place an emphasis upon the symbolic and 
positioning qualities of the interface. Whereas Docampo Rama (2001) alluded to broad interactional styles that 
were seemingly transferred over generations of both the design of technologies and populations, Lewis and 
colleagues appears to take a more discreet method of dismantling the interface into individual, disconnected 
components. 
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study displays little correlation between prior experience and performance. Instead, in terms 
of Lewis e/a/.'s microwave study, it was proposed that products and interfaces that entbrce 
sequential and discrete forms of interaction are inherently cognitively intensive for the user 
by design. Despite this potential contradiction emerging from their studies, Lewis et al. argue 
that prior experience holds a key role in developing more usable digital media products for 
older people, and studies performed by O'Brien (2010) lend support to Lewis et al.'s 
argument. 
In light of the work of Docampo Rama (2001) and Lewis el al., (2008) there appears 
to be a strong relationship between the cognitive disconnection older people are observed as 
suffering when attempting to interact with digital media products and the fundamental 
incompatibility of their long term memory with contemporary styles of interface design. In 
particular, the theoretical basis of technology generations appears to offer an opportunity for 
designers to explore and develop cognitively inclusive approaches to design. 
2.3. Intuitive interaction 
It is possible to design intuitive digital media products that are inclusive of groups of older people by 
going through an iterative process of identifying the metaphors of prior experiences that can be 
mapped onto new digital products, reducing the effects of cognitive dysfunction in later life. 
The claims made regarding prior experience by Lewis et al. have been picked up by research 
groups at the Queensland University of Technology'*•' and Technische Universitat Berlin'*'', 
both of which focus upon developing digital media products and interfaces based upon the 
notion of intuitive use. (Blackler ef al., 2003; Hurtienne et al., 2008) These researchers note 
how intuition, intuitive use, intuitive interaction and similar terms have been in use by 
designers for some time with little clear definition of what the terms may mean (Blackler & 
Hurtiennc, 2007). Both groups offer their itidividual definitions. Through an analysis of 
literature from cognitive psychology, design, and subsequent empirical investigations, 
Blackler and colleagues established a definition of intuitive use as the following. 
*' The research at C?ueensland University of Technology is lead by Allhea Blackler, whose docioraJ thesis 
{Blackler, 2006) initially explored the notion of inluilive interactions with complex digital products. For the ease 
of reading the main body text, this group's work will be referred to as Blackler el al., and specific studies, 
papers and articles will be individually referred lo as and when necessary. 
** The research al I'echnische Universilal Berlin is mostly lead by Jom Hurlienne, and for the same reasons 
noted in footnote 43 this group's work will be referred to Hurtienne el al. This research has more recently 
transferred from Berlin to the Engineering Design Centre, at the University of Cambridge. 
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Intuitive use of products involves utilising knowledge gained through other 
experience(s). Therefore, products that people use inluilively arc those with features 
ihey have encountered before. Intuitive interaction is fast and generally non-
conscious, so people may be unable to explain how they made decisions during 
intuitive interaction. (Bladder ei ai, 2007, p.2) 
A similar definition of intuitive use is provided by Huitienne and colleagues: "A technical 
system is intuitively usable if the users' unconscious application of piior knowledge leads to 
effective interaction' (Blackler & Hurtienne, 2007, p,8). Although the ideas of these two 
groups emerge from different theoretical frameworks and sets of terminologies, these 
definitions ground both lines of questioning within the trajectory of cognitively inclusive 
design as discussed thus far in this chapter, as evidenced in the work of Schieber (2003), Fisk 
el al. (Fisk ei al., 2009; Rogers & Fisk, 2003), Docampo Rama (2001) and Lewis el al. 
(Langdon el al., 2007; Lewis, 2007; Lewis etal., 2008). Although the definitions of intuitive 
use quoted above have their differences, both research groups consider themselves as talking 
in complementary terms (Blackler & Hurtienne, 2007). Despite this, however, due to the 
fundamental differences in the evidential grounding of these two research projects it is worth 
examining the projects separately in more detail.''^ 
2.3.1. Intuitive interaction and user familiarity 
The research at QUT lead by Althea Blackler proceeded from defining intuifive interactions 
with products as being quick and unconscious as a result of a compatibility with a particular 
user's previous experience (Blackler el al., 2006). Intuitive interaction here appears to be a 
rather inexplicable phenomenon. As alluded to by Blackler et al., people appear to struggle 
*' The definition of intuition offered by the intuitive interaction researchers, as described in the main text, might 
behest thought of as referring more explicitly to identifiable prior experience rather than intuition as it is used in 
philosophical and psychological terms, Richard Gregory notes that intuition is 'arriving at decisions or 
conclusions without explicit or conscious processes of reasoned thinking' (Gregory, 1987, p.3S9). The definition 
provided by Blackler I't iil. and Hurtienne el al., whilst alluding to a level of immediate understanding, suggests 
that the process of intuition can be described when thought of in terms of designing interactions between people, 
products and interfaces. 
Although in Blackler and Hurtienne (2007) an agreement appears to be made that llicse two research groups 
are discussing similar trajectories, their approaches arc based upon very difVerenl conceptions of human 
cognition. Blackler et al. draw upon literature situated within the cognitivist information-processing models of 
cognition explained in chapter three, llurticnne el al. speculate that there may be something more to 
understanding human cognition than abstract and functional menial processes, invoking how the human body 
may be as much involved in cognition as the brain or centra! nervous system is, Looking at the development of 
Hurtienne el «/.'s argument over time, it appears this aspect of their argument is becoming increasingly 
prominent. Hurtienne ui al. appear to struggle in communicating the potential relevance of this alternative model 
of human cognition to the issue of temporal change; chapter six of this thesis, drawing upon a similar paradigm 
of cognitive science as Hurtienne et al., attempts to resolve this problem. 
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when asked to explain what is or what is not intuitive to them; it just occurs or does not. 
Blackler et al. (2006, p.2) allude to the research of Docampo Rama by arguing that 
'[i]ntuitive interaction involves the use of [implicit and unconscious] knowledge gained from 
other products and/or experiences [...] products that people use intuitively arc those with 
features they have encountered before.' Through a number of empirical Studies of people 
using and interacting with various types of digital interface, Blackler ci al. (2007) detine 
three principles of intuitive interaction. 
1. Make function, location and appearance familiar for features that are already 
known. Use familiar symbols and/or words, put them in a familiar position and make 
the function comparable with functions users have seen before. 
2. Make it obvious how to use less well-biown features by using familiar things to 
demonstrate their function, appearance and location. 
3. Increase the consistency within the interface so that function, appearance and 
location of features are consistent between different parts of the design. Use 
redundancy in order to maximise the number of users who can intuilively use the 
interface and the ways in which they can choose to complete their tasks, (Blackler & 
Hurtienne, 2007. p.4) 
A cursory reading of the above principles suggests that the development of intuitive 
interactions may be a relatively simple process of user research. In the transfer from 
principles to practice, however, the process of intuitive interaction turns out to be 
increasingly complex. Blackler and Hurtienne further decompose the principles as being 
formed of the following components. 
Principle I relates to the simpler end of the continuum, where body reflectors, 
population stereotypes or familiar things from tiie same domain are applied. 
Principles 2 relates to transferring things from other domains, including the use of 
metaphor. Principle 3, internal consistency and redundancy (represented by the 
dolledtine), needs to be considered at all times and so it surrounds the other 
principles. (Blackler & Hurtienne, 2007, pp.3-4) 
The above statement requires some unpacking. Blackler et al. argue that intuition in 
interaction starts at the most basic level of interaction; that of body reflectors, 'which are 
based on the embodied knowledge learned so early [in life] that it seems almost innate'. 
Beyond references to Bush (1989) and then the supposition that body reflectors are somewhat 
analogous with Norman's (1988) concept of affordance, however, Blackler ct al. provide 
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lillle insiglit into how the application of body reflectors in design may be achieved.'" The next 
component, population stereotypes, refers to the cultural conventions in terms of the products 
and interfaces that people would have experienced from an early age.'' 'Familiar features' or 
'things from other domains' refers to the crux of Blacklerero/.'s (2006, p.7) argument that 
'familiar features from the same and different domains would be the main mechanism for 
designers to use in order to apply intuitive interaction,' A key aspect of the transferral of 
familiar features from one domain to another is the identification and application of 
metaphors. 'When a person has relevant experience in a different domain, metaphors could 
be used to relate that knowledge to a new situation' (Blackler el at., 2006, p.7). 'External 
consistency' is another concept that refers to the relationship between the designed system 
'with things outside the system' (Blackler et ai, 2006, p.9), Citing Nielsen (1989), they argue 
that a digital media interface should be consistent with the expectations of the user's 
experience of other available systems. This also requires that the system has internal 
consistency; features within the same product should relate well with one another and not 
conflict with one another. For example, 'if the ftinction of the feature [of an interface] 
requires a metaphor, that metaphor is applied to the appearance and location of that feature, 
so that the metaphor remains consistent' (Blackler & Hurtienne, 2007, p.7). The final 
component of the principles, redundancy, refers to the inclusion of different modes of 
communication of various functions within the interface as is feasible, to ensure that 'as 
many users as possible can use an interface intuitively" (Blackler et ai, 2006, p.4). 
Although both Bush (1989) and Nomian (2004) refer to aspects ormuluaiily between the body of human 
beings and Ihc designed environmeni, both of their arguments are founded on a rather difieren! basis. Bush is 
based within the heritage of product semantics and how certain body-like imagery and forms might become 
manifest in the design of a material products, Nomian (1988), developing a nolion of affordance conceived by 
James Gibson, comes from a cognitive psychology background and understands an affordance to be the 
perception of an opportunity for interaction for a particular group of people. Whilst the human body is invoked 
in both accounts, this occurs from highly contrasting perspectives. Norman's accoimt of affordance will be 
discu.ssed in more detail in chapter five of the thesis. 
*^ The nolion of population stereotypes, as it is used by Blackler « a/., is somewhat similar to Docampo Rama's 
technology generations (described earlier in this chapter). 
It is notable how the notion that systems should share the manner in which interfaces are designed is 
problematic in a socio-economic context, where manufacturers attempt to ensure ilieir brand is often easily 
distinguishable irom their main competitors. This notion also limits the potential for interface diversity—which 
is a key necessity for inclusive design. Whal is a good system for one person is not necessarily for another—the 
sharing of properties between systems and limiting the choices made available to the user is highly problematic. 
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Figure 6 Conceptual tool Tor designers to aid the development of Intuitive Interactions. Taken from 
Blackler et al. (1007). 
Blackler cl al. suggest that 'newer' technologies will inherently be less familiar to 
users and a designer would need to increasingly apply metaphors and familiar feature from 
other domains in order to communicate to the user how to interact with the novel. Although a 
novel digital media product suggests the necessity of learning and a period of'un-
intuitiveness' to the interaction, Blackler ei al. (2006, p.10) are keen to argue that this need 
not be so. 'If the principles [...] are used, it should be possible to design an interface at any of 
these levels which people with differing levels of Technology Familiarity could use 
intuitively.' In order to convey how these multiple methods may fit within an iterative design 
process, Blackler el al. provide a 'conceptual tool' to apply intuitive interaction (Figure 12). 
The conceptual tool developed by Blackler el al. introduces the above principles and theories 
from the continuum into an iterative spiral that 'represents a design process with a variety of 
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entry and exit points' (Blackler & Hurtienne, 2007, p.6). Starting at a given point and 
working down, the designer would be able to 'establish the earliest point at which a familiar 
thing can be applial to each feature' (Blackler & Hurtienne, 2007, p.7). In the context of a 
novel technology, which may have no set conventions to be based upon, it is argued that 'a 
metaphor which relates to something that is familiar to the users would need to be applied' 
(Blackler & Hurtienne, 2007, p.7). 
The above, and very brief, explanations of Blackler et al.'s framework emphasises 
how the process of intuitive interaction—something that these authors initially suggest is 
indescribable—could be described through a highly complex compilation of exploratory user 
research.^" This elaborate process can thus be applied into the design of a digital media 
product to make it intuitive to use, even if the media or technology is completely novel and 
has no initial reference points to explain its use. In terms of the cognitive limitations of old 
age, Blackler ef al.'s proposals are useflil as part of the wider strategy of cognitively inclusive 
design as a way of avoiding the use of abstract reasoning by emphasising past experiences. 
This point will be elaborated after the second intuitive interaction research project is 
introduced. 
2.3.2. Intuitive interaction and prior knowledge 
In a similar vein to the research of Blackier el al., the lUUI research group ground intuitivity 
based upon an individual's prior knowledge. Hurtierme and Israel (2007) define the prior 
knowledge of human beings as stemming from a number of experiential sources, ranging 
from innate 'universals" to the specific expertise a person gains from experiencing a certain 
profession or pastime. Hurtienne and Israel (2007, p. 128), like Blackler et al., conceive of 
these sources of knowledge in reference to interaction as a continuum in which the 
'frequency of encoding and retrieving of knowledge increases' from the top to the bottom 
(Figure 13). It is claimed that the lower the level of knowledge appears within the continuum, 
the more generalisable and useful such knowledge is to a large group of people. 
'" The aulhors of this framework nole the lenglhy limeacales involved in this design process (Blackler & 
Hurtienne, 2007; Biackler ei«/,, 2006J. 
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Figure 7 Continuum of knowledge for intuitive interaction. Talien rrom Murtiennc and Israel (2007). 
As a way of exploring these lower levels of knowledge, the authors draw upon the 
work of cognitive linguists and philosophers George Lakoff and Mark Johnson^', in arguing 
that human thought is fundamentally formed of 'recurring dynamic patterns of bodily 
interactions' that develop into image schema of the mind (Hurtienne& Israel, 2007, p. 130), 
One example of an image schema is UP-DOWN, which is a basic attribute of human 
sensorimotor knowledge as a result of the experience of gravity. Lakoffand Johnson (1980) 
suggest that such basic image schemas are transposed onto other aspects of daily life in 
metaphorical fashion. For instance, UP may equal HAPPY, whereas DOWN may equal sad. 
UP may be ALIVE, DOWN may be DEAD. UP may be LOUDER, DOWN may be 
QUIETER. Hurtienne cl al. (2009a) use this latter metaphorical extension to discuss the 
example of the Touchplayer developed by Pirhonen ct al. (2002). The Touchplayer is an 
adaption of the Windows Media Player interface to run Irom touch-sensitive controls, rather 
than on a point and click graphic user interface. The Touchplayer was designed to be hung on 
a belt on the side of the user and was operated using various gestures of the hand; to turn the 
volume up, the user swiped the panel up, to turn down, swiped downwards. To skip, they 
swiped forwards, to go back, swiped backwards. Tapping the pad started and stopped the 
" Lakoffand Jolinson (1980; 1987) have argued ihat human thought is mostly comprised of metaphorical 
reasoning based upon experiential aspects of the human body. I-akoffand Jolmson's claims are situated within 
an allemaiive paradigm from wilhin the cognitive sciences thai places a greater significance on the human body 
and Ihe environment in the emergence of cognitive phenomena and experience. Although this thesis does not 
develop Lakoff and Johnson's particular accouni due to limitations outlined in the main text, arguments from 
this paradigm of cognitive science are discussed at length in chapters five and six. 
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player. Hurtienne et a!. (2009a, p.256) noted that the ditTcrence between the two systems was 
that the 'Touchplaycr strongly relies on sensorimotor knowledge and embodies this in 
interaction instead of presenting symbols with weak sensorimotor associations' and that it 
'uses stronger image schemas' compared to a traditional interface, which used LEFT to 
RIGHT controls for volume and track skipping. 
Hurtienne et al. suggest that image schemata, such as those applied in the design of 
the Touchplayer, can be metaphorically extended to understand and structure the abstract 
concepts required to interact with novel digital media products and interfaces, making these 
products more intuhive to use. The 'universal character' of image schemas, 'their - in the 
course of life - extremely frequent encoding in and retrieval from memory and their 
unconscious processing makes them interesting' (Hurtiennc & Israel, 2007, p. 130) as a way 
for implementing digital media, such as in tangible user interfaces, or to describe the 
stereotypes of a population of users (Hurtienne et a!., 2009b), Rather than the explicit 
metaphorical references that are favoured by Blackler et a!., Hurtienne et al. emphasise how 
there may be benefit in harnessing the unconscious and bodily dependent sensorimotor 
knowledge that, it is argued, is universal to all human beings." In terms of the cognitivist 
definition of cognition, the proposals of Hurtienne et al. (and their origins in the work of 
Lakotfand Johnson) do not refer to functional cognitive processes. In terms of Hurtienne e/ 
a/.'s argument, however, the application of image schemas may free cognitive resources that 
would otherwise be used for basic aspects of interacting with digital media interfaces. By 
fi"eeing up these resources for more complex processes, it is argued that the learning process 
is made simpler and more intuitive for a non-expert user. 
2.3.3. Intuitive interactions for older people 
Both the research of Blackler et al. and Hurtienne et al. was initiated in terms of the 
development of intuitive products for a general population; however, both teams of 
researchers have noted the particular applicability of their projects to older people and the 
associated changes to cognitive functioning. For example, Blackler (2005) observed that 
This claim is made by Hurtieime et al. in a number of texts, but it is arguable that image schemas (or at least 
sensorimotor knowledge) are not universal, or at least consistent, to all human beings. In some respects, this is 
noted by Lakoff and Johnson (1999). who suggest thai the manner in which image schemas form are also a 
result of the body in relation to the environment (including the cultural environment). Image schemas would 
therefore differ drastically between contexts and cultures. In lemis of this thesis, however, Hurlienne el al.'s 
claim is problematic as it does not account for people whose cognitive experience may be significantly impeded 
by sudden clianges to the way their body relates to the environment. The thesis attempts to resolve this issue in 
chapter six. 
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throughout studies with various age groups, older people consistently appeared to encounter 
greater difficulty in using various types of interface in an intuitive manner. Initially, Blackler 
(2006, p.231) considers whether these may be down to the 'well known factors of aging such 
as speed of reaction times and cognitive processing' but she then goes on to postulate 
whether there may be more to these interactivity issues. If younger people are able to interact 
more intuitively than the old, even if the older people have a certain level of familiarity with 
such devices, it may be that there are temporal issues related to cognition, the brain and 
interaction that designers must take into account. As Blackler (2006, p.231) asserts: 
one possible explanation is thai children and teenagers are at the right age to learn 
new things and their brains are more receptive to laying down lliis infomiation. An 
older adull inay still have their mental models based around the interaction techniques 
they learned in their youth, which are now obsolete, and it is known that older people 
need to make more elTorl in order to learn new things. 
Taking Blackler's above assertions, a response to these issues in terms of the intuitive 
interaction framework of Blackler el al. would examine more fully what these "mental 
models' of older users comprise of In terms of intuitive interaction, these mental models may 
be implemented in the redesign of digital media products and interfaces through metaphorical 
representations. 
Hurtienne el al. (2008) also recognise the relevance of their ideas to inclusive 
designers. In defining image schema asbeingpart ofa very basic, almost universal 
sensorimotor level of knowledge, they suggest that they are "accessible to the widest range on 
people' (Hurtienne et al., 2008, p.l 1 Sf^. In a later paper, Hurtienne et al. (2009b, p.257) go 
on to state that '[l]he universitality" of image schemas 'predicts that user interface features 
designed with image schemas should be equally usable by members of different technology 
generations' (referring to Docampo Rama's research) and offer promising insights for 
inclusive design. In terms of ageing, they suggest that the emphasis of sensorimotor 
" Lawry el al. (2010) have extended the earlier intuitive interaction research into the area of ageing. Thus far, 
however, tlieir results appear to be inconclusive. 
" It appears that Hunienne t'l al. (2008) assert this point but perhaps need lo examine the claim in a little more 
detail. It might be that the concept of image schema been •uni\crsals' to a great many users falls down in an 
inclusive approach to design. Of course, on one hand the inclu.sive approach lo designing is about finding aspect 
of human beings that are suitable for one and all. However, an inclusive approach is also about looking at the 
specific differences between groups of people and approaching the design of products and services that take 
account of these differences. Tlie argument that image schema are useful to inclusive or universal design 
approaches may fall down once it is taken into account that the groups of people often targeted by inclusive 
design require a more specific understanding as their image schema due to their fundamentally different 
embodiment lo the 'typical' human being. Differing embodiments would lead lo different forms of sensorimotor 
knowledge. The perceptual abilities of older people might be attuned to interacting with the world in a ditTering 
maimer; this theme will be elaborated in chapter six of the thesis, 
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knowledge, as applied in the design experiment of the Touchplayer, avoids having to use 
limited and deteriorating cognitive capabilities, as is the case with older people interacting 
with many contemporary digital media interfaces. 
The research of these two groups into the relationship between intuitive interaction 
and human ageing is still ongoing, therefore this thesis can only infer its relationship based 
upon the proposals made in their work thus far. In relating the intuitive interaction studies to 
the context of older people interacting with digital media, the suggestion is that in identifying 
the properties of a group of older persons prior experiences—such as symbols, interface 
types, aesthetic styling cues, or the underlying 'universal' image schema—designers can 
develop more 'familiar', or intuitive, interactions with new forms of media. Taken in terms of 
cognitive ageing, the intuitive interaction research is a useful component within an attempt to 
develop cognitively inclusive digital media products. By understanding the metaphors by 
which older people make sense of the media and products they encounter, whether these refer 
to past technologies or projections of sensorimotor knowledge, then the necessity to develop 
new conceptual knowledge as to how to use the technology (which likely requires significant 
use of working memory) will be reduced. As a result, the intuitive interaction research— 
along with the human factors research and Docampo Rama's technology generations— 
influence what this thesis defines as a contemporary account ofcognitively inclusive design, 
which is defined in the concluding section of this chapter. 
2.4. Cognitivcly inclusive design 
// is possible to remove cognitive friction from digital media products through a process ofcognitively 
inclusive design. 
The loosely affiliated research projects brought together in this chapter are part of a 
perspective on designing that in this thesis is defined as cognitively inclusive design. This 
title is used to suggest that the collection of research discussed provides guidance to designers 
of digital media that better affords the inclusion of cognitive functioning of older people. As a 
result, cognitively inclusive design attempts to ensure that the design of digital media 
products and interfaces suitably match the claims of the cognitive psychology of ageing. By 
understanding how the features of the digital media interface relate to the cognitive 
functioning of older people, and by amending designs to better suit aged cognition, it is 
suggested that the disconnection between older people and digital media can be resolved. It is 
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possible to summarise the claims of cognitively inclusive design in reference to the cognition 
in later life into three key points: 
1. The information processing functions of older people are significantly reduced as a 
result of cognitive ageing. Therefore, digital media must be designed to reduce the 
amount of information it provides at once for the human information processor to deal 
with— i^t should be "chunked". 
2. As a result of the reduction in information processing functioning, older people 
struggle to attend to correct information if a significant amount of stimulus is 
presented at once. Therefore, digital media products and interfaces must be designed 
to only present infonnation that is absolutely necessary. 
3. An older person perceives how to use a technology based upon the symbolic and 
metaphorical basis of their long term memory. The digital media product and 
interface can be designed to metaphorically represent the historical interactions of the 
group of older people to be designed for; in doing so, long term semantic and 
procedural memory will be invoked, meaning less working memory and attention is 
required to be applied. 
It is possible to add a fourth aspect to cognitively inclusive design (although, as will be 
identified in chapter three, in terms of tradition cognitive psychology it would not be classed 
as a 'cognitive' aspect of interaction) which, as argued by Hurtienne et al., benefits the 
learning of an interface: 
4. Older people make sense of aspects of the world through bodily metaphors (image 
schemas). Digital media products must be designed to make use of these basic 
capabilities of human beings, freeing up cognitive resources for more infonnation 
intense aspects of interactions with digital media. 
If these four features of cognitively inclusive design were to be integrated within an iterative 
design process of a novel digital media product, the research discussed within this chapter 
suggests that the outcome will be a product that places less strain upon the limited 
information-processing abilities of an older person. Cognitive studies of ageing postulates 
that cognition in old age is poor at processing the novel but strong at recalling long term 
stored knowledge; as such, digital media that reflect this in their design will better connect 
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with older people. Returning to Dreyftiss' (1955 [2003]) terminology from chapter one, there 
will be less friction between people and digital media; or, in Blackler ci «/.'s (2006) and 
Hurtienneera/.'s (2009) terminology, the interaction with digital media would be more 
intuitive. In ternis of the argument portrayed in this and the preceding chapters, where both 
the human cognitive system and the digital media system are conceived as information 
processors, the exchange of information from one system to the other would become more 
tluid. There would be a greater opportunity for cognitive connections, and the media is 
designed in such a manner to offer maximum opportunities for incorporation into the 
everyday activities of older people. 
In the following, an example will be provided to demonstrate the above principles of 
cognitively inclusive design as it relates to the design of a novel digital media product. In a 
previous research project ('Photo Reel', Vines, 2007), the author has observed through 
meetings and group discussions with older people (in this scenario, the stakeholders) that 
there was an increasing desire to collect and view digital photographs, yet a reluctance to 
engage with a personal computer to do so. Following in the lineage of Docampo Rama and 
Blackler et al., the designer, in collaboration with the stakeholder group, explored examples 
of photography concepts, media and the related interactions from what constitutes the 
formative period of the user group. A number of initial concepts were developed by the 
designer in light of the collaboration with the stakeholders. These initial concepts focused 
upon the role of references to technologies and media such as picture frames, photograph 
slides, picture albums, slide projectors, film reels, and film negatives. In order to reduce the 
strain on cognitive working memory, the initial exploratory process developed into concepts 
that were devoid of abstract iconography and graphic user interfaces. Rather, the concepts 
were developed based upon the ideas of tangible computing*** and information-appliances , 
focusing upon computational products designed with one activity in mind, instead of the 
'* This example discusses a project developed during the author's Master's projects, although the description is 
slightly altered in the thesis' text compared to the original documentation. The original, unpublished, research 
can be found in full in Vines (2007), and pan of the study was published within Vines and Thompson (2007), 
'^  Tangible computing, or Tangible User Interfaces (TUls), were conceived as a reaction to the predominance of 
llic Grapliic User Interface (GUI) in the design of computational and digital media systems. 'Rather than make 
pixels melt into an interface, TUIs use physical forms that fit seamlessly into a user's physical environment. 
TUls aim to take advantage of these haptic interaction skills, an approach significantly different from GUIs.' 
(Ishii, 2008, p.34) 
" Norman (1998, p,53) defmed an information appliance as '[aln appliance specializing in information: 
knowledge, facts, graphics, images, video, or sound. An information appliance is designed to perform a specific 
activiiy. such as music, photography, or wriling. A distinguishing feature of informalion appliances is the ability 
to share informalion among themselves." Norman's main reason for coining the informalion appliance was to 
'break through the complexity barrier of today's personal computers' (1998, p.53), instead arguing for less 
general-use machines ihal were better suited to individual praclices. 
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multiple tasks and activities of a typical personal computer. The benefit of emphasising single 
activity products devoid of complex graphic interfaces is demonstrated in the reduction of the 
amount of'layers' within the interface, and a lessened necessity to keep information in short 
term and working memory (Docampo Rama, 2001). Along with this, as argued by Hurtienne 
et al, incorporating certain aspects of the basic sensorimotor knowledge of older people via 
tangible interactions, would mean fewer cognitive resources would be taken up. The initial 
concepts, once further developed (by the author) in order to be less taxing on the cognition of 
older people, were re-proposed to the stakeholder group. Through a process of rough 
prototyping and scenario role-play, the stakeholders helped in identifying the most 
appropriate concepts to be developed into a proof-of-concept, The participation of the 
stakeholders higlilighted a concept based upon a photographic 'reel' that could be used to 
both store and view digital images, and a number of proposed compatible devices (Figure 
14), as particularly relevant to the aspirations of this group of people. 
Figure 8 Photo tteel. John Vines. 
A number of issues were identified with the stakeholders in the initial exploratory 
prototyping of what became entitled the 'Photo Reel' concept, most of which appeared to 
relate to limitations in their cognitive functioning. One issue was that the magnifying screen 
on the front of the main reel device was used to both view pictures and rotate them; rotations 
were made using buttons on the side of the screen. In the participatory workshop and testing, 
however, it appeared that stakeholders had difficulties making the abstract transformations 
required to link the movement of the buttons to the rotation of the images. Another issue 
observed in group participation was the manner in which pictures were transferred from one 
device to another (such as from the Photo Reel to projectors, or picture frames). In the 
exploratory prototyping, it was proposed to provide a small device that acted as a pick-up and 
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drop tool from one device to another (Figure 15). The pick and drop device would work by 
touching one edge of the device against the picture to be picked, and then placed against a 
surface again to drop it. A seemingly simple interaction to the designer, the stakeholders 
struggled to conceptualise what could have been a somewhat abstract process. 
Figure 9 Image toot, John Vines. 
Both of these limitations in the initial prototype, which appeared to emphasise the 
cognitive limitations of the older stakeholders, were resolved through exploring metaphors 
from within the historical interactions of the stakeholders that were relevant in the context of 
the sharing of photography. Of a number of metaphors that were experimented with, it 
appeared that replacing the magnifying screen with a 'slide" mechanism resolved many of the 
conceptual fallibilities of the initial prototype (Figure 16). The slide could be removed from 
its cage, physically rotated, and replaced to move a picture around. In order to move an image 
from one device to another, the slide could be removed and placed into the other devices. 
Multiple slides could be used, so that multiple pictures and multiple devices could display 
images simuhaneously. 
Figure 10 Slide interaction. John Vines. 
Although testing with the device was limited, the 'Photo Reel' appeared to be a 
successful example of cognitively inclusive design. It was initially conceived to reduce 
cognitive effort, harnessing the basic sensorimotor knowledge and metaphors of long-term 
procedural and semantic memory. The Photo Reel provided an example of how cognitively 
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inclusive designing, when incorporated into an iterative design process involving the 
participation and observation of stakeholders, can result in digital media products that 
provide novel forms of media content to older users without the burden of applying abstract 
reasoning and cognitive information processing. 
However, whilst on the surface cognitively inclusive design appears to resolve the 
problem of the cognitive disconnection between older people and digital media, it is also 
rather problematic as an approach to design. The cognitivcly inclusive approach to design, as 
that applied in the design of the Photo Reel, is trapped in nostalgic connotations of designing 
the new. The designer takes for granted that past experience can be reduced into an array of 
symbols, representations and properties that are transferrable to the design of novel products 
and interfaces. As will be explained in the following chapter, it is possible to identify these 
traits of cognitively inclusive design as embedded within the cognitive psychology of ageing 
literature that it relies heavily on. In particular, it will be argued that the various design 
approaches brought together in this chapter relies upon a reductionist, cognitivist model of 
human beings interacting with digital media. What is meant by the term cognitivist, and how 




Understanding 'cognition' in cognitivcly inclusive design 
Question: What does the term 'cognition' mean as if is used in cognitively inclusive design. 
and what are the implications of age related changes to its functioning? 
3.1. Contemporary cognitive inclusive design research is founded upon a cognitivisl philosophy of 
mind, which understands cognition as a Junctional system of information-processing. 
3.2. The cognitive study of human memory is particularly influenced by the cognilivisi paradigm of 
information processing, which has been characterised by attempts to reduce memory into discrete, 
functional systems. 
3.3. As people age. their ability to encode and recall complex memories deteriorates, whilst the basic 
information-processing abilities required to transform and manipulate short-term memories are 
substantially limited. 
3.4. Old people are understood to be poor processors of information but a storehouse of long term 
memories, claims that largely influence cognitively inclusive design. 
3.1. The historical roots of cognitivism 
Contemporary cognitive inclusive de.iign research is founded upon a cognitivisl philosophy of mind, 
which understands cognition as afunctional .system of information-processing. 
Much of the cognitively inclusive design research described in the previous chapter draws 
upon a large array of cognitive psychology research that has investigated how the mind 
changes in later life. As was noted in the previous chapters, concepts such as working 
memory and various forms of long term memory have been invoked as being related to the 
cognitive disconnections that occur between older people and digital media. These concepts 
will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. Before discussing these, however, it is 
useful lo be more fully understanding of the roots of these concepts within cognitive 
psychology and cognitive science.^^ What is meant by the tenn 'cognition' in cognitively 
The thesis notes thai a signilicanl amount of research and literature that discusses the design of digital media 
products and interfaces for older people often draws upon evidence from the cognitive psychology of ageing 
without necessarily discussing what 'cognition' or "cognilive' may refer lo. The assumption might be that 
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inclusive design, and what are the implications of its definition when applied in design? In 
the first half of this chapter, it will be noted how these concept of cognition that influence 
much of cognitively inclusive design are rooted in a philosophy of mind known as 
cognitivism. This and the following sections trace some of the historical roots of the concepts 
of memot7 used in cognitively inclusive design in order to understand several of the 
underlying assumptions of the discipline's study of human thought as it is applied in design. 
Contemporary histories of cognitive psychology portray the discipline as developing 
irom the resurgence in the scientific study of mind in the interdisciplinary field of the 
cognitive sciences, which is itself a collection of interrelated but often independently studied 
disciplines (Hatfield, 2002).^^ Central to the foundation of the cognitive sciences in the mid-
twentieth century was the philosophy of the human mind that came to be called cognifivism. 
The influence of the cognitivist model of mind can be observed in contemporary studies of 
cognitive ageing that underpin contemporary investigations in inclusive design at the time of 
this thesis. 
In order to understand the cognitivist philosophy of the mind, it is helpful to recognise 
the epistemological context in which it developed, Contemporary accounts of the history of 
cognitive science, such as that provided by Howard Gardner (1985), claim that cognitivism 
was a hostile response to behaviourist psychology that dominated Western psychological 
experimentation from the early to mid-twentieth century. Behaviorism focused purely on 
what was deducible from observing the external actions of the organism, denying the 
relevance of internal structures in the organism in umierstanding interactions in the world. 
cognitive psychologists studies the brain; or the mind; or conscitiusness. This is noi necessarily Ihe ca.se. This 
thesis attempts toprovideadeeperundcrsiandingof how certain paradigms of the scientific study of cognition 
informs designers developing novel digital media for older people. In order to do this, this thesis proceeds from 
a perspective thai as much critical attention must be paid to the scientific study of cognition, and its discontents, 
as should be to its application by designers. 
" Along with cognitive psychology, the cognitive sciences arc typically defined as extending to the disciphnes 
of artificial intelligence, linguistics, and neuroscience (Hatfield. 2002). 
** Behaviorism was based upon the principle thai ihe only way human psychology could be studied scientifically 
was through the observable actions of the organism in the world. It rejected any possibility that there ihe mind 
could be scientifically studied as ii was irilemal, bidden and private. Instead, behaviorists asserted that thought 
was fundamentally visible in behaviour, and that learning could be explained by the conditions of the 
environment rather than any internal psychological or menial stale. As such, behaviorisls argued that "thoughts, 
feelings, and inleniions, mental processes all, do not determine what we do. Our behaviour is the product of our 
conditioning. We are biological machines and do not consciously act; rallier we react to stimuli' (Gregory, 1987, 
p.71). The emergence of cognilivism and cognitive science in ihe mid-twentieth century afforded a relum to the 
scientific siudy of human tliouglil. ii appears that popular historical accounts of the nascent period of cognitive 
science (such as Gardner (19R5)) present Noam Chomsky's (1959) critical re\iewof Burrhus Skinner's (1959) 
book 'Verbal Behavior' as the moment where behaviourism was felled by cognitive science. As Hatfield (2002) 
notes, however, it is somewhat problematic to take that this one publication as such a pivotal momeni in the 
history of cognitive science, especially as latterly it is understood that Chomsky's review was based upon a 
number of critical misinterpretations of Skirmer's claims. 
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For a behaviorist, the denial of the internal mental apparatus of human thought as a suitable 
project of scientific study was founded upon the argument that the mind could not be 
observed other than through introspective or psychoanalytical methods(Gardner, 1985). The 
mind and mental processes, it was argued, were completely hidden from external human 
sensing. 
If behaviourism can be portrayed as being only interested in the external, observable, 
actions of organisms, cognitivism can be described as internal centric, understanding 
interactions in the world primarily from the internal mental slates of human beings. A key 
influential factor in the transtbnnation of the scientific acceptability of studying the human 
mind was the development of computation. For many scientists disillusioned with 
behaviorism, computation provided evidence that it was possible to understand the functional 
attributes of a system—its information—without having to observe its physically operating 
mechanisms. As such, 'the activitiesofthecomputer itself seemed in some ways akin to 
cognitive processes' (Neisser, 1976, p.5). 
In order to understand how human cognition became described as being similar in its 
operation to computation, it is helptlil to understand some of the influencing factors that 
shaped the move from behaviour to cognition in the mid-twentieth century.^^ A lot of the 
groundwork for the formation of the cognitive sciences was performed by researchers 
associated with the study of cybernetic systems, such as Norbert Wiener, Warren McCuUoch, 
Walter Pitts, and John von Neumann.^^ Dupuy (2009) identifies that the co-extensive 
Introspection is a 'method of data collection in which observers examine, record, and describe their own 
internal mental processes and experiences' (Colman, 2006, p.389). Psychoanalysis, most prominently known 
through the influential work and writing of Signiund Freud (in works such as Studies on Hysteria (Breuer & 
Freud, 1955 [1895]) and The Interpretation of Dreams {\9\y)) was a method of investigating the (mostly 
unconscious) human mind. The unconscious as understood in psychoanalysis should not be confused with the 
unconscious, non-conscious and non-declarative in much of cognitive psychology. Colman (2006, p.788) states 
that the psychoanalytic unconscious is understood as 'a part of the mind containing repressed instincts and their 
representative wishes, ideas, and images that are not accessible to direct examination.' As psychologists 
attempted to greater align their discipline with scientific approaches, introspection and psychoanalysis became 
increasingly isolated from the academic community due lo the un-replicable and non-objective nature of claims 
and findings. 
To cover the full and diverse history of the cognitive sciences isout of the scope ofmany a thesis, and even 
more so in a short section of a thesis moving between a number of discrete disciplines. Howard Gardner (1985) 
provides a detailed, if somewhat dated, account of tlie early years of cognitive science thai is sympathetic to the 
cognitivist philosophy of mind. Sieve Heim (1991) provides a useful synthesis of a large amount of archival 
material from the developmental years of first-order Cybernetics, which heavily influenced the development of 
the cognitive sciences but is often lefl out of the latter's history. Similarly, Jean-Pierre Dupuy (2009) presents an 
analysis of similar material to Heim in order to higjiiight how intimately connected contemporary cognitive 
science is to first-order Cybemeiic, arguing how the fundamental limitations of the original Cybernetics 
research, that lead to its failure, are evident within current research and practice. VareJa et al. (1991) also 
provide a useful chapter-length overview of tliis period of time. 
• Norbert Wiener, primarily a mathematician, was a particularly influential founding member of the original 
cybernetics movement. Cybernetics, which can be understood as meaning 'Ihe science of control and 
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development of computing and the mind could be observed as occurring in three acts. 'The 
first assimilated the mind to a logic machine. The second treated the brain as a machine as 
well. Since the machine is considered to operate the same in each case, mind and brain were 
inferred to also be one and the same' (Dupuy, 2009, p.65). The third act, Dupuy argues, was 
the 'construction of the first uhrarapid electronic calculating machine, ENIAC In describing 
these acts, Dupuy is referring to how, in its cybernetic form, the mind was understood as a 
form of calculating machine prior to the existence of the computer (whereas in cognitive 
science, the opposite understanding prevails, where the computer informed the study of the 
human mind).^ "* 
During this same period of time, Claude Shannon was developing his influential 
information theory.*"* One of the cenfral attributes of Shannon's information theory was the 
notion that 'information can be thought of in a way entirely divorced from specific content or 
subject matter' (Gardner, 1985, p,21). Norbert Wiener (1948) introduced Shannon's theory 
into cybernetic research, arguing that the meanings and values communicated between 
devices—^be that a machine or the human mind—are completely separate from a particular 
physical embodiment. As a result of the earlier cybernetic research, there was an analogous 
nature to the development of computational systems—computers, robotics, artificial life— 
and the notion that the brain itself is somewhat computational in its nature. As Dupuy (2009) 
argues, the human mind was essentially mechanised. 
In terms of its use in the developmental period of the cognitive sciences: 
[t]he analogy to the human system and to human thought processes was clear. The 
human brain [...] corresponded to the computational liardwarc; patterns of thiriking or 
problem solving [..,] could be described entirely separately from the particular 
constitution of the human nervous system. (Gardner, 1985, p,31) 
communication in the animal and the machine" (Gregory. 1987, p.810) (where animal includes human beings). 
A keycoraponent of cybernetics is the notion of feedback, which is 'the transmission and return of information' 
(Wiener, 1948, p.96). Feedback, Wiener argued, was a key feature of all natural and artificial systems of 
interaction (or information exchange) in order for some form of effective action to emerge. 
^ Dupuy (2009) notes that John von Neumann, one of the founding figures of computing and artificial 
inielligence, was heavily influenced by McCulloch and Pitts {1943) article ihat argued neural networks and the 
brain could be modelled with mathematical, logical, calculus. Von Neumann noted tliat McCulloch and Pitts 
were suggesting that neural nelworks essentially operated at two levels; ihat of a physical system, and Ihat of a 
model running on top of the physical level, in terms of the original computers, von Neumann transformed this 
idea into the distinction between hardware and software (Dupuy, 2009). 
''' Claude Shannon, along with Warren Weaver (1949) is often attributed to the development of information 
theory, which used a( length by some of the early pioneers of cybernetics—particularly Wiener—in terms of the 
communication channels between cybernetic systems; be these human or artificially intelligent systems. 
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Cognitivism, at least to begin with, rather explicitly used the ix)mputer as a reference point 
for the human mind to be studied. Along with considering mind and body in terms of 
hardware and software, the virtuous circularity between computational technology and the 
liuman mental apparatus developed into a number of other synergies. "Human beings, no less 
than computers, harboured programs; and the same symbolic language could be invoked to 
describe programs in both entities' (Gardner, 1985, p.31). 
Having a generally agreed theory of mind founded upon computational logic meant 
that research into artificial and human forms of cognition were somewhat co-extensive with 
one another. The terminologies used to describe the machine were also used to describe the 
human, whilst the distinction between the mental and physical embodiment was strictly 
adhered to. For example, a key attribute of cognitivist theory is the extrapolation of the 
representational qualities of computational systems to the human mind.*'*' In the cognitivist 
tradition, representations are necessary as a way of connecting the realms of the physical and 
mental, and are generally discussed in terms of symbols (Varela el al., 1991). In cognitivism 
these symbols are conceived as being comprised of dual qualities; they have both physical 
and semantic resonances.^^ It is argued that whilst symbolic representations exist on a 
physical level in the human body of the human being (most likely to be the central nervous 
system or the brain), somehow, semantic meaning and values are attached (and it is the latter 
that matter to the cognitive scientist). The duality of symbolic representation in cognitivism is 
*'' ll is important to distinguish the notion of representation from how il is used in cognitive science, computer 
science and the design ofdigital media, and in ilieories emanating trom the humanities. Within cognitive science 
and psychology, representation may be understood in terms of mental representations. The manner in which 
definition is defined maydifTer drastically depending upon the ontological perspective of a specific research 
project. For example, a traditional perspective such as cognitivism, especially in terms of iK counler-argument 
to behaviorism, would argue that science cannot explain cognitive behaviour without presupposing thai the 
mind, in some respect, represents features of the world (Varela el al., 1991). Problematically, the concept of 
representation leads lo questions regarding dualities between mind (the cognitive) and body (the physiological), 
or body and world, along with further issues as lo where these representations exist physically. As a 
consequence, certain paradigms of cognitive science (such as those ofJames Gibson (1986) and Varela el a!. 
(1991), to be discussed in chapter Five) argue against (he existence of mental represenialions. In computer 
science, more specifically, representations are understood in a different context but perhaps share similarities 
conceptually with its usage in cognitive science. Fssenlially, computers act upon computational symbols, which 
represent a certain numerical state of the computational system. Typically, digital imerfaces are designed around 
another layer of represenlalions Ihat make ihis numerical state accessible to human beings (as in Graphic 
Interfaces). In literature more aligned with the humanities, representation tnay be understood in terms of 
rellecling certain cultural values. As Manovich (2001) highlights, the numerical and interactive representations 
have yet another layer of representation to consider; that of representations used to reference other cultural 
artefacts, technologies and media. In terms of cognitive science in its traditional, cognitivist, formal, discussion 
of cultural representations and subsequent conversaiioas of meaning and qualia are noi a factor. 
^' In extreme perspectives, such as that argued by Jerry Fodor (1975), it is suggested thai human beings have an 
innate language of thought thai allows them lo map the experiences of the worid onto a set of representations 
that are fully available, yet completely sub-conscious, from birth (Hatfield, 2002). Fodor expands the iheories of 
his menlor Noam Chomsky, who had introduced the notion of universal grammar. Chomsky (1965) argued that 
all human beings have a universal area of the mind/brain where a limited set of symbolic rules govern the 
acquisition of any language. 
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another transformation of computational logic into the study of human cognition. A typical 
computational system only directly interacts with the physical state of the symbols, the 
semantic value attached to these symbols—their meaning^—is arbitrary for the computer to do 
what it needs to do.^" In extreme functional accounts of cognitivism, the dualism of symbolic 
representation is evident but also simultaneously actively denied; for example, Fodor (1975) 
and Putnam (1988) argue all that is necessary to understand human cognition are the semantic 
values of the computations^—the physical qualities oi'lhe hardware, although present at some 
level of analysis, are inconsequential in terms of cognitive functioning. 
Varela el al. (1991) usefully summarise the cognilivist philosophy of mind and 
provide a definition of human cognition to be taken forward in the remainder of this chapter. 
Question I: What is cognition? 
Answer. Information processing as symbolic computation - rule-based manipulation 
of symbols. 
Qiieslion 2: How does it work? 
Answer. Through any device that can support and manipulate discrete functional 
elements - the symbols. The system interacts only with the fonn of the symbols (their 
physical attributes), not their meaning. 
Question 3: How do I know when a cognitive system is functioning adequately? 
Answer. When the symbols appropiiately represent some aspect ofthc real world, and 
the information processing leads to a successful solution of the problem given to the 
system. (Varela et al., 1991, pp.42-43) 
3.2. The influence of cognitivism in the study of human cognition and memory 
The cognitive study of human memory is purficularly influenced by the cognilivist paradigm of 
information processing, which has been characterised by attempts to reduce memory into discrete, 
functional systems. 
** This disconnection between the physical and software embodiments of compulalianal systems appears to also 
influence the manner in which people interacting with compuliii!; systems on a expert level interact with them. 
Winograd and Flores (1986) document this well in 'Understaniling Computers anil Cognition'. one of the key 
texts that offer a critique of the cognilivisl tradition as it is applied within artificial intelligence and human-
computer interaction research in a 1980s context. Winograd and Flores note that '[t]he computer programmer or 
theorist does not begin with a view of the computer as a physical machine with which he or she interacts, but as 
an abstraction—a formalism for describing patterns of behaviour. In programming, we begin with a language 
whose individual componenls describe simple acts and objects. Using this language, we build up descriptions of 
algorithms for carrying out a desired task. As a programmer, one views the behaviour of the system as being 
totally determined by the program. The language implementation is opaque in that the detailed structure of 
computer systems that actually carry out the task are not relevant in thedomainof behaviour considered by the 
programmer' (Winograd & Flores, 1986, p.87). They argue thai Ihe computer can be considered in terms of 
diree main level of representation that are discrete from one another; the physical machine, the logical machine, 
and the abstract machine (Winograd & Florcs, 1986). 
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Cognitivism was considered a useftil way of studying the psychology of human beings as it 
provides insights into the functioning of the human mind without burdening psychologists 
with relating their observations to the physiology of the body. As Endel Tulving, discussing 
experimental psychology in the mid-twentieth century, notes: 
psychology was an autonomous scientific discipline that did not have to learn from 
any other and was best kept from the possibly corrupting influences of oilier 
disciplines, such as neuropsychology or physiology. Every graduate sludenl of 
cxperimcnlal psychology al the lime knew that there was nothing useful that one 
could leam from physiology and that smart experimentalists stayed away from brain-
damaged amnesic patients, because we had problems enough with more-or-less 
nomial sophomores and their minds and did not need any extra troubles. (Tulving, 
2001, p.9) 
In comparison to its neighbouring disciplines of linguistics and artificial intelligence, 
psychology as a discipline was seemingly slower in its uptake of the cognitivist philosophy of 
the mind (Gardner, 1985); however, once its usefulness was highlighted its uptake appears to 
have been dramatic. Ulric Neisser, in his 1967 work Cognitive Psychology, contributed 
significantly to the integration of cognitivism into experimental psychology. Neisser 
discussed cognitive psychology as supplementary and coextensive with what he termed 
'dynamic psychology", which he defined as beginning with "motives rather than with sensory 
input' (Neisser, 1967, p.4). Alternatively, cognitive psychology dealt with 'all the processes 
by which the sensory input is transformed, reduced, elaborated, stored, recovered, and used' 
(Neisser, 1967, p.4). For example, if "asked why I did a certain thing, I may answer in 
dynamic terms, "Because I wanted . . . , " or, from the cognitive point of view, "Because it 
seemed to me . . . " ' (Neisser, 1967, p.4)^^ 
As with the prevailing thought of cognitivism at the time, Neisser's (1967) 
descriptions of the mind disembodied the cognitive psychological properties of human beings 
from the body and world. Another trait that Neisser (1967) took from cognitivism was the 
analogy of the computer as a way of explaining the reasoning behind this disembodiment. 
Neiaser, in his 1967 text, appears to draw a distinction between the cognitive and the emotional, and suggesis 
thai rational thinking and emotion are fundamentally polar (although mutually beneficial) opposites. Gregory 
notes how the 'peculiar characterislics of emotional behaviour and experience have been repeated stumbling 
blocks in the attempt to see nature a.s rational, Intelligent, and even sublime.' (Gregory, 1987, p.218) 
Historically, scientists dealing with cognitive behaviour and processing tend to avoid references to emotions. In 
recent years, the research and writing of Anlonio Damaslo (such as Damasio (1994)) has seemingly given 
emotion research within the cognitive science greater credibility, although often emotion in such areas of 
research becomes just an new process of cognitive behaviour (such as attention, or memory). 
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The task of a psychologist trying to understand human cognition is analogous to that 
of a man trying to discover how a computer has been programmed. In particular, if the 
program seems lo store and reuse information, he would like to know by what 
"routines" or "procedures" this is done. Given this purpose, he will not care much 
whether his particular computer stores information in magnetic cores or in thin films; 
he wants to understand ihe program, not the "hardware." By the same token, it would 
not help the psychologist lo know that memory is carried by RNA as opposed to some 
other medium. He wants to understand its utilization, not its incarnation. (Ncisser, 
1967, p,6) 
TTie integration of the language between the mechanical and the mental was seen to be 
particularly relevant to the discipline of cognitive psychology. 
Computers accept information, manipulate symbols, store items in ''memory" and 
retrieve them again, classify inputs, recognize patterns, and so on. [...] The coming of 
the computer provided a much-needed reassurance that cognitive processes were real; 
that they could be studied and perhaps understood. (Neisser, 1976, pp.5-6} 
Although Ncisser (1967) found usefulness in using the analogy of information processing and 
certain computational terminologies in describing aspects of human cognitive psychology, he 
was very clear that he did not consider human mental processes as being like a computer. 
The occasional and analogic use of programming concepts does not imply a 
commitment lo computer "simulation" of psychological processes. It is true that a 
number of researchers, not content with noting that computer programs are like 
cognitive theories, have tried to write programs which are cognitive theories [...] none 
of them does even remote justice to the complexity of human mental processes. 
Unlike men. "artificially intelligent" programs tend to be single-minded, 
undistraclibic, and unemotional. Moreover, they are generally equipped from the 
beginning of each problem with all the cognitive resources necessary to solve it. 
(Neisser. 1967. p,9)™ 
Neisser (1967) highlights the plausibility of working with the ideas that emerged from the 
cognitivist philosophy of mind, and its metaphorical use of computation, without fully 
advocating the hard-line views argued by its key figures (Gardner, 1985). The view portrayed 
to the psychology community by Neisser was that analogies to computation and mathematical 
logic were useful but not to be taken at face value. One way of interpreting Neisscr's (1967) 
use of terminologies, including 'information processing' and 'program', is as place-markers 
™Nei8ser's last senience above is particularly relevant lo the discussion of artificial intelligence and ils 
relationship lo human forms of knowing. There has been a growing amount of evidence over ihc pasl two 
decades that suggests that Ihe idea of an intelligent agent being 'pre-programmed' lo live in a predetermined 
world is jusi nol praclical in everyday contexts—be it for a human being, an animal, insect, robot or other (see 
Brooks, (1999; 198S); PfciferA Bongard, (2006)). These argumenls are discussed inmoredemil in chapter five 
of the thesis. 
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until more appropriate concepts and descriptions became available. ' In the following years, 
however, the terminologies used in the nascent cognitive psychology became increasingly 
analogous with those from the cognitive and computer sciences; information, storage, 
executive control, processing, input, output and subroutine became increasingly common 
ways to explain human cognition (Neisser, 1976). 
Shannon's information theory and subsequent theories of information-processing 
heavily informed the formation of the cognitivist theories within psychology. Predating the 
work of Neisser—around the same period of time as information theory was being introduced 
by the cybernetics researchers into contexts far broader than Shannon initially envisaged— 
some psychologists began examining the usetulness of information as a way of describing 
and studying the attributes of human memory. 
The research of George Miller (1956) is noted as significant in introducing 
information theory to the study of memory 7^ In Miller's (1956) case the interest was in the 
capabilities of the mind to filter and process information perceived irom the world. Miller 
was seemingly fascinated by the observation that human beings dealt with stimuli or objects 
of memory in a dramatically different manner beyond seven items. Miller determined the 
mind itself as a form of information input-output device. 
If you will now imagine a communication system, you will realize that there is a great 
deal of variability about what goes into the system and also a great deal of variability 
aboul what comes oul. The input and llie output can therefore be described in terms of 
their variance (or their infomialion). If it is a good communication system, however, 
there must be some systematic relation between what goes in and what comes oul. 
That is to say, the output will depend upon the input, or will be correlated with the 
input. If wc measure this correlation, then we can say how much ofthc output 
variance is attributable lo the input and how much is due to random fluctuations or 
"noise" introduced by the system during transmission. So we see that the measure of 
transmitted infonnation is simply a measure of the input-output correlation. (Miller, 
1956,p.344) 
' ' This is perhaps notable by (he manner in which Neisser, in his follow up 1976 text Cognitkm and Reality, 
emphasises how the then maturing discipline of cognitive psychology was showing signs of being overiy 
focused on the idea of infomialion processing and computational processes. The focus upon infornialion 
processing, which required highly rigorous and repealable laboratory experimenlalion, lacked any 'ecological 
validity' (Neisser, 1976, p.7), Neisser's later ideas, which mostly opposed his earlier cognitivial argument 
portrayed in 1967 as a result of the inherent lack of consideration for everyday situation, will be discussed in 
chapter five of this thesis. 
Miller was not alone in investigating the possible usefulness of information theory and its associated concepts 
in experimental psychology. William McGill's paper "Muilivariate Information Transmission' (McGill, 1954) 
predated Miller's first published work on information theory principles in psychology. In terms of the historical 
influence on the cognitive psychology of ageing, however, this thesis identifies Miller's work as introducing 
certain key ideas that appear to still influence contemporary studies within this field. 
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Miller (1956) introduced the first prominent example of taking the information theory 
approach to tracing data through communication systems into the realm of human 
psychology. Whilst the straight application of information theory and computer science to the 
study of human memory is highly problematic^^ and this thesis will present the case for an 
alternative in chapters five and six, the basic principles of Miller's work still appear to 
resonate in the concepts of ageing memory used within cognitively inclusive design. At the 
time Miller provided a radical move in providing a method for tracking how information 
flowed from the environment, through the mental apparatus of human beings, and back out 
again. Although Miller (1956) did not go as far as visualising this relatively simple idea 
schematically, it could be deduced that it would be somewhat akin to that of Figure 3. 
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Figure II Interpreration or Miller's (1956) basic model of human cognitive InformHllon processing. 
During the same period of time as Miller was conducting his studies, Donald 
Broadbent (1958) was investigating the information processing capacities of the human 
mental apparatus in a similar manner. Whereas Miller (1956) focused solely on the 
correlations between the input and output from the studied subject, Broadbent (1958) 
attempted to track intbrmafion through the organism as it gets processed into and out of 
various types of storage. This meant that rather than purely correlating information going into 
and out of the organism, Broadbent (1958, p.299) proposed it may be possible to break this 
up into stages or steps for ftirther correlating. Broadbent went as far as providing a schematic 
'information-flow diagram' that somewhat visualised the processes, systems and sub-systems 
^ The period in whicli Miller was working on his application of information theory to psychology was a time in 
where many scientists of the human mind feU studying information as key to understanding the human psyche. 
'The enthusiasm—nay, faddishness- of the times is hard to capture now. Many felt thai a very deep truth of the 
mind had been uncovered' (Luce, 2003, p. 185). Claude Shannon questioned theapplicabilily of information 
theory to areas of study beyond those of the study of communication ihal is original work intended. Shannon is 
quoted an staling 'infonnalion theory has perhaps ballooned to an importance beyond its actual 
accomplishments', (cited in Johnson (2001)) highlighting his scepticism of information theory's usage in a wide 
array of fields during the 1950s. 
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associated with the flowing of information through the mental apparatus of the human subject 
(Figure 4). 
The use of flow and schematic charts as a tool for describing the models of the human 
mind appeared to be logical due to the engineering-derived approach to these new techniques 
of learning about the mind. Although various approaches to the discipline of cognitive 
psychology were devised during its formative years, the informational theoretical approach 
developed by Miller and Broadbent appeared to be of particular interest. (Gardner. 1985) 
Following Miller and Broadbent, many of the information-theoretical studies were focused 
upon various aspects of memory. In such studies, infonnalion flow charis such as those 
introduced by Broadbent became increasingly commonplace. More significantly, however, 
his claims that human memory could be separated into discrete steps and functions became 
widespread, with the development of elaborated models of memory formed of many 
components and sub-components. Although the pioneering work of Miller and Broadbenl is 
now considered highly limited, the fundamental characteristics of their research (for example 
the increasing compartmentalisation of memory in cognitive psychology and the underlying 
information theoretical basis of cognition) are still evident in the application of ageing 
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Figure IZ 'A fenlative informaflon'flow dingram for the organism' adapted from Broadbenl (]957« p.299). 
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3.3. Cognitive concepts of memory and human ageing 
As people age, their ahiliiy to encode and recall complex memories deteriorates, whilst the basic 
information-processing abilities required to transform and manipulate short-term memories are 
substantially limited. 
Traditionally, psychologists have found the division of memory into short term and long tenn 
variants usefiil as it provides a way of "categorising memories by the length of time over 
which they are retained' (Stuart-Hamilton, 2006, p.9y). 'Short-term memory is the temporary 
storage of events and items perceived in the very immediate past: that is, events and items 
that occurred no more than a few minutes ago, and usually a much shorter period {i.e. the last 
few seconds)" (Stuart-Hamilton, 2006, p.99). Whereas,'[l]ong-term memory seeks to be a 
permanent store of information' (Stuart-Hamilton. 2006, p. 100). It appears, however, that the 
introduction of information theory into the psychological study of memory (as discussed in 
the previous section) marked the opportunity to turtlier define and isolate functional 
components of human memory beyond these initial distinctions. Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) 
made explicit the idea that human memory could be separated into three key components; the 
sensory register, short term storage and long term storage (Figure 5). Atkinson and Shiffrin 
defined these components as the following: 
Incoming sensory infonnation first enters the sensory register, where it resides for a 
very brief period of time, then decays and is lost. The short-lerm store is the subjecls's 
working memory; it receives selected inputs from the sensory register and also from 
long-term store, InfonnalJon in the slion-lerm store decays completely and is lost 
within a period of about 30 seconds. [.,.] The Long-temi store is a fairly permanent 
repository for information, information which is transferred from the short-term store. 
Note that "transfer" is not meant to imply that infonnalion is removed from one store 
and places in the next; we use transfer to mean the copying of selected information 
from one store into the next without removing this infonnation from the original 
store. (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968, pp,14-i5) 
Atkinson and Shiffrin's model waskeyin the development of cognitive psychology literature 
as it introduced the idea that memory can be reduced beyond the broad areas of short and 
long term forms of storage. Althougli this model is of less relevance contemporarily, it 
popularised the notion that human knowledge production, acquisition and recollection can be 
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Figure 13 Atkinson anil Shlffrln's proposed structure of the human memory system. Adapted from Atkinson and 
Shl f r r ln( l968,p. l7) . 
Ahhough a useful starting point for the cognitive study of memory, there was a view 
within the memory research community that the modal model offered by Atkinson and 
Shifirin did little justice to the complexities of human memory and overly simplified its 
operation (Baddeley, 2007). Atkinson and Shiffriirs (1968) model assumed that if an 
individual holds information in short term storage long enough, then it gets transferred to the 
long term "fairly permanent' store. Alongside this assumption, Atkinson and Shiffrin also 
suggested that a person required their universal short-term store to be ftinctioning correctly in 
order for information to be transferred to the long term store. A number of cognitive 
experiments, in particular those of Alan Baddeley and Graham Hitch (such as Baddeley and 
Hitch (1974)), observed that these underlying claims did not stand up, leading to two 
alternative positions of understanding the components of memory.^ '* These coexisting 
approaches individually examine the short term and long term aspects of memory, and 
although studied separately have become complimentary to one another and integrated in the 
cognitive psychology literature. As will be explained, these approaches are particularly 
important to the subject of this thesis, as they appear to heavily influence cognitively 
inclusive design. 
''* Baddeiey and Hitch's argumeni againsi Alkinson and ShilTnn is discussed later in this chapter. 
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3.3.1. Levels of processing, long term memory and ageing 
Fergus Craik and Robert Lockhart (1972) developed an alternative to Atkinson and Shiffm's 
model which became referred to as the 'levels of processing' effect, Craik and Lockhart 
(1972) argued that rather than being merely dependent upon holding information in short 
temi storage for a certain length of time, the transfer of information into long term storage 
was more related to the type of processing that is performed on the information. Whereas 
Atkinson and Shiffrin's model separated the processing of information and the perception of 
information into distinct and separate stores, Craik and Lockhart (1972) argued that 
perception and the cognitive processing of information were more intimately connected. 
[W]e prefer to think of memory tied to levels of perceptual processing. Although 
these levels may be grouped into stages (sensory analyses, paHem recognition, and 
stimulus elaboration, for example) processing levels may be more usefully envisaged 
as a continuum of analysis. Thus, memor>', loo, is viewed as a continuum from ihc 
transient products of sensory analyses to the highly durable products of 
semantic-associative operations. (Craik & Lockhart, 1972, p.683) 
The position outlined by Craik and Lockhart is that the manner in which information transfers 
from perception to long term memory can be thought as a continuum moving from the 
shallow to the deep. The principle behind this conceptualisation is that the shallower 
information is processed, the less likely it is to be transferred to long term memory; the 
deeper it is processed, then the more likely it is to be remembered (Craik & Lockhart, 1972). 
Baddeley explains what constitutes deep processing based upon these claims: 
Tliey [Craik and Lockliart] suggested that probability of subsequent recall or 
recognition was a direct flinction of the depth to which an item was processed. Hence, 
if ihesubject merely noted the visual characteristics of a word, for example whether it 
was in upper or lower case, little learning would follow. Slightly more would be 
remembered if the word were also processed acoustically by deciding, for example, 
whether it rhymed with a specified target word. By far the best recall, however, 
followed semantic processing, in which the subject made a judgement about the 
meaning of the word, or perhaps related it to a specified sentence, or to his/her own 
experience. (Baddeley, 2004, p.2) 
As Baddeley (2004) highlights, levels of processing varies based upon the manner 
information was perceived, subsequently transferred to memory, and how this transferral 
interacts with previously stored memories. For example, as Craik and Lockhart's argument 
goes, information that is only quickly gleaned from the environment would, consequentially, 
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only have a minimal amount of processing. Alternatively, information that is repeatedly 
perceived, has relevance to already stored memories or happens to be particularly relevant to 
whatever task is at hand, would incur a deep level of processing and be more likely to be 
transferred to long term storage. Furthering the computational metaphor, Craik and 
Lockhart's work established a then novel focus on the relationship between the manner in 
which information was 'encoded' from perception to the brain and the organisation of long 
term storage. 
Although the suggestion of understanding cognitive processing as a continuum from 
shallow to deep suggests memory could be understood as a dynamic process, Craik and 
Loekhart's influential theory has rather amplified arguments for the compartmentalisation of 
human memory in cognitive psychology. As noted above, prior to Craik and Lockhart, 
psychologists were already decomposing long term memory into smaller, distinct 
components, the most frequent being the divide between explicit and implicit or declarative 
and nondeclaritive memory (Baddeley, 2004). In the context of psychological study, explicit 
(declarative) memory refers 'to tasks in which people are directly tested on episodes from 
their recent experience; In performing the tasks people are instructed to remember events and 
presumably are aware that they are recollecting previous experiences.' Contrastingly, 
'[i]mplicit memory is revealed when performance on a task is facilitated in the absence of 
conscious recollection' (Graf & Schachter, 1985, p.501). 
Endcl Tulving (1972), both influencing and influenced by Craik and Lockhari's level 
of processing theory^*, developed an argument for the further separation of memory systems 
by suggesting that the declarative/explicit further compartmentalised into semantic and 
episodic memory systems.^^ Tulving (1972) classified episodic knowledge as the explicit 
recollection of past experiences and their temporal relations, whereas semantic knowledge 
related to a person's general knowledge of the world and the understanding of concepts. 
Endel Tulving and Fergus Craik collaborated at great length over the course of their careers in cognitive 
psychology and (heir theories developed and iiilbrnied one another. The relaledness of Tulving's llioory of 
semantic and episodic memory to Craik and Ix)ckliarl's is perhaps best emphasised by Tulving's collaborations 
with Craik on a number of 'levels of processing' studies at tlie University of Toronto (such as Craik and Tulving 
(1975)). 
Endel Tulving is a prominent example of cognitive research that focused upon the separalion of particular 
memory systems wilhin the cognitive psychological discipline; however, his work is one of the most ofl-ciled 
examples, particularly in conceiving the distinction between semantic and episodic memory. Although Tulving 
mostly restricted calegories of long term memory lo semantic and episodic, a briefsearch of literature reviews 
and synthesis articles identifies a huge array of alternative classifications. Concepts such as semanlic memory, 
autobiographical memory, implicit memory, declarative memory, explicit memory, procedural memory, and 
episodic memory, among others, are all identified as reducible functions of human long term memory. Despite 
all these diverse and, on occasions, only subtly different concepts of memory within cognitive psychology, 
almost all these concepts can be distinguished into eitlier explicit/declarative or implicit/non-declarilive forms 
(Siuart-Hamilloii2006). 
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labels and their relations. Later on, Tulving added the concept of procedural memory to his 
theory of the organisation of long term memory, whilst also slightly adjusting these 
definitions. 
Procedural memory enables organisms to retain learned connections between stimuli 
and responses, including those involving complex stimulus paitems and response 
chains, and lo respond adaptively to ihe environment. Semantic memory is 
characterized by the additional capability of internally representing states of the world 
that are not perceptually present. It permits the organism to construct mental models 
of the world [...] models that can be manipulated and operated on covertly, 
independently of any overt behaviour. Episodic memory affords the additional 
capability of acquisition and retention of knowledge about personally experienced 
events and their temporal relations in subjective time and the ability to mentally 
"travel back" in lime. (Tulving, 1985. p.387) 
Figure 14 Tulving's monohlerarchlcal tri-memory system. Adapted from Tulving (1985). 
The definition of procedural memory provides an aspect of implicit memory and learning that 
Tulving had not previously considered in his definitions of semantic and episodic memory. 
This tri-memory system Tulving developed (Figure 6) was conceived to be 
'•monohierarchicaP, meaning higher-level forms of memory could only exist if the organism 
possesses the lower-level system. (Tulving, 1985) Therefore, episodic memory is dependent 
upon semantic memory, and thus semantic memory is dependent upon procedural mcmory.^^ 
^ Within more recent literature thai cites and develops Tulving's concepts the monoheirachical basis of his 
argument appears to be either not considered or disregarded. This is particularly evident when Tulving's 
concepts arc transferred from cognitive psychology into tlie broader human factors literature. For example. 
Schciber (2003) describes episodic, scmanlic and procedural memory as discrete enlilies that arc not necessarily 
dependent upon one-another. 
Tulvitig's theory works neatly with the framework developed by Craik and Lockhail (1972) 
as it supposes that those processes that require less perceptual processing—the almost 
automated procedural processes—^are the more basic cognitive processes. The semantic 
system is built upon the procedural, and thus the episodic on top of the semantic, requiring 
greater amounts of perceptual and cognitive processing. 
The cognitive memory systems defined by Tulving (1985) have become a regular test-
bed for the study of the effects of the human ageing process on the performance of long term 
memory. The general consensus within the literature suggests that aspects related to the 
semantic and procedural systems are generally robust in later life, whilst episodic memories 
decline in reliability (Schieber, 2003).'"' Experiments into why episodic memory declines 
more than procedural or semantic systems in older age have suggested that it is related to a 
reduced ability to integrate perceptual information with already existing memories (Schieber, 
2003). If we are to subscribe to Craik and Lockhart's (1972) levels of processing framework, 
then limitations in the ability to process and encode information from perception into long 
term memory storage provides an explanation for the limitations in episodic recollections. If 
we assume that, with age, the functions related to the encoding and processing of infonnation 
deteriorate, but are still functioning at a limited capacity, then the memory systems requiring 
the deepest level of encoding (such as episodic memory) would be those that become the 
most observably dysfunctional. 
Studies of ageing and long tenn memory certainly suggest that there are 'robust' areas 
of cognitive fimctioning where there is little decline in ability. Al the same time, however, 
these studies also suggest there may be problematic elements related to the storage of new 
long term memories. There appears to be a consensus within the cognitive psychology 
" Two words of caution should be considered throughout the discu.tsion of the differences between young and 
old in psychological studies. Firstly, differences between groups of people are inherently hard to quantify and 
qualify through experimental procedures. Stuart-Hamilton (2006. p.61) notes that 'the 'true' size of a decline 
may be different from what has been measured, lliis is a common theme in psychological studies - since 
researchers cannot open up tlie brain and see thought taking place, everything has to be inferred from behaviour 
and this inevitably means that some error creeps in.' Secondly, all studies of ageing also have the problem of 
grouping together individuals in order to compare old, or the very old, or the middle-aged, or teenagers, to one 
another. Individual variances in the participants of a particular test is not always documented in the published 
material, although RabbitI (1984) is an example of a comparison between young and old that does. Rabbit's 
study measured mental abilities known as fluid and crystallised intelligence, which will be discussed in more 
detail later in this section. Rabbit noted thai in testing, when discussed as whole groups there was little change in 
certain abilities between young and old but large differences in others. The conclusion that might be drawn from 
reading such results is that all the older people declined in this one ability, but Rabbilt (1984) observed this was 
simply not the case. Although there were more poorly performing older people on this particular ability 
measure, there were a number of older participants who had not had any decline (Rabbitt, 1984). As such, all of 
the generalised changes with age in certain cognitive abilities highlighted in this section need to be read bearing 
in mind they are not inevitable for all. As much as this is true for psychological studies, it is also the case in any 
discussion of older people Interacting with digital media. 
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literature that the deterioration in the capability to encode and retrieve certain long term 
memories is rather a side-effect of more significant changes occurring in areas of human 
short temi memory (Park & Gutchless, 2005; Park et ai, 1996; Salthouse, 1994; Salthouse, 
1996). In particular, changes to the cognitive functions associated with working memory, a 
concept developed and investigated at length by Alan Baddeley and colleagues, are heavily 
implicated in many of the cognitive limitations that appear to manifest later in life. 
3.3.2. The significance of working memory in the study of cognitive ageing 
The levels of processing ft-amework of memory brouglit about a significant interest within the 
cognitive psychological discipline in the study of long term memory storage. It appeared to 
Alan Baddeley and Graham Hitch that a similar depth of discussion related to the short term 
aspects of memory, and how such a system may interact and relate to perception and long 
term storage, was somewhat lacking (Baddeley, 2007). Baddeley and Hitch (1974) focused in 
particular on the claimed over-simplification of the short-temi aspects of memory that was 
found in the previously introduced modal mode! of memory by Atkinson and Shiflrin. In a 
similar vein to that of Endel Tulving's monohierarchical framework of long term memory, 
Baddeley and Hitch (1974) proposed that rather than the short term store of memory being 
made of a singular component, it was itself a multiple component system formed of a 
visuospatial sketchpad, a phonological loop and a central executive (Figure 7). 
Visuospatiai 
Sketchpad Central Executive 
Phonological 
Loop 
Figure 15 BNddeley and Kllch's original propoi^al for the worklni ; memory system. Adapted from Baddeley (2000). 
In the intervening years since its initial conceptualisation, Baddeley and various 
colleagues have refined and expanded the model of working memory. Over Ume, the initial 
three components have multiplied, as did the arrows distinguishing the flow of information 
from one system to another. The refinement of the model initially focused on the role of the 
central executive, which was initially argued to be a somewhat general purpose system that 
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controlled attention, as it appeared to lack conceptual and empirical clarity. This led to the 
identification of an 'episodic bufTer' that formed 'an interface between the three working 
memory subsystems and long-term memory' (Baddelcy, 2007, p.l3), as shown on the right in 
Figure 8. This alteration to the model allowed for an increased level of integration between 
Baddeley's model and the research of numerous other cognitive studies focused upon the role 
of information processing into and out of long term memory (Baddeley, 2007). Further 
studies that focused ujjon the role of emotion on cognition led to further additions to 
Baddeley's (2007) model of working memory. The initially simple, yet powerftil, model of 
working memory has over time sprouted multiple sub-systems and become increasingly 
complex (as visualised in Figure 8). 
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Figure 16 Further developments to Badclelcy and Hllcli 's model of working memory. 
Although the continuous expansion of Baddeley's model of working memory 
suggests some limitations to its conceptual basis, it has proved to be highly influential and 
robust within cognitive psychology. Baddelcy (2007) puts this down in part to the working 
memory research being seemingly compatible with much of the levels of processing research 
focused upon long term storage. As shown in Figure 8, it appears thai the assumption is that 
working memory acts as a type of dynamic and tluid ability of processing and attending to 
certain perceptual information, whereas the long term memory act as a crystallized, 'solid 
state' of storage. Although long temi storage interacts and has information placed into and 
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out of it all the time, the suggestion appears to be thai it is a far less dynamic process than the 
components of working memory. 
Working memory research is particularly ccniral to cognitively inclusive design as 
declines in its functioning arc some of the most profound and often observed changes to 
cognition in later life (Baddeley 2007). Beyond this, changes to working memory are often 
considered to be linked with problems with other memory systems. Park and Gutchless 
(2005, pp.218-219) note that '[s]tudies have conclusively demonstrated that both speed of 
processing and working memory mediate most, if not all, age-related variance in long-term 
memory', suggesting that whilst the aforementioned changes in episodic memory are 
significant, they are possibly just an atter-effect of the more significant limitations to these 
crucial functions of human cognition, In particular, it has been observed that in relatively 
simple short term memory tasks there appears to be no significant difference between the 
ability to recall information between younger and older people (Stuart-Hamilton, 2006)^^. As 
soon as short term memory tasks become more complicated, however, and require a person to 
transform infonnation or having to remember multiple bits of information for various tasks, 
older people are noted to significantly suffer (Stuart-Hamilton, 2006). Stuart-Hamihon 
observes that 'memory span is relatively unaffected by ageing - the principal deficit is in 
organising the material that is to be remembered and in juggling different tasks when doing 
something more complex than simply remembering a list of items' (Stuart-Hamilton, 2006, 
p.l03).*° In terms of his model of working memory, Baddeley (1986) cited deteriorations in 
the central executive as the primary reason for these declines in ability. It would appear that 
whilst certain aspects of long term memory continue to fimction well in old age, essentially, 
older people are poor processors of information. 
" Basic short term memory word span lesls assess the 'primary' allribules of short term memory. The concept 
of primary memory in conlemporary cognitive psychology is often attributed to Waugh and Norman (1965), 
who argued that short term memory could be divided into a more basic store (primary) and a larger, 
transformative store (secondary). Craikef a/. (1995) note how Waugh and Norman's separation appears to 
invoke an earhcr description made by William James about the features ofshort term consciousness. James' 
descriptions, along with Waugh and Norman's experimental rL'search, are somewhat evidenced in Baddley's 
model of working memory. 
'" It does not appear to take much complication of the standard word span lesls to make the differences between 
young and old become more noticeable. Craik (1986) had young and older people perform what was a standard 
word span test with the added necessity to read back aloud the list of words in alphabetical order rather than the 
order in which they were initially read out lo them. Craik (19H6) observed that even a very simple extension to 
the already simple word span tests can highlight the declines in working memory ability older people must 
contend with. 
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3.4. Older people arc poor processors of information 
Old people are understood to be poor processors o} information but a storehouse of long term 
memories, claims that largely influence cognitivety inclusive design. 
It is possible to summarise the historical and theoretical basis of the cognitive psychology of 
ageing—as it is applied in cognitively inclusive design—in the following points: 
• The findings of the cognitive study of memory research are suggested to be important 
to many of the changes that are understood to occur in the human cognitive system as 
people age. 
• The dominant way of conceptualising memory in cognitive psychology of ageing is 
that it is formed of various sub-systems of information processors. 
• These information-processors can be separated into dynamic, transformative and fluid 
mechanisms (such as the working memory system) or static, stored and crystallized 
mechanisms (many of the long term memory systems). 
• These memory systems are understood in an abstract functional manner, distinct from 
the physiology of human beings. 
The above claims do not provide a particularly positive description of cognition in later life. 
As Ian Stuart-Hamilton (2006, p.127) puts it, 'the familiar complaint of many older people 
that their memories 'aren't what they used to be* seems in the main to be justified. Memory 
does decline in later life, and despite a few areas of relative preservation [...] the outlook is 
downwards.' As people age, it seems as though the cognitive abilities dramatically emphasise 
the static; the development of new memories is lost and as a result leaves only the traces of 
the past. 
Moving briefly outside the cognitive study of ageing memory, research into the fluid 
and crystallized sub-components of human intelligence provides complimentary 
observations. Raymond Cattell" and his student John Horn considered that whilst all 
Human intelligence here is described in the conlexl of its study within the discipline of experimental 
psychology, building upon the foundational research of Charles Spearman (1904; 1923; 1927). Speamian 
developed a 'Theory of Imelligence' thai divided inielligence into 'general' and 'specific' forms. For Spearman, 
intelligence was understood as the quantifiable ability for an individual to perform well on intelligence tests, 
where general inlelligence was a figure representing one's continuous intellectual ability applied over tests, and 
specific inlelligence representing ihe inlellectual abilities used on highly specialised tasks. 
*' Raymond Callcll is a particularly controversial figure within psychology. Although his research into fluid and 
crystallized intelligence is generally considered his significant contribution to the discipline, in recent years his 
work has become overshadowed by the ideological nature of some of his other writings. As Tucker (2009) 
argues in great length and detail, much of Callcll's work on intelligence is rooled in his broader interest in 
eugenics and 'Beyondist' theology. Although similar criticisms were made of Charles Spearman, whose work 
86 
intellectual skills make use of the ability of general intelligence, certain types of task require 
the utilisation of specialist sub-systems of intelligence (e.g. Cattell, 1971; Horn, 1978; Horn 
& Cattell, 1967). Cattell and Horn developed the concepts of fluid intelligence and 
crystallized intelligence to describe specific intellectual abilities they felt were observably 
and behaviourally separable. Cattell (1971, p.98) states: 
itnmediately it can be seen that the crystallized ability (gc) expressions, through 
judginenlal. discinminatory, and reasoning nature, operate in areas where the 
judgments have been laughl systemalicaljy or experienced before. 
Whereas, fluid intelligence: 
is an expression of the level of complexity of relationships which an individual can 
perceive and act upon when he does not liave recourse lo answers to such complex 
issues already stored in memory. (Caltell, 1971, p.99) 
Horn and Cattell (1967) noted very early on in the development of these separate components 
of human intelligence there appeared to be dramatic shifts in certain abilities in reference to 
the age of tested participants. They noted that fluid intelligence was typically higher in 
younger adults than older adults, and vice-versa for crystallised intelligence. Their initial 
observations have been similarly noted in numerous comparisons between fluid and 
crystallised skills in young and old since (e.g. Cunningham, Clayton &. Overton (1975); 
Hayslip & Stems (1979); Rabbitt a al. (2004))." It is noteworthy how the definitions of fluid 
and crystallized intelligence complement the division of working and much of long term 
memory as alluded to by Baddeley and others. It is equally notable how the observations of 
these intellectual abilities with age compare well with the cognitive study of ageing memory; 
the fluid and transformative skills decline in ability, the crystallized and stored skills maintain 
ability. 
The cognitive psychology of ageing research presents a scenario where older people 
are fundamentally limited in perceiving and acting in the world as a result of the significant 
deterioration of cognitive information-processing that occurs in old age. In situations where 
an older person is required to process considerable amounts of information, an example being 
greatly influenced Cattell, it is Cattell's prominence as a significant academic within the contemporary scientific 
smdy of human psychology ihat has perhaps made Tucker's claims all the more provocative. Although this 
thesis does not attend (he provocative issues addressed by Tucker, it is perhaps important to consider the 
ideological context Catlell's research was performed in when applied in design. 
" Sluart-llamillon (2006) notes thai the only notable difference between Horn and Catleirs( 1967) original 
study and subsequent tests appears to be that the original authors may have, if anything, underestiniaicd the age 
al which fluid skills begin to decline. 
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when interacting with digital media products and interfaces, certain aspects of the interaction 
exchange will take more effort to process, or may not be cognitively processed at all. 
An approach to designing based upon the knowledge from the cognitive psychology 
of ageing will have a number of limitations. Primarily, as was highlighted in the previous 
chapter and discussed in more detail in the tinal sections of this chapter, a designer working 
with the claims of cognitive change in later life is always going to be identifying ways to 
limit the interactivity of digital media, not increase it. Secondly, by applying the cognitive 
psychology of ageing literature within a design process, cognitively inclusive designers 
appear to implicitly subscribe to a reductionist model of human-technology interaction. 
Whilst this thesis is not a critique of reductionist methods, such as cognitivism, as they are 
used in cognitive psychology and science, there are problems when the principles underlying 
this discipline are transferred into design theory and practice without critical reflection. These 
issues will be explained in detail in the following chapter, which highlights the limitations of 




The problems of the current cognitive approaches to design 
Question: What are the potential limitations of the contemporary approach to cognitively 
inclusive design in reference to the broader context of research on interactions betn'een 
people and digital media? 
4.1. WJiilst cognitively inclusive desi^ focused upon the prediction, inscription and prescription of 
interaction, there are both practical and philosophical reasons as to why this is limited in an 
approach lo designing digital media products for older people. 
4.2. The focus on prediction, inscription and prescription appears to be the result of a fascination 
with constructing models of users in order to generate design outcomes; in doing so, the designer 
fiindamentally limits the agency of the people who use their products. 
4.3. The constructions made in cogniiiveiy inclusive design are useful as they provide fixed points of 
reference for the designer to work with: the issue of cognitive ageing, however, requires a sen.sitivity 
to the ongoing temporal changes to cognition that occur as people age, and how these relate to 
interactions with digital media. 
4.4. Designers requiring an explanation of the cognitive disconnection between older people and 
digital media are currently limited to the cognitive psychology of ageing as the dominant knowledge 
on changes to the ageing mind, which makes it difficult lo move away from the preceding limitations. 
4.5. From the limitations identified in this chapter, it is possible to propose a number of themes with 
which an alternative to cognitively inclusive design might be developed. 
4.1 . The limitations of prediction, inscription and prescription. 
Whilst cognitively inclusive design focused upon the prediction, inscription and prescription of 
interaction, there are both practical and philosophical reasons as to why this is limited in an 
approach to designing digital media products for older people. 
In chapter two, a number of research projects attending to the cognitive disconnection 
between older people and digital media were brought together under the title of cognitively 
inclusive design. Chapter three identified how much of cognitively inclusive design is 
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founded upon certain principles rooted in the cognitivist philosophy of mind. Cognitively 
inclusive design is based upon the examination of the past experiences and technological 
familiarities of older people in order to bypass the information-processing limitations of 
cognitive ageing. This process, it is argued, leads to a subsequent exploration and application 
of metaphors and references to historical forms of interaction in the design of novel digital 
media products and interfaces. It appears, therefore, that the process of cognitively inclusive 
designing is focused upon identifying how attributes of the user—in this case their cognitive 
abilities, bodily experiences and prior interactions with technology—may be reflected in the 
designed outcome. 
One way to convey the process of the contemporary approaches informing cognitively 
inclusive design is that of predicting, inscribing and prescribing the actions of the older user 
of a digital media product. The designer makes certain predictions as to how an older person 
may act within a particular technological context; these predictions are used as a generative 
mechanism for the design process and subsequently inscribed into the design of a digital 
media product. Tlie user is conceptually prescribed how they can and cannot act with a 
product as a consequence of the features of their past experience the designer indentifies as 
contextually relevant. In the case of cognitively inclusive design, this prescription emerges as 
a requirement for design as a result of cognitive ageing, which suggests older people make 
best use of digital media when drawing upon prior experiences with technologies. 
This chapter will address some of the implicit problems within this design approach 
on both a practical and philosophical level. The prominent work of Lucy Suchman (1987), 
which developed from anthropological critiques of cariy human-computer interaction 
research, highlights how reliance upon cognitivist models of human psychology in the design 
of interactive systems leads the designer to make predetemiined plans of how a user will 
interact with a particular system. Suchman {1987, p.3) argued that such a designer 'treats a 
plan as something located in the actor's head, which directs his or her behavior" and 
prescribes action 'at every level of detail' (1987, p.27). '' Although the use of a plan as a way 
of modelling the cognitive functioning of a user is useful (as it is deemed to be in the studies 
discussed in chapters one and three), Suchman {1987, p.39) takes issue with them being used 
"•' When referencing the concept of using a plan to predict and inscribe interactions between a user and a 
technological-system, it appears thai Card eial.'s (1983) GOMS method of analysis and the traditional human 
factors approach to analysing and redesigning digital products were primary targets for Suchman's (1987) 
argumeni. Although Suchnian's{1987) argumenl was published over a decade prior to much of the work 
described in chapter three, it might be fair to assume these approaches, focusing upon the description, prediction 
and inscription of a person's relevant prior experiences, would be included as problematic design processes. 
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as a "generative mechanism for action". Her argument is founded upon ethnographic 
observations and her subsequent analysis of novice users trying to use a then-novel 'double-
sided scan' feature of a photocopying machine and an 'expert-help feature' intended to 
simplily its use. She further argues that the help feature, designed with a plan for human 
actions, tasks and goals in mind, did not hold up on a practical level, especially in light of the 
manner in which people appear to make sense of situated activities. Suchman (1987) argued 
that a constraining factor for most people interacting with novel digital products is the limited 
access that an object such as a 1980s Xerox photocopier has to the intentions of the user. In 
order to get around this: 
the designer of the expert help system attempts to circumvenl those constrainls 
through prediction of the user's actions and detection of the effects of actions taken. 
When the actual course of action that the user constructs proceeds in the way that ihc 
design anticipates, effects of the user's actions can be mapped to the projected plan 
and the system can be engineered to make an appropriate response. (Suchman, 1987, 
p. 169) 
In her analysis of users interacting with this system, Suchman (1987) observed attributes of 
the human interaction with the technology that emerged in real-time and could not be 
accounted for in the a prior/modelling of the user inscribed in the design of the system. 
The new user of a system [...] is engaged in ongoing, situated inquiries regarding an 
appropriate next action. While the instructions of the expert help system are designed 
in anticipation of the user's inquiries, problems arise from the user's ability to move 
easily between a simple request for a next action, "meta" inquiries about the 
appropriateness of the procedure itself, and embedded requests for clarification of the 
actions described within a procedure. (Suciiman, 1987. p.169) 
Highlighting the ethnomethodological and conversation analysis backdrop of her research, 
Suchman argued that the user interprets aspects of the machine's communications as they 
would in conversing with another human being, but this is an expectation that the machine 
cannot live up to.^*' A plan is just one factor that forms a person's interaction with a digital 
media product and that, in the practical context where everyday activities take place, 
interaction is rather unpredictable. Instead of focusing upon a priori modelling, Suchman 
"* The use of cognitive psychology and rationalistic methods within the design of technological systems has 
been argued againsl for some lime, with prominent scholarship such as Suchman (1987; 2007), Winograd and 
Fiores (1986). Agre (1997) and Coyne (1999). 
'* Much of Suchman's (1987) analysis of human-computer interactions was based upon a method of 
ethnographic analysis called ethnomethodology, originating in the work of Howard Garfinkel(l967). In HCl, 
ethnomethodology is typically used as a way of analysing ethnographic observations of the raomenl-by-moment 
conversational inleraclions between people in particular situational contexts. 
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argued that designers of digital media systems examine the situated actions of groups of 
people. She defined situated action as "an emergent property of moment-by-moment 
interactions between actors, and between actors and the environments of their action' {1987, 
p. 179). The move from the cognitive scientific stance to situated action realigns the 
designer's role Irom engineering the information passed between the symbolic system of 
human cognition and the symbolic system of computational apparatus, to being an observer 
of the situated activity and designing in response to the analysis of these observations. 
Sucliman's work illuminates how modelling the user in an o priori manner is overly 
restrictive in the context of designing digital media interfaces. In the example of the novel 
photocopier system, it appears that the cognitive model of the office worker applied by the 
systems designer-—fi"om cognifive science —fails to account for the non-cognifive 
situational context. 
At the same time as Suchman was developing her account of human-machine 
communicaUon, Winograd and Flores (1986) provided their seminal critique of artificial 
reason. Winograd and Flores, through readings of Heidegger, Gadamerand Maturana, 
developed a phenomenologieal perspective on the use of technology thai un-concealcd the 
depth at which reductionist and rationalistic conceptions of human thought and 
communication had penetrated the then nascent field of human-computer interaction. Both 
Winograd and Flores (1986) and Suchman's (1987) critiques have heavily influenced human-
computer interaction research since. Winograd and Flores (1986), however, is considered 
somewhat problematic as their alternative framework for human-computer communication— 
based upon Searle's speech act theory-—can also be considered heavily rationalist (Suchman, 
1993). Suchman's alternative approach—based upon ethnographic observation and 
ethnomethodo logical analysis—has found much more favour within human-computer 
interacfion research, leading to a paradigmatic change from the emphasis on cognitive models 
to the exploration of the situational context.*"* The subsequent 'ethnographic turn' (McCarthy 
*^  This refers lo ihe co-extensive developmenl of computer science and cognitive science, particularly during the 
period of lime that Suclinian's original argument was developed in. As was discussed in chapter two, cognitive 
and compulcr science were developed alongside one-anolher and Ihe knowledge of computational engineering 
and programming informed the study of human cognition, and vice-versa. The computational paradigm of 
understanding the human mind, it was argued, would be paniculariy useful when developing computer systems 
where people needed to communicate with computational machines. This is particularly noteworthy in Card el 
«/.'s (1983), where Newell's background in cognilivist approaches to studying the mind is particularly apparent. 
"" Atier Suchman's (1987) initial publication, the analysis of ethnographic and observational material became 
increasingly popular within studies of human-computer interaction, particularly in die context of augmenting 
workplaces with computer technologies. Prominent examples of the use of elhnomethodology in workplace 
studies is a series of studies of air traffic control (ATC) centres, initially developed at Lancaster University by 
Hughes « « / . (Harper & Hughes, 1993; Hughes cI a/., 1995) with fimher studies taking place at other centres as 
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and Wright, 2004, p.34) in human-computer interaction lead to a greater emphasis on the 
social construction of activity {such as Nardi, 1996) and the distribution of cognition around 
social environments (such as in Hutchins, 1995). 
The influence of Suchman's argument is particularly evident in Paul Dourish"s(2001) 
later argument that it is the user that manages their own couplings with a digital media 
product, and not the designer. Coupling, for Dourish (2001), is the intentioned process of 
making a connection with a digital system—and this process is under the control of the user, 
not the designer. It is difficult for the designer to predict exactly how a person may couple 
with a digital media product, and a design approach that attempts to do so may be inherently 
flawed. Dourish suggests that this is both a practical and a philosophical issue for d e s i ^ , 
bringing the ontological stance of the designer into question. By "designer's stance' Dourish 
(2001, p.172) refers to 'the designer's conception of what he or she is doing, and in 
particular, of his or her role in an interaction between the user and the artefact.' He argues 
that: 
This stance has to be transformed when we recognize that users play a much more 
active roie in delcrmining precisely how a technology will meet their needs—needs 
that are continually changing, and thai will be satisfied using a variety of features of 
the setting, of which the technological artefact is only one. In other words, the precise 
way in which the artefact will be used to accomplish the work will be determined by 
the user, rather than by the designer, instead of designing ways for the artefact to be 
used, the designer instead needs to focus on ways for the user to understand the tool 
and understand how to apply it to each situation. The designer's stance is revised as 
the designer is less directly "present" in the interaction between the user and the 
artefact. (Dourish, 2001, pp.172-173) 
Dourish argues here that the immediate consequence of this altered stance is an alternative 
array of design activities and concerns. "In particular, the designer's attention is now focused 
on the resources that a design should provide to users in order for them to appropriate the 
artefact and incorporate it into their practice' (Dourish, 2001, p. 173). 
a result (Bemdtsson & Normark, 1999: Mackay, 1999; Rognin el al., 1998). The ethnography oflhe workplace, 
in il.s actual settings, highlights ihe activities oflhe air traffic controllers in a highly different manner to thai 
noted in procedural manuals of the work. The studies by Hughes ef a/. (1995) highlighted the significance of the 
'tlighl strips', a piece of card that reprcsenl certain data of an aircraft as it is in the control of the ATC's 
airspace. A simplistic analysis oflhe ffighl strips may be that ihey merely hold and communicale information, 
and could be augmenied or replaced by a digital representation instead. However, a deeper elhnomethodological 
analysis suggests thai lliey are far more integral lo how work is done; ihey hold handwritten information of 
various individuals, move across ihe centre from one station to the next, and can be configured in sequences thai 
represent (he air traffic as it is. The assumption may be thai the "basic' card strips aid the greater technological 
representations of radar systems, whereas in practice it is the other way round. 
93 
The arguments of Suchman (1987) and Dourish (2001) highlight a key limitation to 
the contemporary approaches of cognitively inclusive design discussed in chapter two. The 
practical methods and philosophical stance of cognitively inclusive design lead to a situation 
where the designer is implicated as the manager of couplings between older people and 
digital media. By focusing upon the role of metaphors and prior experience, cognitively 
inclusive design is primarily about predicting the interactions between a group of people and 
a particular digital system. The designer, through the examination of historical resources and 
groups of typified stakeholders, identifies what interactions, features, symbols etc. relate to 
the context to be designed within and make the initial interaction process as simple as 
possible. These problems can be highlighted by returning to the case study of the Photo Reel, 
discussed near the end of chapter two. A media context was identified, in the form of 
photography and its digital counterpart, and the personal histories of media and product 
interactions of a limited group of users participating in the design process were explored. 
These personal histories were used as the key to prescribing the coupling between older 
people and this media context. Therefore, seemingly abstract aspects of the original iteration 
of the Photo Reel were refined to better match the histories of technological interactions of 
these users. The process of designing the Photo Reel was a case of continuous prediction and 
subsequent prescription of what prior experiences this group of older people could bring to 
bear when interacting with this type of technological context. 
It is important to emphasise that even in situations where the designer explicitly 
mediates the coupling between people and technology, the user still controls their intentional 
choices in terms of how to interact with specific aspects of a digital media product or 
interface. Problematically, however, the stance of the designer, and their subsequent design 
activities, reduces the amount of choices made available to the user. In the example of the 
Photo Reel, the stance and activities of the designer focused almost entirely on prescribing 
how the user couples with the digital media product. Therefore, the possibilities of 
interaction—or to manage coupling—are inherently limited for the user. The continuous 
referral to historical modalities of interaction, although well intended in terms of usability or 
intuitivity, leads to a situation where the connections a user can make are prescribed by the 
designer based upon their analysis of the stakeholders and the products context. This leads to 
a particularly paradoxical situation; the designer, acknowledging that older people seemingly 
struggle to connect to novel digital media products and interfaces, mediates the connection 
process through older media. Consequentially, novel learning never takes place outside of 
this extra layer of representation entbrced on the user by the designer. As noted, whilst areas 
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of HCl and interaction design have taken on board arguments favouring the examination of 
situated social context and have moved beyond using primarily cognitive models to generate 
the design of media interfaces, this conversation is lacking within cognitively inclusive 
design. A reason for this may be that cognitively inclusive design, as a consequence of the 
prevailing claims from the cognitive psychology of ageing, is trapped in a discourse of 
constructing between older people and digital media. 
4.2. The limitations of constructing Tit between older people and digital media 
The focus on prediction, inscription and prescription appears to be the result of a fascination with 
constructing models of users in order to generate design outcomes; in doing so, the designer 
fundamentally limits the agency of the people who use their products. 
The issue of predicting, inscribing, and prescribing is a side-etTect of designers constructing 
fit between people and the products designed for them. Johan Redstrom (2005) argued that 
much of post-Modemist design, both in terms of industry and research, has evolved into a 
discourse centred upon getting a better fit between object (be this an electronic consumer 
product, a service, a media interface, or a piece of furniture) and user. In common design 
processes, as in the inclusive design process discussed in chapter one, this better fit is 
established through researching who the potential user is, what makes them who they are, and 
communicating the message of how to use a particular design to this user.' Design, then, 
becomes a matter of using the right 'language' to express the functionality and intended use 
of the object' (Redstrom, 2005, p.126). Redstrom argues that even though interaction design 
research has shifted from predominantly focusing upon physical or cognitive attributes of 
users, towards a greater awareness of'user experience', this theme ofcommunicating ideas to 
users still prevails. This more recently introduced strand of'experience design""'', although 
moving the goalposts somewhat, still attempts to fit design to the user. 'By providing the 
right material preconditions, we aim to make people more productive, more willing to 
consume [...] through our designs' (Redstrom, 2005, p.l28). 
Redstrom argues that rather than designing products based upon a centralisation of the 
user, designers have gravitated towards designing the user instead. Decisions made during the 
''' Experience design, as RedslTom (2005) uses it, refers to the increased focus on expanding traditional models 
of use (as in tlie lineage of cognitive psychology, human factors, and ergonomics) into the realm of emotion and 
experience. This usage of the term experience design is not to be confused with the recent research into 
experience-centred design by McCarthy and Wright (2004; Wright and McCarthy 2008), which takes a more 
reflective approach to understanding the experiences of people using technology. This latter approach will be 
discussed in the final chapter of the thesis. 
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design process related to what type of product or service is being designed, and what type of 
person would be using such a product or service, require certain assumptions as to how 
certain groups of people would use certain types of products from the beginning of the design 
process. Through this process—be it with the participation of users, or the acquisition of 
knowledge about users from other domains—the designer constructs an image of who will be 
using what. Redstrom (2005), much like Suchman (1987) before, argues that very rarely does 
the construction a designer makes of both a particular products use and the user who will use 
it—which is fundamentally a prediction—correlate with how products and objects are 
actually used. 
While the process of people becoming users certainly is in focus in user-centred 
design, it is olten from ihe perspective of how lo make it as fast and efficient as 
possible: wlial needs lo be done in order to make the intended use of the object easy lo 
understand, its functions easy to leam, the product immediately appealing, etc. Use, 
however, seems to be a kind of on-going achievement, the results of a continuous 
process of encounters with objects and how one acts upon them. (Redstrom, 2005, 
p.131) 
The argument of Redstrom (2005) is highliglited in the earlier stated account made by 
Suchman in terms of human and machine communication, wherein the predictions and 
prescriptions of the designer failed to match the contingencies of the situated activity. It is 
argued by Redsfrom (2005), however, that beyond just failing to adequately predict the 
actions of people in relation to the designed object, such user-centred approaches to designing 
tend to focus upon reducing the space for opportunities of interaction. He comments that: 
[c]reating a light fit leads to a reduction of the ambiguity in how to interpret the object 
in tenus of use. When asking "what is Ihe use of this?', there is a ready answer and we 
do not have to think lurther about what it means. [,..] As ihe possibilities for 
alternative interpretations are systematically reduced as a result of ihe designer's 
attempt to optimise the design with respect to fit, the room for finding our own 
solutions, possibly coming up with interpretations that are more interesting than the 
original intent, is reduced to a minimum, (Redstrora, 2005. pp.I32-133) 
This is particularly evident in cognitively inclusive design, wherein the very purpose of the 
design process is to identify the prior experiences of particular groups of people in order to 
limit the opportunities for interaction with the interface. In terms of usability or intuitive 
interactions, this fit between the user and technology is portrayed as beneficial. Redstrom, 
alluding to interactions with products as an ongoing and in some cases efforttlil experience, 
considers such reductions as repressing the user. Almquist and Lupton (2010) take up 
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Redstrom's argument to suggest that a key problem of design research has been the division 
between the use of objects and the meaning of objects. Drawing upon user-centred design 
research after Norman (1988), they argue that much of design research—in terms of studying 
the user—focuses on designing atTordances. Almquist and Lupton (2010, p.7) argue that: 
[tjheoriesofuse, usability, and users have grown out of the fields of engineering, 
cognitive science, and design research, and have been heavily influenced by 
Norman's notions of affordance (or perceived affordance). In order to communicate 
the use of an artifact, the designer aims to make expbcit specific affordances by 
intentionally embedding cues for people who use the object. [...] The designer 
becomes concerned with embedding content and action into artifacts so that the 
function of the object is immediately understood by the subject. 
The concept of affordance and the work of Norman (as developed in Norman (1988; 1999; 
2002; 2004) is heavily implicated by Almquist and Lupton (2010) in the centralisation of 
studying the user in the design process. Affordances are (in Norman's account as it is 
described by Almquist and Lupton) the glue between the subject and the object; affordances 
communicate how to use a product or interface to a particular audience of users.^ If 
affordances are designed into products then, it is assumed, users will understand the product 
and use it accordingly. This position—based upon the notion that use can be designed into an 
object based upon knowledge of the user—is problematic in that it fundamentally places the 
decision making process in the power of the designer, rather than the agency of the user 
(Almquist & Lupton, 2010), 
This issue has been critically discussed in the field of the history of technology in 
relation to the design of new media. Michael Punt (1998) highlights how the history of 
personal computing and associated media technologies is a strong example of where 
technologists, businessmen and designers, influenced by the perceived potential of new 
technological developments, have mismatched technological potential to the needs, desires 
and aspirations of potential users. Punt (1998, p.63) argues how it is somewhat remarkable 
'that the PC survived as a consumer product, given ihe gulf between the consumers and the 
producers' ideas about the machines." He contrasts further the development and deployment 
* As Almquisl and Luplon (2010) highlight, the iheory affordances was developed by Norman from the 
ecologieal psychology of James Gibson (1986). In its translation ironi the ecological psychology of Gibson to 
the design of everyday products by Norman, significant attribiiies of the original theory have been maligned. 
Although Almquisl and Lupton (2010) do not go into detail regarding the differences between Gibson and 
Norman's accounts of affordancc, it appears worthwhile to examine the notion of affordance in greater detail. In 
chapter five, this thesis will begin to develop an alternative foundation for thinking about cognition as it relates 
to human senescence and older people interacting with digital media based upon developments of Gibson's 
original account of affordance over the later defmitions offered by Norman. 
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of CD-ROMs, which at one point was predicted to 'transform education and popular 
entertainment in unbounded ways. This medium [..,] would be used to store data in a great 
variety of forms [...] which would be accessed associatively to provide a powerful value-
added learning tool' (Punt, 1998, p.63). Highlighting how, as of 1998, many of these 
predictions had not come true. Punt (1998) contrasted the technologically determined 
approach of CD-ROM design with the emergence of the internet as a popular medium. He 
argued that: 
the network of networks which we call the Internet, is often frustrating and irregular, 
yet it has an enomious constituency of aclive participants trying to make it work in 
unscientific ways. \l is a hit and miss lectinology that uses an ugly and burdensome 
language called html, slow screen refreshment rates, and low resolution, bul it has 
captured a popular imagination in ways that have taken industry and dedicated media 
analysts such as Ted Nelson by surprise. (Punl, 2005, p.79) 
Although the internet is a coming together of a large amount of discrete technological 
components and the hard work of amateurs, it has been 'appropriated by popular culture in 
ways that its inventors could not have envisaged' (Punt, 2005, p.79). Punt (2005) reflects this 
was supported by the non-technologically determined emphasis of the medium's 
development; the technological potential merely played a supporting role in the ability for the 
audience to engage and actively participate in the communities and content that emerged. 
This brief excursion into the history and social construction of technology highlights 
how historical analysis is useful to current designers in highlighting the central role of the 
user—whomever this may be—in the ongoing changes in meaning, use and application of 
technological systems.^' Rather than taking history in terms of nostalgia—which becomes 
invoked in cognitively inclusive design—designers would benefit from using the numerous 
historical analysis of technology and science to reflect upon their own practice and process. 
In contrast to the social construction of technologies, the approaches informing cognitively 
inclusive design are explicitly focused upon what Redstrom (2005) called "user design". 
These approaches to design are primarily concerned with the a priori construction of a 
representation of the user as much as it is the construction of designed object. By going 
*" Punt's historical analysis of personal computers, CD-ROMs and the internet is just one example of a variety 
of hi.siories of technology that have highlighted the profound agency of cultures and groups of people in giving 
technology its meaning. Bjiker (•/«/. (1987) present a comprchensiveanthology of some of the original social 
construction of technology lexis, including studies examining ihe social context of the development of 
technologies such as Bakelite, synthetic dyes, missiles, and medical imagery. Nye (2006) describes a large array 
of technologies, such as the bicycle, the automobile and llie distribution of electricity in the United Stales, 
whose success or development has been shaped primarily by social and cultural factors rather than technological 
possibilities. 
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through this process of constructing the user and the technology, a best possible fit is made 
that leads to the correct appropriation of a product by a group of consumers. This is 
particularly evident in the work of Blackler et al., wherein it is suggested that in situations 
where a technology or media is completely novel, it is necessary to establish what references 
may work from other contexts for particular groups of users. In tenns of a design stance 
focused upon usability, or intuitive interactions, Blackler et a/.'s approach is acceptable. If 
taken in light of Redstrom's (2005) argument, and considered within the wider understanding 
of the social construction of technologies, then such a closed stance in design substantially 
limits the agency of potential users. 
4.3. The limitations of concrete constructions 
The constructions made in cognitively inclusive design are useful as they provide fixed points of 
reference for the designer lo work with; the issue of cognitive ageing, however, requires a sensitivity 
to the ongoing temporal changes to cognition that occur as people age, and how these relate to 
interactions with digital media. 
The tendency to construct a fit between older people and digital media that appears in 
cognitively inclusive design can be viewed as a consequence of an assumption that older 
people, digital media, and the contexts these constructions interact in, are concrete and fixed. 
Groups of people in this context are considered to be somewhat concrete in terms of their 
cognitive fiinctions (or lack thereof) and prior experiences; individual members of these 
groups are considered to be suffering certain deteriorations at definable moments in their 
lifetime; the contexts older people are understood to engage with technology in are concrete, 
static and, as such, describable in fixed terms. 
For example, it is possible to observe the concrete constructions of the older user in 
both the tools and methods of the human factors of ageing studies, and also the design 
process tor intuitive interaction described by Blackler el at. Human factors research, as 
discussed at the end of chapter one and the start of chapter two, is very often performed in 
reference to the corpus of scientific knowledge about the user—such as that provided by the 
cognitivepsychology of ageing. As Rogers and Fisk (2003, p.2) stated, '[h]uman factors 
researchers aim to match the demands of a system to the capabilities of the user'. This is 
emphasised in the guidelines for designers provided by Schieber (2003), which are essentially 
a matching of the demands of digital media interfaces to the cognitive capabilities of older 
people. Kline (2003, p.85) notes that the guidelines otTered by Schieber (2003) are consistent 
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with 'the principle of "the greatest good for the greatest number" [... and] appropriately 
emphasizes findings regarding normal age-related changes that come from well-control led, 
small-group experimental studies." In these human factors studies, the knowledge of 
cognitive deterioration comes in the form of concrete points of reference (in terms of specific 
ages or age-ranges for changes in specific functions) and 'normal' becomes a mean or an 
average. A concrete construction of the 'normal' older user is created, which the next stage of 
design activities can be centred upon. Wliilst this may be a necessary consequence of 
standardisation and contemporary commercial design practice, such a perspective lacks 
sensitivity to the diverse and ongoing changes that all human beings, and particularly people 
later in their life, are engaged with. 
The concrete constructions of the cognition of older people found in human factors 
studies are observable in the proposals made by Blackler et ai, only this time in terms of 
prior experience with technology rather than specific cognitive abilities. To recollect from 
chapter two, Blackler et al. proposed the following principles as key to developing intuitive 
interactions: 
1. Make function, location and appearance familiar for features thai are already 
known. Use familiar symbols and/or words, put ihem in a familiar position and make 
Ihe function comparable with functions users have seen before. 
2. Make it obvious how to use less well-known features by using familiar things to 
demonstrate their function, appearance and location. (Blackler & Hurtienne, 2007, 
p.4) 
In order to establish familiarity it is necessary to ask questions such as: Familiar for whom? 
Familiar in relafion to what? What makes certain properties of interfaces more familiar than 
others? How can a symbol and/or feature from one context be transferred to another without 
losing its familiarity? Whilst in terms of usability these are appropriate questions, now 
informed by the work of Suchman, Dourish, Redslrom, Punt and the history of technology, 
these questions appear as problematic. It is assumed that prior experience can be identified by 
designers, transferred symbolically onto newly designed products and interfaces, and 
comprehended by the user with some immediacy. The problematic nature of the metaphorical 
approach is noted by Blackler el al. in refiection upon their own argument; "familiar terms 
can have multiple meanings' and what is familiar 'to one user is not [...] to others' (Blackler 
ei al, 2006, pp. 15-16). Rather than identifying this as a limitation, Blackler e/A/. {2006, p. 16) 
reaffirm their approach with caution; '[mjetaphors should be selected for their 
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appropriateness to the target market and should be matched to the experiences and 
capabilities of typical users'. 
Similarly, the argument presented by Hurticnne el al., although coming from a 
different perspective on cognition to that of Blackler ct al. and the human factors community 
before, appears to characterise diverse groups of technology users, such as older people, as 
concrete entities. To recap, Hurtienne el al. argue that there is certain basic, low-level 
sensorimotor knowledge—known as image schemas—that all human beings have developed 
to make sense of abstract situations. Designers, Hurtienne el al.'s argument goes, would do 
well to exploit these image schemas of sensorimotor knowledge within digital media products 
in order to make interactions more intuitive and familiar to the user. It appeared that the 
application of image schemas may have particular benefits to inclusive design as they are 
"accessible to the widest range on people"'^ (Hurtienne cf a/., 2008, p. 115) and "[tjhe 
universitality' of image schemas 'predicts that user interface features designed with image 
schemas should be equally usable by members of dilTerent technology generations' 
{Hurtienne e! al., 2009a, p.257). By making the most of this sensorimotor knowledge, which 
operates on a non-conscious level, then cognitive resources would be freed for more intensive 
aspects ofinteracting with digital media products. In terms of older people. Hurtienne e/o/. 
argue the application of image schemas navigates around the limitations of cognitive 
functioning in later life. 
Hurtienne ei al.'s argument is founded upon a paradigm of cognitive science that is 
rooted in the inseparability of the human body and its interactions with environments from 
cognitive functioning and experience. Hurtienne el al. state that: 
[i]mage-scheiTiatic designs should be less susceptible to variations in users' cognitive 
ability like working memory capacity, atlentional resources, decision-making, etc. 
Similarly, cognitive losses should alTect knowledge on the higiier levels of the 
knowledge continuum earlier than image schemas that reside on a lower, earlier 
obtained and more strongly rehearsed level of knowledge.' (Hurtienne ei al.. 2009a. 
p.257) 
'^ It appears Ihai Hurtienne el al. (2008) assert this point but perhaps need to examine the claim in a htlle more 
detail. It might be that the concept of image schema being "universals' to a great many users falls down in an 
inclusive approach to design. Of course, on one hand the inclusive approach to designing is about finding aspect 
of human beings that are suitable for one and all. ilowever, an inclusive approach is also about looking at the 
specific differences between groups of people and approaching the design of products and services thai include 
these differences. The argument that image schema are useful to inclusive or universal design approaches may 
fall down once it is taken into account thai these people require a specific understanding as their image schema 
are different to Ihe 'typical' human being. They have differing bodies and differing embodiments of 
-icnsorimotor knowledge. Their perceptual abilities are tuned in a differing manner for dilTering specialisms. 
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The limitation of Hurtienne et ai's proposal, however, is that if we are to take a position that 
argues mind, body and world are inseparable in cognitive experience, then ongoing temporal 
changes to the physiology of the body and how this relates to the world will subsequently 
alter the manner in which the world is perceived, cognised, and acted upon. If lower-level 
sensorimotor and image-schematic cognitive abilities are left intact in later life, then they 
may be somewhat out of synchrony with the ongoing changes to an individual's body and 
environment.'^ Whereas the design activities of the human factors researchers and Blackler el 
al. proceed to universalise a process of temporal change into static reference points, 
Hurtienne el al. seek to apply a universal (and seemingly static) reference point onto a 
process of change. 
The problems associated with dealing with a slate of ongoing change in a traditional 
design process appear to be evident within some of the paradoxes of the approaches that 
inform cognitively inclusive design. This paradox is highlighted by how the construction of 
older people in cognitively inclusive design flips between two extreme accounts. In one 
extreme, the older person is portrayed as lacking certain abilities and encountering a state of 
profound temporal change and deterioration in their cognitive functioning; this temporal 
change, however, can only be reflected in design through concrete definitions based upon 
moments in this transition. On the other extreme, the older individual is constructed as 
holding certain universal forms of knowledge formed through their own bodily interactions; 
these universals, it is argued, are still present in old age, and designers would be wise to make 
use of this user knowledge in the design of digital media products and interfaces. In the first 
extreme, the designer is aware of changes to people over their life span, but can only model 
human beings in terms of concretely defined moments. In the latter extreme, the designer is 
aware of aspects of human sense-making and cognition that go beyond the contemporary, 
cognitivist, definitions, but fails to consider that these universals may also change over a 
lifetime. 
Problematically, inclusive designers dealing with the disconnection between older 
people and digital media are immediately presented with a discourse that focuses upon the 
losses of ageing. This is particularly evident in cognitively inclusive design, which, in 
drawing upon the dominant literature of cognitive psychology of ageing, attempts to fit 
objects to the older user as a result of the claimed losses of cognitive ftinctioning. If the group 
of people to be designed for are in a state of profound and ongoing change, then it is no 
" This point, which is not discussed in Hurtienne el al. (2009a), is elaborated throughout chapter six of this 
thesis where a framework for undersianding senescent, rather than ageing, cognition is developed. 
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longer possible to support a design process that attempts to develop technological contexts 
and, thus, digital media products, in light of static and concrete points of reference. With 
some consideration, attributes of these extremes will be brought together by this thesis into a 
framework that takes into account the ever-changing, contingent, and emergent dynamic 
aspects of interactions between older people and digital media. Referring to older people and 
the digital media they interact with in terms of an ongoing change, or achievement, will 
highlight the limitations of contemporary inclusive practice, whilst also offering an 
alternative way of thinking about the problem of cognitive disconnection. 
4.4. The limitations of applying the cognitive psychology of ageing in design 
Designers requiring an explanation oflhe cognitive disconnection between older people and digital 
media are currently limited to the cognitive psychology of ageing as the dominant knowledge on 
changes to the ageing mind, which makes it difficult to move away from the preceding limitations. 
The limitations of contemporary approaches to resolving cognitive disconnections identified 
in this chapter—those of predicting and prescribing interactions, of designing for a fit 
between person and technology, and of lacking a sensitivity to the dynamic and temporal 
aspects of the issue being investigated—appear as consequent side effects resulting from the 
claims of the cognitive psychology of ageing. Cognitive psychology, as the dominant 
resource of knowledge on how cognition alters as a result of human ageing, portrays older 
people as in a state of sudden and continual cognitive deterioration. This deterioration is 
particularly significant in terms of the abstract reasoning that is necessary to learn and 
connect to a novel digital media interface. As a result of these claims, designers with an 
inclination to include accounts of cognitive deterioration into the design process are 
immediately presented with a construction of the user that is inherently limited in their 
capabilities. As a consequence, digital media products and interfaces are designed with the 
effect of restricting the interactional possibilitiesof the older user. This is not intentional but 
rather a consequence of a reductive approach. As was observed in chapter two, one strategy 
to respond to the claims of limited cognitive capabilities is to subsequently limit the 
opportunities to interact with the digital media system. As Schieber (2003) noted, a designer 
would be wise to ensure that as little 'irrelevant' information and clutter is presented to the 
older user of a digital system as possible. By sending less information at a time to the 
cognitive infonnation-processor to process, then the older user does not experience such an 
overload of their, substantially limited, cognitive functions. 
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Beyond the design of consumer-oriented products and interfaces that are of interest to 
inclusive design, the tendency to treat older people as suffering losses is repeated in much of 
the research examining ageing and technology. For example, research on intelligent systems 
and technologies are supposed to 'enable elders to live more independently by compensating 
for diminished mobility, assisting those with memory impairment, and providing remote 
monitoring capabilities' (Marling, 2009, p.l82). Marling suggests that: 
[i]n the near future, il is possible that smart devices will automalically open doors, 
refill prescriptions, and control home comfort syslcms. Smart wheelchairs will enable 
those unable to operate standard wheelchairs to navigate smoothly. Reminder systems 
will help elders to remember to take medications, to keep appointments, and to 
complete unfinished tasks. (Marling, 2009, p.l82) 
The systems that Marling alludes to in this quotation are designed specifically to compensate 
for the deterioration in cognitive tiinclioning that occurs with age. Researchers at the Georgia 
Institute of Technology have developed an 'aware home" that is filled with a wide variety of 
sensor technologies that constantly monitor and model the activities of the people interacting 
with the systems perceivable environment (see Mynatt etal. (2001), Abowd etal. (2002), and 
Rogers and Mynatt (2003)). In developing a model of what is expected of the person 
interacting with the environment, the home provides prompts through various interfaces to its 
inhabitants if certain activities that the system expects have not been performed. A similar 
system is implemented in the 'autominder', an intelligent automatic reminder system 
integrated within a mobile robot (Pollack et at., 2003). The autominder acts as a reminder 
system for certain activities—such as going to the lavatory every few hours—that an older 
person suffering Irom pathological memory loss requires reminding of throughout the day 
(Pollack et al., 2003). As an intelligent agent, the autominder observes the older person's 
activities and builds a schedule or plan of what they do on a daily basis, actively altering this 
schedule based upon what the individual does, and issuing reminders as and when it is 
observed certain tasks have not been completed (Pollack ei al., 2003). 
An alternative way of conceptualising affective-assistive technologies has been 
provided through the technological augmentation of the loss of physical abilities in old age. 
Examples of products making use of these technologies are intelligent walking frames'*'' and 
** For example, smart canes (Dubowsky el al., 2000) and sman walking frames (Wasson ei al., 2001) thai are 
able to provide feedback lo visually and cognilively impaired users regarding proximity to objects in the 
environment. 
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intelligent wheelchairs . Technological interventions such as these typically replace certain 
physical functions that older people no longer appear to have; however, there are also 
examples of augmenting weakened physiology. One area of research of physical 
technological augmentation relevant to ageing has been exoskeleton research. For example, 
HAL-5 (Hybrid Assistive Limb-5 , Figure 17), claimed to be "a cyborg-type robot that can 
expand and improve physical capability', became the first commercially available 
exoskeleton in the world (Cyberdyne Inc, 2010). Based upon research led by Yoshiyuki 
Sankai at Tsukuba University, HAL-5 picks up on minute electrical signals trom the muscles 
of its wearer in order to interpret their movements and support certain physical abilities. 
HAL-5, when worn, feels weightless—the exoskeleton supports its own weight and that of its 
wearer (Cyberdyne Inc, 2010). Althougli HAL-5 was possibly intended for activities beyond 
that of enabling senior citizens to continue their gardening activities, it is seen as part of the 
field of developing technology that supports Japan's rapidly ageing population.''' 
HAL-5 
Figure 17 The HAL-5 robol suit. © 2005 CVBERDVNE Inc. 
'* Two prominent examples of inlelligcm, or smart, wheelchairs arc Wheelesley, developed at the MIT Artificial 
Intelligence Laboraiory (see Yanco (1998; 2001}), and NavChair (see Levine i-t at. (1999)). 
** The full description ofHAL reads: 'When a person anempts lo move, nerve signals are sent from the brain to 
the muscles via motoneuron, moving Ihe musculoskeletal system as a consequence. At this moment, very weak 
biosignals can be detected on the surface of the skin. "HAL" ciilchcs these signals through a sensor attached on 
tlie skin of the wearer. Based on the signals obtained, the power unit is conu-olled lo move tlie joint unitedly 
with the wearer's muscle movement, enabling to support the wearer's daily activities. This is what we call a 
'voluntary control system' that provides movement interpreting the wearer's intention trom the biosignats in 
advance of the actual movement. Not only a'voluntary control system' "HAL" has, but also a'robotic 
autonomous control system' that provides human-like movement based on a robotic system which integrally 
work together with the 'autonomou.s control sysicm'. (Cyberdyne Inc, 2010) 
" Whilst a significant amount of the advertising surrounding HAL-5 is focused upon its potential benefits to 
elderly or disabled people, or perhaps for commercial activities where sirength is required (as in warehouses), its 
most viable application might be in military contexts. 
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Due to the medical contexts of assistive technologies, there is an inherent response to treat the 
technology as supportive and as unobtrusive as possible (unless required). Within 
descriptions of the assistive technologies discussed within this sub-section, there is an 
emphasis upon the role of technology to fill in for certain lost abilities, or to make life in old 
age as simple as possible. One reason for this may be the use of robotics and artificially 
intelligent technologies as replacements for care workers and hospital staff (many examples 
of which are described by Roy and Pineau (2009)). Another reason may be the overwhelming 
focus of much ageing literature on deterioration in crucial abilities, as prevails through much 
of the cognitive psychology of ageing literature. This is not to argue that assistive 
technologies are inherently flawed—they are very often developed and designed in response 
to the very important needs and requirements of certain individuals and communities. As 
Marling, in a review of literature entitled Intelligent System Technology for Enhancing 
Quality of Life, states: 
[w]hcn physiological and/or cognitive decline prevents elders from performing daily 
activities that keep them safe and healthy, they cannot remain at home. [...] 
Technological assistance can compensate for some of these problems, enabling elders 
to remain longer in Iheir own homes in safety and comfort. (Marling, 2009, p. 183) 
In terms of developing cognitively inclusive digital media products, however, it may be 
necessary to move beyond reflecting the deteriorations and limitations of becoming old. In 
the same anthology as that containing Marling (2009), Lesnoff-Caravaglia argues that: 
[a]ssitive devices [.,.] are geared essentially to maintain the status quo. Aging, 
however, should not be geared toward normative behaviour. Rather, this is the time of 
hfe when uniqueness, individuality, interests, and enthusiasms unlempered by 
responsibilities and spontaneous expression of feeling can best come forth. 
Technology helps this, of course. Nonetheless, it is assistive rather than an end in 
itself. It reduces physical difficulties but needs to allow the emergence of the person, 
one more unique and satisfying than previously known. Rather than retard aging, 
technology can move individuals to a level of aging not yet achieved, but one that is 
now possible. (Lesnoff-Caravaglia, 2009, pp.30-31) 
Lesnoff-Caravaglia appears to suggest here that digital media and new technologies may not 
merely be an assistive presence in the lives of older people but actively afford novel 
opportunities to go beyond the traditional tenets of ageing as a process of deterioration. She 
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does not extend opportunities for advice as to how these futures may manifest, however, and 
the remainder of this anthology she edits appears to be a continuation of the 'status quo'.*^" 
Returning to the attempts of cognitively inclusive design to reconnect the cognitive 
functioning of older people to the design of digital media products, it appears that whilst the 
discourse is less explicitly medical, there continues to be an emphasis on loss due to the 
application of knowledge from the cognitive psychology of ageing in a human factors-esque 
approach. Liam Bannon (1991, p.25), in a critique of the human factors approach to 
designing interactive systems, argued that there is: 
an implicit view of ordinary people which, if surfaced, would seem to treat people as, 
at worst, idiots who must be shielded from the machine, oral best, as simply sets of 
elementary processes or "factors" that can be studied in isolation in the laboratory. 
The opinion of Bannon, informed througli years of working within the human factors 
community and the ICT industry, can be levelled against the contemporary approaches that 
inform cognitively inclusive design. Although areas of the human-computer interaction and 
interaction design community have largely distanced themselves from human-factors-esque 
approaches, instead focusing almost on 'practice''''', there is something about the ageing 
process of human beings that still requires a theoretical basis accounting for cognition. As a 
consequence, the designer attempting to reconnect older people to novel forms of digital 
media appears to be in a dilemma. By using the cognitive psychology of ageing within both 
the analysis and (re)design of digital interfaces, designers can never move beyond knowledge 
of a user that restricts the possibilities for interactions. At the same time, cognitive 
psychology of ageing provides what appears to be the most useful body of knowledge with 
which to understand the reasons why digital media products and interfaces, designed in 
certain ways, are difficult for older people to incorporate into everyday activities. Inclusive 
^' h is noteworthy that in the aforementioned volume, Lesnoff-Caravaglia (2009) authors sections on the age-
related changes in a number of biological systems, whilst subsequent chapters in the anthology examine vision, 
hearing, and ergonomics. This theme recurs throughout the anthology, with the exception of a curious 
concluding chapter called Geronlechnological Ontology: Human Experience within Extraordinary Frameworks, 
This chapter, authored by Lesnoff-Caravaglia, harshly contrasts with those that preceded, ofiering insight into 
alteraafive ways of conceptualising ageing and future old people. As curious as it is, it appears that gerontology, 
much like cognitively inclusive design, would struggle to move towards the open-ended and experiential 
frameworks described by Lesnoff-Caravaglia if it remains attached to the prevailing assumptions of tlie 
discipline. It might be impossible for the "gerontechnology' community to move towards a new level of ageing 
if the traditional model of developing technology and digital media to be supportive of the process of 
deterioration with age persists. 
' ' Practice is a vague terra, but appears to be prevalent within much of the post-cognitivisi and post-human 
factors HCI and interaction design community. 
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design discourse, minus cognitive psychology, appears to be devoid of any strategies that 
reconnect older people with digital media beyond people-centred methods of designing. 
4.5. Beyond limitations: towards 'scncscentcchnics' 
From rite limitations identified in this chapter, it is possible to propose a number of themes with which 
an alternative to cognitively inclusive design might be developed. 
This chapter has examined a number of prevailing themes of the approaches informing 
cognitively inclusive design that highlight why contemporary approaches to the design of 
digital media products for older people are limited. Contemporary cognitively inclusive 
design focuses upon the forced reconnection of older people and digital media. These 
contemporary practices focus upon the prediction, inscription and prescription of interactions 
between people and technology; a tight fit between the cognitive and physical flinctions of 
the older person and the functions of the technological objects; and concrete and 
universalised descriptions of groups of older people and the technologies they use. 
Whilst cognitively inclusive design provides an answer to the problem of cognitive 
disconnections between older people and technology, it is somewhat limited in reference to 
moves made in interaction design theory and practice over the past two decades and ignores 
the agency of user's; an agency which, as the history of technology shows, has always existed 
even if malnourished by the design process. The focus upon usability and knowledge about 
the user has ushered in approaches to resolving the disconnect that attempt to make products 
simpler, easier to learn, less distracting and better matched to the capabilities of certain 
groups of people. In particular, the observation that there is a cognitive disconnection 
between older people and novel digital media has lead to an inclusive approach that focuses 
upon the designer communicating messages regarding the use of a product in an explicit, and 
supposedly non-interpretable, manner. 
Problematically, however, it appears that designers require some sort of support in 
navigating the problem of cognitive disconnection between older people and technology. The 
cognitive psychology of ageing is particularly useiul to designers of digital media that is 
inclusive of older people; it provides some explanation as to the goings on in the black-box of 
the ageing mind, giving a backdrop to some of the problems designers may have encountered 
when working with older users, and, in the case of human factors literature, also give some 
concrete advice as to how to navigate around these problems. At the same time, in its 
application in design frameworks, such as in the practice and theory surrounding cognitively 
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inclusive design, it implicitly frames older people, and the process of ageing in general, as 
deteriorating in certain key abilities; as an increase in fallibility; and as a reduction in 
information-processing functionality. In cognitively inclusive design, as a result of drawing 
from the knowledge of cognitive ageing, older people can never truly connect on their own 
terms with digital media; the cognitive psychology of ageing denies them of the very abilities 
required to do this. 
The critical engagement with this body of work so far suggests working towards an 
alternative series of strategies for designers dealing with cognitive disconnections between 
older people and technology. In order to distinguish these new strategies from the 
contemporary approaches, ageing will in the following be distinguished from senescence. 
Senescence as a term is used in this thesis in reference to its usage within the biological 
sciences, referring to the cellular alterations of an organism beyond a moment of maturity. 
Whilst this thesis does not enter into a discussion with the biological sciences and does not 
aim to argue in favour of biological determinism, distinguishing the term senescence from 
ageing in this manner is useful to the argument developed in the following chapters for three 
key reasons. Firstly, as will be highlighted in the following chapter, considering temporal 
change to a particular organism's cognition in biological terms requires the observer to attend 
to the mutuality and inseparability of an organism and its surrounding environment. 
Secondly, taking cognition as inseparable from the encompassing environment provides an 
alternative lens with which to theorise how and why cognitive disconnections may occur later 
in life. Thirdly, the consequence of this alternative lens is that rather than developing an 
account of cognitively inclusive design, these alternative questions and strategies will provide 
a basis for what is coined in this thesis as 'senescentcchnics'. Before exploring this argument 
in detail, it is possible to make five proposals for the basis of senescentechnics as a 
consequence of the discussion within this chapter. Primarily: 
(i) a future senescentechnics proposes to provide an understanding of how human 
cognition changes in senescence that is not laden as purely losses, or reductions and 
avoid designing digital media and technology lo act purely as a supportive role for 
the decay in physiological and cognitive functioning in old age. 
The consequence of the contemporary useof cognitive psychology of ageing in design leads 
to an immediate situation where older people are conceived as unable to couple with digital 
media on their own terms. In light of the claims discussed in this chapter, however, the 
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enforcing of couplings by decisions made in the design process somewhat hmits the agency 
of the people who use technologies. Therefore: 
(ii) a future sencscentcchnics will provide an understanding of relationships between 
older people and digital media products where the senescent human is not considered 
in immediate opposition to digital media, and vice-versa. 
Rather, as described by Redstrtim (2005), interaction needs to be understood within the same 
temporal frame of reference as the ongoing changes to senescent cognition. It can be stated 
that: 
(iii) a future senescentechnics conceptualises changes to human cognition with age as an 
ongoing dynamic in relation to digital media, wherein the state of the product and its 
interfaces are affected by the people interacting with it and vice-versa, in a 
continuous engagement over time. 
This is not to argue that a senescent conceptualisation of older people and digital media 
means an instant connection between a designed outcome and the user. Instead of attempting 
to design tor a perfect fit between people and media, which suggests that aignition and prior 
experiences can be designed for, instead cognition and experience happens to emerge through 
interaction. Therefore: 
(iv) a future senescentechnics conceives of interactions between older people and digital 
media not as a form of instantaneous and obvious communication of use. functionality 
and meaning, but instead is open to being incorporated Jlexibly into the activities and 
experiences of the older person. 
A major implication of the suggested fi-amework is that the process of predicting, inscribing 
and prescribing that dominates cognitively inclusive design is no longer tenable. A greater 
amount of flexibility is required on the part of the designer. Finally, then; 
(v) a future senesccntechnics conceives older people as interacting with digital media 
based upon the contingencies of the situation and forming their own connections with 
the products they engage with, not those predetermined by the designer. 
no 
The remainder of this thesis will unpack these five statements in more detail through an 
original investigation. The following chapter commences the exploration of a 
senescenteclinic alternative by discussing research from within the cognitive sciences that 
deals with issues that are somewhat analogous with the debates within interaction design 
discussed within this chapter. In explaining this work, the next chapter will outline the basis 
for a senescent understanding of cognitive decoupling. 
I l l 
Chapter 5 
Cognition and inseparability 
Question: Is it possible to return to the cognitive sciences and identify alternative strategies 
for the basis of senescent human cognition to the problematic cognitive psychology of 
ageing? 
5.1. it is possible to conceive of human cognition as inseparable from the body and world, 
encompassed in an individual's Umwelt, within which cognition is the perception of and acting upon 
ajfordances. 
5.2. It is necessary for there to be coherence betuven body and world in order for an economy of 
cognitive functioning to emerge. 
5.3. Human cognition continually enacts and re-enacts the Umwelt through a history of structural 
couplings; these couplings are somewhat closed, yet also open to new couplings to emerge in the 
future. 
5.4. It is possible to conceive of the Umwelt of a person and the affordances they perceive as dynamic 
and continually in a state of change based upon innumerable factors; human cognition allows for the 
continued integration of these factors into a coherent understanding of the Umwelt. 
5.1. Inseparability, the Umwelt and affordances 
// is possible to conceive of human cognition as inseparable from the body and world, encompassed in 
an individual's Umwelt, within which cognition is the perception of and acting upon affordances. 
Cognitivism, as discussed at length in chapter three, is founded on a fundamental separation 
of human thought from the human body, and a subsequent separation of human beings from 
environments. As the discussion in the previous chapter higlilightcd, the implication of 
cognitivism when applied in the design of products is that a middle layer of representations 
can be designed that enables the immediate communication of a product to the cognitive 
functions of a perceiver. Whilst the use of cognitivism in design applications is problematic, 
it will be argued here that alternative paradigms of cognitive science are useful in generating 
design strategies. In particular, various attempts have been made within cognitive science to 
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explain human cognition in terms of a greater reliance upon the human body and relations 
with the world. In the following chapter, an explanation of the cognitive disconnection 
between older people and digital media products will be provided based upon what will be 
defined as a senescentechnic understanding of cognition. Before proceeding with this 
explanation, however, it is necessary to examine in more detail discussions surrounding 
cognitive science that argue cognitive experience is fundamentally inseparable from body and 
world. 
When discussing cognitive experience, as opposed to the cognitive function of an 
older person, it isuselijl to think in terms of a person's particular f/mu'e//."^" The term 
Umwelt derives from the work of Jakob von Uexkiill, a Swiss biologist whose research 
focused upon analysing the behavioural ecologies of animals. Von Uexkull (1957, p. 11) 
stated that the first principle of the Umwell is that 'all animals, from the simplest to the most 
complex, are fitted into their unique worlds with equal completeness. A simple world 
corresponds to a simple animal, a well-ariiculated world to a complex one.' Von Uexkull 
contrasted the Umwelf to the Umgebung. Both the Umweit and the Umgebung related to the 
manner in which the world was perceived by a specific animal (including human beings). The 
Umwell referred to the phenomenological world of the organism, whereas the Umgebung was 
the appearance of an objective reality to a particular animal. Von UexkiilPs argument was 
that the everyday world of organisms^as it is experienced—was rooted in the 
complementary nature of their physiological make-up, and how this fitted the environment. 
Von Uexkull suggests that objective descriptions of the Umwell of different organisms can 
only ever be speculated and provisional, giving a conceptual glimpse into the Umwelt of an 
individual perceiver. Von UexkiJll related the study of an animal's Umwelt as like placing a 
bubble around its world and attempting to move beyond the human conception of the 
Umgebung. 
Perhaps it should be called a stroll into unfamiliar worlds; worlds strange lo us but 
known to olher creatures, manifold and varied as the animals themselves. The best 
lime to set oul on such an adventure is on a sunny day. The place, a flower-strewn 
meadow, humming with insects, tluttering with butterflies. Here we may glimpse the 
worlds of the lowly dwellers of the meadow. To do so, we must first blow, in fancy, a 
soap bubble around each creature to represent its own world, filled with the 
perceptions which it alone knows. When we ourselves then step into one of these 
'"" Umwell is a German word, which is best understood in English as referring to 'surrounding world', although 
is commonly translated as •environment'. 
"" Umgehung, when translated from German lo English, often becomes a synonym to Umwell and used as also 
refening to 'environment'. In terms of von Uexkiill's work, however, these words had very distinct usages as 
defined in the main text. 
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bubbles, the famihar meadow is Iranslbrmed. Many of its colourful features 
disappear, others no longer belong together bul appear in new relationships. A new 
world comes into being. Through the bubble we see the world of the burrowing 
wonn, of the butterfly, or of the field mouse; the world as it appears to the animals 
themselves, not as ii appears lo us. This we may call the phenomenal world or the 
self-world of the animal, (von UexkiJll, 1957, p,5) 
The a>ncept of the Umwelt highlights how the development of theories of cognition (be this 
either functional or experiential) isolated from and devoid of the encompassing 
phenomeno logical and ecological relationships of an individual is limited outside of the 
laboratory. These problems have been identified within cognitive science. In chapter three, 
the work of Ulric Neisser was discussed as pivotal in introducing cognitivist philosophy into 
experimental psychology—focusing upon examining the 'programs' and functional 
properties of the human mind—^rather than how it relates to the physical embodiment of the 
organism. Less than a decade later, however, Neisser had become highly critical of the ideas 
he proposed in 1967. Neisser (1976) provided a damming verdict on the then still developing 
cognitivist paradigm of studying human cognition and positioned his writing against the very 
infomiation-processing models of cognition that he found so useful nine years prior. 
The study of information processing has momentum and prestige, bul it has not yet 
commitled itself lo any conception of human nature thai could apply beyond the 
confines of the laboratory. And within that laboratory, its basic assumptions go little 
further than the computer model to which it owes its existence. There is still no 
account of how people act in or interact with the ordinary world. (Neisser, 1976, pp.6-
7) 
The villains of the piece are the mechanistic infonnation-processing models, which 
treat the mind as a fixed-capacity device for converting discrete and meaningless 
inputs into conscious percepts. (Neisser, 1976, p. 10) 
There were anumberof issues with the information-processing model of studying cognition 
that concerned Ncisser(1976). In the context of the discussion to be developed here, 
however, his key point is the issue of'ecological validity' (Neisser, 1976, p.BS).'"^ Neisser 
states tliat ecological validity is of great importance to the cognitive psychologist as '[i]t 
reminds them that the artificial situation created for an experiment may differ from the 
everyday world in crucial ways' (Neisser, 1976, p.33). He argues that in cognitivist 
information-processing studies, the participants are isolated from extraneous perceptual 
information and treated as a static entity which receives and decodes information from the 
'"^  Neisser atlribules the idea of ecological validity to (he work of Egon Brunswick (1956), although his usage of 
the term is rather different to Brunswick's original definition. 
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world. Rather than considering activity and movement as a key feature of human perceptual 
and cognitive experience, cognitive psychologists consider them as 'mere nuisance or sources 
of blur' (Neisser, 1976, p.l09). In tenns of the everyday cognitive experience of the world, 
however, such nuisances and blur is common, he argues, to the point where taking it out of 
consideration would amount to developing a potentially invalid, if not useless, understanding 
of how human beings cognize. 
The final chapterof Neisser (1976) investigates how psychologists and behavioural 
scientists make attempts to predict human behaviour based upon the formation of cognitive 
models of the organism (in the former's case) or by responses to environmental stimuli (in 
the latter case). He argues that the idea that the way human beings behave in the world can be 
predicted, based upon models of purely functional aspects of the psychological apparatus, is 
misplaced. At the same time, he argues that the idea that purely environmental aspects can 
condition human beings to respond in a particular manner is also incorrect, "^ ^ Instead, he 
suggests that in order to understand the actions of human beings, it is necessary to know as 
much about the environment as it is to know about the psychology of the individual. Whilst 
still rather functionalist, Neisser (1976) usefully discusses this idea in terms of skilled and 
novice chess players. 
One of the characteristics of a good chess player is his skill in picking up relevant 
infomialion from the board. [..,] The master succeeds because he can perceive certain 
aspects of the position that escape a lesser player; structural characteristics ihat, once 
seen, constrain the locations of the pieces themselves very precisely, [.,.] he quite 
literally sees the position differently—more adequately and comprehensively—than a 
novice ornonplayer would. Of course, even thenonplayer sees a great deal; the 
chessmen are carved of ivory, the kniglil resembles a horse, the pieces are (perhaps) 
arrayed with a certain geometric regularity. A young child would see still less: that the 
pieces would fit in his mouth, perhaps, or could be knocked over. A newborn infant 
might just see Ihal "something" was in front of him. To be sure, he is not mistaken in 
this; something is in front of him. The ditfcrences among these perceivers are not 
matters of truth and error but of noticing more rather than less. The information that 
specifies the proper move is as available in the light sampled by the baby as by the 
master, but only tiie master is equipped to pick it up. (Neisser, 1976, pp. 180-181) 
In order to comprehend the psychology of a human being, especially when concerned with 
the practicalities of everyday or expert ecologies, Neisser (1976) argues that it is necessary to 
examine the interactions between the human subject and the environment and the relations 
between the two; he implies the necessity to account for human cognition in reference to an 
' " Although Ncisser (1976) does not directly reference any particular worlc.s, it is highly probable that he is 
refcmng lo the beiiaviourisi study of human psychology brielly descrit>ed al the start of chapter two. 
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encompassing Umwelt. Neisser (1976) appears to assert that there may be an objective reality 
for human beings to perceive, but the perception of this information is always dependent 
upon the history—the knowledge produced over time—of the individual. This history, 
however, is not tbrmed of the properties, icons and symbols of the world as understood in 
cognitivism (and cognitively inclusive design) but instead an ongoing dialogue within the 
Umwelt. Neisser's later work focused on incorporating techniques into cognitive psychology 
that examined 'traditional' cognitive phenomena (such as memory) in terms of relations with 
'real' events, ecologies and everyday activities. For example, rather than focusing upon 
controlled testing of memory within the laboratory, Neisser and his collaborators examined 
the flaws of human memory in naturalistic contexts such as the recollection of events 
(examples being birthday parlies, political scandals or spacecraft explosions (as in Neisser 
and Hyman (2000)) and how interactions with the environment and other organisms provide 
knowledge of the self (as in Neisser (1993))."^ 
The influence of Umwelt theory is particularly evident in the writings of perceptual 
psychologist James Gibson, who held a similar discontent with the cognitivist information-
processing theories of human psychology to Neisser. Whereas Neisser developed various 
methods, techniques and studies that examined typical cognitive phenomena in naturalistic 
contexts, Gibson's work could be considered a rather more polemical opposition to 
traditional cognitive science.'"^ There are two key reasons why Gibson's work is particularly 
relevant to this thesis. Firstly, his research is already familiar to the interaction and product 
design communities, through his concept of'affordance' (Gibson, 1986) and its subsequent 
redefinitions for the design community (as has already been touched upon in chapters three 
and four). Secondly, Gibson's theory of aJTordances, especially in terms of recent 
Since Ihe late 1970s, when Neisser published his concerns regarding the ecological invalidity of cognitive 
psychology, there has been an increase in 'cognitive' studies in what are considered more naluralislic coniexis, 
such as the colieclions published in Neisser (1993), Neisserand Hynian (2000), and Winograd ei iil. (1999), The 
earUer discussed work of Suchman( 1987), along with Lave (1988) could also be considered as naturalistic 
studies of cognition, although their arguments, perhaps as a result of their eiluiographic basis, tend to be 
somewhat distanced from and problematic for the cognitive science community. 
' Both Neisser and Gibson appear to have influenced one another, and Neisser in particular highlights his 
gratitude to James Gibson and his wife Eleanor Gibson in the preface to CogniiUm and Realily. Comparing the 
two corpus' of work of Neisser and Gibson, however, highlights how much their perspectives difier as much as 
they are similar. Neisser could be characterised as attempting to introduce ecologically valid perspectives on 
traditional cognitive and experimental psychology concepts, whereas Gibson appeared to reach much further in 
his opposition to his contemporaries. In ilic preface to Cognilion and Realily, Neisser points out how some of 
his major concerns with the development of cognitive and infonnalion-processing psychology were influenced 
by James and Eleanor Gibson, whilst also highlighting how many of his ideas (developed from traditional 
experimental psychology terminologies) are not compatible with the 'Gibsonian' principles (Neisser, 1976, 
p.xii). Particularly problematic for Ihe cognitive psychology and science community is thai Gibson's does not 
necessarily provide definite evidence backing up his claims, instead appearing to rather provoke thought and 
speculation beyond the then dominate cognitivist principles (Goldstein, 1981). 
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developments in cognitive science, provides a useful basis with which to provoke thought 
about the way in which older people cognize within the Umwell. Before explaining Gibson's 
theory of affordance, it is necessary to introduce some generalities to Gibson's last work.'"^ 
Chemero (2009) defines Gibson's ecological psychology as constituting three main 
principles; perception is direct; perception is for action; perception is of affordances. 
Although it is the theory of affordance that is particularly useful to the argument to be 
articulated in the following chapters, it is given that atTordance follows from the previous two 
principles. These principles will now be explained in more detail. 
5.1.1. Perception is direct 
The cognitivist accounts of ageing cognition introduced in chapter three characterised human 
cognition as the transformation and computation of mental representations, most likely in the 
brain or central nervous system of the human being. Gibson (1986) departs from this 
prevailing approach, founding ecological psychology on the notion that animals directly 
perceive the environment.'"^ For Gibson {1986, p.l47): 
[d]irect perception is what one gets from seeing Niagara Falls, say, as distinguished 
from seeing a piclure of it. The latter kind of perception is mediated. So when 1 assert 
that perception of ihe environment is direct, I mean that it is not mediated by retinal 
pictures, neural pictures, or mental pictures. 
He argues that when an animal perceives a part of its environment, it is in a manner that is 
unmediated by inner mental representations. Gibson's theory of direct perception was in 
contrast to his earlier research, which had focused on the physiology of the eye in 
constructing visual perception, leading him to assert in this earlier work that visual perception 
was dependent upon the retinal image of the human being (as in Gibson (1950)). This eariier 
work, much like that of Neisser's, was studied within controlled laboratory conditions, where 
eye movement was purposely restricted and visual perception was examined based upon 
predefined visual stimulus. In his later work Gibson's (1986) was more interested in the 
natural context of vision. He argued 'that natural vision depends on the eyes in the head on a 
'"^ Gibson passed away shortly after the publication of The Eculogical Approach to Visual Perception 
(originally published in 1979) and, therefore, could not provide any greater clarification on his last claims. 
"" Gibson used the term "animals' throughout Iiis text, although it is evident that he considered human beings as 
just another set of animals that had a particular body and perceived a particular set of affordances as a result. As 
such, this thesis interprets Gibson's use of the term animal as it refers to human beings, or more specifically 
senescent human beings experiencing a process of temporal cognitive change, 
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body suppoiled by the ground, the brain being only the central organ of a complete visual 
system" ""* {Gibson, 1986, p. 1). in ecological approaches to understanding perception, that 
human beings have a body formed in a particular way and that this body enables the 
engagement of actions within environments is fundamental to how human beings perceive in 
everyday activity. The introduction of the active body in the study of perception and 
cognition was unheard of within contemporary cognitive science at the time of Gibson's 
writing, and lead lo the second principle of ecological psychology highlighted by Chemero 
(2009); perception is for action. 
5.1.2. Perception is for action 
Moving from place to place is supposed to be "physical" whereas perceiving is 
supposed to be "menial," but this dichotomy is misleading. Locomotion is guided by 
visual perception. Not only does it depend on perception but perception depends on 
locomotion inasmuch as a moving point of observation is necessary for any adequate 
acquaintance with the environment. (Gibson, 1986, p.223) 
The intcrconnectedness of action and perception follows from human beings being able to 
directly perceive the world. In wanting to consider the perception of human beings in terms 
of more naturalistic contexts, Gibson (1986) emphasised the role of the active organism in an 
environment, rather than wanting to study the isolated perceptual or cognitive system in the 
laboratory. In terms of ecological psychology, then, 'we must perceive in order to move, but 
we must also move in order to perceive' (Gibson, 1986, p.223). As Chemero (2009) 
highlights, the interconnectedness of perception and action in this way also means that action 
also informs perception and cognition. As small pockets of cognitive science have moved 
towards studying perception and cognition in everyday situations, the interconnectedness 
between perception and action has become a central feature of post-Gibsonian research. "'^  As 
Chemero and Turvey (2007a) note, in Gibson's terms the human being and the envirormient 
""* Gibson's laler work primarily appeared to attack his previous position on visual perception. The differing 
nature of his most popular works can mean contradictions and confusions appear in references lo his texts. This 
is not helped by Gibson's somewhat complicated description of Iheambieni array of information and 
affordances in his later work, which can be off-pulling to even ihe most philosophically engaged cognitive 
psychologist. Chcrmero (2009), although a firm supporter of Gibson's ecological theories, notes how Gibson 
often appears to contradict himself, even within ihe same paragraph. The manner in which Gibson changed his 
iheorelical positioning can be clearly seen in a series of letters he publicly exchanged with Emsl Gombrich, 
Rudolph Amheim and Nelson Goodman after his article On In/ormadan Available in Pictures [Gibsoa, 1971) in 
llie journal Leonardo in 1971 (see Gombrich tv «/. (1971) and Goodman (1971)). 
'"^  The intcrconnectedness of perception and action has become a central iheme of posl-Gibsonian ecological 
psychology and, more recently, the embodied and enactive cognitive sciences. These ideas will be further 
explained throughout Ihe remainder of this chapter and those that follow. 
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are an inseparable pair, and the perception of the environment and the actions of an agent are 
equally so. For Gibson, cognition is not consigned to certain mental representations of the 
perceiver, but is the engagement of perception and action. 
5.1.3. Perception is of affordances 
Chemero (2009) proposes the theory of affordances can be understood as an ontology that 
ties together the notion of direct perception and the interconnection of perception and action 
(Chemero, 2009). Gibson (1986, p.l27) defined the affordanccs of the environment as: 
what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either lor good or ill. [...] It 
implies the complimcntarily of the animal and the environment. 
Affordances are Gibson's way of conceptualising the opportunities for acfions that are an 
objective part of the environment but perceived relative to a specific animal. The affordances 
of the environment, he argued, can be understood as a system of meaning that is external to 
the animal. 
[Affordance is] a radical hypothesis, for it impHes thai the "values" and "meanings" 
of things in the environment can be directly perceived. Moreover, it would explain the 
sense in which values and meanings are external to the perceiver. (Gibson, 1986, 
P-127) 
AfTordances, as Gibson originally defines them, do not refer to purely physical opportunities 
for action but phenomenal oppjortunities as well. These affordances, although claimed to be 
part of the environment, are always to be considered in relation to a particular animal. For 
example, properties such as horizontal, flat, extended and rigid: 
would be physical properties of a surface if they were measured with the scales and 
standard units used in physics. As an affordance of support for a species of animal, 
however, they have to be measured relative to the animal. They are unique for that 
animal. They are not jusl abstract physical properties. They have a unity relative to 
the posture and behaviour of the animal being considered. (Gibson, 1986, pp. 127-128) 
It would appear that in one sense, an affordance can be treated as a physical property of the 
environment, objectively measured as long as it is relative to a particular agent. At the same 
time, it appears an affordance offers a more subjective role of shaping that agents experience 
of the world through shaping its behaviour. 
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An important fact about the affordances of the environment is that they are in a sense 
objective, real, and physical, unlike values and meanings, which are olten supposed to 
be subjective, phenomenal, and mental. But, actually, an affordance is neither an 
objective property nor a subjective property: or it is both if you like. An affordance 
cuts across the dichotoiny of subjective-objective and helps us to understand its 
inadequacy. It is equally a fad of the environment and a fact of behaviour. Il is both 
physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both ways, to the 
environment and to Ihe observer. (Gibson, 1986, p. 129) 
For Gibson, then, affordances are neither physical nor phenomenal—they are both and 
neither. Gibson claims that if the dichotomy o f subject and object is no longer possible based 
upon a perspective of affordances, then neither are other traditional dichotomies such as 
natural/artitlcial and cognitive/cultural, 
It is a mistake to separate the natural from the artificial as if they were two 
environments; artifacts have lo be manufactured from natural substances. It is also a 
mistake to separate the cultural environment from the natural environment, as if there 
were a world of mental products distinct from the world of material products. There is 
only one world, however diverse, and all animals live in it, although we human 
animals have altered it lo suit ourselves. (Gibson, 1986. p. ] 30) 
The theory of affordance appears to be about something more than culturally attached 
meaning. Affordances, Gibson suggests, rather than being cul tural ' ' " are the meeting point 
for an essential aspect of experience that is not part of the subject 's personal world, but one 
that is shared and experienced by an entire species in their ecological niche. 
The child begins, no doubt, by perceiving the affordances of things for her, for her 
own personal behaviour. She walks and sits and grasps relative to her own legs and 
body and hands. But she must Icam lo perceive the affordanccs of things for other 
observers as well as for herself. An alTordance is ofkn valid for all the animals of a 
species, as when h is part of a niche. (Gibson, 1986, p.l41) 
h is suggested by a number of authors, particularly within design, thai the theory of alTordances, and 
ecological psychology in general, is acullural (such as Ohver (2005), McGrenere and Ho (2000), and Norman 
(1988)). Although il is possible lo read Gibson (19R6) as suggesting ihai atTordances (ranscend culture and arc 
universal, a detailed reading suggests llial Gibson was necessarily shifting lemii no logics. As explained in the 
body text, rather than culture, Gibson refers to ecological niches. Rather than defining culture through the 
symbols, objects and languages thai a definable group of people use, Gibson used ecological niches to suggest a 
form of mulualily between a certain group of animals with shared qualities of physiology and perception with 
particular parts of the enviromncni. On a macro scale it is possible to understand ecological niches as universal, 
but on a micro scale each individual member of a group of animals may have subtly difi"erent ecological niches. 
This is particular evideni in Chemero's (2009) analysis and development of Gibson's work, which is discussed 
later in this chapier. 
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What may this mean for the perception of objects in the world? Echoing the claims of Neisser 
(1976), Gibson (1986) asserts that although psychologists have gone to great lengths over the 
years to identify certain properties of objects (such as colour, elasticity, rigidity, mobility, 
texture) and subsequently argue that human beings perceive objects based upon combinations 
of such properties, outside of the laboratory in the real-world of action this is simply not the 
case. "We can discriminate the dimensions of difference if required to do so in an experiment, 
but what the object affords us is what we normally pay attention to' (Gibson, 1986, p. 134). 
Gibson again discards the subjective/objective dichotomy in regards to affordance, as they 
'are properties of things taken with reference to an obsen'cr but not properties of the 
experiences of the observer^ (Gibson, 1986, p.l37 - emphasis in original). For Gibson, the 
idea that an affordance may be part of the phenomenal world of the observer is to give way to 
a dichotomy again; "[tjhere is only one environment, although it contains many observers 
with limitless opportunities for them to live in it' (Gibson, 1986, p.138). By claiming there 
are limitless opportunities to live in the world, Gibson is referring to the invariance of the 
affordances in ecology. For example, it might be the case that an observer may not perceive a 
particular affordance—either because they are not looking for it or that they are simply 
unaware of it—but that is not to say the atTordancc, the potentiality for action and interaction, 
does not exist. As Gibson (1986, p. 139) notes; '[a]n affordance is not bestowed upon an 
object by a need of an observer and his act of perceiving it.' 
The theory of affordance provides a powerful but equally controversial 
characterisation of how human beings interact and make sense of the world in terms of an 
encompassing UmweltV^ Although Gibson's work is complicated and at times contradictory, 
the concept of affordance has become popularised within product design and human-
computer interaction. Some of the key issues surrounding the use of atTordance in design will 
now be addressed. 
' " The theory of affordance is controversial in that a large proportion of cognitive science does not attribute it 
much worth. There may be a number of factors influencing iliis. Perhaps sirongest of all is the aforementioned 
conflation and complexity thai Gibson himself appears to gel inio in writing his arguments (see footnote 109). It 
may also be thai Ihe language developed and used by Gibson is rather paradoxical to much psychological 
research dial went before. For example, Gibson uses the tenn infonnalion throughout lo describe the ambient 
opiic array, yet a cognitive psychologist reading his work would need lo understand beforehand that his basic 
conceptualisation of information differed drastically to thai used within Ihe then prevailing cognilivisi studies. 
Gibson, as was touched on earlier, also could not provide a great amount of evidence backing up his claims, and 
An Ecological Approach to Perception was published just prior to his death, meaning many of his questions 
were left unanswered. Some of Gibson's ideas were developed further with experimental evidence by his wife, 
Eleanor Gibson, in particular the interconnectedness of perception and action (as in Gibson (1991)). 
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5.1.4. The contemporary use of afTordance in design 
Gibson's theory of affordances is an often cited component of a great variety of design 
literature. As a result of its generality, and for having been an eariy account of explaining 
human psychology in reference to the environment {some of which is designed), affordance 
has been seen as a useful concept for designers to consider, or even implement.' '^  At the 
same time, however, the use of affordance in design is rather complicated. Although 
affordances appear to be directly relevant to the perception of designed objects, the theory 
offers little in the way of direction as to how lo improve the design of certain objects to be 
more or less suited to meeting certain affordances. As Gibson (1986, p.l39) goes to great 
lengths to point out, '[l]he object offers what it does because it is what it is.' Donald Norman 
(1988) is often considered to have introduced the theory of affordance into the context of 
product and industrial design as a way of describing certain ergonomic and usability 
attributes of designed objects. Although Norman—a cognitive psychologist prior to turning to 
product design—worked alongside Gibson during his career, the conceptualisation of 
affordances that Norman provides differs dramatically to that of the original definition. ' 
Specifically, when Nonnan (1998) talks of affordances he refers to 'perceived affordances'. 
One reason for this distinction was Nonnan's interest in the applicability of affordances to 
design, rather than metaphysics and psychology. 
In Ihe design of objects, real affordances are not nearly so important as perceived 
ones; it is perceived affordances that tell the user what actions can be perfonned on an 
object and, to some extent, how to do them. In the design of everyday things, proper 
uses of perceived affordances make the difference between objects thai are 
It is imporlanl lo note, as will be noted within Ihe main text later on in this thesis, that the notion that an 
affordancc can be implemented is nol in line with Gibson's definition oftlie concept. As will be argued in the 
body text, the idea that an alTordance can be designed into products and objects primarily emerges from Donald 
Norman's (1988) iranstbniialion of Gibson's theory into design literature. 
' '^  Although his definition differed drastically, this was not a misinicrprelation on Norman's behalf Norman 
notes how his definition was different to Gibson's original, but considered this a necessity in moving the theory 
from psychology to design. At the same lime, however, it is important to take into consideration thai Norman's 
background as a cognitive (as in cognitivist) psychologist may also influence his changes lo Gibson's ihcory. As 
Norman himself slates: 'I originally hated the idea [of affordance]: il didn't make sense. I cared about processing 
mechanisms, and Gibson waved them off as irrelevant. Then, Gibson started spending considerable lime in La 
Jolla, and so I was able to argue with him for long hours (both of us relished intellectual arguments). I came to 
appreciate the concept of affordances, even if I never understood his other concepts, such as "information 
pickup." He and 1 disagreed Ibndamentally about how Ihe mind actually processes perceptual informalion (that 
phrase alone would inftuiate him)' (Norman, 1999). Iti The Psychology ofEveryikiy Things, Norman asserted 
that: 'My view is somewhat in conflict with the views of many Gibsonian psychologists, but this inlenial debate 
within modem psychology is of htlle relevance here' (Norman, 1988, p. 14). His this thesis' argument, however, 
Ihat these debates are relevant to design practice and theory, especially if there is a subsequent effect on the 
manner in which designers impose or restrict interactional possibilities upon the users of digital media products. 
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understandable and usable from those that are quite unfathomable. (Norman, 1998, 
p. 123) 
Rather than being a direct relationship between perception and action, Norman's perceived 
affordances suggest an extra layer ofinterpretation that differentiates itself from Gibson's 
affordances. For example, a poorly designed door handle may be perceived to afford pulling, 
but the door itself may only afford pushing. Since Norman's incorporation of affordance into 
design, the concept has gone through a number of transitions departing further from Gibson's 
original ideas. 
Affordance, as it has been debated as a concept within the design discipline, is 
seemingly problematic. McGrenerc and Ho (2000) highlighted a number of conflations of the 
term, which they determined was often a result ofre-interpretations of Norman's definition as 
opposed to examinations of Gibson's texts, Oliver (2005) argues that the acultural 
foundations of affordance does not match the socio-communicative requirements of 
designing, and that the manner in which most designers have appropriated the term 
completely devalues Gibson's original argument. Oliver notes how the concept of affordance 
has increasingly become incorporated into frameworks of designing technologies which, 
although holding certain ontological similarities with Gibson's ecological perspective, 
essentially keep the label of affordance but transform the concept into something completely 
different (this can be observed in activity theoretical accounts of affordances, as in 
Albrechtsen e/fl/. (2001)). Oliver (2005) goes on to suggest that affordance, in Gibsonian 
terms, is also problematic to designers due to being too broad and ineffective on the micro-
level of interactions with technologies to be useful. Throughout his article, he notes how 
Gibson's ecological psychology provided little more than species-level speculation. 
[Gibson's] discussions resort to commonsense examples that are not exhaustive or 
definitive, merely illustrative. This does not give a method for research or design, and 
led lo Nonnan's veiled reversion to designing around cuhural norms. By conceding 
that affordances need to be learnt but failing to explain their relationship lo 
'altunement", Gibson leaves himself vulnerable lo the same charge that he levelled at 
"* For example, Gaver(1991) developed an account of affordatices that was culturally contextualised, and 
particularly interested in human beings interacling with then-novel fomis of technology. Alhrechsten et al. 
(2001) iran-slbrm llic theory of affordanccs into an activity theoretical framework. Conole and Dyke (2004) 
focus upon (he affordances of educational information technologies, in particular developing Salomon'.^ 
definition (1993) rather than Gibson'.s or Norman's. McGrencrc and Ho (2000) provide a useful overview of a 
number of attempts to incorporate the theory of affordances in design theory and practice, yet appear to fall into 
some of (he usual problems of Gibson's complex and sometimes contradictory writing style. 
"* McGrenereand Ho (2000) noted that although a number of design related articles cited Gibson's concept of 
affordance, it would often only be used to provide historical contextualisalion and, typically, Norman's 
defmition of affordance was used. 
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cognitive processing theorists [.,.] there are too many perplexities, and thus this 
explanation should be abandoned, h is arguable Ihal atTordancc as a concepi in dcsigii 
has lost much of its value due to the vast alterations and redefinitions it has gone 
through that has taken it further away from Gibson's original conception. (Oliver, 
2005, p.412} 
Oliver notes that the theory of affordances, in their Gibsonian sense, provides little insight as 
to the learning of novel technologies (as a system of affordances) due to the denial of cuhure 
and cognition. Oliver's argument, however, fails to consider how Gibson does not concretely 
deny cognition and culture; rather, Gibson resituatcs these ideas within the ontology of 
affordances. For Gibson, cognition is perception and action, and culture is the ecological 
niche that is formed by the affordances between a particular human being and the 
environment. 
Although the concept of affordance has a comphcated history in design research—to 
the extent that Donald Norman now distances himself from the idea"^—^the following 
chapters will keep returning to the concept in order to explain why it is critical to forming a 
new understanding of ageing human cognition. In order to do this, however, the thesis is 
required to move away from the design-orientated interpretations of affordance, with their 
baggage of social and cultural relativity, and instead develop an account of affordances based 
upon claims emerging from cognitive science focusing upon human cognitive development 
embedded within an Umwelt. 
'"•The problems identified by Oliver (2005) are valid, bul fall foul of the similarproblemsof other arguments 
that claim artbrdances are acultural. This is noted byGaver (199l,p.81), who notes that the "actual perception 
of affordanccs will of course be determined in part by the observer's cullure, social setting, experience and 
intentions.' Gaver goes on lo stale ihat, '[IJike Gibson 1 do not consider these factors integral to the notion, but 
instead consider culture, experience, and so forth as highlighting certain allbrdances. Distinguishing affordances 
and the available information about them from their actual perception allows us to consider aflbrdances as 
properties that can be designed and analyzed in their own terms. L.eaming can be seen as a process of 
discriminating patterns in the world, as opposed to one of supplemeniing sensory infonnation with past 
experience. From this perspective, my culture and experiences may determine the choice of examples 1 use here, 
but nol the existence of the examples iheniselvcs' (Gaver, 1991, p.Rl). 
Nonnan has argued that many design practitioners saw the potential in the concept of affordances but 
interpreted it at almost face-value. In a number of articles (such as Norman (1999; 2004)), Norman has argued 
iha! rather than affordance, his definition should be considered as 'perceived alTordance', distinguished from 
Gibson's 'real' affordance. In a recent communication to the PhD-Design email list and a forthcoming book 
(Norman, 2010) Nonnan suggested the concepi of'signifier' in.steadof afTordances, although it may be the case 
that the differences between his definition of the two are little. As was noted on said discussion list, the use of 
ihe term signifier rather than affordance might be of equal, if not more, controversy to a community of 
communication theorists, psychologists and designers. 
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5.2. The Vmwelt of autonomous robots 
It is necessary for there to be coherence between body and world in order for an economy of cognitive 
functioning to emerge. 
A key focus point of Gibson's perceptual research was that of the active perceiver, exploring 
the world for perceptual information (its affordances) through movement. Perception and 
action are necessary for understanding the world. This contrasts sharply with the cognitivist 
assumption that cognition predetermines both perception and action. The problem of the 
active or passive cognizing agent has been explored at length within areas of artificial 
intelligence research aimed at developing autonomous robots. The key contribution of this 
area of research is that the body, and the manner in which the body allows exploration of the 
world, are actually the prerequisites of cognition. 
Much like the cognitive psychological approach to human cognition, cognitivist 
artificial intelligence research^—or Good Old Fashioned AI (GOFAI) as it is sometimes 
referred to—focused upon the role of symbolic computation and "mental' algorithms as 
central to the development of artificially intelligent agents. Early Al applications were 
intended to simulate and replace human experts—such as doctors and physicians—but over 
time it became apparent that the abilities of expert systems in certain cognitive tasks 
consistently fell short of human beings, despite technological advancements in computational 
processing (Pfeifer & Bongard, 2006). Pfeifer and Bongard highlight how the traditional 
sequential and linear symbolic computation was replaced in the 1980s by neural network 
approaches to AI. 
Neural networks are computational models ihal are inspired by biological brains, and 
therefore many of them inherit the brain's intrinsic ability for adaptation, 
generalization, and learning. [...] However, although there was definite progress, 
because most of these models were jusl algorithms like all Ihe others, ihey did not end 
up solving the big problems of mastering the interaction wiih the real world either. 
(Pfeifer & Bongard, 2006, pp.28-29) 
Rodney Brooks argued that GOFAI focused too much on the complexity of internal 
computations and algorithms in attempts to develop autonomous robots, rather than 
examining the complexities of the environments these robots would be engaging with. 
GOFAI, as with cognitivist psychology, considered the internal representations of the 
computational system the most significant attribute of an artificially intelligent agent. Brooks 
went against the prevailing cognitivist and connectionist AI to suggest autonomous agents 
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need not be super-complex computationally, but robust and reflective of the complexity of 
the world {Brooks. 1984; 1986)."^ Rather than attending to the development of internal 
representations of the world, often formulated a priori \o the act, Brooks {1990, p.5) argued 
that 'the world is its own best model'. 
In the design of his situated robots. Brooks purposively eschewed providing his robots 
with apre-determincd representationof the world they were to be deployed within."'' 
Instead, the robots were designed to be both embodied and situated. Brooks' early robots, 
rather than simulating or mimicking human beings, examined what may be considered less-
grand examples of intelligence.'^" The robots were designed to have sensory apparatus that 
picked up information from the environment that was used to engage in the action of the 
motors that moved the robot through the same environment. It was not necessary to 
constantly refer to an internal representation of the world in order to ensure correct 
movement; if the robot questioned its placement in the environment, it would check its 
sensory apparatus. In this explorative manner, the action and perception of the robot is 
interconnected and informs one-another. Although Brooks' early work examined relatively 
simple autonomous behaviour in comparison to human beings, he argued that developing 
robots that were grounded by their body and environment was a necessary prerequisite to 
developing higher level cognition. Brooks (1990. p.6) argued that: 
problem solving behavior, language, expert knowledge and application, and reason, 
are all rather simple once the essence of being and reacting are available. That essence 
is the ability to move around in a dynamic environment, sensing the surroundings to a 
degree sufficient to achieve the necessary maintenance of life and reproduction. This 
part of intelligence is where evolution lias concenlraled its time—it is much harder. 
This is the physically grounded part of animal systems. 
Key to the notion of using the world as the model for interaction was the development of AI 
within a body. Most autonomous robots have a body of some sort; however, making the most 
' Brooks' seminal papers were collected within his 1999 book Cambrian Intelligence. Although 
contemporarily Brooks' work is considered influential, the papers in Brooks (1999) represent a period where the 
embodied and situated robotics programme his work was an inlluenlial part of caused a great amount of dislain 
from wilhin the more traditional artificial intelligence research community, 
"'' It is worth noting that although Brooks' earlier work was characterised by arguments against the use of 
representations in Al. instead encouraging the direct coupling of the perceptual and action capabilities of the 
robois, in lalcr years his posilion on computational representations has softened. This can be seen in a reading of 
Cambrian Inieltigeme (Brooks, 1999), going from Brooks' earlier info Iiis later writing. 
' " For example, one of his early experiments 'Genghis' explored insect-like locomotion. The perception that 
Brooks' robots were iess-grand' in their insecl-esque levels of intelligence was part of the arguments against 
much of his earlier work; the dominant perspective wilhin artificial intelligence research was still focused upon 
atlenipl-s to simulate and develop artificial forms of high level intelligence and cognition. For Brooks', however, 
it was not thai (he insectoid robots were less intelligent—it was a completely different form of intelligence; 
intelligence Uiai was embodied, situated, grounded and autonomous. 
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of the world in terms of action is not just about having a body, but a particular type of body. 
Honda's Asimo (Advanced Step in Innovative Mobility) is a prominent example of an 
autonomous robot which, in certain ways, alludes to human physiology (Figure 18). 'Asimo 
is able to navigate the real world, reach, grip, walk reasonably smoothly, climb stairs, and 
recognize faces and voices' (Clark, 2008, p.3). Despite these great robotic achievements, 
however, Asimo is not particularly economical in completing these tasks. Clark notes that: 
[w]hcreas robots like Asimo walk by means of very precise, and energy-intensive, 
joiiil-angle control systems, biological walking agents make maximal use of the mass 
properties and biomechanical couplings present in the overall musculoskeletal system 
and walking apparatus itself. (Clark. 200S, pp.3-4) 
Figure 18 Honda's Asimo robot. C 2009 Honda Motor Company. 
Pfeifer and Bongard (2006) suggest that robots such as Asimo, although 'bodied', are not 
'embodied'. 
[E]mbodiment is an enabler for cognition or thinking: in other words, it is a 
prerequisite for any kind of intelligence. So, the body is not something troublesome 
that is simply there to carry the brain around, but it is necessary for cognition. [... 
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M]any tasks become much easier if embodiment is taken into account. (Pfeifer & 
Bongard,2006.p.l9) 
Ahhough Asimo is conceptualised in terms of autonomy in the world, the manner in which it 
has been developed has lead to a cognitivist-esque result where the "intelligence' is within a 
centralised processer—the brain of the robot—rather than distributed through its body. 
This often lead[s] to computationally expensive solutions that not only produced 
unnatural behaviour, bul were also loo slow to achieve, for example, nuining 
behaviour. Thus, the concept of embodiment not only implies that the agent must 
have a body—obviously robots do have bodies—it also means thai one should follow 
a particular style of thinking when building robots or generally inleUigent agents. 
(Pfeifer & Bongard, 2006, p.29) 
Pfeifer and Bongard highlight how it is not just the fact that robots such as those developed 
by Brooks" had a body that made them intelligent cognitive agents, it was that they were 
developed in such a way to have a body that took advantage of the world and intelligence was 
layered on lop. Although Asimos do have bodies, and are highly intelligent on a 
computational level, as agents they expend a lot of "mental' energy for very little gain. 
Instead, Pfeifer and Bongard argue that what is needed instead is an increased consideration 
o f morphological computation'; 'that certain processes are performed by the body that 
otherwise would have to be performed by the brain' (Pfeifer & Bongard, 2006, p.96). Human 
beings and many other species, Pfeifer and Bongard argue, appear to be rather good at 
allowing their embodiment to take control of certain actions in the world rather than relying 
upon conscious control. For example, the muscles and tendons in the human leg are 
elasticised in such a manner that when walking and running the knee can make small 
adaptive and dynamic movements without requiring control from the nervous system (Pfeifer 
& Bongard, 2006). Pfeifer and Bongaid (2006) suggest that in order to develop complete, 
embodied, agents, robotocists and cognitive scientists must take into account how 
intelligence is distributed around the physiology of the body in this manner.' ' 
TTie embodied and situated robotics research suggests that in order to have robust 
cognitive functioning, first there is a requirement to have a particular type of body and for 
this body to be grounded in the environment. In reference to von Uexkull and Gibson, human 
'^' Pfciferand Boiigard deline five properties of'complete agents', of which ma rp ho logic a I computation is the 
fiElh on a growing scale. The properties are: ' 1 . They are subject la the laws of physics [energy dissipation, 
friction, gravity). 2. They generate sensory stimulation through motion and generally through interaction with 
the real world. 3. They affeci the environment ihrough behaviour. 4. They are complex dynamical systems which, 
when they interact with the environment, have altraclor stales. 5. They perform nwrpkological computation' 
(Pfeifer & Bongard, 2006, p.95). 
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beings appear to have such a complementarity between their body and the environment; their 
Umwelt is integrated and coherent, freeing up certain mental processes for more strenuous 
cognitive activities. It is possible to ask here, however, as to what happens when this 
integration and coherence is disrupted? This question has some resonance with the temporal 
changes occurring to the cognition of older people, especially in relation to the broader 
physiological changes to the body that occur in later life; this theme will be explored further 
in chapter six. In the following section, the issue of embodiment and environment will be 
discussed in relation to the enaclive cognitive sciences, dealing with human cognitive 
development and change. 
5.3. Enactivc cognitive science 
Human cognition continually enacts and re-enacts the Umwelt through a history of structural 
coupling: these couplings are somewhat closed, yet also open to new couplings to emerge in the 
future. 
If embodiment and the situated environment are implicated in the development of human 
cognition, then the cognitivist idea that human thought is entirely internal information-
processing, or of the brain, must be reassessed. A great variety of research within the 
cognitive sciences has established relationships between embodiment and cognition, to 
varying degrees of radicalism against prevailing ideas. " One influential perspective has been 
that cognition is inseparable from the lived experience of the world, as is suggested by 
Francisco Vareia, EvanThomspon and Eleanor Rosch (1991). Varelae/a/. (1991) claim that 
in the life world as it is lived by the cognizing agent, both knowledge and phenomenal 
experience are a result of active construction, rather than relying upon decoding an objective 
reality independent of the agent. McGee (2005) argues that Vareia et al. proposed a model of 
cognition based upon a radical constructivist ontology. The significance of this perspective is 
that it suggests a 'middle-way' between the contemporary dualisms of objective and 
' " Although ontological and epistemological arguments within cognitive science are often shifted into one of 
two camps—such as cognhivist or enactivist; rationalist or pragmatisl; sot^  or hard; functional or experiential— 
divisions are usually far less well-defined. For example, philosopher Andy Clark notes that embodied cognitive 
science can be divided into 'embodied' and "radically embodied" camps (Clark, 2008). Clark's own argument 
can be described as a form of wide compuiaiionalism (as documented in Clark (1997; 1998; 1999; 2003; 2008; 
Clark & Chalmers, 1998)). Clark walks a line between cognilivism and enactivism (as in Varcla « «/. (1991)). 
where he lakes on-board aspects of computational and information-processing paradigms of the mind, whilst 
also arguing for how the body and world is a pan of these compuiaiional abilities as much as the brain or central 
nervous system is. 
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subjective reality.''^ Von Glasersfeld claimed that radical constructivism 'breaks with 
convention and develops a theory of knowledge in which knowledge does not reflect an 
"objective" onlological reality, but exclusively an ordering and organization of a world 
constituted by our experience' (von Glasersfeld, 1984, p.24). These themes of radical 
constructivism are evident within Varela el al.'s proposal of using enactive as the defining 
term of their paradigm of cognitive science. 
We propose as a name the term enactive to emphasize the growing conviction that 
cognilion is not the representation of a pregiven world by a pregivcn mind but is 
rather the enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history of the variety of 
actions thai a being in the world peribrins. (Varela elal., 1991, p.9) 
Varela ei al. argue that in being enacted, cognition in experience is fundamentally groundless. 
That is, although knowledge appears to be fixed in cognition at certain moment in time, it is 
only ever provisional and Is liable to change at any moment, even if very subtly, as a result of 
perturbations to human beings Vmwelt (McGee, 2005). In terms of Varela ei al.'s positioning 
of cognition, the Umwelt is the result of a history of structural couplings. For Varela el al., 
the term structural coupling develops directly from Varela's previous second-order 
cybernetics research'"^ into autopoietic cognition with Humberto Maturana.'' Maturana and 
'- The onlological similarities between radical constructivism and enactive cognitive science stand in stark 
contrast to the dominant perspectives on ontological realities that prevails within the cognitive sciences. One 
way lo characterise cognitivist ontology would be as the decoding of information from (he world in an 
internalised, private system of processing. Gibson's ecological psychology opposes this perspective completely. 
Of course, he does have an interest in the physiology of the animal, but he is clear that the information for 
making sense of the world is in the world, and human beings discover this information as active agents. 
Maturana and Varcla highlight the difTiculty of these opposing approaches, highlighting that "[ajll doing is 
knowing and all knowing is doing' but also that '[eiverylhing said is said by someone' (Maiurana & Varela, 
1987, p.26). They highlight how it is there is validity to ontological perspectives that either emphasise the 
subjective ideal, or the objective real, or both, or neither. 
' " In chapter two, the thesis highlighted how the original cybernetics movement heavily influenced the 
contemporary understating of human cognilion in the cognitive psychology of ageing. Whilst the earlier 
c>*emetics research could be considered reductionist, focusing primarily on objective understandings of the 
cybernetic system, second-order cybernetics more prominently acknowledged the subjectivity of analysing 
cybernetic systems. In particular, second-order cybernetics noted how the observer—be that the designer of an 
artificial intelligent system, or the scientist experimenting willi self-organised biological or cognitive systems— 
are also a cybernetic system, Heylighen and Joslyn note that "observer and observed caimot be separated, and 
the result of observations will depend on their interaction. The observer too is a cybernetic system, trying to 
construct a model of another cybernetic system. To understand this process, we need a "cybernetics of 
cybernetics", i,e. a "meta" or "second-order" cybernetics' {Heylighen & Joslyn, 2001, p. 157). 
'-* Much of Maturana and Varcla's work focused upon a theory of self-organisation they coined autopoiesis. 
They defined an aulopoietic system as "a network of processes of production (transformation and destruction) of 
components that: (i) tlu'ough their interactions and transformations continuously regenerate the network of 
processes (relations) that produced them; and (ii) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in the space in 
which the (the components) exist by specifying die topological domain of its realisation as such a network' 
(Maiurana & Varela, 1980, p.79). Winograd and Flores (1986) highlight how the technical language of this 
definition might be off-putting, but "it is in fact a carefully crafted statement expanding on a simple idea: the 
essential cliaracteristic of a living system is that it is a collection of components constituting a unity that can live 
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Varela claimed that structural couplings occur when 'there is a history of recurrent 
interactions leading to the structural congruence between two (or more) systems' (Maturana 
& Varela, 1987, p.75). The concept of structural coupling suggests from the outset that 
certain systems are not integrated. Over time, repeated patterns of interactions between 
overlapping systems mean they become coupled with one another. In terms of Maturana and 
Varela's research, structural coupling is a phylogenelic (evolutionary) phenomena where two 
or more systems, be these formed of a single cell or higher complexity, couple with one 
another as a result of stable interactions over evolutionary time. Varela et a/. (1991) position 
structural coupling in terms of the ontogenetic timescale of the lifespan of a human being. 
Structural coupling implicates that over the history of a lifetime, the nervous system, the body 
and the environment continuously and dynamically overlap one another, developing new 
couplings whilst others diminish (Thompson & Varcia, 2001; Varela e? a/., 1991). The 
Umwelt, when interpreted through Varela el al.'s tenns, is both closed and open, Much like 
the embodied robotics research discussed previously, Varela ct al. are keen to highlight the 
reliance upon the body and world for cognition. 
By using ihe term embodied we mean to highlight two points: first, that cognition 
depends upon the kinds of experience th;it come from having a body with various 
sensorimotor capacities, and second, that these individual sensorimotor capacities are 
themselves embedded in a more encompassing biological, psychological, and cultural 
context. (Varela et a/., 1991, pp. 172-173) 
Varela et al. stress how human embodiment, its sensorimotor capabilities and the experiences 
that come from having a body constructed in a particular way are ftindamental to the 
development of human cognition. This body, however, is always situated; cognition is not 
just about the sensorimotor structure of the physiology of the human body, but how this 
relates to second and third order structural couplings with the world. Varela et al. continue: 
By using the term action we mean to emphasise once again that sensory and motor 
processes, perception and action, are fundamentatly inseparable in lived cognition. 
Indeed, the two are not merely contingently linked in individuals; they have also 
evolved together. (Varela i?f a/., 1991, p. 173) 
or die. Malurana's central observation is that exactly this simple property leads to the complex phenomena of 
life. The functioning of an organism as .structure-determined system with the potential of disintegration leads to 
adaption and evolution" (Winograd & FJores, 1986, p.45). Theories of second-order systems and autopoietic 
self-organisation are fundamental loihedeveiopmcnt of Varela e/a/. 's( 1991) theory of enactive cognition, but 
will not be developed further in the main text. 
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The interconnection of perception and action, linked through the structural couplings of the 
nervous system, the body and the world, highlight the reciprocality and circularity inherent in 
Varela et a/.'s approach to human cognition. 
Although at the time of formulating their argument the concept of embodiment in 
cognitive science was not necessarily new'^'', what is radical in Varela et a/.'s perspective is 
their argument of the reciprocal nature of the body and environment in cognition, h is this 
reciprocality that forms the structural coupling of cognition. Over the lifetime of a human 
being, certain patterns of interaction between human and environment are repeated in such a 
manner that they become structurally coupled. This reciprocality emerges from the circularity 
with ecology, where 'we are in a world that seems to be there before reflection begins, but 
that world is not separate from us' (Varela era/., 1991, p.3). To distinguish this approach 
from other embodied models of cognition, Varela eM/. (1991) coin their new paradigm as 
enactive cognitive science. The enactive approach to cognition is comprised of two main 
points; '(1) perception consists in perceptually guided action and (2) cognitive structures 
emerge from the recurrent sensorimotor patterns that enable action to be perceptually guided' 
(Varela e/a/., 1991, p.173). Within an enacted cognitive science, human perceivers are 
guided by the actions made available by a particular embodiment and actively 'contributes to 
the enactment of [... the] surrounding worid*'^" (Varela e/a/., 1991, p. 174). Varela e/A/. 
subsequently define their positioning of cognition in the following: 
' * A number of scholars and philosophers dealing with the cognitive sciences have provided accounts of" 
cognition that are more rooted in the body. Although this thesis focuses primarily on the works of Gibson 
(1986), Varela etal. (1991) and Chemcro (2009), tliere are multitudes of oilier works that have informed in 
subtle ways these ideas. Varelae/a/, cite Dreyfus (1992), Lakoff (1987), Johnson (1987) as preceding examples 
of accounts of embodiment within cognilive science. More recent examples thai have informed this discussion 
are Lakoff and Johnson (1999), Clark (1997; 200S), Pfeifer and Bongard (2006) and Gallagher (2005). Noe 
(2004), O'Rcgan and Noe (2001), Barsalou (2008), Glenberg (1997), Wilson (2002), Thelen and Smith (1996) 
and Shapiro (2007). Although these arguments may be broadly contextuahsed as embodied cognilive science, 
there are huge variances between the literature as to how embodied cognition may be used and defined. 
'"'Although this thesis refers to 'enaction' in terms of how it was introduced by Varela e/«/, (1991), the term 
enaction has been used at length within the earlier work of cognitive psychologist Jerome Bruner. Bruner was a 
key advocate of the original incorporation of'cognitive' philosophy in lo expert menial psychology, Bruner 
(1966) inlroduced 'enaclive' knowledge as part of a three-stage hierarchical model of human knowledge (the 
other been iconic and symbolic knowledge), Bruner argued thai we "know many things for which we have no 
imagery and no words, and they are very hard to teach anybody by the use of either words or diagrams and 
pictures' (Bruner, 1966, p. 10). For Bruner, il was this form of knowledge thai formed enactive knowledge. 
Although Varela I'l al.'s (1991) approaches have similarilies to Bruner's (1966) understanding of enaction, there 
are also substantial differences in (hat Bnincr considered enaclivc knowledge as represented in the mind of ihe 
individual and distinct from the iconic and symbolic knowledge, which were privileged higher-cognitive and 
disembodied status. Inlight of Vareal I;'/M/.'S( 1991) approach it is evident ihat Bruner (1966) considered the 
knowledge of the body as separate trom cognilive knowledge. Pia Tikka (2008) observes that recent research on 
•enactive inlcrfflces' (Enaclive Network, 2007), allliough referencing Varela's and Maturana's research, mainly 
emphasises a defmilion of enaction similar to Bruner's, 
'"* Varela ff«/, note the significance of thephenonicnological writings ofMerieau-Ponly, particularly 
Phenomenology of Perception (2002), tliroughout their development of their enaclive account of cognition, 
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Question 1: What is cognition? 
Answer: Enaction: A history of structural coupling that brings forth a world. 
Question 2: How does il work? 
Answer: Through a network consisting of multiple levels of interconnected, 
sensorimotor subnetworks. 
Question 3: How do I know when a cognitive system is functioning adequately? 
Answer: When it becomes part of an ongoing existing world (as the young of every 
species do) or shapes a new one (as happens in evolutionary history). (Varela etai, 
I991,pp.206-207) 
In developing the enactive cognitive sciences based upon notions of structural coupling, 
Varela et al. appear to allude to the possibility that the nervous system, body and 
envirotmient are not always coupled. Cognition, in this account, appears to be the human 
capability to ensure enaction; that is, to successfiilly integrate, or couple, the nervous system, 
body and environment into coherent system. This is suggested by Thelen et al. (1996), who 
observed that human adults are adept at integrating both perception and action through 
interconnected sensorimotor networks, whilst children have to develop these abilities. Much 
of Thelen's research (such as Thelen and Smith (1996))highlights the manner in which 
human cognition develops in infancy through the self-organisation of a dynamic system 
bridging the brain, central nervous system, the body's physiology and the environment. 
Similarly, ChJel and Beer (1997) have noted the significance of Varela el al.'s perspective in 
terms of understanding how organisms adapt neurally to changes to environments. They note 
that the then prevailing attempts to identify the basis for organisms adapting to envirorunents 
had focused upon neurology and the central nervous system (Chiel & Beer, 1997). Chiel and 
Beer identified this as problematic, however, as the "nervous system, the body, and the 
environment are each rich, complicated, highly structured dynamical systems, which are 
coupled to one another, and adaptive behavior emerges from the interactions of all three 
systems' (Chiel & Beer, 1997, p.554). In this sense, il is only possible to understand the state 
of the nervous system in reference to the continuous system of feedback to and from the body 
and the world. 
highlighting that any account of cognition should make sense in regards to the enacted experience of the world. 
Like Neisser and Gibson before them, Varela t'f a/. (1991) were not interested in .sialic latioratory studies of 
cognition, but how cognition emerges through real world interactions, 
' " The research described by Thelen and Smith (1996) and Chiel and Beer (1997) are prominent examples of 
the use of dynamic system theory wilhin the study of human cognition. Thelen and Smith argue that the 'central 
tenet of dynamic systems is that order, discontinuities, and new forms emerge precisely from the complex 
interactions of many heterogeneous forces I-..] the power source of human cognitive development is not in the 
separate modules but in their mutual interactions' (Thelen & Smith. 1996, p.37). The dynamicisi approach lo 
understanding cognitive development is coextensive with Varela et al.'s enactive approach. Aspects of Thelen 
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5.4. The dynamic affordances of the Vmwelt 
U is possible lo conceive of the Umwell of a person and ihe ajfordances they perceive as dynamic and 
cunlinually in a stale of change based upon innumerable factors; human cognilion allows for ihe 
continued integration of these factors inlo a coherent understanding of the llmwelt. 
In recent years, post-Gibson ecological psychologists have proposed a variety of redefinitions 
to the theory of affordances that arc increasingly suited to the enactive framing of human 
cognition presented by Varela e/a/. (1991).'"* A recent elucidation of the theory of 
affordances by Anthony Chemero (2003; 2009) emphasises how affordances are part of the 
enaction of the Umwelt}'^^ In terms of the experience of the cognizing agent, Chemero 
continues the claims of Varela ei al. that the phenomenal, cognitive and behaviour are 
inseparable, 'achieved by closely coordinated perception and action' (Chemero, 2009, p.212) 
as an integrative system. Chemero (2003) differs from Gibson in arguing that affordances are 
relations between an animal and the environment. More specifically, these relations arc 
between the abilities of the animal and the features of the environment. Chemero (2009) 
expands his relational account of affordance into the context of real-time accounts of 
interactions with the world. 
[C]onsider the interaction over time between an animal's sensorimotor abilities, that 
is, its embodied capacities for perception and action, and ils niche, the set of 
affordances available to it. [...] Over developmental time, an animal's sensorimotor 
abilities select its niche—the animal will become selectively sensitive to information 
relevant to the things il is able lo do. Also over developnienlal lime, the niche will 
strongly influence the development of the animal's ability to perceive and act. 
(Chemero, 2009, pp.150-151) 
and Smith's (1996) use of dynamic systcm.s theory will be explored in chapter eight of the thesis in reference to 
design. 
"° Again, this emerges from the complicated and contradictory nature of Gibson's argument. Much like it has 
been in design, the theory of affordance has been highly debated within posi-Gibsonian ecological psychology. 
These discussions often surround ihe fundamental nature of affordances—whether they exist as objective 
properties of the world (as in Turvey (1992)), or as relations between animals and environments (as argued by 
SlofTregcn (2003a; 2003b), Chemero (2003) and Cliemero and Turvey 12007b)). Although these discussions are 
valuable, this thesis tbcuses upon Chemero's (2009) definition, as il is most relevant in the thesis' context. 
'"" The thesis will continue to use Umwell in place of animal-environmcnl system, altliough il is the latter 
terminology that Chemero (2003; 2009) and SlotTregen (2003b) use. 
' " Although Gibson suggested at various points thai affordances are only perceived in reference lo certain 
animals, he was clear in stating that they were invariant properties of ecology. Although Gibson identified 
afibrdances as a relation between the animal and ecology, the relation is always focused upon the animal in 
relation to ecology, and not in completely mutual terms. 
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For Chemero (2009), if this is what occurs in the relations between animal and environment 
over evolutionary or developmental periods, then a similar account of affbrdance can be 
offered for real-time interactions.'" 
Over the shorter time scales of behaviour, the aninial's sensorimotor abilities manifest 
themselves in embodied action that causes changes in the layout of the available 
affordances. and these affordances will change the way abilities are exercised in 
action. (Chemero, 2009, p.151) 
Chemero highlights here how atTordances are not simplistic, static aspects of the animal's 
opportunities for action with the environment, but change, sometimes dramatically, moment-
by-moment through real-time alterations in the embodiment of the organism and the layout of 
the environment. In the case of Chemero's theory of atTordances, the animal enacts the 
Umwcll in terms of an ongoing development and achievement. This is not a one way system 
though of enaction from the organism, as the world also shapes the animal; subsequently, the 
animal, in turn, can change this world. To reiterate: 
an animal's aclivities alter the world as the animal experiences it, and these alterations 
to the phenomenological-cognitive-behavioral niche, in turn, affects the animal's 
behaviour and the development of its abilities to perceive and act, which further alter 
the phenomenological-cognitive-behavioral niche, and on and on. {Chemero, 2009, 
p. 152) 
Abilities are, for Chemero, a further relation, but this time between the affordance and the 
animal. In order to perceive a particular affordance, that is to act upon a feature of the 
environment, the animal requires particular abilities, a sensorimotor coupling. In 
conceptualising the human variable of affordance as abilities, Chemero (2009) is not 
suggesting that upon the correct matching of an environmental teature a particular affordance 
will be executed. Chemero notes that: 
[h]aving the ability to walk does not mean thai one will not fall down even in the ideal 
conditions for walking. This is to point out that there is something inherently 
nomiativc about abilities. Individuals with abilities arc supposed to behave in 
particular ways, and they may fail lo do so. (Chemero, 2009, p. 145) 
'^ ^ The idea ihat affordances can be thought of as relations between the animal and the environment are evident 
in Gibson's original definilion. What Chemero (2009) (and also Stoflregcn (2003b)) defines as animal-
environment systems appears to have a similarity with Gibson's 'ecological niche'. Gibson stated that '[t]he 
natural environment offers many ways of life, and different animals have different ways of life. The niche 
implies a kind of animal, and llie animal implies a kind of niche. Note ihc complementarity of the two' (Gibson, 
1986, p.128). However, where Chemero (2009) differs dramaiically is a move from the evolutionary limescale 
ihal Gibson appears lo continuously allude lo, towards a dynamic, real-time account of affordances. 
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Also, as Stofiregen (2003b) argues, there are situations where a great many atTordances 
emerge but are ignored. The implication here is that in everyday situations, although 
affordances may emerge within the Umweh, they are not necessarily exploited by an 
individual. It may also be that the abilities of particular human beings do not match the 
potential affordances of the envirormient. In such circumstances the environment may be 
changed to suit the abilities of the individual, or the potential affordance influences the 
development of the required sensorimotor couplings. Chemero (2009) illustrates his theory 
of dynamic affordances as in Figure 19. 
Considering Chemero's account in terms of the enactive cognitive sciences, it can be 
taken that atTordances are the necessary bridge between the autopoielic system of the 
organism and the environment. As is observed by Thelen and Smith, infant children actively 
explore their environments in order to identify what it affords; in identifying novel 
atTordances, further subtle couplings with the environment are made, altering both the neural 
dynamics and sensorimotor couplings of the child, thus aiding the active exploration of 
further affordances.'"'^ The child's Vmwelt is constantly in a state of change; this continuous 
change is perhaps most apparent in youth but continues througliout an individual's lifetime. 
• Chemero cites the research of Esther Thelcn (1994) that examined the manner in which ihree-montli old 
infants are able lo develop couplings belwecn themselves and the environment. Thelen (1994) trained the infants 
lo spin a mobile by kicking their legs. After learning this ability, Thelen (1994) banded their legs together, 
making ii dilTicull to continue enacting the perceived affordance. It was observed thai the children very quickly 
lean)! lo move ilieir legs ai the same lime in order to spin the mobile (Thelen. 1994). Chemero noles that 
Thelen's studies are useful as ihcy highlight how, firstly, "thai even very young children actively explore ihcir 
environments in order lo discover affordances. Secondly, these studies show that infants make changes to their 
behavioural repertoire in order to aller their environment and, in so doing, to alter Uieir phenomenology' 
(Chemero, 2009, p.201), 
• The discussion provided here somewhat portrays afibrdance.'- as a having a positive effect on people. This is 
nol necessarily Ihe case, as affordance can be portrayed as negative as much as positive. Affordances are, of 
course, not the implementation of certain phenomena (as it may be understood in design accounts such as 
Norman) but are rather the exploration of phenomena. In exploring certain environment, alTordances may 
emerge that have effects on organisms thai may be understood as negative. For example, computer games may 
aflbrd a lowered excursion of bodily organs and mu.scle groups for children, making children potentially unfit. 
Although it may be the case thai certain affordances may be perceived as having negative or positive effects on 
people, affordance as phenomena are fundamentally neutral. An affordance itself does not have agency; rather, 
it is the collective conditions of particular monienls in time, interconnected with the intentions, desires and 





Figure 19 Chcmcro's (2009) proposition of dynumic affordances. Taken from Chcmero (2009, p.15.1) 
The account of cognition described within this chapter has explained it to be an ability 
of an entire embodied and situatetl organism that integrates and couples together the nervous 
system, the body and the environment to allow for the coherent enaction of a world. 
AfFordances, in this account of cognition, emerge as relations between the abilities of 
particular person and features of their environment (which have resulted from a particular 
history of structural couplings). The affordances of the Umwcit are instable and provisional, 
changing as a result of alterations to the autopoietic structure of the human and the layout of 
the environment. These changes are ongoing, altering at a moment's notice yet also traceable 
over time. 
The revision of the definition of human cognition provided by those researchers 
dealing with ecological, enactive and dynamic aspects of cognitive science provides a basis 
for the design to think somewhat differently about the cognitive disconnection between older 
people and digital media products. Problematically, however, little to no research in this area 
has been performed on the subject of ageing. The discussion of this chapter characterises 
human cognitive experience as a flexible and plastic process in which perception and action 
are perturbed by a great variety of neural, physiological, and environmental influences and 
yet are combined in a rather seamless fashion, What happens, however, when this seeming 
robust integration goes wrong? The following chapter will examine the relevancy of the 
perspective of cognition developed here in reference to human senescence, leading to an 




Question: Is it possible to reinterpret the cognitive disconnection ohsen'ed to occur between 
older people and digital media products through a dynamic and enactive understanding of 
senescent cognition? 
6.}. Insufficiencies in the ability to integrate the implicit knowledge of bodily abilities with ongoing 
activities lead to situations where cognitive resources become limiled, the body becomes overtly 
present and the perception ofajfordances in the Umwelt becomes somewhat incoherent. 
6.2. It is possible to reinterpret studies of relationships between cognitive, physical and sensory 
deterioration in old age as highlighting a misalignment of an individual's perception of their abilities 
and the potential abilities of their own embodiment; rather than a process of deterioration, this 
presents a situation of ongoing experiential blindness. 
6.3. Recent studies of the ageing brain suggest that rather than declining in physical and cognitive 
function, it appears to be highly plastic and engaged in a process of continual re-organisation 
resulting from the process of senescence and novel interactions in the world. 
6.4. A senescentechnic understanding of cognitive disconnect is presented that highlights how the 
contemporary approaches of cognitively inclusive design are limiled in focusing purely on storehouse 
metaphors of memory. Instead, senescent cognition presents a situation where designers are 
implicated in harnessing the agency and potential abilities of the embodied and enacting older 
person. 
6.1. Disruptions to the coherency of the Vmwelt 
Insufficiencies in the ability to integrate the implicit knowledge of bodily abilities with ongoing 
activities lead to situations where cognitive resources become limited, the body becomes overtly 
present and the perception ofqffbrdances in the Umwelt becomes .somewhat incoherent. 
In the previous chapter, the thesis explained an alternative paradigm of understanding human 
cognition to that of cognitivism, where cognition is grounded and enacted and considered to 
be a process of the continued integration of sensorimotor coupHngs that allow for the 
perception and action upon atTordances. This account of cognition, rather than separating and 
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reducing cognitive fianclions as discrete to the body and environment, proposed that human 
thought is inseparable from an encompassing Umwcli. Whilst the work of Gibson, Varela el 
al., and Chemero provide a useftil place to begin searching tor alternative design strategies 
than those proposed in cognitivcly inclusive design, the literature discussed in the last chapter 
provide little explanation for those moments when cognitive disconnections—where mind, 
body and world appear to be separated—are observed as occurring. The discussion from the 
previous chapter, whilst providing an alternative basis with which to conceptualise human 
cognition from cognitivism, fails to engender a greater understanding of the problems older 
people encounter with digital media products based upon this framework. 
This chapter builds upon the previous discussion by developing an account of 
senescent cognition that provides a basis for understanding the temporal changes occurring to 
human cognition in later life. In particular, recent work by phenomenologist Shaun Gallaglier 
(2005) and philosopher of mind Alva Noe (2004), which is synergetic with the arguments of 
Varela el al. (1991) and has examined aspects of embodiment and enaction in relation to 
changes to integrative systems of the human body, provides a useful place with which to start 
developing a senescent understanding of cognitive disconnection. This chapter will bring 
these works together with more traditional studies of changes to the ageing human body, 
cognition and neurophysiology, in order to highlight certain synergies between a number of 
studies that have previously been unattended. Following this, the proposal of senescent 
cognition will be used as a critical lens to reinterpret the previously discussed cognitive 
disconnections between older people and digital media. 
The research of Shaun Gallagher (2005), informed by the phenomenology of 
Merleau-Ponty (such as Merleau-Ponty (1962 [2002])), is focused upon providing 
explanations as to how human cognitive experience is grounded in the human body, and how 
subtle changes to this grounding have profound consequences on an individual's perception 
and cognition. A significant contribution of Gallagher's research has been the study of 
interactions between two bodily s>Btems related to the coherency of perception and action; 
the body schema and body image. Gallagher, developing and synthesising notions developed 
by Head (1920) and Merleau-Ponty (1962 [2002]), defines the body schema as 'a system of 
sensory-motor functions that operate below the level of self-referential intentionality" 
(Gallagher, 2005, p.26). '^'' The body schema operates in a close-to-automatic manner to aid 
"* The usefulness of Gallagher's work is partly in his synthesis of a large amount of disparate literature 
discussing the t)ody schema and ihc body image. Gallagher (2005) traces the notion of the body schema lo Head 
(1920). Head (1920) defmed the body schema as preconscious (hence prenoelic) system somewhat related to 
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the positioning of the body in relation to the environment. A correctly functioning body 
schema atTords a situation where aspects of bodily movement arc not required to be under 
conscious control when engrossed in interactions with objects and other people. As Gallagher 
defines it, the body schema is a prenoetic' performance of the human body, suggesting that 
'the body acquires a certain organization or style in its relations with its environment' before 
an individual is consciously aware of it occurring (Gallaglier, 2005, p.32). It is not, therefore, 
just a case that the body schema coordinates the sensorimotor system of the human being in 
order to engage in a certain activity, but that it is in a constant exchange with the 
environment. Gallagher (2005) suggests that at times the body schema can expand beyond the 
flesh of the human and incorporate aspects of environment. 
Tlie body schema allows the body actively to integrate its own positions and 
responses and to deal with its environmenl wilhoul the requirement of a reflexive 
conscious monitoring directed at the body, h is a dynamic, operative performance of 
the body, rather than a consciousness, image, or conceptual model of it. (Gallagher, 
2005, p.32) 
The body image, on the other hand, is 'a system of perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs 
pertaining to one's own body' (Gallagher. 2005, p.24). The body image frequently appears in 
conscious experience and is not equal to the body schema (Gallagher, 2005). An extreme 
example of the difference between a body image and body schema is that at times one's body 
image can be brought to conscious attention, whilst the body schema always stays outside of 
consciousness. The body image is an explicit understanding of what constitutes an 
individual's own body, rather than the tacit performances of that body, Gallagher (2005) 
argues that in terms of perceptual experience, the body image distinguishes itself from the 
environment. If an individual is required to consciously attend their perception to the 
performance of their body in a task, then the body would be brought forth as the focal point 
cortical system of human physiology, yei authors that developed his ideas (such as Schiider (1935)) defined the 
body schema as a fmalised conacioua perception ol'lhe self (Gallagher, 2005). Il appears to be Merleau-Ponty's 
definition of schema corporel that most influences Gallagher's definition of body schema, yet Merleau-Ponty's 
work is also problematic. Gallagher notes that Merleau-Ponty used schema corporel 'to signify a dynamic 
functioning of the body in its environment. The schema operates as a system of dynamic motor equivalents that 
belong to the realm of habit rather than conscious choice. Nonethele.ss, the schema works along with a marginal 
awareness of the body, and Merleau-Ponty ofien left the relation between the schema and the marginal 
awareness unexplained. To make matters worse, however, the term schema corporel was rendered 'body image' 
in llie English translation of his work The Phenomenology of Perception' (Gallagher, 2005, p.20 - emphasis in 
original). It is prudent to use Gallagher's work, rather llian tlie original definitions, to navigate around tliis 
complexity. 
' Noetic, or noesis, is an Ancient Greek word referring to understand or to know something, often 
immediately. In terms of Gallagher's (2005) usage, prenoetic is understood as a process of the body that means 
it is aware of certain relations with the world prior to the beholder's conscious understanding or knowledge of il 
occurring. 
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of attention. Gallagher (2005) notes that ifpeople were required to utilise their body image 
for sensorimotor control, as opposed to the body schema, then action would be 'inexact and 
awkward' {Gallagher, 2005, p.33). As such, much like the design of robots for a greater 
embodied and environmental economy (see chapter live), human beings have the 
sensorimotor abilities to tree up cognition to attend to intentional activities, rather than the 
control of the body in relation to the environment."" 
The sense of proprioception is a significant sub-system coupled to the body schema. 
The notion of proprioception is ot^en traced to the work of Charles Sherrington, who 
described it as a person's sense of movement from the muscles, tendons and joints of the 
body {Sherrington, 1907). Gibson, during his formulation of the theory of aflbrdanccs, argued 
that proprioception was a formof'egoperception, as sensitivity to the self, not as one special 
channel of perceptions or as several of them" (Gibson, 1986, p. 115). He went on to argue that 
all the perceptual systems are in some way proprioceptive as well as exlerosensitive, 'for they 
all provide information in their various ways about the observer's activities' (Gibson, 1986, 
p.] 15). He stated thai: 
[t]hc observer's movements usually provide sights and sounds and impressions on the 
skin along with stimulation of the muscles, the joints, and the inner ear. Accordingly, 
information that is specific to the self is picked up as such, no matter what sensory 
nerve is delivering impulses to the brain. [...] An individual not only sees himself, he 
hears his foolsleps and his voice, he touches the tloor and his tools, and when he 
touches his own skin he feels both his hand and his skin at the same time. He feels his 
head turning, his muscles flexing, and his joints bending. He has his own aches, the 
pressures of his own clothing, the look of his own eyeglasses-in fact, he lives within 
his own skin. (Gibson, 1986, p.l 15) 
Proprioception then, for Gibson, was a form of continuous feedback from the environment 
felt through the body. In engaging with the environment, a person discovers as much about 
their own abilities and embodiment as they do the worid. In order to explore the worid—to 
develop the perception of new affordances—then it is also necessary to have an 
understanding of one's own body, its capabilities and an unconscious awareness of what to 
do with this body in relation to the world. 
' ' ' This is not to say there are not times when the body is controlled by the conscious awareness and therefore a 
body image, Gallagher uses ihc example of learning new bodily skills. 'The visual, tactile, and proprioceptive 
attentiveness that 1 have of my body may help me to leam a new dance step, improve my lennia game, or imitate 
the novel movements of others. In perfecting my tennis serve, for example, 1 may, al first, consciously monitor 
and correct my movements" (Gallagher, 2005, p.27). In situations, however, where some son of conscious 
control of the body is emphasised, they will be complemenied by the skills ofthe body schema to maintain 
balance and movement. 
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It appears that the body schema, informed through the various senses of 
proprioception, is a necessary function of human embodiment that integrates the environment 
to support enactment; it is crucial to the coherency of the Umwcli. As such, an individual with 
imbalances related to the coupling of these systems would hkely have significant issues 
organising their body in relation to the environment. Gallagher (2005) discusses a clinical 
study of a patient called Ian Waterman, which presents an extreme example of such a 
situation (originally described by Cole (1995)). Ian Waterman had no sense of touch or 
proprioception below his neck as a result of an illness in his late teenage years. His sense of 
continuous feedback as to the position of his body was void and, as a result, he was 
effectively paralysed. This is not to say his body was not capable of movement, however. The 
possibilities for action were still fundamentally the same as before, but the necessary 
sesnsorimotor coordination to make them happen was lost. Gallagher (2005) notes that over 
time, Ian Waterman was able to regain movement. This was only possible through 
emphasising the role of vision in controlling his body. Without visual perception: 
pan] does not know [...] where his timbs are or what poslurehe maintains. In order to 
maintain motor control he must conceptualize his movemeiils and keep certain parts 
of his body in his visual field. His movement requires constant visual and mental 
concentration. In darkness he is unable to control movement; when lie walks he 
cannot daydream but must concentrate on his movement constantly. (Gallagher, 2005, 
p.44) 
Gallagher (2005) and Cole (1995) argue that what is occurring with Ian Waterman is the 
replacement of his missing body schematic capabilities with his body image. When 
interacting with the environment, it is impossible for lan's body to disappear into the 
background of his intentional activity; he always has to include his body in his conscious 
awareness. Gallagher (2005) notes that to look at Ian years after his illness, it would be 
difficult to observe him acting any differently to most healthy adult males. His actions are 
only possible, however, through his extreme efTort and hard work to regain control of his 
body; medically, Ian Waterman "s proprioceptive system never recovered from his illness. 
Gallagher (2005) implicates the body schematic systems of the human body, of which 
proprioception fulfils a substantial role, as necessary for the seamless enaction of the 
affordances within the Umweit. Although Gallagher (2005, p.26) argues that the body schema 
'is not itself a form of consciousness, or in any way a cognitive operation", in terms of the 
perspective of enaction developed in this thesis these prenoetic performances are to be 
understood as directly implicated within the cognitive act of the human being. The body 
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schema provides a necessary integration of sensorimotor systems; it is necessary for 
structural coupling between neural, bodily and environment systems. Tlierefore, in terms of 
senescent cognition, body schematic performances are a crucial part of cognitive experience. 
The claims made by Gallagher can be augmented with the work of the contemporary 
philosopher Alva Noc (2004), who uses clinical studies of patients with perceptual and 
cognitive dysfiinctions in an enactive account of perception.'^^ Proceeding from a slightly 
different perspective to Gallagher, Noe presents a similarly useful characterisation of bodily 
systems that allow for the integration of a coherent Umwelt. Following the work of Gibson, 
Noe is keen to emphasise that theories of perception are only relevant if they take the 
perceiving agent to bean active explorer of the world. A consequence of this perspective on 
human perception is Noe's argument that 'perceiving is a way of acting' and that all 
perception is "touch-like' (Noe, 2004, p. l) . 
[TJhinkofa blind person tap-lapping his or her way around a cluttered space, 
perceiving that space by touch, not all at once, but through time, by skililil probing 
and movement. [...] The world makes itself available to the perceiver through physical 
movement and interaction. [...] Perceptual experience acquires content thanks to our 
possession of bodily skills. What we perceive is determined by whai we do (or what 
we know how to do); it is determined by what we are ready to do [...] we enact our 
perceptual experience; we act it out. (Noe, 2004, p. 1) 
For Noe (2004), human perception is a skilful activity of the whole body. Human beings 
know how to interact with objects and are aware of the perceptual consequences of certain 
actions as a result of the implicit sensorimotor knowledge that shapes all experience. Noe 
(2004) terms this implicit knowledge as sensorimotor contingencies. 
When you move toward an object, it looms in your visual tleld. When you move 
around it, it changes profile. In these and many other ways, sensory stimulation is 
affected by movement. These patterns of interdependence between sensory 
stimulation and movement are patterns of sensorimotor contingency. Perceivers are 
implicitly familiar with ihese sensorimotor contingencies. (Noe, 2002) 
Sensorimotor contingencies, then, are an integrative feature of human embodiment that 
interlinks perception and action and couple being to the world. Over a lifetime, a person 
becomes adept at understanding how moving around objects has a subsequent effect of how 
' " Noe lenns his theory of perception as the enactive approach to perception. He alerts the reader thai he lakes 
this name from Varela et al.'& (1991) concept of enaction, but that some of his ideas differ from iheir argument 
on certain points. These poinis, although significant in terms of a comparison between the two corpus' of work, 
do nol impede upon ihis thesis' discussion. 
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they are perceived; this altered perception thus affects how you act, in a continuous 
circularity similar to that presented by Varela e/a/. (1991). In terms of enaction, then, the 
integrative sensorimotor contingencies are necessary in order to seamlessly incorporate the 
world into experience. 
As with the claims regarding the body schematic system made by Gallagher, h is 
plausible that discrepancies in sensorimotor contingencies have subsequent effects on the 
ability to interact with the world in a coherent manner. Noe explains such situations as a form 
of blindness. In the enactive view of perception there are two different types of blindness. 
First, there is blindness due to damage or dismption of the sensitive apparatus. This is 
the familiar sort of blindness. It would include blindness caused by cataracts, by 
retinal disease or injury, or by brain lesion in the visual cortex. Second, there is 
blindness due not to the absence of sensation or sensitivity, but rather to the person's 
[...] inability to integrate sensory stimulation with patterns of movement or thought. 
(Noe, 2004, p.4) 
Tliis second form of blindness is termed 'experiential blindness' (Noe, 2004, p.4). 
Experiential blindness occurs when an individual's sensorimotor contingencies do not match 
the sensations and actions that their body is capable of performing. In a similar vein to 
Gallagher, Noe (2004) uses clinical examples to support the notion of experiential blindness. 
Noe takes as an example attempts to restore sight in people blinded as a result of cataracts. 
The "surgery restores visual sensation, at least to a significant degree, but [...] does not restore 
sight, In the period immediately af^er the operation, patients sutfer blindness despite rich 
visual sensations' (Noe, 2004, p.S).'*"' For example. Sacks wrote about one of his patient's 
reports on his experiences immediately after waking fixim the operation. 
[H]e had no idea what he was seeing. There was light, there was movement, there was 
colour, all mixed up, all meaningless, a blur. Then out of the blue came a voice that 
said, "Well?" Then, and only then, he said, did he finally realize that this chaos of 
light and shadow was a face—and, indeed, the face of his surgeon. (Sacks, 1995, 
p.114) 
The situation described by Sacks provides evidence to suggest that it is not possible to 
perceive coherently purely as a result of having the necessary sensory apparatus, but also that 
'*" A significant feature of Noe'a research is making a case against cognilivisl-like models of perceplion as 
much as it is developing an enactive account of perceplion. For Noe, the case of experiential blindness post 
cataract operation is evidence to suggest the input-computalion-outpul concept of perceplion and cognition is 
flawed. He suggests that if cognitivism was correct, then in correcting tlie sense-organ, it would be akin to 
'sweeping a.side the blinds, letting the light and thus enabling normal vision' (Noc, 2004, p.4). As Noe explains 
llirough examples taken from clinical studies, these claims do not appear to be die general rule. 
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an individual requires the embodied knowledge of how to interpret and act upon perceptual 
stimulus. Gregory and Wallace (1963), discussing a cataract patient one month after 
operation, state that: 
[a]t tlrst impression he seemed like a normally sighted person, though differences 
soon became obvious. When he sat down he would not look round or scan the room 
with his eyes; indeed he would generally pay no atlenlion to visual objects unless his 
attention were called to them, when he would peer at wliatever it was with extreme 
concentration. (Gregory & Wallace, 1963, p.364) 
Gregory and Wallace's (1963) patient lacks the necessary practical understanding of how his 
visual sensations relate to his movements. He lacks a coherent system of sensorimotor 
contingencies. The new capabilities of his visual sense arc not integrated within his whole 
embodiment. The integration of capabilities with contingencies is a necessary requirement for 
a coherent enactment of the Umwelt. 
Both Gallagher (2005) and Noe (2004) provide examples of how aspects of human 
embodiment related to the sensorimotor system are necessary for coherent interaction with 
environments. The prenoetic performances of the body (the body schema and proprioception) 
and the contingencies human beings implicitly deploy when interacting with the environment 
are necessary cognitive functions in terms of enactivc cognitive science. In terms of dynamic 
atTordances, the manner in which atfordances are experienced is dependent upon the manner 
in which these bodily systems integrate perception and action. In the following section, the 
chapter will examine how the claims made by Gallagher and Noe relate to some 
contemporary studies of the relationship between physiology and cognition in later life. 
6.2. Senescentechnic disembodiment 
/(is possible to reinterpret studies of relationships between cognitive, physical and sensory 
deterioration in old age as hightighling a misalignment of an individual's perception of their abilities 
and the potential abilities of their own embodiment; rather than a process of deterioration, this 
presents a situation of ongoing experiential blindness. 
Returning to Chemero's (2009) proposal of dynamic affordances (discussed in the previous 
chapter), an affordance is understood to be a relation between the abilities of a particular 
embodied agent and the feature of the environment. Abilities are, however, not purely a 
consequence of physical embodiment but also require an individual to hold the knowledge as 
to how to make use of this embodiment. As was highlighted by Gallagher (2005) and Noe 
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(2004), implicit capabilities of the sensoiimotor system often inteirene silently in experience 
to ensure that human beings do not have to consciously attend to a variety of embodied 
abilities. When these fundamental bodily systems begin to falter, however, one's body comes 
10 the fore in relation to affordances and, consequently, the perception of affordances 
becomes somewhat incoherent. In terms of the topic of this thesis, an understanding of how 
these embodied sensorimotor systems function as a result of human senescence appears to be 
usefij] as, in most cases, senescent human beings have bodies. '•" Discussions of embodied or 
enactive cognition in terms of senescence, however, are somewhat absent. This section 
bridges the arguments of Gallagher (2005) and Noe (2004) and the cnactive cognitive 
sciences with research from the fringes of contemporary studies of the ageing body and 
cognition. 
In the discipline of ecological psychology and research examining human locomotion 
and kinacsthesia, it has been acknowledged for some time that the ageing process results in 
changes to the atTordances within an individual's Umwelt. An often cited study of these 
changing relations is the observation related to the affordance of'stair-cHmbability' 
introduced by Warren (1984). In his original study, Warren (1984) attempted to identify 
whether there was a consistent relationship between measurable components of human 
anatomy and differently sized staircase steps in terms of whether certain sizes of staircase 
afforded better 'stair-climbability". Warren (1984) noticed that there was a consistent 
relationship between the length of legs and what was the highest step they could climb; this 
being 88% of the length of the leg. Going by Warren's (1984) argument, in order to design a 
staircase that is suitable for 'stair-climbability', it would be suggested that steps should be no 
It will be assumed here thai ihe thesis isaltending to older people thai have a body capable of actively 
exploring environmenls for affordances. It is particularly important lo highlight here that when referring lo a 
body, it is understood that the body of an older person would be rather different to iliat of younger people and 
children, who tend to be the focus of much embodied and enaciive cognitive science research. The general 
processes of liieir enacted cognition may be similar though. The senescent human body is still a body thai 
shapes cognitive experience in a great variety of ways; it jusi happens lo be a body dial might be in a profound 
stale of temporal change that requires a greateramount of control from the individual, 
'*" There are very few conceptual reasons why embodied cognition in the later life of human beings has gone 
relatively un.studied, although there may be some very reasonable practical reasons. The circular and 
developmental nature of Brooks' (1986; 1999) and Varela cr a/."s (1991) research lend themselves to studies of 
children and the rapid development of skills instead of Ihe study of older people and processes of senescence, 
which are typically conceived of to be a slow deterioration. Oulside of cognitive science, discussions referring 
to the ageing body and embodiment have become more apparent in recent social science literature, particular 
that which extends gender studies and feminism argument to the study of older people (i.e. Calasanti and Slevin 
(2001; 2006)). Some of this literature is referred to at points in this Ihesis lo elaborate certain ideas. For the most 
pari, however, ihe discussion of embodiment as it is used in the social sciences complicates the understanding 
developed tlu^ough thi.s tliesis. 
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higher than 88% of the leg length of those who will climb it, '" Konczak a a!. (1992) and 
Cesari et al. (2003) expanded Warren's initial study to compare younger and older people. 
These latter studies proposed that, for older people, it is not just a case of using a ratio based 
upon anthropometric data to predict affordance, but that it is also necessary to account for 
biomechanical changes to the body that occur with age (Cesari et al., 2003; Konczak el al., 
1992). In these later studies, the abilities of older people were conceived in terms of a 
combination of anthropometric data (such as the length of the leg from a specific point to a 
specific point) and biomechanical data (the elasticity of muscles and tendons, and the 
flexibility of certain joints), In terms of understanding interactions with a limited array of 
staircases in a test situation, this conceptualisation of affordance is adequate. These studies of 
older people and affordance from ecological psychology, however, appear in some respects to 
be the polar opposite to cognitive studies. The ecological psychology studies suggest that the 
physiologically measurable properties of people and the environment are taken to be the key 
reference points with which to identify whether a certain person's abilities cohere with the 
environment. Considered in terms of the embodied and enacting senescent human, an extra 
stage is required to understand how one's own abilities are understood. 
Returning to the cognitive psychology of ageing, efforts have been made in recent 
years to examine the relationship between the previously discussed changes to human 
cognitive functioning occurring in old age and changes to sensory and motor systems. Ulmar 
Lindenberger and colleagues noted strong correlations between deteriorations in cognitive 
and sensory abilities in later life (Baltes & Lindenberger, 1997; Lindenberger & Baltes, 
1994). Noting these correlations, these researchers have perfonned a number of studies of 
people performing 'dual-task' operations. A dual-task is the completion of a cognitive task 
(for example, trying to memorise a sequence of words) at the same lime as a sensorimotor or 
physically taxing task (such as walking around obstacles). In one such study. Lindenberger et 
al. (2000) observed that in dual-task situations older people showed significant reductions in 
both their cognitive and sensorimotor accuracy when compared to younger people. Huxhold 
el al. (2006) suggest that as older people exert a greater amount of cognitive information-
processing, they suffer from lapses in the coherency of their sensorimotor system (notably 
their posture), suggesting that cognition, particulariy in later life, is significantly implicated in 
sensation and action. In more recent studies, Lindenberger e/a/. (2009) have focused upon 
'^ •' Of course, this in a purposely flawed example of aflbrdancc in terms of design, harking back to the ideas of 
Norman (1988) ihal alTordances can actually be designed for. This example is used in the text primarily for 
illustrative purposes. 
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exploring the foundations of a common cause to these various cognitive and sensorimotor 
declines in old age in the neurophysiology of the ageing brain. Although the brain is 
imphcated in embodiment, however, to focus purely on changes to the brain as the cause of 
sensory and cognitive dechne detrimentally limits the consideration that the body and 
environment are as equally implicated in human thought. This will be elaborated in the 
following section of this chapter, where a number of emerging neuroscientific studies of the 
brain will be discussed that presents a radically different argument to that of Lindenberger el 
al. (2009).""* 
The combined suggestions of the ecological and cognitive psychology studies of older 
people are synergetic with the phenomenological arguments developed by Gallagher (2005) 
and Noe (2004). Despite these synergies, however, these considerations come from rather 
discrete and separated discussions within cognitive science. Whilst Lindenberger et al. come 
from a traditional, cognitivisi-informed, approach to understanding ageing cognition, their 
studies begin to invoke the important role the body and its relations to the worid play in 
temporal changes to cognitive functioning. Problematically, however, being situated within a 
discourse where the body is otten considered as a problem, Lindenberger et al. might be 
prevented from moving these ideas further. Contrastingly, Gallagher and Noe present 
evidence of how the human body and its relations with the world are essential to human 
beings coping with temporal changes to cognition and subsequent interactions within the 
Umwelt. This discussion, however, is completely isolated from the cognitive study of human 
ageing. A framework for senescent cognition, aligned with the enactive cognitive science and 
dynamic affordances, requires that these ideas are taken on board. 
It is possible, therefore, to reconsider Lindenberger el al.'s observations in reference 
to the work of Gallagher and Noe. In terms of the embodied senescent human being, the 
correlations between cognitive and sensory decline observed by Lindenberger et al. (2000) 
can be viewed as the result of changes to the prenoetic performances of human body and the 
contingencies these provide to guide perceptions and enactions of afTordances in the Umwelt. 
'*•' In [he following section, this chapter will explore recent studies of the ageing brain that emphasises quite a 
different understanding of temporal change to thai the studies provided by Lindenberger e! al. (2009). Whereas 
Lindenberger e( al. (2009) are attempting to identify a common cause for cognitive, neural, and sensorimotor 
deterioration in Ihe chemical and electrical changes within neurophysiology, an alternative perspective is being 
developed thai suggests that the brain may not be the primary focal point of such declines in ability. It should 
also be noted that in terms of the embodied and enactive accounts lo cognition, and as a result senescent 
cognilion, tlie posilion ihat the brain is the central point of cognition and coasciousness fails to account for the 
inseparability of cognilion from the Umweh. Therefore, based upon the arguments discussed within this and Ihe 
previous chapter, whilst the brain is important to human cognition, it is a part of a broader and more 
encompassing nelwork of systems. 
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Returning to Gallagher's (2005) discussion of the body schema, it was established that the 
proprioceptive systems play a pivotal role in configuring the implicit bodily relations and 
extension into the environment. An alternative reading of the issues highlighted by 
Lindenberger ei at. (2000) then is that the cause of the combined sensory and cognitive 
decline may be related to the proprioceptive and body schematic systems. This interpretation 
appears to have weight due to observations of reductions in the acuity of proprioceptive 
feedback in older people compared to younger adults. (Camicioli et ai, 1997; Teasdale et al., 
1991) The lowered acuity of proprioception with age is not necessarily severe and in habitual 
activities may not surface; however, in moments where sudden and unexpected 
reconfigurations of the Umwelt occur, proprioception is implicated as a crucial sub-system of 
human embodiment (Peterka, 2002). Peterka and Loughlin (2004) obser\'ed that the reduced 
accuracy of proprioceptive feedback leads to under and over compensations in certain 
movements, which are particular evident in older people. It has been suggested that the 
decreased accuracy in proprioceptive feedback results in an increased risk of trips and falls 
for older people (Peterka & Loughlin, 2004). This increased risk is not necessarily as a rcsuh 
of misperceiving, but as a result of over or under compensating within dynamic interactions 
with the environment through conscious, rather than automated, sensorimotor action. 
These reductionist studies of the ageing proprioceptive system can be both 
strengthened and strengthening by being considered within the work of Gallagher (2005) and 
Noe (2004). Bringing these discrete discussions together highlights how reduced 
proprioceptive feedback as a result of the process of senescence can lead to, first, an 
emphasis of conscious perceptual control of the body through the individual's body image 
and, second, a certain level of ongoing experiential blindness. As people proceed through 
senescence, one of the key features of their embodied cognitive capabilities, that of 
proprioceptive sensorimotor integration, provides less acute streams of continuous feedback 
regarding the interactions between body and worid. This alteration in the ability to integrate 
the Umwelt into a coherent whole, and the resulting increased necessity for conscious 
perceptual action, presents a situation where conscious mental activity is divided. It can no 
longer be placed primarily into an intentional activity, and the body is perceived in opposition 
to the environment rather than as situated and extending within it. The sensorimotor 
contingencies of the senescent human, based upon a certain level of proprioceptive and 
implicit knowledge that no longer coheres to the physiology of the body, are somewhat 
misplaced. Instead of there being a coherence between the integration of'sensory stimulation 
with patterns of movement or thought' (Noe, 2004, p.4), there is a mild yet continuous 
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experiential blindness. This is not to say this process of senescence is one of deterministic 
deterioration; rather, it is a state of continuous and ongoing change resulting from some of the 
consequences of human senescence. Whilst the studies discussed above suggest that 
proprioception and sensorimotor integration reduces as a result of senescence, there are also 
suggestions that proprioception in later life is relatively plastic and can be re-integrated 
(Gauchard et al., 2003; Hay et al, 1996; Li et a!., 2008; Xu et al., 2004). '"^ This suggests 
that although human senescence leads to problems in integrating the dynamics of the Umwell, 
these integrative systems do not so much deteriorate in ability but are rather just misaligned 
with the changing embodiment of later life. 
It is argued here that senescent cognition provides a rather different perspective on the 
cognitive disconnections supposedly experienced by older people, particularly in terms of 
engagements with novel digital media products. Senescent cognitive disconnect, as argued 
here, occurs as a result of a misalignment between the interactions of the physiological basis 
of the organism and the unconscious sensorimotor knowledge an older person applies to 
know what is possible with their embodiment. Abilities, in relation to affordances, are not 
just to be understood as purely cognitive (as in cognitivism), or as physical (as in certain 
ecological psychology studies) but as the resulting combination of potential couplings a 
particular embodied being is capable of and, at the same time, what couplings this being 
actually perceives as possible. To design the space to allow for the enactment of affordances 
in this situation is to provide the space for the individual to explore not only the possibilities 
for action in features of the environment, but to reintegrate their knowledge of their embodied 
capabilities. This requires a complete transformation from the cognitivist proviso of 
deterioration to that of continued enactment. When discussing human cognition in old age, 
however, it is difficult to move beyond the prevalent claims of the cognitive psychology of 
ageing. The following section will explore emerging claims about how the brain changes as a 
result of ageing in later life, highlighting how the assumptions of continued deterioration in 
functioning are becoming increasingly unstable. 
'*' This will be discussed fiirther in chapter seven, where it will be argued thai designers should employ 
strategies in the design of digital media products (hat allow for Ihe emergence of affordances that support such 
reintegration. 
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6.3. The senescent brain 
Recent studies of the ageing brain suggest that rather than declining in physical and cognitive 
Junction, it appears to he highly plastic and engaged in a process of continual re-organisation 
resullingfrom the process of senescence and novel interactions in the world. 
In recent years, there has been an increase in studies of the human brain as it relates to 
cognition and consciousness. Cognitively inclusive design, as it was introduced in chapters 
one to three, is based upon the combined claims and observations of a significant mass of 
knowledge from the cognitive psychology of ageing. As discussed in chapter three, a key 
feature of cognitivist cognitive psychology is a background assumption that cognition occurs 
somewhere in the brain, or at most the central nervous system of human beings. This 
connection between cognition and the brain, for a great many years, remained hypothetical; 
beyond the neuropsychological studies of brain damaged patients, or post-mortem 
examinations, there were few ways to study (scientifically at least) the relationship between 
human cognition and the brain. In recent decades, the development and proliferation of 
neuroimaging instrumentation, such as Electroencephalography'''^, has supported the 
increased study of the relationship between brain and cognition 'in-vivo''''^ (Cabeza et al., 
2005, p.4). Consequentially, it is necessary to introduce another sub-discipline of cognitive 
science to this thesis; ihe cognitive neuroscience of ageing. The cognitive neuroscience of 
ageing is the discipline situated at the intersection of cognitive psychology of ageing and 
neuroscience. Research within this discipline attempts to correlate cognitive functions (such 
as working memory, central executive, attention process, etc) to a material basis in the brain. 
During the infancy of this sub-discipline, the ideas of'cognition' and 'brain' are purposively 
kept distinct, although the long term aim of this area of research is to integrate the two 
(Cabezae(a/.,2005). 
Early studies attempted to link cognitive ageing to neurological ageing, with an 
expectation that the information-processing limitations of older people would be represented 
by reduced mass within the associated parts of the brain. These early studies appear to have 
' * Electroencephalography, often shortened to EEG, is one of a variety of imaging instrumentation used in 
contemporary neuroscience to examine the structure and (unciionalily of the brain. Other examples include 
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), funclional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRl), positron emission 
tomography (PET), event-related potentials (ERP), event-relate optical signal (EROS) and single photon 
emission computed tomography (SPECT) (Cabeza et al., 2005). 
'•"^  The term in-vivo stresses thai these neuroimaging instruments provide information of living human beings, 
as opposed to the posl-mortem examinations of Ihe brain. Functional neuroimaging Icchnologics, such as fMRl 
and EEG, provide streams of data over periods of time, so are deemed to be particularly useful in examining 
neurological responses to certain stimuli or tasks (Cabeza el al., 2005). 
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observed that this is the case; grey and white matter decrease in mass and 'with age, frontal 
and hippocampal structures that are central functions to higlier order cognition', such as 
working memory, 'show a decrease in volume, particulariy in frontal areas' {Cabeza el al, 
2005, p. 10). The early consensus within cognitive neurosciencc was thus that the ageing 
brain, deteriorating in mass and structural functionality in key areas, could be associated with 
the deteriorations in cognitive information-processing as described throughout chapter 
three. '•"* Goh and Park (2009; Park & Goh, 2009) note that this has typically lead to the 
characterisation of the ageing cognitive brain within a continuum that starts with decline and, 
at best, ends at preservation, denying the feasibility of expansion. The early collection of 
cognitive neuroscience of ageing studies, along with the abundant literature of cognitive 
psychology, holds little hope for older people in terms of their mental abilities; the best that 
can be hoped for is the preservation of already existing neural or cognitive structures. 
Park and Reuter-Lorenz (2009) postulate whether there is more to be explained by 
cognitive neuroscience. Whilst agreeing that "[IJittle doubt exists that the extent of cognitive 
and structural decline is substantial" in old age, why is it that 'people generally function 
remarkably well even into advanced old age, and do so even in the prescience of a great deal 
of pathology as discovered at autopsy" {Park & Reuter-Lorenz, 2009, p. 183). In recent years, 
neuroscience has moved towards the increased use of'functional" neuroimaging 
instrumentation. The benefit of such instrumentation is that activity of the brain can be 
observed whilst people are engaged in certain cognitive tasks. The observations made in 
functional studies of the ageing brain appear to stand in somewhat of a contrast to the earlier 
imaging studies, which focused more upon the structure of the brain.'^^ Whilst it appears to 
be that the brain reduces in structure in key areas normally associated with cognitive 
processes such as working memory or episodic memory, the brain also actively reorganises 
itself in later life in order to adapt to these "challenges" (Goh & Park, 2009).'^ *^ 
'•" Raz(2002; 2005) provides an overview of the literature making these claims, which is loo vast to detail 
bibliographically here. 
'"' Whilst stniclural imaging provides in.iight into the anatomical state of the brain, functional imaging tracks 
the paiiems of neural activation thai occur over a period of time. 
'*" Cabeza (2002) observed that young adults activate only one hemisphere of the brain whilst performing 
memory and cognitive encoding tasks, whereas older people displayed neural activations thai were far more 
symmetrical. The argument made by Cabeza (2002) is that although it appears lo be correct that the areas of the 
brain that have been related to key cognitive functions such as working memory (in youth) do reduce in 
structure in later life, the brain restructures its activation patterns and uses still healthy regions of the brains 
anatomy. Therefore, the areas of the brain used for specific types of cognitive processes actively change 
tliroughout lifespan. For detailed reviews of these findings, from a neuroscienlific perspective, see Cabeza 
(2002), Park and Gulchless (2005), Buckner (2004) and Heddec and Gabieli (2004). 
152 
Cabeza (2002) suggests that the changes in the structural fiinctionality within the 
ageing brain leads to a compensatory process wherein the brain transfers cognitive activity to 
structurally integral parts of the brain.'^' This is furthered by Goh and Park, who argue that: 
[fjunciional neuroimaging studies have demonstrated quite clearly that the brain has 
the capacity to increase the breadth of its function with age. Thai is, as various insults 
of aging occur (e.g., shrinkage, white malter lesions, etc.), the brain responds to these 
changes by expanding its activity or by recruiling additional sites of activation to 
process the information streaming into the system.'" (Goh & Park, 2009. p.39l) 
Park and Reuter-Lorenz (2009) argue for approaches to examining cognition and the ageing 
brain that identify the reasons why the typical healthy older person is able to mitigate against 
certain physical and cognitive declines. In a move away from conceiving older people as, at 
best, preserving or compensating for certain losses, Park and Reuter-Lorenz (2009) discuss 
the ageing human brain instead in terms of its adaptability to the challenge of' neural 
insults'. They explain the brains adaptability through the concept of'neural-scaffolding', 
which 'is not merely the brain's response to normal aging; it is the brain's normal response to 
challenge" (Park & Reuter-Lorenz, 2009, p. 1 S3). These challenges, in their view, can be 
comprised of 1), an internal shock to the neurobiological system, such as the loss of a 
previously functioning part of the brain's anatomy, or 2) interactions with novel stimulus 
from the external world (Park & Reuter-Lorenz, 2009). These shocks may be sudden, and 
require great effort to overcome, or slowly evolve and become compensated for over greater 
periods of time. 'In response to the [...] neurobiological challenges of aging, new scaffolds 
can be established, or previously established scaffolds acquired in eariy development or 
during new learning can be recruited' (Park & Reuter-Lorenz, 2009, p. 185). This is not to 
claim, however, that the brain is able to compensate completely for these challenges in later 
life; as Park and Reuter-Lorenz (2009, p. 184) put it: 
We presume that scaffolding processes operate with more efficiency in youth, when 
scafTotding is typically and frequenliy engaged to meet novel situations and to 
achieve new learning. With age, scaffolding processes may be invoked to perform 
familiar tasks and basic cognitive operations as these processes become increasingly 
challenging with the degradation of existing neural circuitry. 
' " Cabeza (2002) entitled his theory the 'hemispheric asymmetry reduction in older adults' (HAROLD) model. 
' " Goh and Park refer to a number of studies in arguing this point. For more specific details regarding these 
changes observed through neuroimaging techniques, see Dennis and Cabeza (2008). Hedden and Gabricli 
(2004), Park and Reutcr-Lorenz (2009), and Reuter-Lorenz and Cappell (3008). 
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Park and Reuter-Lorenz use neural scaffolding as a way of conceiving processes that occur 
throughout the lifetime of human beings, h is suggested that scaffolding occurs at younger 
ages as a response to the cognitive challenges of novel interactions with the world. In older 
age, however: 
scaffolding occurs not only under conditions of new learning, but may be invoked 
even for less novel or practiced behaviors because ihc existing neural circuitry for 
performing the task has degraded. These secondary networks may be less efficient 
than the primary circuitry, but nevertheless result in task performance thai is better 
than could be achieved by using only ihe primary but degraded network. (Goh & 
Park, 2009, p.395) 
A key point to be taken from the observations of Park and colleagues is that it is those older 
people who are able to fight against the structural reductions of the brain that appear to be 
most cognitively proficient. Individuals whose brains are unable to respond to the structural 
degradation of ageing, therefore, have an increased risk of losing those cognitive faculties 
related to the deteriorating areas. Goh and Park (2009, p.396) suggest that "individuals will 
improve their ability to scaffold and develop effective new neural circuitry if they maintain 
high levels of engagement in novel activities including learning new things, engage in 
exercise, or possibly participate in cognitive training.' In terms of a neural perspective on 
cognitive enaction, older people are actively encouraged to engage in novel interactions and 
stimulate novel neural circuitry; to not do so may lead to a subsequent lack of novel neural 
circuitry. 
Despite appearing to begin with the hypothesis that the ageing brain will correlate 
with the declination of cognitive functioning, and initially finding evidence to support this 
evidence, the cognitive neuroscience of ageing currently appears to portray ageing in a less 
determinisfic manner. There is a hopefialness from the emerging research within cognitive 
neuroscience that ageing human cognition, as it relates to the brain, can be conceived of as 
dynamically reorganising itself against shocks to its system. These alternative sets of 
perspectives from the cognitive neurosciences add support to the notion of senescent 
cognition developed in this thesis. This is not to argue, however, that in highlighting the 
claims of neuroscience, any extra emphasis is given to the brain in cognition than the body 
and the world. In terms of an embodied and enactive account of cognition, although the brain 
is implicated within the Umwelt, it is not to be overstated, TTic cognitive neuroscience of 
ageing is useftil as it provides a perspective on how the process of senescence alters the 
manner in which people may make sense of interactions in the world; however, the research 
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still limits itself to the neural stimulation of the brain or, at most, the central nervous system. 
Park and Goh (2009, p. 1206) argue that '[a]s our knowledge rapidly increases about the aging 
brain, it is now required that any behavioural theory of cognitive aging be neurally plausible." 
The problem with statements such as this is that it highlights how there is a prevailing 
assumption that cognition and human consciousness can be reduced to collections of neural 
signals. Joyce (2008) highlights how both within academic texts and the popular press, 
neuroimaging instruments are sometimes given an unquestionable position of providing 
'transparent windows' into the inner human body, with the images these instruments produce 
becoming "interchangeable with rather than a construction of the real' (Joyce, 2008, p.51). 
Noe (2009) highlights how neuroimaging instruments such as fVIRI and PET provide no 
more exclusive information on cognition or consciousness than do behaviourist, cognitivist, 
enactive and a great variety of other arguments. To suggest that any theory or claims of 
cognition must be accountable to neurological research is to overstate the power of brain 
imaging technologies, and to exaggerate the centrality of the human brain (devoid of the body 
and the world) in human cognition (Noe, 2009). Echoing the claim made by Gregory Bateson 
(1972, p.460) that '[t]hc mental world - the mind - the world of information processing- is 
not limited by the skin', accounts of cognition based upon enaction are not reducible to 
knowledge acquired through neuroimaging instruments. 
Despite the reservations regarding neuro-centric research within the enactive 
cognitive sciences, as a way of instigating thinking regarding an account of senescent 
cognition, the claims of Park and colleagues offer encouragement. The senescent brain is not 
to be assumed to be in a state of atrophy. In addition, the human brain is constantly adapting 
to the challenges of physiological, biological and chemical alterations to the brain, the body 
and interactions with environments throughout life; a process that continues into older age. 
Finally, older people whose brains reorganise in later life, and as such are radically different 
functionally compared to their youth, are generally those who have the higlier cognitive 
functioning and are in a better position to continue enactment. 
6.4. Scnescentcchnic cognitive decoupling 
A semscentcchnic understanding of cognitive disconnect is presented that highlights how the 
contemporary approaches ofcogniiively inclusive design are limited in focusing purely on storehouse 
metaphors of memory. Instead, senescent cognition presents a situation where designers are 
implicated in harnessing the agency and potential abilities of the embodied and enacting older 
person. 
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At this point in the thesis, it is possible to provide a speculative reinterpretation of the 
problem of older people becoming cognitively disconnected from digital media products and 
interfaces through the lens of senescent, rather than ageing, cognition. To recall, at the end of 
chapter three it was argued that, as a consequence of the body of knowledge from the 
cognitive psychology of ageing, older people can be considered as poor processors of 
information but storehouses of long-term memories. Based upon the argument presented in 
chapter tliree {which is founded upon cognitivist principles), ageing cognition is understood 
to be the temporal deterioration in the information-processing capabilities of the human mind. 
As a consequence of the ideas developed in chapters four, five and six, however, senescent 
cognition proposes an explanation of temporal change to human cognition that is not based 
upon input-output, information-processing models of the human mind. 
Before explaining these differences between the ageing and senescent approaches, it 
is necessary to briefly return to the discussion in the previous chapter. At the end of chapter 
five, Chemero's (2009) proposition of dynamic affordances were discussed, which suggested 
that affordances are dynamic experiential properties that are the relations between the 
abilities of a particular individual and features of the environment. In Chemero's (2009) 
account of affordances, all phenomena are provisional and continuously changing. The 
abilities of human beings are the result of a history of structural couplings that fonn the 
sensorimotor system. Cognition, here, is the result of these patterns of couplings and ongoing 
changes in the resulting abilities, and cognition aids the continued enactment of these abilities 
and the affordances within the Umwelt. In light of the discussion of this chapter, however, 
there is the necessity to supplement Chemero's (2009) proposal so that it can accommodate 
incoherencies to the enaction of the Umwelt. As proposed in this chapter, abilities are not 
primarily the result of sensorimotor couplings in the manner that Chemero argued; they also 
depend upon whether an individual is capable of integrating the Umwelt into a coherent 
whole. If the prenoetic role of the body is not acting in a sufficient manner, then the 
absorption of environmental phenomena into being will not necessarily occur; in such cases, 
couplings will never be fully instantiated. In these moments of insuiTicient prenoetic 
performance, one of at least two experiential qualities will occur; !) an individual takes over 
conscious control of the body as it is separated from the environment; or 2) an understanding 
of the role of embodiment in relation to the worid is not engaged, and experiential blindness 
occurs. As a result of the discussion made in this chapter, the thesis can now compliment 
Chemero's (2009) dynamic affordances of the Umwelt with a consideration for the failure to 
integrate sensorimotor couplings and a failure to perceive and act upon one's own abilities. 
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Based upon the differences between ageing and senescent cognition, it is possible to 
reinterpret the cognitive disconnection between older people and digital media. It is possible 
to speculate a virtual scenario between an older man (Ted) and his personal computer (PC). 
In this first scenario, Ted is described in terms of an ageing cognitive informafion-processor. 
Ted the cognitive informatioD-processor 
Ted and his PC are separate entities thai conununicale to one another tlirougii an exchange 
of information. The PC provides a flow of information from the visual representations on 
its screen, the audio from its speakers and from the array of status lights on its exterior. Ted 
receives this information through his perceptual apparatus and processes it internally 
through his cognitive apparatus. Upon the processing of this infomiation, Ted transfers the 
information through his motor systems and inputs the information baclc into the computer 
system via its mouse, keyboard, or exterior operation buttons. The PC within this ecology 
utilises one of the latest graphic user interface based operating systems, designed for 
increase intuitivencss and for reducing the complexity of the interface. Despite the 
advanced nature of the design of his new PC, the information flowing from the media 
apparatus is in excess to the processing abilities of Ted's perceptual and cognitive systems. 
As a result of sensory decline, information is transferred through the perceptual apparatus 
in an incomplete and hesitant manner. The incompleteness of infonnation arriving at the 
cognhive apparatus is compounded by resulting declmes in the material basis of Ted's 
cognition. The flow of information from the teclmology is bottlenecked within Ted, 
meaning there is a reduction in fluid infonnalion exchange within the Ted-PC ecology. 
From an outside observer, it will appear that Ted behaves with the computer in a hesitant 
marmer, with interactions being slow and awkward. It appears to lake longer for Ted to 
learn to complete certain activities compared to younger people. 
In this second scenario, Ted is described as a senesccntechnic enacting being. 
Ted the senesccntechnic enactee 
Ted and the PC are separate stmctures that intersect each other and have the opportunity to 
become slmcturally coupled. The computer system provides a number of features that 
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afford coupling from human beings with the abilities to act upon their perception. Ted's 
embodiment comprises of a contingent array of sensorimotor couplings thai are the result 
of a history of interactions al an evolutionary and developmental scale. In order for Ted to 
develop structural couplings with the technology, he is required to actively explore its 
possibilities for interaction. As Ted explores possible activities in the interface, the 
prenoetics of his sensorimotor system would normally support his interaction, 
incorporating the PC seamlessly into his experience and enabling the development of 
further novel couplings between Ted and the media interface. As Ted interacts with the PC, 
however, there is incompleteness to the incorporation of the technology into his experience. 
Slight alterations in the prenoelic performance of the body means that Ted's sensorimotor 
abilities are inhibited and the aiTordances that emerge between Ted and the PC are different 
to those of other human beings. In order for some sort of coherency to be developed in this 
process of interaction, Ted engages in a cautious form of interaction where his 
sensorimotor actions are more explicitly controlled and he is always aware of his 
separaleness from the computer. The affordances that emerge between Ted and the PC are 
continuously and consciously attended to. The aiTordances are the result of Ted's 
perception of his own abilities, not what liis sensorimotor embodiment is capable of 
achieving. The computer, a concretely designed product based upon a predetermined 
modelling of human interaction, is unresponsive to Ted's altered sensorimotor couplings. 
Although still a feature of Ted's Vmwelt, the structural couplings between Ted and the PC 
are weak and for the most part Ted and this technology are discontinuous entities. From an 
outside observer, it will appear that Ted behaves with the computer in a hesitant manner, 
with interactions being slower and awkward. It appears to take longer for Ted to learn to 
complete certain activities compared to younger people. 
The result of the transition from cognitivism (ageing) to enactivism (senescence), then, has 
not initially provided a solution to the issues of disconnections with digital media products in 
later life; it has merely realigned the issue. In realigning the issue, however, the limitations of 
contemporary approaches to cognitively inclusive design are highlighted further. Whilst the 
contemporary understanding of ageing cognition emphasises the deterioration in fijnction 
related to human information-processing and memory, the account of cognitive disconnect 
developed in this chapter notably avoids an explicit discussion of memory. There are two key 
reasons for avoiding a discussion of memory. 
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Firstly, concepts of memory as they are understood in enactive accounts of cognition 
significantly differ from those of the more traditional cognitivist accounts. The traditional 
models of human memory within cognitivist accounts have a tendency to conceive of 
memory mostly as a storehouse of knowledge (Pfeifer & Bongard. 2006). In enactive and 
associated accounts of cognition, however, memory lends to be understood more as in 
dynamic relations to real-time perceptions and future action. For example, Arthur Glenberg 
argues that "[mjemory meshes nonprojectable features with projectable features of the 
environment to suggest actions for that person in that situation. These patterns of action are 
what make the environment meaningftil to that person' (Glenberg, 1997, p. 17).'" It is 
possible to understand Glenberg's proposal in terms of dynamic affordances; memory is the 
collection of recurrent patterns of structural couplings that allows for an individual to 
perceive and subsequently enact environmental affordances, Memory is of the moment and 
not necessarily perfect; it is connected with and extended into the body and the world. ^^  
Therefore, memory is an integral part of a senescent account cognition, but here memory is 
understood in such a manner that it differs greatly from the cognitivist conception that older 
people are a storehouse of knowledge and prior experience. 
Secondly, the move away from relying upon the memory model of older people forces 
a change in the stance and activities of the designer when developing novel digital media 
products for older users. The consequence of the argument developed within this and the 
previous chapter is that the designer is forced to look beyond nostalgic and historical forms of 
interaction when developing cognitively inclusive interfaces. Whilst explicitly harnessing 
aspects of long term memory provides more usable digital media interfaces, where the 
learning process is understood to be at its most efficient when invisible, discormections 
within senescent cognition requires designers to account for how older people can encourage 
' " Glenberg (1997) does not deny there being a type of memory as described within traditional cognitivisl 
studies. The problem, however, is thai these understandings of memory tend to restrict themselves to recalling 
past experiences and testable phenomena (such as Usts of words, as in many memory tests within cognitive 
psychology). 
Having to understand human memory in lerms of its inseparability from the body, enviromnenl and 
situational environments provides some insight into the supposed limiialions of cognitive functions such as 
Working memory, Kirsch and Maglio (1994), in their observations of novice and expert players of the computer 
game Tetris, noted that those who made the better decision.^  tended to be those players who used the screen as a 
form of extension to their cognitive functions. The expert players actively turned tlic shapes around and across 
the screen in order to develop a quick understanding as to how certain shapes might fit into the open gaps. In 
some respects these manoeuvres appeared to be self-defeating and completely unpragmatic detours- however, 
they in fact provided valuable information to the players that their own cognitive functions would struggle to 
complete. Kirsch and Maglio (1994) coined these epistemic actions. Similarly, Wilson (2002) notes that studies 
of the limitations to long lerm memory functions fail to lake inio account how people use their environment—in 
Ihe form of books, pictures, archives, and digital media — as storage facilities. It might be true that memory in 
terms of the functional attributes thai are ••internal" to a person might be limited, but in most situations memory 
is far from limited to purely internal or brain-baaed operations of the individual. 
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the development of novel structural couplings. Whilst it was always presumed older people 
could not make novel cognitive couplings, the recent studies of the senescent brain suggests 
that those who actively engage in a form of sensorimotor and neural reorganisation are those 
who are most likely to retain cognitive abilities in old age. In light of the discussion in this 
chapter, it appears that a framework for design that encourages the limitation of developing 
novel structural couplings between brain, body and environment, focusing instead on 
harnessing past experiences, is counter to the response required for the continuation of 
enactment. 
In realigning the issue of cognitive disconnection, as is proposed in this thesis, a new 
critical lens is provided that opens the space for an alternative set of strategies for the design 
of digital media products and interfaces that engage older people. If, as Gibson (1986) claims, 
in interacting with the world the agent learns as much about one's own skills, both with a 
conscious or unconscious awareness, then thoughtfully designed interactive technologies may 
provide the augmentation of the awareness of one's own sensorimotor abilities that appears to 
be required in later life. Therefore it is necessary to suggest strategies as to how technological 
interactions can be designed to support a senescent human to become greater experientially 
aware, both consciously and unconsciously, of their sensorimotor capabilities and provide the 
space for a greater array of affordances and potential couplings to emerge with digital 
systems, This will be explored in the following chapter, which will form broad strategies for 
designers that harness the agency and potential abilities of older people within interactions 
with novel digital media. It will also be argued that rather than reducing the agency of the 
ageing human being as a poor processor of information, the untapped potential of older 
people as embodied and enacting senescent human beings can be made better use of by 
designers of digital media products. 
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Chapter 7 
Affordances for senescentcchnics 
Question: What strategies are available to open up opportunities for the design of digital 
media products that afford the enaction of senescentcchnic cognitive experience? 
7.1. A senescentechnic account ofaffordance requires the eschewing of closure as far as it is feasible; 
the designing of specific affordances is no longer sufficient, instead the designer must explore the 
broader and dynamic spaces for affordances to emerge and disappear in. 
7.2. Senescentechnics requires spaces that afford opportunities far the augmentation of the self-
knowledge thai is constructed and continually reconstructed by a senescent human being, 
7.3. Senescentechnics requires spaces that afford the older user of a technology to be engaging in an 
ongoing creative and sense-making process of co-design at the interface of a digital media product. 
7.4. Senescentechnics requires spaces that afford a balance for incremental adjustments to the 
delicate embodied sensorimotor couplings of an older person, providing information as to the 
provenance and ramifications of real-lime interactions. 
7.5. Senescentechnics requires spaces that afford ongoing physical activities that are necessary for 
the reintegration of key proprioceptive and body schematic systems of the .senescent cognizer. 
7.6. Senescentechnics requires designers to have a sensitivity to the agency of older people as having 
intentional control over both their embodiment and interactions with digital media products: 
designers must consider the ongoing process of wear betu'een people and lechnology. and how digilal 
media wears with older people rather than treating older people as wearing out. 
7.1. Design for the enaction of dynamic affordanccs 
A senescenlechnic account ofaffordance requires the eschewing of closure as far as it is feasible; the 
desiring of.specific affordances is no longer sufficient, instead the designer must explore the broader 
and dynamic spaces for affordances to emerge and disappear in. 
In previous chapters, affordances were situated within the study of ecological psychology (as 
in Gibson (1986)) and subsequently enactive (as in Varela et al. (I99I)) and dynamic (as in 
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Chemero (2009)) cognitive science. As discussed in chapter six, affbrdances are understood 
to consist of a dynamic relationship between a person's abilities and perception of their 
abilities and the environment. The discussion of affordance in chapters five and six has not 
been explicitly used by this thesis as a way of understanding the design of a particular digital 
media product but rather as a way of thinking about how the Umwelf is enacted for certain 
people. In order to move towards a greater understanding of the role of dynamics in terms of 
older people interacting with future digital media products, it is necessary to understand 
technology and media, and consequentially the design and interaction thereof, in equally 
dynamic terms as the senescent human being. Similar to the historical analyses of technology 
by Punt (2000) and Nye (2006), it is necessary here to take forward the notion that digital 
media is always in a dynamic process of creation with, and by, users. It will be argued in this 
chapter that the shift to conceptualising the design of digital media as dynamic is not a 
reflection of increases in technological complexity but rather is a necessary component of a 
design response to the senescent account of cognition developed in chapter six. 
To conceptualise digital media in terms of dynamics requires a rather different 
perspective on 'designing affordances' to that used by contemporary design literature (as in 
Norman (1988)). As a consequence, and as argued in chapter five, this thesis has revisited the 
original definition of affordances provided by Gibson (1986) rather than using the concept's 
traditional design usage as appropriated by Norman (1988). It is critical, therefore, to clarify 
what is meant here by designing affordances. As has been highlighted at length in chapters 
five and six, cognitivism, which can be viewed within Norman's understanding of 
affordances, diflers radically to enactivism to the extent where designing for cognitivist 
ageing cognition, or enactivist senescent cognition, require equally diverse approaches. 
The account of cognitively inclusive design outlined in chapter two was reliant upon a 
representational layer of mental content with which to base the design of digital systems. 
Contemporary inclusive design literature has struggled to move beyond this 
conceptualisation, seemingly as a consequence of the overwhelming evidence of cognitive 
deterioration occurring later in life irom cognifivist psychological studies. The claims of the 
cognitive psychology of ageing would suggest it is unwise for a designer to even consider 
that older people can enact novel technologies in a seamless manner; they lack the very 
cognitive ftinctions necessary to do this. 
In chapter six an account of temporal changes to human cognition later in life was 
developed that this thesis has defined as senescent cognition, which presents a radical 
alternative vision of what cognitive disconnect may mean in old age. Instead of a continual 
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deterioration of cognitive ability, the thesis argued that cognitive disconnections emerge as a 
result of broad changes to the dynamic systems transcending brain, body and world. If 
cognitively inclusive design was focused upon the prediction, inscription and prescription of 
specific affordances for the ageing mind, then the sencscentechnic domain examines how the 
space for certain affordances emerges and allows for the continued enaction of senescent 
cognitive experience with, and through, novel digital media. The consequence of this, as will 
be argued in this chapter, is that the designer has to take a broader meta-perspective on the 
situation to be designed for and allow for an open-ended design outcome where the user 
answers some of the specific questions of affordance. 
Affordances, when understood in cognitively inclusive design as defined in chapter 
two, are actual, real, objective and static properties of the technological environment that 
offers definable actions to the older person, their body and their cognition. In terms of 
enaction, however, there are no mental representations for the designer to map an affordance 
onto. Returning to Dourish's{2001) distinctions, enaction requires both the stance and 
subsequent activities of the designer to be transformed. Thompson (2008) contrasts the 
opposing views of cognitivism and enativism in terms of the design of anodic 
technologies'^^, using the useful question and answer fi"amework of Varelae( al. (1991). 
Question 1: What does design do when it humanises technology? 
Cogniiivisl Implication: Design manipulalcs symbolic images by which people read 
the world so that they can make sense of and give value to technologies (semiotics). 
Enactivisl Implication: Design enables people to enact in the world by enabling 
potentiality of whole human as a distributed soma ... 
Question 2: How does design work? 
Cognitivist Implication: Designers create the means to project simple or mulliple and 
complex symbolic meanings. These symbols are primarily experienced by people in 
reference to a codified cultural understanding of referents. 
Enactivist Implication: Designers intervene in the complex processes by which people 
form an experience of their world. Their task is to enable people to experience the 
worid 'naturally' without necessarily needing to attach meaning to individualised 
inieractions, 
' " Thompson (2008) provides an historical analysis of industrial design that highhghls how designers have 
struggled to deal with aspects of the anoetic (which is understood to consi-st of aspects of cognition that are 
outside the main awareness of an individual, yet ti/so present in experience). Technologies that are untietk are 
those that become somewhat incorporated into a person's being through interaction. Thompson argues in favour 
of a 'holsomatic' model of human beings that takes into account a wider understanding of experience with 
technology. Thomspon's (2008) argument is that designers, in struggling to comprehend the ineffabilily of 
certain aspects of human experience with technologies, have continuously returned to traditional boundaries of 
human beings (such as the physical boundary of the skin) in order to 'humanise' technologies. This thesis 
follows some of Thompson's argument, in suggesting that the inability to deal with tlie cognitive disconnection 
that appears to occur between older people and digital media products, has lead certain design communities to 
reify a concrete and delerminist model of human ageing. 
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Question 3: How do 1 know when design is functioning adequately? 
Cognitivist Implication: Wlien people understatid the symbols they encounter and 
react appropriately. 
HnaclivisI Implication; When people incorporate the designed world seamlessly as 
part of their experience of being. (Thompson, 2008, p.245) 
Thompson (2008) highlights the disparateness of the cognitivist and enactivist positions once 
translated into designing technologies for human beings. Whereas in taking a cognitivist 
position the designer is provided with a backdrop of knowledge from the domain of cognitive 
psychology to distinguish what is and what is not suitable to certain groups of human beings, 
enaction eschews closure in the design process. In taking an enactivist perspective, the 
designer takes the human being into account in the fullest range of experience rather than 
proceeding through a reductive-scientific model, as is the case with cognitively inclusive 
design. The enactivist designer understands the interaction process as the unravelling 
exploration of complex interrelationships, which exist on multiple levels between human 
beings and the world. Instead of attempting to design a closed product in reference to the 
closed cognitive system of the user, designers are lead to speculate open-ended technological 
systems that augment the enaction of cognitive experience.'^^ 
The discrepancy between cognitivism and enactivism suggests a similar discrepancy 
between cognitively inclusive design (as explained in chapter two) and the enactment of 
senescentechnics. It is necessary to distinguish cognitively inclusive design from the 
cognitively enacted design of senescentechnics. In senescentechnics, technology is not 
conceived as an opposing force to human beings that requires neutralising, but instead is 
'*^  Thompson (200S) argues that research on enaction in cognitive science suggests a radical departure from the 
contemporary heritage of design, which has struggled to comprehend how technology can expand the 'human 
soma' beyond the boundary of the body. Thompson (2008) highlights how the inlellectual heritage of enaction 
in regards to designing technologies can be traced to the Vorticisl movement of the early twentieth century. 
Headed by Percy Wyndham Lewis, the Vorticisis believed that technology and humanity would become one 
over time, but with the preservation of the human ego. Wyndham Lewis poUrayed humanity as making the most 
of the new techno log ie-s of his time, offering the possibilities of a new sense of ego and being, still loosely 
attached to the human body but extended beyond it though technological augmentation. The ideas of Wyndham 
Lewis are implicated within the post humanist movement, and are not far removed from the later claims of 
Varela el al. (1991) presented in chapter six (although used in completely different contexts). As Thomspon 
(2008) highlights, however, Wyndham Lewis' writings are often not included in histories of the design of 
technology despite their apparent relevance with the embodied and enacted modes of thinking that arc 
encouraged within a number of contemporary design and cognitive discourses. Thompson (2008) notes lliat this 
is very likely a result of Wyndham Lewis' association with fascist politics. In most literature, such as the 
aforemenlioned work of Foster, the Vorticistsare gathered together with the Futurists as an intensely right-wing 
movement, although whether this should actually be the case is up for much debate (see Munton (1997) for 
examples of this complexity). Much like the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, whose writings were somewhat 
marginalised from popularity post-Second World War as a result of his politics, it maybe difficult to present a 
reading of Wyndham Lewis devoid of his ideological motivations. However, again like Heidegger, it may be 
thai the climate is as such now thai his work can be revisited and contextual ised with a concern for current 
matters on the analysis and design of technology. 
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constructed to become integrated within the enacted Umwelt. It is no longer feasible to 
suggest certain affordances can be 'designed' in the objective fashion alluded to by Norman 
(1988). Instead, in the dynamic affordances of enaction, the designer must have a broader 
awareness of how affordances appear and disappear through interaction so as to create spaces 
for novel couplings in the Umweli to emerge and be created. The designer, here, is unable to 
predict and thus explicitly determine, either before or after the fact, what affordances are 
experienced. This is in stark contrast to cognitive inclusion and the historical tradition of 
people-centred design, wherein technology is formulated to reduce fHction and increase 
closeness to the abilities of the human in an immediate manner.'" In the specific case of 
older people, cognitive inclusion suggests technology is somewhat aggressive to their being, 
and the designer needs to look towards the structure of the ageing human in order to weaken 
this hostility. 
The aforementioned work of Redstrom (2005) and Almquist and Lupton (2010) both 
higlilight that critical and experimental design practice provides a potential route out of the 
continuous striving towards a fit between people and technology by actively provoking the 
user to question their use of a product. For example, Anthony Dunne and Fiona Raby have 
established 'critical design' as a provocative aspect of designing which "uses speculative 
design proposals to challenge narrow assumptions, preconceptions and givens about the role 
products play in everyday life" (Dunne & Raby, 2010). Their approach is still concerned with 
technologies becoming incorporated into the everyday lives of people, but actively considers 
how design can transform and change certain societal assumptions rather than be submissive 
to them.'^" Similarly, the 'droog" collective of designers provide an extreme example of a 
critical design response, emphasising a design stance that attempts to combine functionality, 
ftin, humour and critique. 
The droog mentality could be summarized as 'dry'. 'Dry' as in dry wit, unadorned 
informality, ascetic irony. 'Dry' as that essentially Dutch inclination to 'do normar 
and al the same lime critically investigate what you're doing and the way you do it. 
(Droog Design, 2010) 
' " People-centred design might be argued not to do this, having moved far beyond primarily usability or 
cognitive models of human beings. In chapter eight, the thesis will argue lliat, as if is used by the inclusive 
design community, people-centred design is still focused upon concrete constructions of the user—these 
consUuclJons just go by diiTeren! names. 
' '* For an introduction into critical design approaches, see Dunne (1999) and Dunne and Raby (Dunne & Raby, 
2001). 
165 
Figure 10 Bootleg objects. Taken from Bader and Wolf (2003). 
Droog are an example of a design practice that ignores any formal conception of what 
constitutes the human being in reference to the object. For example, the works that formed 
the "Bootleg Objects" collection by Marcus Bader and Max Wolf could represent, at a glance, 
a materiahsation of the ideas of contemporary cognitively inclusive design. Rebraun, Re-Bo, 
and Re-SP (Figure 20) are home music system 'classics" that have been altered in such a way 
that their functionahty is changed to varying degrees of subtlety. 
In "ReBraun", recombinalion is paramount - while most features remained present, 
ihey slide along the surface, into new meanings. At the ReBo, nothing has been 
moved. Instead, an ahen object - the touch screen - has slyly integrated himself 
Lastly, the record player object Rc-SP has not changed at all (apart from three 
clownish minimanipulalions). Railier, its whole usage conlexi has been taken. All of 
its working fiinclions are completely different than it might seem, and all of its 
previous controls are now dead. (Bader & Wolf, 2003, p.l) 
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Externally, the Bootleg Objects are manifestations of an earlier period from the history of 
technology—on the surface, they can be interpreted as examples of contemporary cognitively 
inclusive design. Further exploration of the functions (or lack thereof) of these objects 
reveals, however a subversive reading; a reading where any connection with cognitively 
inclusive design is merely ironic. Rather than offering the functions that the external aesthetic 
appears to state, the Bootleg Objects have features that appear to contradict, defamiliarise and 
invite a certain amount of reflection on the part of their user—and the designer—in order to 
discover as to what they are and why certain changes may have been made.' 
Similarly, Gaver and Mailin (2000) developed a number of information appliance 
concepts that eschewed the technological determinism observed in many such concepts in 
favour of technological plausibility , and instead explored certain boundaries regarding 
what is normally socially and culturally acceptable."'' In the description of one information 
appliance concept, 'Dawn Chorus' (Figure 21), Gaver and Martin (2000, p.210) deceptively 
claim that '[i]tis pleasant to be awakened by the sound of local songbirds, but how much 
more enjoyable it would be if they knew our favourite music'. In order to implement this 
'"Although Badcrand Wolf describe defamiliarisation in general sense of ihclerm, Dell etal. (2005) provide a 
recent example of interaction design research has examined more formally the role of detamiliarisation in the 
design of digiial media systems. In particular. Bell eta/. (2005) liighlighl how a process of defamiliarisaiion 
highlights might make certain individuals question something thai appears so normal lo them that it is 
completely unquestioned. Bell eial. (2005. p. 152) stale that 'reading ethnographic accounts of llie UK can have 
a [...] dislocating effect on UK readers." Drawing upon a study by Bell (2001), they note that "people in the UK 
have lo pay for local and national telephone calls by the second and part second. UK residents might respond to 
such ail observation with "well of course, lliat"s obvious, doesn't everyone?" The etiinographic description 
renders the practice strange and therefore questionable. This kind of observational work is part of the 
ethnographic tradition of unpacking and interrogating naturalizations of social practices and institutions. In this 
sense it is implicitly critical: "'why should we pay by the second for local calls, no-one else does!'" Such 
ethnographies invite us to look again at our public and private spaces, our social practices, ourselves, and notice, 
perhaps for the first lime, how strange ii might all look lo other people' (Bell tv al., 2005, p.l52). Therefore, 
products that delamiliarise might make the user question their normal behaviours when interacting with and 
exploring familiar con.sumer orientated products and services. 
'*" Gavcr and Martin (2000) argued that '[i]n presenting these proposals we are deliberately noncomniiltal about 
the exact technologies thai might be used in their implementation (...] in the technology industry a prototype 
"works" when the technology has been implemented, even if aesthetic and cultural issues are neglected. In 
design the opposite is true: A prototype "works" when it successfully captures the experience of using a given 
device, even if implementation issues are noi fully resolved. At the same time, we see liltle value in "science 
fiction" concepts which rely on technological cITects that can or do not exist. Instead, the proposals are intended 
to be technohgicaliy plausible, in Ihe sense that il seems likely ihat they can be realised even if the exact means 
are unknown or unspecified. In practice, achieving plausibility depends on designers' knowledge and judgement, 
while an evaluation of the results may depend on discussions with technical experts' (Oaver & Martm, 2000, 
p.211). 
*' Gaver and Martin (2000) refer lo Anthony Dunne's concept of value functions as influencing their works. 
Dunne and Raby define value fictions as an alternative to science fictions. 'If in science fiction, the technology 
is oflen futuristic while social values are conservative, the opposite is true in \'alue fictions. In these scenarios, 
ihe technologies are realistic but Ihe social and cultural values arc ofien fictional, or at least highly ambiguous. 
The aim is lo encourage the viewers to ask themselves why the values embodied in the proposal seem "fictional' 
or 'unreal', and to question the social and cultural mechanisms that defines what is real or fictional' (Duime & 
Raby, 2001, p.63). 
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possibility, the Dawn Chorus birdfeeder applies behaviourist principles of stimulus-response 
in providing food to the birds when it senses they can mimic the same song. In using Dawn 
Chrorus, its owner may enjoy the pleasurable experiences of waking up to birds chirping their 
favourite song; however, it can also be read as an intervention upon the human tendency to 
tame nature. (Gaver & Martin, 2000) Whilst typically the critical approaches to design 
emphasised by the work of Dunne and Raby, Gaver and Martin, and Droog are essentially 
examples of critiques of consumer-oriented design, Bowen (2009) has recently attempted to 
develop a design methodology that transfonns elements of critical design into the process of 
developing everyday consumer items. 
Figure 21 Dawn chorus. Taken from Gaver and Martin (2000) 
A Stance on design that suggests products can be designed as critical arguments or 
questions projected to the user are relevant to the discussion of creating the space for 
affordances to emerge. Problematically, however, the above design approaches still require a 
certain level of closure to the designed outcomes. The products are created in a manner to 
invoke very specific questions from very specific users; Gaver and Martin's bird feeder 
appears to be directed towards those people who may be concerned with the questions of 
man's dominance on the environment; Dunne and Raby's (2004) "huggable atomic 
mushroom" (Figure 22) assumes a user who is constructed in such a manner that they can 
recognise the purpose of the societal questions being asked of them; the droog works suppose 
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the 'user' is able to recognise the original uses of the objects in order to engage with the 
intended humour. Enaction and dynamics, however, determines that such questions—made 
from specific a/Jrion constructions of the people intended to interact with the object—are as 
limited as the people-centred approaches they appear lo critique; the object, and the people 
intended to use it, are still rather concretely conceived. 
Ftgure 22 Dunne ind Raby's (2004) huEgRble nlomfc mushroom. 
Returning to the discussion in chapter five, Chemero (2009) introduced a dynamic 
theory to affordances in order to explain how human cognition, perception and action are 
continuously engaged in temporal change. This, in turn, suggests that affordances are 
continuously changing as a result of the dynamic natureofthehumanpoint of reference. 
What is not explicitly discussed by Chemero (2009), and is avoided in the ecological 
psychology literature, is how Umwelicn affordances do not emerge and disappear solely as a 
result of changes lo the abilities of a human perceivcr, but also as a result of ongoing changes 
to the environment. The environment, just as human beings, must be understood as dynamic. 
This is not an attempt to animate a feature of the Uinwcli which, in certain accounts, might be 
'*^  This may be unavoidable in a design process. It is evident that this thesis—in arguing for closure and non-
concreteness—still has to use a model of human beings with which to frame the design process. The senescent 
human being, rather ihan ihe ageing human being, is just another way of understanding a particular group of 
people and designing in rellection of this knowledge. The key difference is, firstly, having sensitivity to the 
provisional nature of models and, secondly, as a result trying lo ensure that the design process is left to be as 
open-ended as is feasible. 
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treated as objective and real. Firstly, in this thesis' argument, this is to emphasise that 
technology and media requires to be understood as dynamically as the enacting, senescent, 
human being. Secondly, this is significant as it implies that, in terms of the interactions 
between a particular older person and a digital media product, the Umwelt of the whole 
system is conceived as providing possibilities for dynamic change. As a consequence, it is not 
just a case that technologies arc conceived as constituting certain predictions of use—-as is the 
case in cognitively inclusive design—but are instead understood in terms of dynamically 
responding and offering opportunities for action and opening the space for creativity. Within 
contemporary literature for designing for older people, however, digital media and 
technology is not conceived in terms of this mode of dynamic engagement. In fact, as is the 
case in the human factors literature, designers arc provided explicit guidance to avoid the 
necessity for such dynamic engagements when developing products and interfaces that are 
inclusive of older people. 
The following five sections explore some creative spaces for affordances to emerge 
that are particularly relevant to cognitive disconnection as it is understood in 
senescentechnics. The purpose of exploring these affordances is to highliglit ways in which 
future digital media products can afford the continued integration and enaction of cognitive 
experience of older people. Therefore, these short discussions can be considered to be a tbrm 
of'technological imaginaries" (Punt, 2000) for designers. Punt (2000, p.20) proposed that the 
technological imaginary "refers to the ways in which technology was thought about both in 
terms ofits hardware and as a representation of cultural aspirations - imagined and actual.' 
Therefore, these speculative discussions are provided in terms of a critical conversation for 
future design research, when practical tools are available to expand, implement and refine the 
ideas. These conversations eschew the tradition of guidelines, principles and specifications; 
in terms of enaction such concrete guidance is restrictive and un-usefiil. At the same lime, 
however, this thesis understands that in the case of the cognitive disconnect between older 
people and novel digital media, designers require some form of direction. Therefore, 
alongside these conversations there are a number of design examples to provide a little more 
concrete grounding. Again, however, these design examples are somewhat uncertain, 
plausible and implausible to varying degrees, and rely upon the imagination of the reader to 
make them fully explicit. The purpose of these conversations and examples is to open up 
pathways to certain spaces that encourage the emergence of certain types of atTordances 
without the centralisation of prediction, inscription and prescription that dominates 
contemporary cognitively inclusive design theory and practice. It is suggested that by 
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thinking about these processes in dynamic terms, it is possible to afford the incorporation of 
technologies into the ongoing enactment of cognitive experience in later life, 
7.2. Affordances of self-perception 
Senescentechnics requires spaces thai ajford opportunities for the augmentation of the self-knowledge 
that is constructed and continually reconstructed by a senescent human being. 
It is possible to unpack some of the implications of dynamic technological affordances by 
returning to Gibson's (1986) original theory of affordances. Gibson reminds us that in 
engaging in the environment the human being perceives their self as much as ecology. 
Gibson (1986, p.l26) stated that '[ilnformation about the self accompanies information about 
the environment, and the two are inseparable. [...] Perception has two poles, the subjective 
and the objective, and information is available to specify both. One perceives the 
environment and perceives oneself." Gibson conceptualised perception of the environment 
and the self as occurring at the same moment, rooted in the idea that perception and action are 
interlinked (as discussed in chapter five). If knowledge of the self and the world are part of 
the same spectrum of sensations, then actions on the world provide an equally large amount 
of self-perceptual knowledge as do the sensations enclosed within the supposed boundaries of 
the human body (Gibson, 1986). In line with the framework for senescent cognition that this 
thesis defined in chapter six, however, it is necessary to note that it is not Just actions that are 
the primary source of these sensations for self-knowledge. Rather, it is the perception of what 
the environment affords in relation to one's own embodiment that provides these sensations. 
It is argued here that it is what a particular individual understands as an affordance which, 
thus, confirms their own understanding of their embodied abilities. 
Gibson's (1986) claims present a situafion where the design of a product and the array 
of affordances it allows have a consequential effect on the manner in which an individual 
understands their own abilities. This is to argue that when engaging in an interactive 
exchange with a digital media product, as much is learnt about one's own abilities as is learnt 
about the possibilities of the technology; this is a mutual and ongoing exchange. 
In terms of senescentechnic cognitive disconnect, or experiential blindness (Noe, 
2004), Gibson's discussion suggests it is beneficial lo harness this seemingly unconscious 
self-reflective feature of exploring the world. Noc (2004) argues that in order to go beyond 
experiential blindness, it is necessary to be an active agent, 'for it is precisely through active 
movement that one is able to test sensorimotor hypotheses' (No6, 2004, p.92). An individual 
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suffering from a state of experiential blindness needs to rebuild the knowledge of how their 
sensorimotor abilities relate to the sensations that are perceived. It is necessary for the 
individual to develop new sensorimotor hypothesis, as Noe calls them, and lest them. In 
terms of the dynamic model of senescent cognition, this is not a systematic process where the 
human being goes through certain stages to reach a level of flilfilment but a continuous 
moment-by-momcnt process of perception and action. In each moment of interacting within 
the Umwelt, an individual is continually developing and testing their understanding of how 
sensations and actions relate to both the environment and their knowledge of their own 
embodiment. To enact a coherent Umwelf is to integrate sensations, actions and self-
knowledge; to do this it is necessary to continue pushing the boundaries of one's own 
abilities. Although senescence constitutes a particular type of experiential blindness—a type 
which is more subtle but as a result less obviously resolved—this process of development and 
testing is no different. 
What Noe's (2004) argument portrays, much like Gibson's (1986) before, is the 
absolute necessity for active exploration of environments in order to construct knowledge 
about not only the world, but also the self Only through this ongoing exploration of 
embodiment in the world can cognitive experience be coherently enacted and sensorimotor 
hypothesis be tested. Therefore, this thesis emphasises thai older people, in order to conlimie 
the enaction of cognitive experience, would benefit from ongoing active explorations of 
Umwelten affordances in order to reintegrate their perception of sensorimotor abilifies with 
the potential abilities of their whole embodiment. 
As a consequence of this proposal, the role of the designer of digital media products is 
not only to consider how a system affords certain actions for certain individuals with certain 
sensorimotor abilities, but also to comprehend how the system provides a level of reflective 
self-knowledge fed back to the user. In the particular case of senescent cognition, it is 
important to highliglit the pivotal role digital media provides in augmenting an older person's 
ability to integrate their self-knowledge with their embodied perceptual-action capabilities, 
and subsequently aid the enactment of the products interface. It is not just necessary to 
highlight what a user can achieve in a present moment but also feed information back as to 
what may be achieved over time through transformations in sensorimotor ability. The 
affordances perceived at one moment in time between a technological system and a particular 
individual will differ from those perceived seconds, minutes and longer periods of time 
afterwards. Conceived as it is here, as couplings between human and technological 
interaction strengthen, then the possibilities for novel couplings emerge; at the same time, as 
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couplings strengthen, the perception of one's own abilities strengthen too—in a reciprocal, 
circular fashion. Designers of senescentechnic digital media products can harness this 
ongoing process of active exploration, rather than focusing upon immediate communication. 
Proposed strategy: Senescentechnic digital media products can support the ongoing enaction 
of cognitive experience by opening opportunities for users to actively explore digital media 
environments in such a manner that provides active feedback that augments the self-
knowledge of how their own embodied capabilities temporally change. 
'TraceMap' 
TraceMap is an App" for smarl-phones that provides feedback on one's geographical 
location in relation to previous routes, journeys and places you have been. It can be used to 
search for locations {much like Google Maps, and similar) and identifies where these are on 
the map. It does not provide directions, routes or a map of streets for you to go along. 
Instead, you are encouraged to be reminded of your previous journeys by looking at the 
traces, and to make new journeys along streets and roads you have never been down before. 
Figure 13 TraceMap Interface on (oucbicreen device, 
Dorothy makes her way into town on the bus to the new council house. The new council 
house is in a part of town thai has recently been redeveloped. She goes through her bag and 
pulls out a small white device. She taps in the address of her destination and a marker 
appears on screen. The marker is where she needs to get to... hut no route explaining how to 
get there appears. 
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Those routes that you go down most often become increasingly prominent on the map 
through tracing your movements. The longer it has been since going down a particular route, 
the less concretely it is visualised. Therefore, in order to keep a long term memory of these 
routes then you need to ensure they are re-enacted regularly. At the same time, in order to 
leave a trace of a new route you need to active explore that area, 
Figure 24 A TraceMap displaying Dorothy'i past 'truces' along with planned destination. 
Dorothy gets off the bus at a central location in town. She knows this area well—this is 
acknowledged by her device, which locates her in a swell of traces from recent journeys she 
has made. As the traces increase in granularity. Dorothy is reminded of previous journeys 
she has made around this part of town. She begins to orientate herself and becomes familiar 
with the previous paths she has taken. She still needs to find a way to somewhere new 
however. Through her past traces she can come nearer to her destination yet to complete 
this journey she must identify new couplings with her environment. This is challenging for 
Dorothy, but some comfort is found in always being able to re-trace her movement through 
the map. 
Trace maps highlight how senescentechnic digital media should provide guidance towards 
active exploration. A TraceMap provides support for a person to find their own routes 
around a geographical locale and suggests directions for them to pursue whilst not offering 
concrete directions. Therefore, the user is motivated to find their own paths to their 
174 
destination rather than relying upon assistive technologies. They have to rely as much on 
their own embodied capacities of exploring the world as they do the knowledge contained 
within the device. 
7.3. Affordances of ongoing co-design 
Senescentechnics requires spaces that afford the older user of a technology to be engaging in an 
ongoing creative and sense-making process of co-design at the interface of a digital media product. 
As has been argued thus far, the shift towards supporting enaction rather than cognitivism 
highlights the transition of the sense-making activity of people interacting with digital media 
from being premeditated by the designer to being contingently co-constructed between the 
dynamics of senescent cognition and the dynamics of the media. The creativity of the 
individual is implicated as playing at least two roles here within a continuous loop. Primarily, 
there is a necessity for the older individual to actively form and engage with the interaction 
process, thus forming their own affordances in terms of a ongoing achievement with the 
media. Secondly, there is an inseparable role of reflection within this process, which 
necessarily draws upon the creativity of the older user. Senescentechnics, then, alters the 
stance of the designer, enabling the human participator to engage in the creation of their 
interface with digital media; a space provided, but not prescribed, by the designer. The issue 
of senescentechnic affordances becomes an issue of co-design, and some of the problem 
solving activities that are normally considered to be the realm of the designer would be 
passed onto the user.'^ 
There are particularities to certain design activities that are sympathetic with 
senescent cognition and the requirement for affordances offering ongoing active engagements 
with digital media products. Donald Schon (1991) has argued that studies of various 
professional practices highlight how knowledge is often developed and reflected upon during 
dialogical interaction within situations. Schon (1991) has argued that this appears to be 
particularly significant to design practitioners. In an often cited study of design activity, 
Schon discusses a dialogue from an architectural review between a student (Petra) and the 
design master (Quist). Petra's project is focused upon the development of building in difficult 
'*' One approach to the issues of introducing co-design into real-time interaction between participants and 
technology was discussed by the author in a collaboration with Brigitta Zics (Zics & Vines. 2009), which can be 
found in the thesis' appendix. 
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space that is based on a slope. At the start of the review, Petra outlines that she is finding it 
difficult to incorporate the building into the slope; in order to resolve the problem, Petra had 
listed a number of smaller problems that had to be resolved first in order to move forward. In 
being unable to develop answers to these problems, however, Pelra was stuck. The primary 
problem that Petra was attempting to resolve—the architectural nonn that the shape of the 
building and the contours of the land must fit one-another—appeared to be the primary 
source of her difficulties. Quist, in response, suggests that part of Petra's problems was an 
inability to let go of the problem. Schon notes that instead: 
the main problem, in Quist's view, is not that of fitting the shape of the building to the 
slope; [he site is too "screwy" for that. Instead, coherence must be given to the site in 
the form of a geometry—a "discipline"—which can be imposed upon it. (Schon, 
1991, p.85) 
Schon notes that Quist's response to Petra's problems is that she needs to resituate the 
problem. Petra was attempting to find coherence in a site that seemingly could not afford it. 
Instead, Quist suggests she starts with a discipline 'a "what i f to be adopted in order to 
discover its consequences' {Schon, 1991, p.93), Quist makes what may appear to bean 
illogical move to Petra; he is suggesting that they ignore what she identifies as the problem. 
Quist plays out the consequences of the new discipline by carving Ihe geometry into 
the slope. In the medium of sketch and spalial-aclion language, he represents 
buildings on the site througii moves which are also experiments. Each move has 
consequences described and evaluated in terms drawn from one or more design 
domains. Each has implications binding on later moves. And each creates new 
problems to be described and solved. Quist designs by spinning out a web of moves, 
consequences, implications, appreciations, and further moves. (Schon, 1991, p.94) 
Quist explores his newly imposed discipline in a pragmatic form of interacfion; although he 
outlines his discipline at the start, he is willing for it to change as he moves through the 
problem setting. 
Each move is a local experiment which contributes to Ihe global experiment of 
reframing the problem. Some moves are resisted (the shapes cannot be made to fit the 
contours), whilst others generaie new phenomena. As Quist rctlects on the unexpected 
consequences and implications ofhis moves, he listens to the situation's back talk, 
forming new appreciations which guide his further moves. {Schon, 1991, p.94) 
Quist performs an ongoing dialogue with the situation. In doing so, he begins to find an 
answer to Petra's original problem, stating that 'the new geometry "works slightly with the 
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contours'", providing a form of coherence that has only been possible by avoiding the initial 
problem. In the linear, rational problem-solving world of Pctra, Quist's moves may appear 
somewhat obscure, irrational and a means without an end; to Qujst, seemingly taking a 
pragmatist approach, the solution, if as such could be defined, emerges from the continuous 
engagement with the situation. 
Henrik Gedenryd(1998) synthesises Schon's (1991) account to argue that Quist's 
cognitive problem solving activity is only possible through his continuous reframing of the 
problem as a result of his interactions with the local cnvironment^primarily. the sketchpad. 
Gedenryd (1998) argues that there is a certain quality to the inquiring materials of designing 
that provides the tools necessary for this form of interactive, world-involving cognition. This 
type of ongoing enquiry or use of situated materials, however, is not confined to design 
activities. Gedenryd (1998) determines that in situations where human beings are enforced to 
cognize about problems 'intramentally'—that is to say, without actively exploring and 
experimenting with the environment—human cognitive 'performance is underwhelming' 
(Gedenryd, 1998, p.215). Gedenryd (1998) argued that human cognition performs better 
when there is an ongoing sense making and construction of knowledge in collaboration with 
environmental affordances.'^ "^ He defined this attribute of human cognition, which is highly 
reminiscent of those of Gibson and Varela discussed before, as 'interactive'. 
Interactive cognition is meant lo indicate Ihat mind, action, and world mutually 
determine an individual's doings, in interaction. Cognition, ofcourse. effects changes 
upon the world. In conventional cognitive theory, it is the mind alone thai determines 
what an individual does, in a simple causiil relation. In interactive cognition, the 
cognizing individual on the one hand, and the world on the other, reciprocally 
influence each other. In other words, mind and world interactively determine each 
'** Schon's description of Quisi's activities highlights how, in some circurasiances, behaviours thai may appear 
irrational on an initial observation mighl actually be beneficial in certain respects. In terms of the problem 
solvingor ideation process of designing, it might be tlial doodling and sketching are part of ihe ongoing sense-
making activities of the designer. 
' " It may be that enforcing 'mental' interactions, rather than using the world lo support or supplement 
cognition, fundamentally restricts human problem solving. This was observed in ihe aforementioned work of 
Kirsh and Maglio (1994) studying Telris players. Kirsh and Miiglio( 1994) discovered that when forced to 
mentally rotate ilie block shapes ralher than physically play wiih them, then ihe calculation time wa.s 
significantly longer. It appears lhat the thought process was improved by what may initially appear to be 
relatively superflurious movements made by ihc player, bul these moves dynamically alter the playing 
environment in a manner that simplifies ihe caleuiaiions necessary in ihe brain, Kirsh and Maglio (1994) called 
actions such as these 'episteniic', and opposed ihem to 'pragmatic' actions. An epistcmic action is the 
performance of some form of change in the environment thai does not necessarily directly achieve a desired goal 
bul allows an individual to aid the cognitive processing of a given situation. Rather llian situating the cognizer as 
a separate perceiver of information from Ihe world on which il makes calculaiions and then acts out moves 
towards a desired goal, Kirsh and Maglio (1994) paini a picture ofhuman cognitive experience as dynamically 
entwined and intimately coupled to ihe environment where it is impossible to separate the 'mental' from the 
objects that are acted on, 
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other, and in particular they interactively determine cognitive perlbrmance. 
(Gedenryd, 1998, p.Ill - emphasis in original) 
Gedenryd (1998) portrays the interactive nature of cognition as coming to the fore in 
situations that require the application of abstract thought. Exploring the activities of 
designers, he notes that design activities revolve around worlds of uncertainties. The use of 
sketching, prototypes, scenarios, layout mock-ups and simulations allows the designer to 
situate their self within a world that is uncertain, ill-defined and, at least during the designing 
process, does not exist physically but emerges within the private Umwelt of the designer's 
activity. Gedenryd (1998, p. 157) calls these 'situating strategies', in that they allow the 
designer to re-create these environments of uncertainty in order to be strategically situated 
within the 'future situation of use'.'^^ The idea here is that the habit of designers re-creating 
worlds to be situated within provides evidence of the intimately tied nature of cognition and 
world. By situating themselves within these potential worlds, the designer is able to enable 
their embodied being to enter an alternative arena where their everyday sensorimotor 
capacities can be utilised. As Clark (2008, p.155) comments on Gedenryd's claims, '[tjhe 
mock-ups [...] serve no primary purpose other than that of allowing human reason to get a 
stable grip on what might otherwise prove elusive or impossible to hold in mind'. 
Whilst this discussion is not one to be simply universalised, Schon (1991) and 
Gedenryd (1998) highlight how certain tools used in the design process appear to offer a 
particular space of affordances to emerge. They enable the construction of imaginary worlds 
to be enacted that would be limited if left to the pure-reasoning of'cognitivist" human 
cognition. The common materials of design appear to afford a certain type of interaction that 
benefits the continuous exploration and experimentation thai Schcin's description of Quist 
highlighted. 
Sketching is made up of very small and simple incremental steps, which yield local 
control and high sensitivity to feedback. This, in turn, makes sketching into a highly 
fluid and efficient process, which supports the open ended and conceptual nature of 
the design work which sketching is typically used for. (Gedenryd, 1998, p,l45) 
The Umwehen of some design activities, it appears, are mutually beneficial to the sense 
making requirements of parts of the design process. Schon terms this aspect of the designer-
Examples of such situating strategies are numerous, such as Elm and Kyng's (1991) olten documenled 
'cardboard computers", where cardboard boxes were used within a 'simulated' environment to represent certain 
possible future technologies without the need of expensive prototyping. Similarly, there has been a recent 
emergence of design research examining the u,sefulness of using film documenlary and actors within speculative 
design scenarios, such as the work of Bas Raijmakers (2007). 
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sketching Umwelt as 'seeing-moving-seeing' (Schon, 1992, p.5), which continuously shifts as 
the designer attempts to make incremental and experimental changes to both the immediate 
environment and the activity, or problem, they are attempting to make sense of. Tlierefore, it 
is not just that the tools of design atTord a certain activity but that the designer's activities are 
in a mutual specification with the atTordances of the tools. More so, the affordances of this 
micro Umwelt support non-concrete activities; for the designer, sketching is a process that 
does not easily afford ends—it is used as a means to make sense of problems and ideas. 
The above model, although not representative of all design activities, provides a 
usefij] paradigm for imagining the ongoing sense-making interactions that should be 
encouraged in the affordances for senescentechnics. Whilst the seeing-moving-seeing process 
that Schcin describes is ocular centric, it becomes apparent that there are qualities of certain 
design activities that affords opportunities to continuously reflect upon sensorimotor abilities 
through an active engagement with the world. The designer unwittingly makes novel 
couplings through spaces emerging before them; enabling the development of new 
sensorimotor couplings; further enabling novel couplings with the medium and thus also 
aiding creative problem solving. It is proposed here that this model of design activity, along 
with certain attributes of design tools, is a useful analogy for thinking about atTordances for 
senescentechnics as such activities emphasise a level of active and interactive engagement 
that support the enaction of cognitive experience. Therefore, it can be highlighted that older 
people, in order to support (he enaction of their cognitive experience, benefit from taking 
over some of the decisions made in terms of real-time and ongoing interactions with digital 
media that would normally be prescribed by the systems designer. 
Taking the above claim, the system must be conceived in dynamic, affective and 
effective terms. The designer must consider how the senescentechnic product would 
encourage the creative and continuously reflective activities of the designer's own sense-
making process. The affordances emerging at the contact between an older person and the 
digital media interface can be considered in terms of an ongoing transition of a means rather 
than an end in itself; the interface is there to afford the particular sense-making activity 
(contextualised within a broader activity) rather than to concretely represent an end. The 
digital product situates an array of possibilities before the fact of the interaction, with which 
the older human swarms together, exploring and experimenting, to construct their own sense 
of interaction. 
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Proposed strategy: senescentechnic digital media products can be designed with a 
consideration as to how the ongoing, momenf-to-moment, contextual, and reflective 
characteristics of certain design activities constitutes a basis for the real-time interactions 
between an older person and digital interfaces. 
Quixotic User Interfaces 
The Quixotic User Interface (QUI, pronounced 'queue-eee') is toolkit for people to use to 
resolve the problems they have making sense of everyday consumer items. It contains a 
number of craft materials that can be carried on your person—pens, pencils, labels, erasers, 
scalpels, card and more. These materials can be deployed as and when seen fu by the user lo 
identify new ways to interact with irritating objects in their lives. 
Ken sits himself in front of his computer. Ken does not consider himself a computer expert by 
any means, hut he is certainly proficient enough lo get by. Despite this, he can't help but feel 
the computer causes him an undue amount of problems when he is tiying to learn new tricks 
and skills. As he tries lo log on to his internet banking, he begins to imagine how different 
this could be. He lakes out of his bag a number of tools. Having enough of staring at the 
screen. Ken starts to draw on his monitor with what looks like a thick, black pen. 
The QUI kit allows the 'user' to identify the problems they have with the digital media they 
interact with on an everyday basis. They begin to ask particular questions of what these 
devices are forcing them to do: why do I have to interact in this way? By asking questions of 
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how they are forced to navigate digital media and technology, new possibihties for future 
iiiieraclions are unearthed. These are fed back to the systems designers over lime. 
Ken scribbles away on his monitor. He marks out a new area on screen where he can put 
his signature. "I've used my signature for banking all my life.... why do they want me to 
change it now? " He grabs the eraser and rubs out the box where he usually has to enter an 
elaborate usemame and password. "I need something that is personal to me, not some silly 
combination of letters and numbers. " Ken actively reconstructs the interface of the hanking 
website. As he does so, he begins to understand better what the bank have presented to 
him—but at the same time his imagination constmcts a new site based upon his own history 
of couplings with the world. 
QUI highlights how senescentechnics requires the people that use digital media products to 
be considered as active co-designers throughout their history of interactions. Co-design is not 
to be primarily considered as part of the design process, to be forgotten once the final 
product is deployed to be consumed. It is part and parcel of interacting with future devices. It 
gives the 'user' the continuous possibility to enact change, to imagine new possibilities, and 
to make sense of both the designed world and their own abilities in a reciprocal, momenl-by-
nioment manner. 
7.4. Affordances of balanced self-efficacy 
Senescenlechnics requires spaces that afford a balance for incremental adjustments to the delicate 
embodied sensorimotor couplings of an older person, providing information as to the provenance and 
ramifications of real-time interactions. 
It is proposed here that designers consider how the emergence of affordances that require an 
active and ongoing engagement might present a fragile situation for the senescent cognizer. 
Whilst it may be the case that the above strategies support the ongoing enactment of 
cognitive experience, it is a fine line between affording a beneficial state and a state where 
the history of structural couplings of an individual are entirely inconsistent with the offerings 
of a digital system. In terms of senescent cognition, an older person's situation requires to 
afford them a balanced self-etTicacy. 
Contemporarily, the term self-efficacy is mostly used within social psychology, where 
it suggests, firstly, that a person esfimates that certain behaviours will lead to certain 
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outcomes and that, secondly, this person has the conviction as to whether or not they can 
perform the necessary behaviour (Bandura, 1977). Therefore, a person with a higher level of 
sclf-efficacy may believe they are capable of more than their embodiment atYords, and a 
person with lower self-cfficacy might believe they are less likely to achieve the necessary 
behaviour (Bandura, 1977). Whilst self-etTicacy is taken to be a rather individual 
characteristic, it is observed that healthy older people arc, typically, more likely to have a 
lowered senseofself-efficaey than healthy younger people as a result of the perceived 
changes to their physical capabilities {Bandura, 1994). In terms of senescent cognition, self-
efficacy can be interlinked with Noe's previously discussed notion of experiential blindness. 
The experiential blindness that occurs as a result of the disintegration of sensations with the 
pragmatic biowlaige of acting in the world has a resulting effect on the ability to know what 
a particular embodiment is, or is not, capable of 
One way of portraying this situation is through the example used in chapter six of 
reductions in the acuity of the sensorimotor systems related to proprioception. Reductions in 
proprioceptive acuity as a result of senescence have been associated for some time with older 
people who encounter an increased risk of trips and falls; the prenoetic performances of the 
body schema no longer adequately integrates the perception of the environment with bodily 
actions. At the same time, this leads to a heightened self-perception of the inadequacy of the 
body to respond to what is perceived. There may be moments of seeming sensorimotor 
inadequacies where an individual has appeared to overestimate their sensorimotor abilities 
and, as a result, are more consciously aware of their inabilities and reduce their expectations 
in fiiture interactions with the environment. Returning to Gallagher's (2005) distinction of the 
body schema and body image, as a result of the perception that aspects of the (unconscious) 
body schema have failed, a greater control of interactions with the environment is given over 
to the (conscious) body image. As argued in chapter six, in using the body image actions are 
slower and more hesitant; this is confounded by the inherent sense that sensorimotor systems 
are somewhat failing. 
An older person who experiences their sensorimotor embodiment as not acting as they 
implicitly perceive it should is likely to be suffering a double handicap in that their explicit 
sense of body movement also provides a deprived sense of ability and coupling with the 
environment. Their sense that they can achieve certain effects through actions would also be 
reduced. Consequentially, this thesis argues that older people benefil from pushing the 
boundaries ofiheir sensorimotor abilities in order to support the enaction of cognitive 
experience, yet if these boundaries are pushed too far more harm can be caused than good. 
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Another way of conceiving the concept of self-efficacy would be through the 
experiential concept of 'flow' introduced by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi and colleagues. Flow 
is defined as: 
a subjective state that people report when they are completely involved in something 
to the point of forgetting time, fatigue, am! everything else but the activity itself It is 
what we feel when we read a well crafted novel or play a good game of squash, or 
take part in a stimulating conversation. The defining feature of flow is intense 
experiential involvement in moment-to-momenl activity. AUenlion is fully invested in 
the task al hand, and the person functions al his or her fullest capacity. 
(Csikszenlmihalyi ei ai, 2005, p,600) 
Csikszentmihalyi et al. (2005, p.60I) suggest that one of the preconditions for the experience 
of flow is 'a balance between the perceived challenges and perceived skills.' This state of 
flow is particularly difficult to achieve, however, and is liable to sudden change. 
This balance, however, is intrinsically fragile. If challenges begin to exceed skills, one 
typically becomes anxious; if skills begin lo exceed challenges, one relaxes and then 
becomes bored. These subjective states pnwide feedback about the shifting 
relationship to the environment and press the individual to adjust behavior in order to 
escape the more aversive subjective state and reenter flow. (Csikszenlmihalyi el al., 
2005,pp.601-602) 
Taken in terms of a senescentechnic approach to designing digital media products, 
Csikszentmihalyi et al. highlight how the relationship between a person and a digital system 
is understood as engaging in a continuous transition between moments of complete 
immersion, boredom and confusion. In order to support the emergence of the optimal state of 
flow, a digital media interface would have to afford a level of engagement that balances 
difficulty with simplicity. 
A primary requisite of entering a state of flow is for the activity at hand to be relevant 
to the individual in terms of their desire, motivation and creativity. Therefore, it is important 
to highlight that senescentechnic digital media products must be contextually significant to 
the older persons using them. Problematically, however, context is not something that can be 
designed for. Context emerges as a result of ongoing interactions with technologies, rather 
than something that can be determined a priori by the designer (Dourish, 2004). Gaver et al. 
(2007) identified the limitations of making contextual predictions before the fact and 
embedding these predictions in the design of digital systems. Gaver et al. {2007, p.546) 
propose that 'instead of systems providing their own accounts' of context, 'systems can be 
designed that encourage people to hold them to account' and context is formed around it. 
183 
Context, it is suggested by these authors, could be informed by the information and data that 
a digital media system presents to users, but this is only useful as a way of provoking the 
interpretation, perceptions, actions and interventions of people. Context, here, is malleable; 
the designers role would be to identify what types of information and feedback is presented 
that opens the aftbrdances for certain contexts to emerge. 
Proposed strategy: senescentechnic digital media products are contextually malleable, where 
the designer provides the basic structure for the digital system to become embedded in the 
activities of a particular user, at a particular moment in time. 
Whilst the display of information as it is understood above requires interpretation on the part 
of the user, in terms of senescent cognition it is necessary to support a balanced self-efficacy 
in providing information that actively responds to the behaviours of the older user. In terms 
of supporting optimal states of flow, Csikszentmihalyi et al. (2005. p.602) argue that the 
'presence of clear and immediate feedback' is crucial. They highlight how, in terms of 
attempting to engage people in such an optimal state, it is necessary for the technological 
system to continuously alter its state in reaction to the actions of the individual. 
In reference to the ongoing sense-making explorations that the senescent human being 
is making of their own embodiment, however, it is necessary to provide information that 
transcends the immediacy of real-time interactions. The potentially fragile nature of efficacy 
and flow needs to be supported by ongoing references to the history of structural couplings 
between an individual and the media, whilst offering insight into where certain decisions 
made by the user will lead in the form of fliture couplings with the digital system. Rather than 
determine the routes to be taken by older people interacting with a digital media product, the 
designer conceives of ways to communicate the couplings a person has already established 
with a product in the past, and what future actions may be possible as the result of this 
ongoing history of exchange. 
Proposed strategy: senescentechnic digital media products can provide continuous feedback 
as to the history of structural couplings it has been engaged in. Senescentechnic media 
affords the spaces for direct and immediate feedback to the ongoing, sense making enquiries 
of the senescent co-designer, highlighting the provenance of real-time interactions and 
speculating the future results of these interactions. 
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Enactive Archive 
The enactive archive is a small table-lop computer that acts as a media hub wilhin the home. 
Content is delivered to the computer from fihn and television archives, amateur video 
resources, news agencies, production houses and broadcasters. Whilst what content is made 
available is delennined by its distributors, the manner in which il is navigated, interacted 
with, and personally archived is all constructed by the user through an ongoing process of 
designing. 
Figure 26 Bob pouring his bag of parapheruulia onto Ihe Interactive table. 
Bob sits down at his desk. On his desk he has a selection of tools: pens, pencils, rulers, 
brushes, erasers, tape, siring and more. He swipes his hand across the front of the de.sk and 
a screen lights up from within the rich, dark, malwgany wood. As several seconds go by. 
images begin to swarm underneath and then slowly .settle to an almost stationary slate. As it 
settles, the visualisation returns to almost the state in which Bob left it ihe last time he used 
it. Only almost, howex'er, as there have been subtle changes to the interfaces organisation. 
Some new objects have appeared on the screen from before, and everything is slightly askew, 
as if a window has been left open and a breeze ha.\ .swept across the screen. Bob is attracted 
by a region to the left that is glowing. TIte glowing suggests there has been some activity in 
an area where Bob has spent some time before. He has no idea what it could be though. 
"I've been to many places over the years". 
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Personal possessions can be placed on top of footage and be 'glued' to one-another— 
therefore, visualisations can be navigated through personal objects, and personal objects can 
be shared wilh others on the archives cloud. 
Figure 27 Bob interacting wiih hU enective archive. 
Bob empties the bags contents onto the desktop. The objects initially appear to he dull and 
discrete from one another. The physical objects have a strange effect on the visualisation 
however. The visualisation begins lo swarm once again and visual objects begin lo be 
attracted towards Bob's possessions. The glowing region becomes fixated around one of 
Bob's possessions - a photograph of him with some of his old Navy colleagues. On his past 
travels through archived videos. Boh had come across a number of videos of his old Navy 
digs. The la.st videos Boh had watched were about these old buildings being knocked down. 
"Ah. / remember, I made some comments about that didn 'I I... utter disgrace getting rid of 
those buildings. They are perfectly fine still! Ah, and then 1 glued it onto this photo of the 
boys. " Previously, Bob had stuck the photo onto some archived news and amateur footage. 
and also some recent news broadcasts about the future of the buildings. The glowing 
suggests a sudden surge in activity. Bob gets his pen out and draws rings around the 
throbbing objects. He grabs his deskbook, which when he opens it unveils an array of new 
comments and conversations since he left his photograph and thoughts. There is a new 
article attached to his photograph... "What's this about them.... blimey, they found an old 
unexploded bomb under the ol' gal! Well I never... she's not going quietly. We always 
thought there was some of those left in the ground. " 
The enactive archive draws attention to how senescentechnics encourages the user to take a 
greater share in the construction of the interface. Here the user takes over pan of the 
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designer's iradilional role, making their own usage decisions through an array of tools and 
objects thai have personal value to them. Tlie user participates by sketching out their lemis 
of intcraclion, and then subsequently deems the archived footage that she or he deems 
relevant to their personal history. The modes of access that the user constructs and enacts are 
continuously open to change; they are dynamic and provisional, and new tools can be 
brought in as and when he deems them appropriate. 
7. 5. Affordances of sc]r-(re)organisation 
Senescentechnics requires spaces that afford ongoing physical activities that are necessary for the 
reintegration of key proprioceptive and body schematic systems of the senescent cognizer. 
In chapter six, reductions in the acuity of proprioception in later life was identified as a key 
influencing factor leading to cognitive disconnections, or experiential blindness, in the 
senescent account of cognition. Even small changes in proprioceptive sensations have 
potentially severe consequences on a person's ability to coordinate and actively explore and 
enact the Umwelt. Whilst it might be assumed that the reduced acuity in proprioceptive 
sensations is a resuh of the typical deteriorafions of the ageing human body, studies have 
highlighted that proprioception is rather plastic in later life. Through rather elementary 
interactions with certain types of affordance, older people are able to renegotiate their sense 
of proprioception. 
Westlake and Culham (2007) observed that whilst proprioception appears to decline 
as people age, through a process of balance training it is often possible to reintegrate 
proprioceptive feedback with the dynamic configuration of sensory, action, physiological and 
environmental systems. In their studies, Westlake and Culham (2007) compared a group of 
older participants going through a process of a sensory training exercise with a group who 
received advice on avoiding trips and falls. Rather startlingly, upon being tested for postural 
sway after a period of training or advice, it was observed that the group who received sensory 
training were more stable, whilst those who received advice were less stable than before 
(Westlake & Culham, 2007). Westlake and Culham's study highlights the plastic nature of 
the human proprioceptive system, even in old age."' ' These studies illustrate how the 
preventative approach to resolving the perceived problem of older people having trips and 
falls—that of teaching older people to be more aware of what they are doing—may actually 
'^' The findings ofWesllake and Culham have also been noted in similar studies, such as those by Li el al. (Li et 
a/.. 2008). Xu CI al. (2004). Beard el uL (1994) and Gauchard i-i al. (2003; 1999). 
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increase the fallibility of the ageing body. When interpreted under the lens of senescent 
cognition, in suggesting a greater attentiveness to the actions of the body, the prenoetic 
performances of the body become less implicated in interactions between body and world; 
this, in turn, results in a heightened awareness of the Hmitations of one's own body in relation 
to the environment and, perhaps, a subsequent decrease in the dynamic process of 
sensorimotor integration. Alternatively, those who exercise the structure of these embodied 
processes increase the acuteness of their sensorimotor integration systems; their body has not 
'improved' suddenly, but their non-conscious awareness of the relations between their 
sensorimotor system and the environment is heightened. This is to say, the prenoetic 
performance of their body appears to become better synchronised with the dynamics of the 
Umwell (that is, the entire brain-body-environment system of the human). 
What these experiments suggest is that the ageing body, although in itself trainable to 
be stronger in terms of exomusculariiy, cannot be exercised to regain its previous 
sensorimotor state. Wliat is possible, however, is that there are particular processes that older 
people can go through to re-integrate their changing embodiment with their proprioceptive 
performances. Therefore, whilst it is not possible to return a person to a previous 
physiological state or an impoverished version thereof, it is plausible that the sensory 
preconcious sensations that inform senescent cognition can be reintegrated with the 
contingencies of their dynamic sensorimotor system and, therefore, couple with the 
environment in a more acute manner. Theretbre, older people benefit fi-om a level of physical 
excursion thai forms the basis for prioprioceptive and body schematic reintegration, which 
subsequently aids the enaction of cognitive experience. 
This places a requirement on designers lo consider the benefits of physical interaction and 
activity in reference to the design of senescentechnic digital media products. Attempts have 
been made in recent years to develop products and services emphasising physical exercise 
and 'brain training' for older consumers (e.g. The Brain Fitness Gym (Hope Technology 
Therapy, 2010)). Similariy, the aforementioned research of Hurtienne et al. (2009a; 2009b) 
have emphasised the potential cognitive benefits that tangible and physical user interfaces 
may provide for older people. ** Rather than conceiving the physical aspects of interaction as 
'** As discussed in chapter three and four, Hurtienne el al. propwsed thai by applying tlic universal image 
schematic knowledge that structures human interactions with environmenis into the design of digital media 
products, it is possible to avoid the limitations of ageing cognitive functions such as working memory. In 
chapter four. Ihe thesis argued that Hurlienne i-i al.'s argument failed to account for the ongoing basis of 
temporal change, and proposed the question of whilst certain groups of people may have image schema that 
somewhat reflecting the predicted or "universal' sensorimotor knowledge of the body (as was 
argued by Hurtienne et at. (2009a}), or as moments oflntense excursion, the tangible, haptic 
and physical attributes of senescentechnic digital media products are be embedded within 
subtle and ongoing and ever changing physical activities. 
Proposed strategy: senescentechnic digital media products are embedded within a variety of 
subtle and ongoing physical activities, affording spaces that provide the continued 
integration of proprioceptive sensations and body schematic systems, and an ongoing 
dialogue between the reorganisation of abilities and self-knowledge as it relates to actions in 
the world. 
Slow Objects 
Slow objects are transformative media that hide within everyday objects. They are cups, 
saucers, kettles, tables, taps, rugs... These slow objects appear lo be the types of mundane 
possessions that are common to many a stereotypical middle-England home. The quotidian 
tamiliarity of these objects, however, disguises their dynamic values. Slow objects 
continuously strive to identify ways to make the lives of their owners a little more effortful. 
They secretly document the movements their owner makes with them, the places where they 
are lefl, and the times of the day they are used. Then, when not in use, they find new places 
lo conceal themselves from their owners. 
Figure 28 Rose's slow bin (hat moves in the direction of her most often walked path. 
Ro.w comes down-itairs lo begin her daily routine. She gets up ai 7am most days, goes 
straight to the kitchen and boils the kettle. The keltic has moved slightly from the position she 
left it in the previous evening. Ii has become unplugged.... Audrey fdls the kettle with water. 
frame iateractions in the world, what happens when these image schema no longer cohere to the possible actions 
of the body? 
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plugs it into the socket, and leaves it to boil. As she walks to her kitchen cupboard, she 
realises the handles of the cupboard have moved several inches upwards. She .stretches a bit 
more than normal, reaches the handles, and drags them back down. "If it wasn 't them doing 
this on purpose, I'd swear J was going mad!" 
Figure 29 Rose's cupboards nnd utenKil ruck Hint Incrementally moves oul of her reach. 
Slow objects delect how they are held, touched stored, and reconfigure their form in order to 
unsettle any consistencies. The casual observer would struggle to sec the dynamic nature ol" 
these objects—their evolution is slow. Yet iheir slow, but continual, process of change 
means their owners can never settle into a concrete routine. 
Figure 30 Slow mug thai deforms slowly over time. 
As she sets her mind to making her cup of tea. Rose grabs the same cup she uses e\'ery 
morning. Overnight the cup has subtly changed its form—it is slightly more bulbous, the 
handle slightly thinner, the height slightly lower. Yet only slightly. This is not enough to 
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distract Rose from her daily routine—yet, at the same time, her routine is every so subtly 
changed as a result. 
Slow objects illustrate how senescentechnic media is never fiilly realised and stable. 
Although these objects appear normal and every-day, they eschew routines and repetition by 
manoeuvring and reconfiguring their position and form all the time. They encourage iheir 
users to continually retlect upon their usage of these items—where they are lef^ , and how 
Ihey are touched and concealed. Their active resistance against regular use requires an equal 
resistance from those who regularly use them. 
7.6. Affording a sense of agency and wear 
Senescentechnics requires {k'signers to have a sensitivity to the agency of older people as having 
intentional control over both their embodiment and interiiclions wilh digital media products: 
designers must consider the ongoing process of wear between people and technology, and how digital 
media wears with older people rather than treating older people as wearing out. 
The two main moves made within contemporary cognitively inclusive design—1) structuring 
interaction in a manner that places less strain on cognitive information-processing and 2) 
compensate for lack of fluid abilities by harnessing past experiences—are flawed in terms of 
an embodied, enactive understanding of senescent cognition. Interactions between people and 
digital media designed in response to a malnourished cognitive system are likely to produce 
malnourished perceptual engagements. Rather than predicting how an older person will 
interact with a digital media product in light of reductionist knowledge on how cognitive, 
sensorimotor and kinaesthetic systems alter in later life, this chapter has proposed open-ended 
strategies to support designers that focus on how novel digital media products can be 
conceived to afford the active exploration and enaction of cognitive experience. Here, there is 
a requirement for designers to conceive of older people not as formed of a slowly 
deteriorating self, impoverished of the abilities they once had, but rather encourage the 
development of new skills and reflect upon their altering embodiment through their agency as 
individuals. 
Whilst designers are still implicated in these strategies, the stance of the designer is 
such that the older user of a technology is empowered as a producer as much as a passive 
consumer. Within gerontology and ageing studies, the concept of agency has become a key 
concern in recent years, with an increased awareness that older people, as individuals, must 
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be empowered to be in control of their own destiny. Tulle argues that Western perspectives 
on ageing are dominated by a narrative of old age as an 'inevitable, wholesale decline, 
physical and cognitive, as well as social and cultural' (Tulle, 2004, p.ix). As a result, Tulle 
(2004, p.ix) concludes that: 
older people themselves operate within a range of expectations, which are bounded by 
this narrative. Thus older people are either denied agency because they are involved 
in an inexorable process of decline, or if agency does indeed manifest itself it is used 
as a way of pushing back decline. 
Cognitive psychology, and subsequent design approaches drawing upon its claims, is situated 
in a deterministic discourse of deterioration in old age. This and the previous chapter have 
highlighted that although there are cognitive functions that alter with age that make it more 
difficult to enact digital media, it is plausible to portray these problems in a less determinislic 
manner than contemporary perspectives. 
Returning to the previously discussed case of Ian Waterman, whose loss of 
proprioceptive and body schematic systems lead to a reliance on his body image for 
movement (see chapter six), Gallagher (2005) observed how whilst most people may have a 
sense of ownership and agency of their body, divisions or discrepancies between schema and 
image may incur a deprived sense of ownership and agency. 
Initially Ian was unable lo control his movements and over the first few days after 
onset of his condilion he felt a loss of embodiment or an alienation from his body. [...] 
As soon as he was able to see his body and ils movements properly, however, even 
though he had not attained motor control over ihem, the sense of disembodiment 
diminished. [...] For Ian, body ownership was re-established very quickly. Yet, 
because his inlenlions to move were imperfectly fulfilled his sense of agency 
continued to be deficient. As he gained more precise control of movement, using a 
body image framework, his sense of agency was gradually re-established. (Gallagher, 
2005, p.56) 
For Ian Waterman, Gallagher (2005) argues that whilst his sense of ownership of his body 
returned relatively quickly, his own understanding that he was not able to enact certain 
perceptions and actions as he should led to a continuous sense of lacking control over the 
precise motor control of his embodiment. If considered in terms of senescent cognition, it 
may be that older people suffer trom an ongoing and potentially increasing sense that their 
agency and intentional control over the body is being incrementally eroded. 
By necessity, the moves made in the preceding chapters require inclusive design to 
move beyond conceptualisations of ageing that portray older people as suffering from 
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deteriorating capabilities which need be accounted for in the design of interfaces. Rather than 
Hmiting the cognitive stimulation an interface may provide, and specifically prescribing the 
human through the process of interaction, the senesccntechnic designer examines the spaces 
for affordances to emerge that support the reintegration of these embodied capacities, Rather 
than supporting the malnourishment of agency, senescentechnic affordances explore the 
possibilities for the continuation of coherent, embodied and enacted cognitive experience in 
later life. In sencscentechnics, older people are understood as being empowered to nourish 
their sense of agency and be active ejfeciors in their ongoing interactions and engagements 
with digital media products. 
The shift in the design stance argued for in this chapter requires design activities that 
examine the level of flexibility to be afforded in the outcome. Rather than focusing upon 
objective and concrete outcomes that embody what the designer has identified as the 
requirements of certain groups of older people, this design perspective requires consideration 
as to how the user moves towards an outcome on their own terms of engagement. The focus 
of design, therefore, is not on the materialisation of a final technological product, but the 
ongoing temporal processes of interaction, both in real-time and between people and digital 
media. Design, here, is the consideration for the process of wear between people and digital 
media. 
Wear may be defined in anumber of ways: 'to diminish or decay through use [,..] to 
endure use: last under use or the passage of time [...] to diminish or fail with the passage of 
time [...] to produce gradually by fiicfion or attrition' (all Merriam-Webster {2010)). Wear is 
a process of gradual change that can be positioned in both positive and negative terms. Wear 
between people and digital media suggests an ongoing dialogue where iriction between the 
two systems has beneficial as well as negative consequences. As has been argued in this 
chapter, a senescentechnic approach to digital media products provokes a mode of thought 
where moments of intensity and effort are to be understood as necessary requirements if 
senescent cognition is to be coherently enacted. Senescentechnics requires designers to 
consider the ongoing process of wear between older people and digital media: the media 
wears in and out along with the people who construct it and friction is understood as both 
advantageous and disadvantageous to the enaction of senescent cognition—designers open 
the space for wear but it is managed by the older user of the product. 
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Sand Computer 
The sand computer is intended to last forever yet also wear out. It expresses how computing 
technologies do have properties that wear. Whilst traditionally these parts that wear out 
might be concealed, the sand computer combines its form with its hardware function— 
therefore, the technology wears out in front of the user's eyes. 
Figure 31 Ted's original sand computer, no brittle and crumbling apart. 
Ted walks past his computer. "Il has happened again... " Ted's computer is a pile of rock-
like rubble. "I only patched it up a few weeks ago!" He picks up a piece of nibble and il 
crumbles into gramdes in his hand. "1 suppose this time I'll rebuild it properly". Ted puts on 
his modelling gloves. He begins to scoop up the granules and collect them into separate 
piles. He moulds the piles into shapes. He could rebuild his computer so it is in a radically 
different form to how itwas before. "Hike it how 1 had it before... did the Job for me... Just it 
was starting to fall apart. " Ted starts to build up a collection of small cubes that look a little 
like keys. He gets a small modelling knife and starts to label each key. He removes his gloves 
and puts on another pair. He begins to mould a roll of the granules together, and then 
shapes them into a circle. "That can be the screen this time. " Ted rolls out a large sphere to 
be used as a mouse. Content with his work, Ted switches the machine on for the first time. 
"As good as new!" he proclaims. 
Rather than suggest that the computer is breaking down and needing replacement, the 
194 
properties of the sand is such that il can be remoulded into new forms and treated like it is 
new once again. This newness is only temporary-—soon, new cracks and holes will appear in 
its surfaces. 
Ted presses the power button to reboot his not so new computer. As he does so, some of the 
fine granules of sand already come free. Ted grabs a small brush and collects the fine 
particles in a bag. He isn't going to throw these away... instead, Ted realises how precious 
this material is. "I can make new peripherals from this!" As he says this, a part of the 
'tower' on his new computer crumbles and slides downwards. "Or perhaps I will just have 
to patch thai bit up there.... " Ted is constantly reminded of the temporary nature of what he 
has created, but also that he can continually make new from what falls apart. 
Figure 3Z The 'lower' of Ted's new compuUr, slowly eroding once more. 
The Sand Computer illustrates the key prerequisites of senescentechnic digital media 
products. Firstly, they do not stand idle, they are dynamic and in continuous change, and the 
changes that occur to Ihem over time are traceable and perceivable. Secondly, 
senescentechnic digital media need people around them to keep them in such a dynamic 
slate, and subsequently people need to act in a proactive and dynamic manner to keep them 
maintained. 
A senescentechnic design process examining the processes of wear between people and 
technology asks rather different questions about use compared to a design process that 
examines how a concrete outcome can reflect the knowledge a designer has collated about 
specific types of human beings. These questions range from the conceptual, to the practical 
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and technical. For example, how might the design of dynamic digital media products and 
interfaces alter the pace at which a technology is incorporated into the Umwelll How might 
new forms of media respond over time to perceived changes to the people in its vicinity? 
How might new forms of media react to changes in contextual domains and multiple 
situations of use? How can media interfaces deal with discriminating one person from 
another reliably over long temporal durations? Questions such as these are tor future research 
to take on board, supported by the conceptual and theoretical basis of senescentechnics as 
developed in this thesis. Senescentechnics, within this context, provides a novel basis of 
knowledge with which to consider the design of future digital media products that amplify the 
agency of the older user in order to allow them to engage in new dialogues with technology, 
supporting the ongoing enaction of their cognitive experience. 
In the above questions issues related to prediction are still present; unlike 
contemporary cognitively inclusive design, however, prediction is used as a way of opening 
up spaces for aftbrdances to emerge, not to concretely communicate possibilities for 
interaction, as will be discussed in the following final chapter. In addition, the final chapter 
will recontextualise the implications of senescentechnics and the dynamic affordances 
discussed within this chapter into the broader context of contemporary inclusive design 
theory and practice. In chapter one, the thesis introduced the inclusive design community 
before discussing research that has specifically focused on cognitive psychology of ageing. 
The thesis will return to this broader community in order to discuss the potentials and 
limitations of current practice and theory to move from the design of concrete outcomes to an 
emphasis of human agency and wear. It will discuss how contemporary inclusive design is 
inherently limited in its capacity to incorporate the claims made within this research, and 
would require a significant amount of negotiation with in order to move towards a 
senescentechnics understanding of older people interacfing with digital media. Building on 
the previous discussion, the following chapter highlights contemporary design theory and 
practice that may support such negotiations, which to both a greater and lesser extent are 
synergetic with the argument of this thesis. 
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Chapter 8 
Afterthoughts: Future inclusivity 
Question: Why might current inclusive design practice and theory struggle to incorporate 
dynamic ajfordances for senescentechnics, and how might this be negotiated in the future? 
8.i. The limitations of cognitively inclusive design can also be observed in how the broader inclusive 
design community, where designers struggle to comprehend user experience that are not based on a 
reductionist matching of the user to the technology. 
8.2. There are a number of design approaches from outside of inclusive design that might aid the 
incorporation ofsenescenteclmics in future design practice. In order to fully realise the potential of 
senescentechnics, however, inclusive designers must look beyond their discipline and its methods and 
models centred on usability, 
8.1. Returning to inclusive design 
The limitations ofcognitively inclusive design can also be obsen-ed in how the broader inclusive 
design community, where designers struggle to comprehend user experience that are not based on a 
reductionist matching of the user to the technology. 
This short chapter reflects on some of the implications of senescentechnics and dynamic 
afTordances as established in this thesis within the broader context of inclusive design and a 
number of approaches to understanding users of technology that are emerging within design 
related literature. This chapter touches upon how the problems identified within cognitively 
inclusive design are replicated on a meta-level within the practice and theory of the broader 
discipline of inclusive design. It will be noted how inclusive design, although considering 
more experiential models of the use of teclmology, continues to be restricted to constructing a 
tit between people and technological media. The chapter discusses how the backdrop of 
assumptions that support current inclusive design theory and practice need to be negotiated 
with if the ideas discussed within this thesis are to become realised. The chapter continues to 
provide a brief overview of a number of alternative methodological propositions emerging 
with design-related research. These alternative approaches offer an opportunity for inclusive 
design to conceive of both people and technology in dynamic terms. Following this, the 
chapter concludes the thesis by reflecting upon these negotiations in liglit of the 
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senescent echnic approach to understanding the problem of the cognitive disconnection 
between older people and digital media products, highlighting the relevancy of 
transdisciplinary investigations to examining design-related problems, and providing 
speculation for the direction of future research. 
Cognitively inclusive design, as defined in chapter two, is just a small component of 
the broader inclusive design community introduced in chapter one of the thesis. Whilst 
inclusive design, taken at its broadest definition, is not particularly concerned with the 
specifics of human cognition as it relates to ageing, ^ the tools and methods provided by and 
to its community of theorists and practitioners are highly analogous with the more specific 
sub-field of cognitively inclusive design attended to by this thesis. Consequentially, the 
assumptions that are embedded within the inclusive design process somewhat limit the 
manner in which the dynamic affordances of senesccntechnics can be understood by this 
important community of designers. 
One key argument emerging from the inclusive design literature is that inclusivity is 
not primarily focused upon usability, which appears to be the focus of attention for the 
cognitively inclusive designers. Inclusive design, as it is defined in key resources, should be 
focused upon the improvement of the experiences of products and services for a more diverse 
range of people (i-design, 2010). 
By meeting the needs of those who are excluded from product use, inclusive design 
improves product experience across a broad range of users. [...] Inclusive design is not 
[...] adequately covered by a requirement thai the product should be easy to use [and] 
solely about designing products for a particular capabilily loss. [...] Inclusive design 
should be embedded within the design and development process, resulting in better 
designed mainstream products that are desirable to own and satisfying lo use. 
(i-design,20l0) 
Rather than focusing on usability per se, inclusive design emphasises experiential aspects of a 
particular product, interface or service. Within inclusive design literature, the case for 
designing for improved user experiences is entwined within the business case for inclusivity. 
This is observable in the way in which cognition and psychology are referred to in inclusive design literature 
but not necessarily attended to in any detail. For example, Coleman ei al. (2007) only brieily allude to its 
significance in their influential text: 'Tapping into the opportunilies offered by an ageing market requires an in-
depth understanding of (he changing aspirations of older people and the ageing process itself Longer life spans 
mean the almost certain experience of age-related capability loss. Reductions in eyesight, hearing, mobility, 
dexterity and cognition will come to us all, and disability will be a common experience, but older people do not 
wish to be stigmatised or singled out as a special needs group' (Coleman el«/., 2007a, p, 14). Coleman et al. 
highlight the significance of cognition among a great variety of factors but avoid discussing it in detail perhaps 
in light of the possibility of stigmatising older people. Despite this, however, many of the examples used by 
Coleman ef«/. (3007) throughout the text emphasise functional aspects of designing for the failing bodies of 
older people. 
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This is argued by Coleman et al., who state that there is: 
a powerful, common sense business case for the inclusive design approach, the core 
of which is understanding and prioritising the user experience. U is also about 
understanding that the less tangible human factors - identity, emotion, delight, self-
expression - are common lo us all, and that getting these right for users who are 
vulnerable to exclusion is an effective way of ensuring that what we design really 
does enhance life quality, simply and intuitively, for as many people as possible. 
(Coleman el ai, 2007a, p.l6) 
Within this case for the financial benefits of performing an inclusive approach to design, it is 
argued that by designing in reference to the needs, desires, and requirements of often ignored, 
yet socially and quantitiably significant, groups of potential users, then these people are more 
likely to purchase the products. The broader the consideration for the experiences of a diverse 
range of users, it is argued, the better placed a particular product is to be purchased and used 
by more people. 
Every decision made during the design cycle can affect design inclusion and user 
satisfaction. Failure to correctly understand the users can result in products that 
exclude people unnecessarily and leave many more frustrated, leading to downstream 
problems, such as increased customer support requirements that can ultimately reduce 
commercial success. Conversely, successful implementation of inclusive design can 
result in a product that is functional, usable, desirable, and ultimately profitable. 
(i~design, 2008c) 
The ultimate profitability of a product, it is argued, comes from the designer matching the 
needs and requirements of the potential user in the designed outcome. This potential user, 
who perceives that a particular product or service matches their needs, desires, requirements 
and abilities, would be inclined to purchase and use a particular company's goods. The design 
process, therefore, becomes fixated upon establishing the experiential properties of the user 
which can be inscribed into the end product. Whilst inclusive design theory appears to call for 
establishing more diverse, experiential and agential models of the user, in practice designers 
are directed towards the traditional approach of constructing the needs of the user and 
reflecting these in the designed outcome. 
Whilst inclusive design calls for a design approach that is beyond usability, the 
manner in which experience is conceived appears to be highly analogous with that of the 
more usability focused research within cognitively inclusive design. As Redstrom (2005) 
observes, the shift from cognitive psychology and usability to experience merely relocates 
terminologies; '\b\y providing the right materia! pre-conditions, we aim to make people more 
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productive, more willing to consume, etc., through our designs' (Redstrom, 2005, p. 128). The 
conflation between usability and experience Is evidenced in some of the key examples that 
are used by the inclusive design literature to highlight the best practice of inclusivity. One 
prominent example, highlighted briefly in chapter one. is the British Telecom (BT) Big 
Button phone.' The phone is designed in order to be inclusive for older people, although it 
is also marketed for people with sight, hearing and dexterity disabilities in mind. The buttons 
on the phone are much larger than normal keypads, spaced out further and have a high 
contrast type font and background colour. A light on the front of the phone alerts a person 
who is hard of hearing when it is ringing. The ringing level can be adjusted to a number of 
levels, and the speaker in the handset is loop-amplified to work with hearing aids. The Big 
Button phone proved a commercial success for BT, and has been critically applauded as a 
good example for there being a business case for inclusive designing (as in Lebbon (2010) 
and Cambridge EDC (2005)). The economic success of the Big Button phone has led to the 
development of a newer model, the 'Freestyle', which was designed from the start based 
upon an inci usive approach to design. The newer model was developed along the lines of 7 
'easy" categories: 
• Easy to dial - Large comfortable keys 
• Easy lo read - Iligh contrast and large characters 
• Easy lo hear - Comfortable ear bowl, easy volume adjustment and inductive coupler 
for digilal hearing aids 
• Easy to hear phone ringing - Lower frequency ringer and increased size of the call 
indicator liglil 
• Easy to understand - No icons, no abbreviations, keys with single functionality, 
intelligent function hierarchy 
• Easy to answer and end calls - Large, separate keys to start and end calls 
• Easy to see who is calling - 2 line dot matrix display, large characters (i~design. 
2007) 
In terms of inclusive design, the Freestyle is fixated around a model of simplicity and 
usability. The Freestyle phone could be understood as a response to increasing the usability 
'™ Although the BT Big Button and Freestyle phones are used here as a particular example often used by the 
inclusive design community, an examination oflhe various toolkits, community websites and publications 
surrounding inclusive design highlights how most examples appear lo equate better experience with better 
usability. For example, Coleman el al. (2007b) use the OXO Good Grips range of kitchen accessories as an 
paradigmatic example of inclusive design. Ciarkson (2007) equates ea.se ofu.se with better experiences of 
producis, and highlights examples such as lickcl machines, kettles, and small remote controls as examples of 
producis and interfaces that are overly complex. Although llie argumenl that Ihese are poorly designed products 
for certain groups of users is wise, the equation that ease of use leads to belter experiences is somewhat less 
supportable. Websites organised to support the inclusive design community, such as the European Design for 
All e-Accessibility Network (www.educaiion.edean.ora) and tlie aforementioned inclusive design toolkit 
(www.iiiclusivedesigntoolkil.coml support this equation of usability with better experiences. 
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of a communication device by refiecting the physiological and cognitive abilities of a key 
target market in the form of the product. The BT "inclusive' products focus upon what would 
constitute the commonly understood physiological abilities of certain groups of human 
beings; the seven 'easy' categories focus upon large comfortable keys (dexterity), high 
contrast lettering (sight), and reducing the need for perfect hearing. Also, the categories 
appear to move into the cognitive; no icons, abbreviations and singular levels of 
functionality; separation and simplification of functions. Although the 'Freestyle" is marketed 
as an inclusive product-—and not specifically for certain markets—it is seemingly embedded 
within implicit implications of it being particularly usefiil for those who require products that 
are designed to meet more specific physical and cognitive demands. Any experiential benefits 
here arc conceived as emerging as a result of the increased usability of the product for these 
often ignored groups of people. 
Often, it appears, objects of inclusive design that are suggested to be targeted to users 
of various levels of experience and ability, are focused in particular to certain models of 
traditionally disadvantaged groups of users. For instance, 'SimplicITy' is a personal 
computing system marketed towards technologically inexperienced groups of people. The 
system appears to be based upon standard personal computing hardware, running a modified 
operating system called 'Eldy' which has a simple menu structure from which it is possible to 
'send e-mails, browse the web, chat to friends and family using our e-mail addresses, store 
photos and write short documents' (simplicITy computers, 2010). The marketing for this 
product states that '[t]he simplicity computer is for people who have had no experience with 
computers or have found PC's too difficult to use" (simplicITy computers, 2010). The 
suggestion appears to be that the SimpliclTy is marketed for those that might be somewhat 
put otT using novel technologies. Certain decisions in the marketing of the product—such as 
naming its specially design operating system 'Eldy", and having Valerie Singleton as the 
instructor within the tutorial videos—suggests that it is more specifically targeted to older 
users.'" SimpliclTy is a standard technological product which has had a layer added to it to 
' " This targeting of the older 'non"-user of personal computers (through the use of terms such as 'Eldy' and 
using a former television presenter that the cohort might identify with) which is never explicitly staled within 
the advertising material of Ihe Simplicity but appears to be an underlying implicit theme, has not necessarily sat 
well with various internet communilies. The chatter found at Computer Acl! ve (Computer Active, 2009), 
appears lo identify some of the inherent problems of computing systems such as the SimplcITy. Some 
commentators have noted how the device belittles 'elderly' people (despite being targeted at people over fifty 
years, who might be somewhat offended with being considered elderly yet still having up to sixteen years until 
retirement) into a group who have a very limited range of expectations of what they would like to do with novel 
technologies. Other issues appear to be related lo the cost of the system, the somewhat condescending adverts 
and instruction videos, the targeting of vulnerable people, and much more. Whilst the SimpliclTy is not an 
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make the product conform to the ability-models of a certain group of users. The "Eldy* 
operating system presents the relatively standard activities that are usually bundled in as 
typical for computer users, and simplitles them to a level that matches the cognitive and 
visuo-perceptual abilities of a highly typified older person. It is alluded to by the 
manufacturer's website that the system works beyond just this simple interface, providing a 
greater level of configurability to the user. 
The simplicity works at two levels: a simple system to allow first lime users easy 
access to the things they are most likely lo use • email, browsing the web, chatting 
and storing photos. For people who master all of this in lildy and then want to do 
more advanced tasks as well, they can switch between Eldy and Linux. (simphcITy 
computers, 2010) 
The portrayal that the simplicity offers such a level of configurability to its user is somewhat 
misleading, however. In order to go beyond the basic interface, it is necessary for the user to 
use the Linux operating system the 'Eldy' interface is built upon, which is arguably more 
complicated to navigate for a novice than other contemporary operating systems. Whilst this 
could be an economic strategy to increase the potential target market for the SimpliclTy as a 
consumer product, it is highly questionable whether a novice user who has mastered 'Eldy' 
may be proficiently abled lo then explore the Linux system.'^" 
Throughout the inclusive design literature, the assumption that prevails is that by 
making technological products and services easier to use—which is often accounted for in 
terms of physical, sensory or cognitive deteriorations—designers can make the products more 
enjoyable to users. SubsequenUy, it is taken that this increases user satisfaction and improves 
experiences, and therefore develops more financially successfijl products. Inclusive design 
takes that it is possible to identify certain properties in the user and match these to the design 
of an end-product. In order to develop a concrete product that meets the criteria of a user's 
ability, it is essential that the designer can describe the user concretely beforehand. Much like 
the cognitively inclusive design sub-discipline discussed at length in this thesis, broader 
inclusive design practice and theory is based upon what is an implicitly assumed objective 
and reducible reality. This is to argue that these designers take that there is an objective 
example of the best inclusive design practice, il profoundly highlights the limitations of taking a fiinciional 
approach to experience without considering the bigger picture. 
' This returns to the issues raioed in 'affbrdances of balanced self-efficacy' discussed in the previous chapter, 
The SimpliclTy computer appears lo offer two options; a basic operating system, or a potentially highly-
complex (and of\en unsupported) operating system. There is liilie room lo support the self-efficacy of 
individuals who become experts (and perhaps bored) at u.sing the basic system, yet do not perceive themselves 
as having the necessary abilities to engage with the more complex operating system. 
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reality of information that an individual consumes; by altering the design of this reality we 
can match it to the consuming abilities of the user. What makes this approach problematic is 
that this implicitly assumed stance of the designer has a subsequent effect on their activities. 
Whilst inclusive design literature appears to call for more emphatic conceptions of 
human beings as agential and experiential users of products and services, the cominued 
obj edification of the user appears to restrict this area of design from moving forward. 
Therefore, current inclusive design practice and theory, and senescentechmcs, is incompatible 
with one another. In the following concluding section of the thesis a number of alternative 
design approaches currently being developed will be connected with, which miglit support an 
inclusive designer who wished to bridge the gap between their tradition and 
senescentechnics. 
8.2. New conversations for future scnesccntechnie inclusive design 
There are a number of design approaches from outside oj inclusive design that might aid the 
incorporation of senescentechmcs in future design practice. In order to fully realise the potential of 
senescentechnics, however, inclusive designers must look beyond their discipline and its methods and 
models centred on usability. 
The previous section highlights the stark contrast between the assumptions made within 
contemporary inclusive design theory and practice and the senescentechnic approach to the 
design of digital media products. It would be rather difficult, therefore, to jump from 
inclusive design to senescentechnics without negotiating between the two. In this concluding 
section, the thesis touches upon emerging areas of design research that are useful for bridging 
the gap between inclusive design and senescentechnics by opening up ways of integrating 
dynamics, change and experience into the design process. The section will conclude by 
summarising the thesis and recognising the benefits of transdisciplinary research in providing 
new insights to everyday design problems. 
Based upon the previous section, it appears that practitioners and theorists of inclusive 
desi^, in its contemporary form, would struggle to conceive of the ageing human being as a 
dynamic entity that is always in a state of tlux. By trying to make certain predictions about 
use and the user, inclusive design subscribes to concrete and static descriptions of people and 
technology. In recent years, attempts have been made by design researchers to identify new 
methods and tools to help bridge the divide between the apparent need to embed a process of 
prediction within the design process and the understanding that people, technology and 
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ecology is dynamic. For example, Love (2010) presents the argument that designers should 
make greater use of computational dynamic systems tools when dealing with "wicked 
problems' that are formed of one or more feedback loop. Love (2010) argues that it is 
becoming possible to simulate and develop computational models of large, dynamic, 
interconnected systems to predict how certain behaviours emerge from complex situations 
and design outcomes. 
Love's (2010) argument can be taken one stage further, by applying dynamic systems 
tools as part of the design outcome as well as within the design process. Since the mid-1990s, 
a number of projects developed at the Affective Computing Laboratory at MIT (as described 
in Picard (1997; 2009)) have utilised dynamic systems tools within computer systems that 
continuously monitor and atfect people that are interacting with or within range of the 
system. Drawing upon then-nascent artificial intelligence research, Picard (1997) explored 
how physiological data could be perceived by interactive systems and, in turn, provide 
affective feedback and content back to the human participant. Affective computing does not 
just examine how human beings respond emotionally to certain interactions, nor just how 
models can be developed for technologies to better sense and react to these emotions, but to 
develop engaging interactions where people are actively affected by the computer and, 
subsequently, actively effect the computational system. Therefore, affective computing is a 
way of monitoring and reacting to the real-time emergence of dynamic aftbrdances between 
people and technology. 
The types of dynamic tools used in Love's and Picard's work are useful when 
considering the future practical application of senescentechnics. Looking back to chapter 
seven, it is notable how the "spaces for affordances' and their associated design examples 
allude to aspects of dynamic systems tools and affective computing to varying degrees. 
Whilst offering a way towards thinking about people and technology as dynamic, however, 
'"According toChurchman(1967, p. 141), wicked problems were originally defined by HorsI Rittel as a 'class 
of social system problems which are ill-formulated, where the information is confusing, where there are many 
clients and decision makers willi conflicting values, and where tlie ramifications in the whole system are 
thoroughly confusing." Rittel conceived of wicked problems in light of the highly indeterminate and mega-
mullifaceied nature of many design problems. Whilst Riltel illuminated how complex the process of design is, 
Buchanan (1992, p. 16) observes that he leaves the question '[w]hy are design problems indelerminale and, 
therefore, wicked?' unanswered. Buchanan (1992, p. 16) argues that 'the answer lo the question lies in 
something rarely considered: the peculiar nature of the subject mailer of design. Design problems arc 
"indelerminate" and "wicked" because design has no special subject matter of its own aparl from what a 
designer conceives it to be. The subject maiter of design is potentially universal in scope, because design 
thinking may be applied lo any area of human experience." It is problematic to believe thai the wickedness can 
be taken out of these problems, and Churchman notes the moral and ethical implications of situations where 
designers believe ihis is so. Love (2010) does nol discuss these issues in his brief paper, however, and il seems 
to be his argument that wickedness can be controlled by accurate simulations a priori. 
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these ideas can lead to conceiving people as purely reacting to the changing stimulus an 
interface provides. Thus, Love's (2010) and Picard's (1997; 2009) suggestions are still highly 
problematic in the context of this thesis—as discussed at length in chapter four, making 
detailed predictions about how people react to technology and media and appropriate it into 
their persona! and shared lives is always going to be of limited use. Despite these limitations, 
however, their work offers a route towards bridging the dichotomy between static, concrete 
inclusive design and the dynamic, temporality of senescentechnics. 
As was discussed in chapter four, over the past twenty years there has been an 
increased focus within the fields of human-computer interaction and society and technology 
studies on approaches to understanding people using technology in non-deterministic, non-
predictable terms. This has been particularly evident in recent years, as HCI researchers have 
dealt with the shift from primarily studying technologies in workplaces to trying to 
understand how people use digital media and technologies in every art of their private and 
shared lives. For example, McCarthy and Wright (2004) argue that HCI research is required 
to not only investigate how people use technology, but to understand how technology is lived 
and experienced. Building upon the lineage of the participatory design movement and 
philosophy of pragmatic aesthetics'''', McCarthy and Wright (2004) call for designers to find 
a new sensibility towards working with 'users' in their everyday life. 
It requires us lo see these familiar things in terms of felt lile, empathy, and the 
aesthetics of everyday experience. User needs and requirements are not the focus of 
our enquiry. Rather the focus is an understanding of individuals, their concerns, 
desires, aspirations, values, and experiences. The relation between designer and 
"user" is not an objective one in which the designer stands outside of the user's 
situation. Instead, it is one in which the designer and user are in mutually influencing, 
empathic dialog,,. (Wright, Wallace and McCarthy, 2008, p.l9) 
Rather than taking the human subject as something to be observed and researched into, 
instead Wright et a/.'s argument suggests the user must be considered as a co-designer and 
co-researcher within the design process. Wright and McCarthy (2008, p.638 - emphasis in 
original) argue that 'understanding an other or more specifically, knowing the user" in their 
lived and felt life involves understanding what it Jeels like to be that person, what their 
situation is like from their own perspective'. As Krippendorff (2006) notes at length, a 
designer is always restricted in terms of their understanding of the user^ —it will always be a 
''* Wrighl and McCarthy's work is influenced by the literary criticism of Mikhail Bakhtin (1981) and the 
pragmatist philosophy of John Dewey (1929; 1934), which has been used lo inform these authors approach to 
experience-centred design (as developed in (McCarthy & Wright, 2004: Wright et ah, 2008)}, 
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second-order understanding. To take the experience-centred approach that McCarthy and 
Wright argue for, however, is to argue that through sensitivity to the experiences and values 
of particular individuals, however, the designer's second-order understanding conies closer to 
the first-order understanding of the user of a particular digital media product. 
The increased notability of experiential models of people interacting with digital 
media within HCI is relevant to this thesis for two key reasons. Firstly, as discussed at length 
in chapter seven of this thesis, it encourages designers to loosen their hold on the design 
process and empower the user in the design process by including them within the creative and 
decision-making process. The user is treated as an expert in their own right, bringing to bear 
their own experiences into the design process. This is not to just treat people as subjects 
within the design process, but to take a more closely coupled, long term view on the 
interactions between one expert (the user) and another (the designer/the computer 
scientist/the engineer/the gerontologist). Secondly, what McCarthy and Wriglit higlilight is 
that to understand people using technology in experiential terms does not require radical 
methodological interventions. Rather, through critically engaging with ideas and knowledge 
from other disciplines (in their case philosophy and literature theory) designers arc provided 
with a new critical lens that can be used to look for very ditTerent phenomena and types of 
design outcome. 
Taking heed of the above, the nearest future of senescentechnics research might be to 
use it as a new critical lens to be incorporated within a more traditional inclusive design 
approach. To take an example, let us return to section 1.2 of the thesis where the inclusive 
design community was initially introduced. It was noted that one of the tactics to ensure a 
people-centred approach to inclusive design was to go through a process of'discover, 
translate, create, develop" (i~-design, 2008b). Whilst the description offered by inclusive 
design focuses upon reductions and "user design' (Redstrom, 2005), it is possible to 
reinterpret these with a senescentechnic lens. 
A senesccntechnic inclusive design process 
Discover: The exploration of the design contexl through a dialogue with necessary 
stakeholders. This leads to the first output of the process, an understanding of what type of 
activities and practices are to be supported. 
206 
Translate: The conversation of this context into a senescenlechnic understanding by asking 
the following questions: What tools are to be given to users that enable suitable coupUngs in 
this context? What dialogue with the user best suits this design context, and how might the 
sensorimotor couplings of the designer become more understanding of those of the user? 
What are the most suitable ways to ensure a balance between the alTordances for 
senescenlechnics? 
Create: The creation of a preliminary tool kit that allows the "user" to begin marking out 
their initial couplings with a digital media product. Evaluation here is done by the user 
themselves, through their ongoing interactions and iterative couplings they make to the 
interface to access contextually relevant "data". 
Develop: The designer observes the ongoing couphngs that emerge and disappear between 
the iwer and the digital media product. The role of the designer here is to evaluate and 
develop ways in which this ongoing relationship may be maintained, balancing How and 
hindrance, effort and ease, application and reflection. 
The above reformulation of the inclusive design process is not intended to be detailed and 
thorough but instead to offer some insight into how it can be interpreted through a 
sympathetic awareness to senescent cognition. Instead of focusing upon closure and 
designing the user, the designer's expertise is focused on tracing the couplings the user 
makes. In tracing these couplings over time, the designer does not look to find ways to bring 
people and technology closer—instead, they explore ways in which the dialogue can 
continue. Notably, unlike as it is described in section 1.2, there are no solutions here in the 
traditional sense—instead the solution is in the maintenance of couplings between people and 
technology, and the enactment of cognition. 
This brief discussion of possible future directions for senescentechnics suggests that 
there are a number of design-related approaches that offer opportunities to bridge the 
epislemologica! chasm between inclusive design and senescentechnics. What is clear, 
however, is that in order to move from inclusive design's tradition of prediction, prescription 
and inscription, then its community of practitioners and theorists must look beyond 
traditional design methods, processes and models of usability. A design discipline that closes 
itself off from debates ongoing in related, or even distanced, disciplines is likely to become 
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malnourished and blind to radical transformations that alternative domains of knowledge 
provide. As discussed in chapter one, whilst the methods and tools of inclusive design are 
useful in certain contexts, when attempting to get a hold on issues related to the cognitive 
disconnection between older people and digital media, this community is substantially 
limited. In chapters two and three, it was observed that cognitivcly inclusive design, which 
can be seen as one attempt to move beyond inclusive design, has mostly taken on board 
reductionist studies of ageing cognition from cognitive psychology. Chapter four identifies 
how whilst cognitively inclusive design is trapped in a discourse of reducfionism and 
deterioration of human cognition, similar literature within the discipline of human-computer 
interaction has been critiqued at length, Subsequently, for the most part much of human-
computer interaction research has moved away from applying cognitivist models of the 
human mind in the design of digital media products. Rather than moving completely away 
fiism the insights that cognitive science provides for the design of digital media products, 
however, this thesis has renewed conversations with the cognitive sciences and has re-
intcrrogated the issues of the cognitive disconnecfion through the lens of enactive cognitive 
science and dynamic affordances; an approach this thesis defined as senescentechnics. In 
chapter five, these alternative paradigms emerging within cognitive science literature were 
introduced. Following this, chapter six reinterpreted the issue of the cognifive disconnecfion 
between older people and digital media based upon a senescent approach to understanding 
cognifion, which brought together synergies in the work of Gallagher, Noe and emerging 
cognitive neuroscience of ageing research, Based upon this reinterpretation, chapter seven 
discussed a number of conceptual spaces within which senescentechnic affordances emerge 
between older people and fijture digital media products. Rather than providing specific 
guidance to designers, chapter seven instead opened up some potential directions for future 
senescentechnic inclusive design practice and theory in light of the argument developed in 
chapter four, five and six. 
In bringing together until now discrete bodies of knowledge, the thesis has developed 
a novel crifical lens with which to evaluate and critique the contemporary use of reductive, 
usability focused models of people and technology within both inclusive design and the more 
specific sub-field of cognitively inclusive design. When transferred into a new perspective on 
designing, this lens highlights how the expertise of the designer must be shitted from that of 
making a tight fit between people and teclmology, to understanding how people can make 
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9.2. Appendix 2: Papers written and delivered during doctoral research 
9.2.1. *The failure of designers thinking about how wc think: The problem of human-
computer interaction' 
Paper presented at Failed Design: What were they thinking. Bard Graduate Centre, New 
York, USA. 24 April 2009. 
The failure of designers thinking about how we think: 
The problem of human-computer interaction 
John Vines 
Translechnofogy Research 
University of Plymouth. UK 
john.vines@plymouth.ac.uk 
This paper stems from the author questioning some of the ways that designers think how we 
think, particularly in the context of developing interactions between people and new 
technologies. Through looking at the role of designers thinking about how we think in the 
field of Human-Computer Interaction (HCI), the paper notes that there is a division between 
two distinct models of human thought and consciousness; the model of the cognitive mind 
and the enacted world. The dominant model in HCI research, the cognitive model, claims that 
an individual's thought process could be understood in a similar mechanical and 
computational manner as the technology. The alternative model of enaction claims that 
mechanizing the subject in such a way reduces the potential to understand and influence the 
unified, dynamic nature of lived human experience; however, this model appears to be 
seldom implemented within contemporary HCI design research. The paper intervenes to 
explain how the specific example of usability studies of older participants interacting with 
computing technologies might exemplify how the mechanization of the way people think 
produce a shortcoming in the HCl design process. The paper presents these shortcomings in 
the form of a dual failure; firstly, the perception of failure within an older persons cognitive 
abilities and, secondly, the failure of designers to recognize that the way in which they think 
people think may be an inherent flaw in their methodologies. The paper concludes by 
speculating that designers working on understanding and forming relationships between older 
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people and new technologies might provide a suitable entrance point to introduce enacfive 
principles into contemporary HCI discourse. 
The cognitive mind 
In examining the field of design it is perhaps surprising to note how little attention is given to 
how the human thought process relates to the products, interactions, objects and experiences 
that the designer creates. One of the few design-related fields where researchers have to think 
about how humans think is the field of Human-Computer Interaction (HCI). The discipline of 
HCI was brought together through a ftision of researchers within Computer Science, 
Cognitive Psychology and Cognitive Science; as a result, it borrows heavily the methods and 
models used in these forming disciplines. Although the influence of Computer Science is 
significant, the subject matter of this short paper- the question of how certain designers think 
people think - is particularly relevant to the influence both Cognitive Psychology and 
Cognitive Science had upon HCI. The cognitive model of the mind (sometimes referred to as 
cognitivist or cognitivism) that dominates these disciplines treats the human thought process 
as being a rational and problem-solving feature of the brain that occurs through the coming 
together of numerous mechanisms and processes that mental activity can be reduced to. The 
contemporary cognitive model treats the mind as being computational and information-
processing device (Neisser 1967), rather like the everyday personal computer. Rather than 
consciousness being a direct experience of the world, it is claimed that the mind represents 
what we perceive through a series of complex and internal calculations that subsequently 
symbolically represent particular phenomena and subsequently direct human action in the 
world. 
The formation of this cognitive understanding of the mind occurred at a time when 
computational technologies were in their rise. There was a desire by many within 
psychological disciplines to move away from the then contemporary behaviorist models of 
understanding the human subject combined with a concerted effort to develop computing 
technologies and their potential applications. There was a real belief at that time, and in many 
quarters this is still evident, that internal human states could be described and explained as 
computational. As such, the development of the technologies, their application into forms of 
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artificial intelligence and the investigation of the human mind as an information processing 
computational device all developtxl alongside and with each other, in a virtuous circularity'^^. 
Bringing the cognitive model back into the context of HCI, designers often attempt to 
understand how the interactions with a computational interface in this external world relate to 
the cognitive computational functions and their internal representations within a defined user. 
Using a cognitive model appears to be particularly useful to the designer of computer 
interfaces as it is, essentially, a way of describing the brain in the same computational (or 
computable) terms as the technology. Going further than this, a logical situation is presented 
where both the subject and the object can not only be described in the same terms, but if the 
cognitive argument is taken to be correct both operate on the same terms as well. Designers 
and researchers within HCI attempt to attune interactions between a user and the 
technological interface for heightened states of intuitiveness, usability and efficiency, as the 
conceptual basis of the cognitive model claims that both subject and object share the same 
symbolic and representational form of intelligence. 
The enacted world 
There has since been a counter movement within the Cognitive Sciences over the past two 
decades that argues against the contemporary mechanistic paradigm of cognition towards 
richer models of human experience that do not reduce human cognition to particular 
computational mechanisms (Varela, Thompson and Rosch 1991). This new paradigm is often 
broadly referred to as enaction, or the enactive cognitive sciences, and as such will be 
referred to in these terms in this paper. 
The enactive paradigm suggests that in order to understand the lived human experience of the 
world and the interactions this comprises of- which would include those with technological 
interfaces - then we must take that human experience and consciousness comes about not 
through just processes in the brain but the broader sensorimotor and physiological capabilities 
ofthe whole body (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Gallagher 2005) and how these are coupled to 
the world one is situated within (Varela et al. 1991; Noe2004; StoffVegen, Bardy and Mantel 
2006). Along with challenging the idea that the brain is the centre of consciousness, enaction 
' "For a informalive and detailed examinalion of ihis period see Gardner (1985), 
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also denies that the brain is a computational and mechanically understandable device thai 
restricts consciousness to internalized states of the perceiver. 
Enaction recognizes that human beings, as with the great array of other organisms and matter, 
are essentially made from the same "stutT as the world they live and with this it is considered 
impossible to determine one part - just as human thought - as in isolation from the broader 
system that it both influences and is influenced by (Maturana and Varela 1987; Noe 2009). 
Whereas the cognitive argument considers an individual's cognitive, action and sensory 
capabilities all as separate from one another, the enactive perspective unifies them as 
inseparable entiUes. Furthermore, this unified bodily ability and experience is situated within 
a particular world, an ecology ^ one is within at any given moment in time. The unification 
of mind, body and world aligns the enactive cognitive sciences with ventures within 
philosophical discourse of phenomenology-the study of human experience- particularly as 
set out by Maurice Merleau-Ponty. He argued that the common sense of the lived human 
experience is that it is done so through a particular physiology (Merleau-Ponty 2002), which 
itself is wrapped within a particular context and worid (Merieau-Ponty 1968; Abram 1996). 
This shift in paradigms within the cognitive sciences is relevant to this discussion as it 
suggests that one of the foremost influences upon HCl research, the idea of a cognitive 
mechanized mind, has been widely criticized and argued against by a growing body of 
research within the very field that formulated it. For a designer of technological interfaces, 
such as those within HCI, it asks questions of the model of understanding the mind that 
appears to be implicitly drawn upon and implemented in the final materialization of the 
process. If we are to take on board the evidence and observations of the enactive argument, 
then it becomes increasingly difficult to support the current model of human cognition that is 
integrated into the design process in HCI as an appropriate way to manage interactions 
between people and computers. By projecting the mechanistic model of the technology onto 
the human mind, designers might encourage and create a crudely reduced model of the lived 
human experience of the world. There have been various endeavors that have attempted to 
initiate behavioral and experiential models and methods for HCI that, to varying degrees, are 
more analogous with a unified model of lived human experience (such as Dide 1993; Dourish 
2001; Kaptelinin and Nardi 2006; Stoffregen el ai 2006). However, despite the movement 
"* The aullior notes ihal the icrm 'ecology' in this context is related to the environment, world and broader 
context that an organism exists witiiin, rather than sustainabjlity and 'green design" arguments, 
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away from cognitive reasoning towards enactive models of consciousness within sections of 
the cognitive sciences, the majority of HCI research still continues lo be dominated by 
understanding the human subject as mechanical, infonnation processing and computational in 
their manner. It is possibly the case that the gulf between the cognitive and enactivc models 
of consciousness may be too large to be comprehended within contemporary applications at 
this time. However, the paper will now argue that studies of older people using new 
technologies might provide an example ofa contemporary dimension of HCI research that 
could benefit from understanding the rich and dynamic nature of momentary lived experience 
as set out by theories of enaction. 
The cognitive model of older people in HCI 
If we are to take a richer understanding of human experience then this points to a short 
coming, or even a failure, within the methodologies used by HCI designers in understanding 
interactions between a cognitive participant and the technological system. It will be argued 
here that this difficulty is particulariy evident in usability studies of older people interacting 
with technology. Within many design fields there is a growing discussion regarding liow to 
develop the methods and tools used by designers in the development of technological objects, 
devices and systems that are inclusive of older people. This is often connected, either rightly 
or wrongly, with an assumption that older people struggle in their comprehension of new 
technologies upon encountering them {Schieber 2003). As such, within HCI and Cognitive 
Psychology there is a pre-given notion that there must be a cognitive change in the operation 
of particular information processing abilities of the brain and that through identifying what 
these changes are il may be possible to redesign computer interfaces to suit. 
Through laboratory testing of particular cognitive functions it is observed that older 
individuals are slower or less competent in tasks and tests emphasizing the use of particular 
cognitive systems when compared to younger individuals, whereas other aspects of cognition 
show little change or even improvements. The widely agreed reductions in the typical ageing 
cognitive model of the mind are that one's ability to formulate an understanding of new 
abstract concepts, lo dynamically reason the holding of information in consciousness for 
further manipulation and a lessened capabilhy to explicitly and reliably recall some long term 
memories (Birren and Wamer Schaie 2001; Stuart-Hamilton 2006). Those that are considered 
stable or even improve are related to the storage and retrieval of implicit long term memories 
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and the unconscious recollection of past experiences (Smith and Earles 1996; Stuart-
Hamilton 2006). 
The result of observing these cognitive alterations once re-considered by HCI designers in the 
context of older people using seemingly complex technological interfaces is frequently a 
reduction of visual information in an attempt to reduce complexity and an emphasis on 
metaphor and analogy of past experiences in order to harness the cognitive functions 
unaffected by age. Interfaces become seemingly simplistic and potentially intuitive in their 
fiinction but, in this papers view, could confuse the relationship between an individual and 
die technology by translating the concepts of one medium or group of products into the 
context of new technologies. For example, word processing software is analogous with 
typewriters, email is treated as analogous with the postal service, Internet over Voice 
Protocol {such as Skype) is a landline phone, and analogue dials and levers are superior to 
digitalization and graphic interfaces (see as examples Docampo Rama 2001; Schieber 2003; 
Zajicek 2003; Blacker, Popovic and Mahar 2005). The mechanical understanding of how 
people think suggests that older people are no longer able to generate new meanings and 
relationships with technologies, so suggests that the designer should harness to an extreme a 
lifetime's worth of interaction experience with past technologies. Although there are 
examples where heavily referencing the past may improve the usability and workflow of a 
particular task, this paper will conclude with some speculation that this may be problematic. 
The idea of using metaphor and analogy for a broad user group might be considered 
inherently troublesome; the technological experiences of one older person might be far 
removed from others, even if they have lived within similar cultures. However, the 
application of the mechanical and computation model from the cognitive disciplines onto the 
user of a technology suggests a dual failure on the part of the designer that goes beyond this 
initial oversight. 
The dual failure of HCI designers thinking about how wc think 
The story within this paper is formed by a two failures made apparent by the design process. 
The cognitive model of human thought suggests that as a person ages there is a particular 
failure in certain computational and information-processing abilities of the older individual 
that are related to making sense of the new. This presents the first failure that becomes 
apparent witliin the design process; a cognitive failure on the part of the user that means they 
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no longer can engage with emerging technologies. It is through the identification of this 
cognitive failure on the human subject's part that leads to methodologies that focus upon the 
past experiences of the older person. This paper proposes, however, that the use of a method 
that explicitly recalls past technological experiences as discrete memories in order to bridge 
the gap between a new technology and the older participant leads to a second failure; a failure 
on the part of the design method to allow for engaging and novel experiences with new 
technologies. 
Both of these failures arc the results of applying the mechanistic cognitive model of the mind 
to the studies of older people using new technologies. The model emphasizes the failure to 
engage with the technology as being on the part of the older person, partially on the basis that 
if younger adults are able to comprehend technological interfaces then the technology itself is 
not the cause of the problem. This is problematic as it ignores the many situations where 
people of all ages become frustrated and conftised with the technologies they interact with on 
a daily basis. This in itself brings the first failure back into tbcus, as the designer does not 
recognize that the failure of an older person to engage with new technologies is not as a resuh 
of just a reduced cognitive lianction, but due to the nature of the technologically focused 
manner the interaction process is conceptualized with. 
Returning to the alternative paradigm within the cognitive sciences of enaction, which 
attempting to understand forms of human knowing within the richer and unified common 
sense of everyday experience of the body and world, it appears what is necessary may be a 
similar conceptual change within the methods and processes used to understand and develop 
human-computer interactions. To take upon an enactive way of understanding the older 
participator of technologies (or of any age) would require designers to move away from 
trying to understand the internal mental states of a particular group of users and to instead 
begin to observe the continuous development and changing of relationships that occurs 
between a person and the objects, artifacts, systems and technologies that inhabit their world. 
Rather than focus upon a failure on the part of the human subject, which could now be 
considered as not a failure at all, we centre attention on the inability for contemporary 
technological systems to adapt to changes in the people that interact with them. However, 
until such endeavors move from extraordinary to the contemporary within HCI, the failure of 
the cognitive basis implemented by designers of technological interactions will still manifest. 
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ABSTRACT 
Inlcractiim design is now of sufficient maturiiy to warram 
a critical discourse of its own. To date much of the 
published material which refers to interaction design has 
Icnded 10 reflect upon examples of ils practice or to draw 
upon research done elsewhere (compuier science or 
cognitive psychology for example) in order to give validity 
10 its own accounts. Interaction design's is a synergistic 
consequence of other fields which it uses in order lo create 
its own creative and strategic practice; this is both ils 
strength and weakness, [nleraciion dcsigti can become 
shaped by the fields it draws upon. The authors of this 
paper lake a cautious view of ihc cogniiive and user 
models ihai are typically applied in the development of 
intcraclion prototypes. Our ideas, presented here in the 
spirit of a critical conversation, are founded in an 
inielleciual insistence that inteniction design presents a 
strategic extension of an embodied model of the human as 
on enacted being. In this paper we outline a way by which 
interaction designers can understand their role to be an 
orchestration of that enaction, not merely a mechanislic 
organiser of 'perceptions' of. 'behaviours' of and the 
•understandings' of, systems. 
Keywords 
Interaction design, design theory, enaction, holsomatic. 
INTRODUCTION 
In order to facilitate a supposedly more seamless 
interaction between people and the technologies ihey use, 
interaction designers often employ metaphorical allusion 
and ideas of tacit social ttlfordance. While these 
approaches have bad an undoubted positive effect upon the 
design of effective interactions they have tended to prevail 
in academic discourse at the expense of the development 
of a more subtle understanding of ways in which humans 
are enacted beings. Enaction does not necessarily imply 
cognitive undCTstanding, but rather a niorc embodied and 
O Stephen Thompson and John Vines. 2009 
Ptocwxlings of the Third Workshop on Physicality 
Phystculify 2a)9, I September 2()09, Cambridge, UK 
Dcvina Ramduny-Ellis, Alan Dix, Joanna Hare & Steve Gill 
(Ediloni) 
intuitive, perhaps pre-perceptual way of being. In this 
paper Ihe authors propose thai, through a new critical 
discourse, interaction design is positioned to engage in a 
theoretical anticipation of the means for people to 
seamlessly participate in the benefits of technology. 
Interjclion design's sO-ategic position as a creative arbiter 
of science and art means that it should seek the design and 
implementation of new human experiences which are as 
real, and as integrative, as those which we take to be a 
natural evolutionary inheritance. Any ambition of 
intLTLiction designers in creating seamless and fluid 
flowing interactions should not necessarily imply a blind 
acceptance of established interaction methodologies. This 
foutulational paper must be read as a speculative 
intervention, rather than an instructive reflection of 
resciirch data; it is intended to be read in a similar manner 
as one might regard a designer's sketch. The paper 
introduces our research project and suggests avenues of 
speculative eni|uiry, outlining the beginnings of a new 
•holsomatic' approach to interaction design. Such a 
holsomalic approach ai^ues that humans can be 
understood to be enacted by means of a "soma", in which 
the organic human and the inorganic technological are 
considered to be coextensive. 
RATIONALISING EXPERIENCE 
Science and the Irrational 
Being no belter than our ancestors we still have a tendency 
to consign things for which we can find no rational 
explanation for to the realm of the spiritual. For some 
people this alignment of the Fortean with the spiritual is in 
itself a reasonable enough explanation. Spirits are often a 
comforting way of describing something twyond the 
rational. Science on Ihe other hand cannot reasonably 
accept the spiritual explanation. If something tends to go 
against the rationality of science and appears beyond 
intellectual foundation, then science has a habit of 
consigning it to the occult and beyond reasonable 
discourse or, worst of all, beyond rational investigation. 
One consequence of this history is that phenometiological 
evidence of enaction is largely consigned to the anecdotal. 
Murphy's 'In the Zone' [19] is a wide-ranging collection 
of carefully transcrilwd anecdotes of so-called 
•Transcendent Experiences in Sports". This text, published 
241 
by Aritana, (a somewhat ahcmative new-age publisher) is 
consigned among other fringe titles. Murphy is the co-
founder of the Esalen Institute, his book is couched in 
somewhat obscure terms, and although its contents arc 
prescmed in a largely rigorous fashion, it lends lo find 
mysticism and avoid scientific explanation. Tliese 
experiences, it seems, are not understood to fit with 
orthodox science and are oilcn described as being mystical 
- a notion reinforced on the cover description of the text: 
'remarkable and mystical things happen to people during 
sports ...' [19]. In a chapter culled 'Mystical Sensations' a 
motorcycle rider describes the experience of riding HI 
considerable speed: 'you feci a calmness ihrougboui your 
body, even though you know intellectually that you're 
right on the brink of disaster' [19, p.ll). Murphy and 
White describe these experiences and point to how people 
describe this in u rather taeilum manncT. Do we sense a 
growing unease in the reader hcTe- a sense that this paper is 
verging into rather embarrassing territory? Embarrassment 
is reflected in many of Murphy's interviewees, apparently 
reluctant to admit a sensuality that appears to diminish 
their sense of themselves as understanding 'users' of their 
perception describe their experience as if it had noi really 
happened without thein being conscious of being 'in 
control', but had simply tell as if il had been automatic. 
The phenomenology of enaction is only just beginning to 
emerge from the realm of the oecull, for example in the 
inclusion of some extraordinary esoteric phenomena hy 
Burger, [3] into academic scrutiny. 'Ouija boards' and 
phenomena such as "phantom limb' and 'oui of body 
experiences' were once condemned to languish in the 
realm of the occult, the concern of the ignorant or the 
insane who often claimed a connection to some supposed 
externalised spirit or energetic force. The use of the Ouija 
is explicitly paranonual; its discussion in rational 
conversation runs the risk of consigning the speaker lo the 
fringe. However, in 'The Illusion of Con.scious Will", the 
neuroseicniisi D M Wegner [27] describes a number of 
scienlillc 'explanations' of the Ouija and olhcr supposedly 
occull phenomena. Tliese explanations foeus upon the 
nonconscious function of the soma. The nonconscious 
should not be confused with the unconscious, as Freudian 
psychiatry might understand il, but a reference to ihe 
functions of the soma that operate beyond human 
sensuality. Wegner suggests that the function of the soma 
cannot be entirely understood to he accountable in 
consciousness. Wegncr [27] cites ihe experiments of the 
neurophysieist Benjamin Libel [ 15] and colleagues whom 
tested the timing between the commenceinenl of somatic 
activity and Ihe subsequent conscious willing of the 
movement. Wegner suggests thai Liba's rescareh presents 
a challenge to ideas we might have of somehow being in 
charge of our bodies and by extension of our free will. 
This idea is outlined extensively in 'The User Illusion; 
cutting consciousness down to size' by Tor Norreiranders 
[20], Wegner suggests that this noneonscious functioning 
of the body may go some considerable way to explain 
these aspects of the oecull as being moments when tlic 
nonconseious reveals itself in ways we are tbrccd lo 
account for in our social lives. 
Rejecting the Reduction of Experience 
Julicn Oftray De la Mettrie's 'Man a Machine' [7] is 
sometimes cited as an example of how science reduces the 
essence of humanity lo that of a mere machine (such as 
[5]). While it may appear superlleially to make that claim. 
in Man a Machine De la Mettrie actually made a far more 
sublle proposition for the condition and experience of 
being alive lo emerge from the enacted condition of being 
in tlie world. Far from suggesting that mankind was a 
zombified pri>duci of the mechanism of the body, De la 
Mettric argued Ihat the world is a product of human 
inierprelation, which is itself conditioned by the worid. In 
his own terms De la Metlrie was clear thai humans had 
evolved to be in the world, and proposed, rather 
unpopularly in his time, ihal humanity was naturally 
inseparable from the world as a being of nature, 
'Man's pre-eminent advantage is his organism. In vain all 
writers of books on morals fail to regard as praiseworthy 
those qualities that come hy nature, esteeming only Ihe 
talents gained by dint of reflection and industry. For 
whence come, I ask, skill, learning, and virtue, if not from 
a disposition that makes us fit to become skill-full, wise, 
and virtuous? And whence again, comes this disposition, if 
not from nature? Only through nature, do we have any 
good qualities: to her we owe all that we are.' [7] 
De la Mettrie argues that while the eorpus is a forni of 
machine, ihe human is more than the sum of' ils 
mechajiistic parts. De la Mcttrie argued that while the body 
and the soul can be understood in isolation, no true picture 
of the human could be built unless they are considered as 
one whole. Dc la Meitrie returns our attention to energy; 
he suggested that it is the ftHKl necessary for ihe machine 
that can influence the soul, and courage or stupidity though 
considered to be essentially a matter of the soul and the 
domain of ihe philosopher, it could nut be separated from 
the somatic influence; 
'Nourishment keeps up the movement which fever excites. 
Without fwid. the soul pines away, goes mad. and dies 
exhausted, ilie soul is a taper whose light flares up the 
moment befoa- it goes out. But nourish the body, pour into 
its veins life-giving juices and strong liquors, and then die 
soul grows strong like them, as if arming itself with a 
proud courage, and the soldier whom water would have 
made lo flee, grows bold and runs joyously to death to the 
sound of drums. Thus a hot drink sets into stormy 
movement ihe blood which a cold drink would have 
calmed.' [7] 
For De la Mettrie it was impossible to reduce mankind to 
undcTSiand him. One can understand something of his 
nature and behaviour and something of his functioning but 
can never reduce him as one might a machine of his 
making. 
'Man is so complicated a machine that it is impossible to 
get a clear idea of the machine beforehand, and hence 
impossible lo define it. For this reason, all the 
investigations have been vain, which the grc^tesl 
philosophers have made it priori, that is lo say, in so far as 
they use, as it were, the wings of the spirit. Thus il is only 
A posteriori or hy trying to disentangle the soul from the 
organs of the body, so lo speak, that one can reach Ihe 
highest probability concerning man's own nature, even 
though one can not discover with certainty whal his nature 
is.' [7] 
Alniosi a century ago Wyndham Lewis and the Vorlicists, 
foresaw a new humanity unbound from the constraints of 
culture. They foresaw a being centred in an ego set in the 
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midst of a swirling and energetic extended condition. This 
ntw being would be capable of extending the human 
lunher and I'unher into the universe, but would always 
a'inain centred on an essentially consolidated ego, bound 
in some fluid manner to the malerial body. Set in the midst 
of an emerging technological culture, the Vorticists 
proclaimed resistance to technology as, "n vampire sucking 
the town's heart and as a gUxiniy circus. It stirs 
scnlimeniat. nostalgic feelings which stifle the new 
generation' [2|. The new ego would be a new sense of 
being that can he understood now, peihaps as a nascent 
allcni|}l lo understand life as something that was embodied 
and enacted outwards, ratlier than resolved outside the 
body and transmitted to it via the senses. Marineiti [16], 
like Wyndham Lewis, sought to extend the somatic 
potential of the body beyond its physical border, Marinetii, 
however, soughl lo unbind ihe ego from physicaliiy and 
saw in Ibis a glorious destruction; "An is the need to 
destroy and scatter oneself The "body' as a contained 
entity, had no objective meaning for either Murinelti or 
Wyndham Lewis. For Mannctti this was an optimistic sign 
of emerging transcendence irom Ihe vilcness of the 
biological organism, though Wyndham Lewis took issue 
with this claim [18]. 
Behaviorism and Cognitivism 
The Vonicisis can be understood now as a largely 
unsuccessful attempt to resist mechanistic models of the 
human mind and to put in place a more enacted and 
dynamic model of being. Contemporary cognitive models 
of the human as a psychology owe much lo the emergence 
of the study of the human mind during the lale nineteenth 
century, panicularly lo the laboratory work of Wilhelm 
Wundi at Leipzig University in 1879 and William James' 
research in ihc USA. James is widely credited with 
establishing the form and scope of psychology and to a 
considerable extent his model shapes psychology today 
(see [12]), Early psychologists were emerging in a climate 
where mind and being itad become modelled on si.imcwhai 
mechanistic models of the human. The Vorlicist objection 
was to the emerging project of reduction of the mind to a 
largely mechanistic model. The implication being that such 
a mechanistic reduction might set in irain the logic that ii 
would be possible to regulate, or condition, human 
behaviour. Ivan Pavlov is perhaps the best known today 
among Ihe researchers who established the field of 
'classical conditioning'. Pavlov proposed that an entirely 
predictable and instrumental model of human behaviour 
and action might be eventually discovered and 
conditioned. One way to observe the history of design is as 
a strategy that has tracked Ihe model of the human as a 
thinking machine. Design has certainly become 
consolidated in recent limes by the collusion of the 
instrumental and reduetivisl methods with the introspective 
studies of Freudian psychoanalysis. Cross [6], for example, 
has argued ihat design, as we understand il today, is rooted 
in the seieniifie understanding of human behaviour and 
recalls Van Doesburg's call for a new spirit in art and 
design: 
'Our epoch is hostile to every .subjective speculation in art, 
science, technology, etc. The new spirit, which already 
governs almost all modem life, is opposed lo animal 
sponlaneiiy, lo nature's domination, lo artistic flummery. 
In order lo construct a new objecl we need a method, liial 
is to say an objective system' [6, p.49]. 
'Behaviorism' became established as a strategy primarily 
through its application in various tonus as models of 
behaviour and expectation in factories [II] and offices 
through Gilbreths ideas of work efliciency and time and 
motion studies [21 ] and other Taylorisi modes of scientific 
management in advertising, marketing and market lead 
ideals of design aeslhelics |13], Pure behaviorism, 
however, is no longer understood to be a viable model of 
the human. During the 1960s models of the human as 
social construction emerged via theorists such as the 
Americiin psychologist Burrhus Skinner (who had 
developed Ihe "Operole Conditioning Chamber' in which 
animals win rewards by responding to learned stimuli). 
attempting lo establish a verbal model of behaviorisi 
construction [22]. Rather famously Noam Chomsky was 
moved lo public disagrecmeni over Ihe political and 
libertarian implications of Skinner's model [4]. Skinner 
proposed thai behaviour was determined by Ihe linguistic 
understanding of the world; such a moilcl remains 
surprisingly pertinent in semiolie models of design, and 
arguably in tangible models of interaction also. 
It has been suggested thai Chomsky misunilcrslood the 
subtlety of Skinner's thesis; nevertheless il is now widely 
belli thai Chomsky's criticisms of Skinner can at the very 
least be seen to encapsulate a new intellectual move during 
Ihe second half of Ihe twentieth cenlury. Like the 
Vonicisis some half a century before this new move would 
be against reductivisi and behaviorist models of being and 
towards a reinvigoraled model of the human as a 
signillcanlly more complex construction. If Skinner can 
stand, for ihe sake of argument, for a mechanistic model of 
human understanding that suggested knowledge was 
cKietnally acquired, then Chom.sky argues for a much more 
subtle coding of human behaviour ihat results from deep 
siruciures of innate behaviour of the species [4], If ihis 
shift tells us anything, it illustrates a dramatic move 
towards understanding the human as an internally 
reducible mechanical objecl - as opposed lo external 
behavioural states - fundamentally separating the cognitive 
attributes of the human species from the body and world. 
The intellectual transition provided by Chomsky, among 
others, in the mid-twentieth cenlury had much bearing on 
the so-called 'cognitive rcvolulion' within p.syehological 
disciplines, notably through the loose federation of 
sciences dealing with knowledge and cognition - the 
cognitive sciences. For interaction design this can be seen 
as an historically significant move, especially wilhin the 
precise context of Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) 
where the development of technology and the interaclion 
modes provided was both influenced and provided impetus 
to the understanding of the human as cognitive, 
information-processing, and disemlwdied beings. The 
interaction designer here becomes a manager of ihe 
symbolic communication between two systems of rational 
logic - the computer and the cognitive apparatus of ihe 
perceiver - in order, theoretically, lo attune interactions to 
be as seamless as po.ssible ([26] provides a more detailed 
explanation of the limitalions of this method). 
2.4 Phenomenology and Embodied 
Interaction 
In recent limes there have been attempts lo bring the 
intellectual impetus of cogniiivc science together with 
phcnomenulogieal philosophy, particularly the work of 
Maurice Merieau-Ponty [17] and lo some extent in the 
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eaTlier posI-Hegelian ideas of Heidegger and Husscrl, 
Tlicse philosophies deal wiih i!ic •embodied' ej^perience of 
being in the world, rather than the conslrucled cultural 
conceptions humans build aboul themselves. The 
relationship between embodiment and cognitive science 
will be discussed further below. Before this discussion 
though, it may be that ihc lerm embodiment is already 
familiar lo the interaction design communily as a resull of 
Paul Dourish's [9] introduction of ihc concept lo the 
context of human interactions with digital computer 
systems and artefacts, Dourish prcseni.s a model of 
'embodied interaction' through drawing heavily upon a 
numl>er of the key figures in phenomenology that he 
identifies as important lo Ihc development of embodied 
interaclion; Husserl's phenomenology; Heidegger's 
henneneutic phenomenology; Shult/'s phenomenology of 
the social world and Mcrleau-Ponty's phenomenology of 
perception, l( appears that, in his choice of 
phenonienologist. Dourish is intent on positing cmtwdicd 
interaction us a methodology that resists genealogy in 
structuralist or cultural-theoretical method and thereby 
eschews the orthodox history of interaction design. He 
starts from his summation of embodied phenomena as 
'those, which by their very nature occur in real lime and 
real space'. Dourish proposes that 'embodiment is the 
property of our engagement with the world thai allows us 
to make it meaningful' ['). p.126]. He locates interaction 
design in phenomenology by arguing that the physical 
experience of being-in-the-world cannot be separaled from 
the "reality of our bodies presence in the world', hence 
•Embodied Interaction is the creation, manipulation, and 
sharing of meaning through engaged interaciion with 
artdacts,' [9,p,126] 
Rellecting on interaction design history as ii is written, 
Dourish suggests that the design of human technological 
interaction has shifted from a focus entirely in the machine 
foundation in protocols (switches, dials, etc) towards 
tangible models of interaction that are distributed and 
intuilive. Examples are ptisiled of digital systems that "lend 
themselves naturally' [9, p.42]; these are inieraciions 
where people appear not to have to think to act. Dourish is 
rather uncritical in his understanding of an action; he docs 
not explore what difference there may be between natural 
or tacii actions, for instance. 
Dourish outlines the framework of social computing and, 
reflecting the thinking thai prevails in contemporary design 
communities, argues that sociological approaches should 
underpin interaction methodologies. Dourish describes 
how, after Suchman {2.1], interaction can he understood as 
an activity systeiri; we have certain behaviours when we 
are engaged in activities that interaction designers would 
he wise to build upon. In this context, tangible interaction 
and social interaction appear to have a lot to offer one 
another, Dourish arguing that both aim to 'smooth 
inieraction by exploiting a sense of fomiliarity with the 
everyday world' [9, p.99|. He calls upon ihe concept of 
metaphorical interaction, but goes on to propose that a 
collision of ideas of situatedness with ethnomcthodo logical 
approaches will bring individual experience into the social 
frame. 
ENACTED EXPERIENCE 
Enactivc Cognitive Science 
It is possible lo contrast Douri.qh's interpretation of 
embodiment as a socially conditioned situation to a slowly 
unveiling paradigmatic shift within the aforementioned 
cognitive sciences, where there appears to be a slowly 
growing conviction that the Cartesian picture of formal, 
logical, well-dcftned units of knowledge is upside down; 
that a radical paradigmatic or epistemological shifl is 
rapidly developing. At the very centre of this emerging 
view is the belief that the proper units of knowledge are 
primarily concrete, embodied, incorporated, and lived [24]. 
Neuro-psychologists, such as Bennude/ and colleagues [1] 
have argued for some time that the body is the foundation 
of the sense of the self In recent years, works such as 
LakotT and Johnson [14] and Varclu, Thompson, and 
Rosch (25] have laid out embodied approaches to 
cognitive studies ihal attempt to understand what it means 
to be human in everyday, lived experience. "If we examine 
the current situation today, with the exception of a few 
largely academic discu.ssions cognitive science has 
virtually nothing to say about what it means to be human 
in everyday, lived situations' [25, p.xv]. 
Embodied approaches to understanding human cognition 
mark in some respects the intellectual drift toward 
connective, rather than reductive, ihought. Emerging from 
whal might be tcrnicd an orthodox scienlific methodology, 
embodied understandings of cognition atiaupt to hring 
rigour to the subjectivity of lived experiences. 'On the 
other hand, those human traditions that have focused on 
the analysis, understanding, and possibilities for 
transformation of ordinary life need to be presented in a 
context that makes them available to science' [25, p.xv]. 
Varela. Tliompson and Rosch's The Embodied Mind can 
be understood as an attempt to reconnect scparatioii.s of 
mind, body and world and to bring these hilherto separate 
epistemes into one conversation. By understanding that the 
human experiaice of being is inseparable from the 
physicality of the reality in which it is situated, an 
alternative is posited to representational models of 
cognition in which the world is understood as tillered 
through senses, raiher as one might experience a gigantic 
and immersive picture show. Varela and his co-authors 
offer 'embodied' models where the worid is 'enacted' 
through series of complex "structural couplings' - that is, 
many tiny connections of sense, experience, imagination, 
memory, knowledge and other somatic systems, 
interacting lo form a mcshwork of impressions of being in 
the world. If representational models supp<ise a tlxed 
world that is experienced, then the worid in embodied 
thinking is entirely constructed. Varela's concept of 
'structural coupling' reflects, although diftcrs from, James 
J, Gibson's earlier model [10], which while rejecting 
ri^rcsenlation relietl upon a largely visual model of the 
world, albeit one determined by species and habitat. Where 
Gibson recognises thai Ihe experience of the worid is 
delennined by the way in which a species is independently 
evolved in it, Varcia and colleagues describe an 'enacted' 
concept that distributes the world into the species, and the 
species into the worid. Taking this position, the world is 
understood to be a lived experience enacted in somatic 
functions, and so humans must learn to be in the world. 
While some aspects of that world arc constructed for some 
humans by others, this docs not mean thai these aspects 
necessarily contain any irulh about ihc world, Dennett (8) 
sets out a neat and concise review of Varela's "enactivist' 
approach in opposition to the dominant 'cognilivist' 
approaches to cognition: 
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'Question I: What is cogniticm? Queslion 2: How does design work? 
Cogniiivisi AnsH'er: Information processing as symbolic 
com pu tat ion-rule-based manipulation ofsymbols. 
EnactMsl Ans^i^er: Enaction. A history of structural 
coupling that brings forth a world. 
Question 2: How docs it work? 
Cogniiivist Answer: Tlirough any device that can support 
and manipulate discrete functional elements; the symbols. 
The system interacts only with the form of the symbols 
(their physical attributes), not their meaning. 
Enacllvlsl Answer: Tlirough a network consisting of 
multiple levels of interconnected. sensorimotor 
subnetworks. 
Question 3: How do I know when a cognitive system is 
functioning adequately? 
Cogniiivisi Answer: When the symbols appropriately 
represent some aspect of the real world, and the 
information processing leads to a successful solution to Che 
problem given to the system. 
Enaciivisi Answer: When it becomes part of an ongoing 
existing world (as the young of evciy species do) or shapes 
a new one (as happens in evolutionary history)' [8, pp.206-
207]. 
Implications of Enacted Experience 
Pcriiaps the easiest way lo emphasise the dilTerence in 
these approaches might be lo consider the act of speaking. 
A cogniiivist approach might focus upon the meaning and 
construction of the words. How has a vocabulary been 
learned; what Is the value of the words used; how are the 
words used ditTerently in cultures and in changing 
contexts, for example. An enaciivisi approach might study 
the processes whereby the words are formed 
noneonsciously by the tongue in the palette; how this 
process is learned as a child; how words are assembled in 
the mind prior to their vocalisation and how in 
conversation their delivery is nuanced, seemingly without 
any thought being given to the process on the part of the 
speaker. The enactivist approach places the somatic system 
at the centre of the process. Assuming the speaker does not 
speak from a predetermined script, many systems are at 
play in the formation of the conversation in design terms. 
Re-ton(exiualising Dennet's review into the realm of 
designing technological interactions has profound 
consequences for the way in which we might understand 
the processes designers implement when relating human 
beings to technology. 
Question I: What does design do when it humanises 
technology? 
Cognilivisi Implication: Design manipulates symbolic 
images by which people read the world so that they can 
make sense of and give value to technologies (semiotics). 
Enactivisl Implication: Design enables people to enact in 
the world by enabling polentialily of the whole human as a 
distributed soma (Holsomatic). 
CogiiitivisI Implication: Designers create the means to 
project simple or multiple and complex symbolic 
meanings. These symbols are primarily experienced by 
people in reference to a codified cultural understanding of 
rclcrcnis, 
Enaciivisi Implication: Designers intervene in the complex 
processes by which people form an experience of their 
worid. Their lask is to enable people to experience the 
world "naturally' without necassarily needing to attach 
meaning to individualised interactions. 
Question 3: How do 1 know wlien design is functioning 
adequately? 
Cognilivisi Implication: When people understand the 
symbols ihey encounter and react appropriately, 
Enactivi.sl Implication: When people incorporate the 
designed world seamlessly as part of their experience of 
beinj;, 
in uiking each question in turn and looking at the 
implications for design in the 'cognilivist' and 'enactivist' 
answers to each queslion it becomes possible to sec how 
eniicled or embodied approaches to cognition place a 
rather different emphasis upon the realisation of the self as 
a constructed (cogniiivist) entity in separation to 
technology or a self-enacted construct formed through 
complex coupling in which technology is understood to be 
coextensive with the soma (holsomulic). Looking back at 
Dourish's understanding of c-mbodiment as a socially 
conditioned situation, and its subsequent adoption within 
the interaction design community, is somewhat far 
removed from Varela's understanding of embodied and 
unacted cognition through 'structural coupling'. Dourish 
appeared to be on the brink of a profound move, towards a 
distributed view of cognition and the soma, bui returns the 
interaction design discourse to the safety of materiality and 
behaviorism. Arguably, then, rather than transforming the 
discourse, Dourish entrenches it in its methodology of 
analysis. A design methodology thai calls for familiarity as 
its guiding principle is likely lo find it difficult to progress, 
especially when the interaction with a potential new 
tecimology may be considered ineffable. 
CONCLUSION 
This papCT has discussed how the diverse disciplines 
drawn upon and applied by interaction designers have a 
history of mechanising human experience into reducible 
and scientifically observable behaviours or measurable 
cognitive phenomena. In this paper we have alteirtpted to 
fathom how interaction design might be able lo integrate 
ilsell' as a strategic practice in light of an alternative 
argument of holsomaiic experience, or more broadly that 
of being enacted, embodied and extended. Tlie paper has 
discussed how Dourisli's "embodied interaction' has 
provided usefulness for understanding the lived cKperiencc 
of human interactions with technology but is restricted by 
gnuiiiding it.scif in the contemporary trajectory of 
interaction design. In highlighting the implications of 
enaction to designers, the paper attempted lo provide 
speculative foundation to a potentially profound shif^  in 
the contemporary discourse of interaction design from 
models of humanity that arc dominated by the social 
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reduL-iion to behaviours or o cognitive reduction lo 
panicular mental processes. 
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This paper addresses tlie problems older individuals 
have been ob.served lo encounter when engaging 
with technological artefacts and how such 
difficulties may relate to the designers 
understanding of the normal cognitive ageing 
process of human beings. This paper suggests thai 
these problems may not be the result of limited 
cognitive abilities of certain older individuals but 
rather the manner in which designers undei^tand 
the complex relationship between the mind and 
actions in the world. The paper speculates thai an 
alternative perspective on inleraclions as 
alTordances that occur between the embodied 
individual and their ecology may benefit design 
methodologies deployed in creating engaging 
technological artefacts for older individuals, 
INTRODUCTION 
There has been growing discussion within ihe 
design cominuniiy regarding the response lo the 
ageing populations of many Western European 
nations for a number of years. One subject within 
this area that has generated discussion is the effects 
cognitive changes have on an older individual's 
ability lo perform certain lechnology-mediaied acts, 
such as u.sing personal 
computers, mobile phones and home audio/visual 
equipment. Although there appears to be no formal 
methodology that designers follow when 
developing cognitively inclusive technological 
artefacts for older 
individuals, there are cases of designeri drawing 
upon knowledge within psychological disciplines 
lliat discuss cognitive change. This short paper 
notes that based upon this knowledge designers 
may be able lo improve the usability of 
technological artefacts for certain tasks but the 
resulting interactions may not be considered as 
novel or engaging. 
This paper will briefly overview some ofthe 
cognitive changes psychological disciplines 
associate with the normal ageing process ofthe 
human brain, These changes will then be unpacked 
in relation to the methods and tecliniques certain 
designers have used when developing new 
technological artefacts for older individuals. It will 
suggest that these methods reduce the mind lo 
discrete processes for exploitation by the designer, 
which might not be productive in the development 
of engaging technological interactions for older 
individuals. The paper will introduce an alternative 
body of evidence based upon theories of cognition 
that suggest an individual's cognitive abilities are 
embodied within the capacities of their particular 
physiology and enacted within a certain ecology. 
The paper will argue that the model of interaction 
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underpinning these theories determines that 
engagement with lechnologica) anefacis is a 
continuous mo mem-by-mo men I reassessment of 
affordances that couple together llie sensorimotor 
capacities of an individual and the ecological 
environment. The paper speculates thai design 
methodologies relating to the creation of engaging 
technological artefacts for older people may benefit 
from considering their changing capabilities in 
relation to this dynamic model of experience and 
interactions as affordances. 
AGED COGNITIVE ABILITY AND DESIGN 
REDUCTIONALISM 
Designers have often drawn from the disciplines of 
psychology and neuropsychology in order to 
understand the changes in the mind as people age, 
with the intention of relating such changes to the 
designed world. Neuropsychology traditionally 
studies and identifies how mental activity relates to 
certain behaviour, sfimuli and pathologies. 
Francisco Varela and colleagues (Varela et ah 
1991) argue that such a method is a result of a long 
standing notion that treats the mind as an 
information processing machine thai can be 
reduced down to specific processes representing 
ex tenia I phenomena, actions and behavioural trails. 
In the cases of older users of technologies, the 
processes most often attributed to restricted 
abilities lo engage with emerging technologies are 
related to an individual's memory and intelligence. 
Specifically, the areas thai relate to working 
memory and fluid inlclligence are widely 
considered as causing the most difficulties (Stuan-
Hamilton 2006, Birren and Warner Schaie 2001). 
These processes will be briefly explained below. 
Working memory is considered the feature of the 
short term memory system that allows an 
individual to not only keep information in 
conscious thought for a short to medium length of 
lime, but lo dynamically manipulate such 
information. Psychologist Alan Baddeley claims 
this is of particular use in activities thai require 
learning, reasoning and comprehension (Baddeley 
1986). It is widely noted thai working memory 
declines in older age (Salthouse 1994), along with 
the explicit recollection of long term memories 
(e.g. Smiih 1996). However, certain abilities related 
to long term memory, such as implicit knowledge 
of previously gained skills and knowledge of 
words, are shown to be robust later in life (Smith 
and Earles 1996). 
Raymond Cattell (1971) described fluid 
intelligence as the ability one has lo decipher new 
information or situations without the need to draw 
upon any prior experience. Tliis is often opposed lo 
crystallized Intelligence, which is the coming 
togclherof past skills, experiences and knowledge 
that may be recalled lo be used once again (Caliell 
1971). Various lab studies have observed a 
lowering of fluid intelligence later in life and little 
change in the crystallized processes {such as 
Hayslip and Stems 1979, Singer el al. 2003), Much 
as with the changes observed in studies of memory, 
(his suggests older individuals are less able to 
develop the skills required for certain 'new' 
experiences, yet have a wealth of previous 
knowledge that is still accessible. 
Some design researchers have noted that the 
research within psychological disciplines on ageing 
inielligence and memory may be of value lo 
designers of new technological interfaces. Mary 
Zajicek identified how the changes observed in the 
cognitive abilities of older people could relate to 
problems that occur upon the use of screen-based 
computational inierfaces, fitting 'precisely ihe type 
of exploratory learning required for computer use' 
(Zajicek 2001. p.2). Zajicek recommended that 
certain measures should be taken by designers of 
interactive technologies in consideration of these 
reduced cognitive abilities, such as simplifying the 
ftinctionality of a particular interface by reducing 
the amount of information that is required lo be 
stored in short term memory. Similar conclusions 
have been made by a number of HCl and 
gerontology researchers over the past decade, often 
resulting as sets of guidelines for the usability of 
new technologies for aged cognitive ability (such 
as Schieber 2003). 
Other practitioners have attempted lo reduce the 
eft'ects of the presumed cognitive change by 
avoiding ihc use of the restricted abilities and 
exploiting the 'healthy' processes of memory and 
inielligcnce. Milli Docampo Rama is one such 
practitioner, investigating the idea that each 
generation of certain age ranges belong to 
particular generations of lechnological interaction 
(Docampo Rama 2001). Docampo Rama's research 
was based upon a cross-validalion between 
sociological, psychological and child development 
research that had suggested the experiences one has 
between ilie ages of 10 and 25 years mosl strongly 
shape personal values and skills u,sed in Ihe future 
(Sroufe and Cooper,1988, Glenn 1974). Docampo 
Rama integrated this argument with a historical 
study of technological inierfaces through the 20''' 
century to establish a series of technology 
generations Ihat certain generations of people 
belong to. It was argued that the integration of 
previously gathered knowledge from this earlier 
period in an individual's life harnessed the healthy 
and able processes of his or her memory, whilst 
removing layers of complexity reduced load on the 
less able working memory processes. Tim Lewis 
(Lewis 2007) and colleagues have explored 
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Docampo Rama's claims further tlirough usability 
studies of older people using certain technological 
products - such as microwaves - with differing 
levels of interface generations, from mechanical-
csque to digitised software-based interfaces. 
In certain cases design methods derived Irom 
psychological studies of aged cognitive ability can 
provide heightened level of 'usability'. This paper 
questions, however, whether a reliance on the past, 
metaphor, analogy and a discrete understanding of 
memory constitutes the development of novel and 
engaging technological intei^ctions for the older 
individual. In using the knowledge from the 
psychological disciplines the designer becomes a 
limiter of potential interactions as opposed to 
allowing an engaging reciprocation between an 
older individual and the technological artefacts they 
encounter. 
These approaches take the world as a discrete set of 
properties that are symbolically stored across the 
mind for later retrieval. As such, this leads to 
designers adapting cognitive change through 
identifying which of these symbolic represcnialions 
in the mind work still and those lliai do not, and 
designing tcclinological artefacts accordingly. An 
alternative perspective on the relationship between 
the mind and actions in (he world that does not 
observe the mind as an information processing 
machine is provided within llic embodied and 
enactive cognitive sciences. 
THE ROLE OF BODY AND WORLD 
The perspectives outlined above rely heavily on the 
idea that the mind sysmbolically represents certain 
external phenomena and treats this as the central 
'computational' processing device of human 
consciousness. Opposing this, embodied models of 
cognition argue that perception and cognition result 
from the physiology of the whole body (Lakoff and 
Johnson 1999, Gallagher 2005). An embodied 
perspective on cognition takes the experience of a 
particular individual occurring as a result of the 
combined sensorimotor capacities (sensory organs, 
muscles, bone and skeleton structure etc, and the 
actions these allow) that their body provides. 
Francisco Varela and colleagues determined that 
embodiment unifies the perceptual and action 
capabilities of an individual. Perception and action 
'arefiindamentally inseparable in lived cognition. 
Indeed, the two are not merely contingently linked 
in individuals, they heive also evolved together' 
(Varela c'(u/. 1991, pp.l72-l73). The model of 
cognition outlined by this group of researchers 
suggests that it is no longer possible to separate the 
mental processes from actual, lived experience. 
Within this body of opinion the processes of the 
mind are not a collection of symbollic 
representations of an outside world that can be 
discretely exploited; the mind is dynamic and fully 
iniergrated within the actions, interactions and 
world an individual finds themselves in (Maiurana 
and Varela 1987). 
This a i lment does not stop at the notion of the 
mind as embodied, as this body is situated io a 
particular world, or ecology, and is acted, or 
enacted, within it. Seasorimolor actions both 
inform and are informed by the wider ecological 
environment an individual is situated within and 
the action possibilities it provides (Abram 1996, 
Noe 2004. Gibson 1979). James Gibson's theory of 
ecological perception introduced the concept of 
affordance (Gibson 1979). Gibson claimed that the 
potentiality for interaction in the environment is 
one of a mutual conversation between an 
individual's physiology and tlie objects, surfaces 
and artefacts that are perceived at a moment in time 
(Gibson 1979). Gibson's affordances (not be 
confused with Donald Nonnan's adaptation of the 
concept (Nonnan 1999)) are invariant properties of 
the environment; an affordance either exists or it 
does not. A particular affordance may not be 
perceivable to a particular individual as a result of 
his or her embodied sensorimotor capabilities, 
however, that is not to say the afibrdance does not 
exist for others. As a result of litis mutuality with 
the physiology of an individual, atfordances can be 
discovered and lost. A branch that affords climbing 
up to and swinging on for a child one summer may 
not the next. This is a significant feature of the 
tlieory of affordances, as it suggests that the 
invariant potentials for interaction are been 
dynamically continuously reassessed. 
Alva Noe expands upon Gibson's concept of 
affordance to include the ability for an individual to 
extend and master their sensorimotor skills, 'the 
possession of which enables a situation to afford an 
opportunity for action not otherwise available' 
(Noe 2004, p. 106). Noe uses the example of how a 
baseball bat may afford little to one individual, but 
to an individual whom has mastered the skill or is 
in the process of doing so, it may afTord the hitting 
of an appropriate ball a long distance. This suggests 
tliat memory is a dynamic process of the 
sensorimotor activity that is in continual change; it 
does not merely act as a static store of information 
to be referred to but is in a constant (luxation based 
upon current and planned action in the world 
(Edelman 1992). 
IMPLICATIONS 
The current direction of the design of technological 
artefacts inclusive of cognitive change in older 
individuals draws heavily from Psychological 
studies of memory and intelligence. As a result of 
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this, the designer relies upon a method of 
distinguishing how ihe design of a particular object 
relates 1o the reduced processes of the brain lhat are 
considered either healthy or unheaUhy in old age. 
This creates a silualion where designers have rehed 
heavily on past experience and simplification of 
interaction possibihiies in order to restrict llie 
claimed affecls of cognitive ageing. Theories of 
embodiment and enaction argue that such a 
reductionalistic method of understanding action 
and interaction in the world ignores the dynamic 
nature of Ihe continual reassessment of mutual 
affordances between the human sen.sorimolor 
capacities and the environment. Il is not as simple 
as reducing cognition, history and experience into 
discrete factors for investigation, but instead to 
understand how the individual is in a constant state 
of flux unified with the activity of the body and the 
broader environment. 
For a designer this would require them moving 
away from a method thai encourages the 
investigation of Ihe discrete facets of long term 
memory and intelligence and explicitly introducing 
past meaning and experience into the technological 
artefacis they create. Rather, this aliemative 
perspective may remove evidence of the designer, 
developing technological artefacts lhat allow for 
the engagement and interaction with any particular 
individual - be they young, old or non-human -
based upon their particular sensorimotor capacity 
and the affordances and engagements it allows, 
The brief discussion of embodied and cnactive 
fonns of cognition has not touched upon how this 
is affected by certain changes m an individual as 
they progress through lifetime. Firstly, this is a 
result of there being little lo refer to regarding the 
intersection between the two subjects - studies of 
aged cognition, which itself is an ever growing area 
of investigation, are still based upon an information 
processing model of the mind. Secondly, it could 
be speculated that to a proponent of embodied and 
enactive cognition ageing as a concept may not 
exist; all lhat is observed is an alternative set of 
affordanccs and mutual couplings between an 
individual and the environment. Rather than 
considering a particular person as having 'aged 
cognitive ability' as they no longer reach the 
standards set by much younger members of the 
population, they are just s^ een as individuals with 
certain sensorimotor capacities that inform their 
activity in the world. 
Some of the difficulties that theories of embodied 
and enactive cognition provide for designers is tliat 
the language used by either discipline is not 
coextensive with one another. Future research will 
have to reframe the terminologies of either field in 
a manner tliat is cohesive and induces collaboration 
and builds upon these synergies. This short paper 
takes a tentative step towards speculating Ihe 
usefulness of these models to designers that are 
relying more frequently on psychological 
disciplines to provide insight into particular aspects 
ofhumanbehaviour. 
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Abslraci: This paper outlines a docloral thesis investigating claims thni ditriculiies older people 
encounter in comprehending new technologies may be accouniable lo a reduced cognitive and 
neurophysiological capacity that occurs in later life. The thesis questions whether understanding 
an individual's experience of technology within a reduced and predetermined cognitive model is 
suitable in design melhodologies attempting to alleviate these difBcullies. A body of knowledge 
opposing this view is introduced arguing that neurophysiologicat change should not be considered 
through an internal schema but in the way it relates to the wider physiological and ecological 
context a person is situated within. 
1. Original Key Idea 
The thesis argues that product and interaction design research should more fiilly account for neurophysiological 
capacity in the design ol" dynamic systems of affordancea that emerge between organisms and objects in the 
development of novel technological experiences for older users. 
2. Problem Domain 
The thesis is situated wilhin the context of product and interaction design research and the role il plays in the 
context of an ageing Western European population [1]. The problem attended to by the thesis stems from the 
difficulty, observed wilhin various disciplines, that in older age it becomes more diflicull for a person to 
participate with and comprehend new technologies [2]. Numerous factors could influence this difficulty in 
participation; social, financial, cultural, psychological, health etc, many of which have been examined 
previously within design research. However, this thesis is particularly interested in claims emanating from 
cognitive science and cognitive psychology that changes in cognitive ability in the later life of most adults 
results in a reduction in the abilities required to learn a new technology [3-5]. This claim is coupled with other 
neurophysiotogical claims that older people have differing levels of activity in brain regions that may relate to 
this loss in ability [6]. The thesis reflects upon these claims and questions whether the application of research 
from the cognitive disciplines may be appropriate b the design of new technological objects for older people, 
and whether there might be potential to provide an alternative route for design research in this area, 
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3. Related Work 
Cognitive science and psychology has traditionally argued in favor of a cognitive model of the human mind. It 
appears that cognitive models are based on the understanding that menial phenomena arc fundamenlally 
computational in their operation and that the brain acts as a form of central information processer managing an 
individual's perceptual input and respective motor output [7], Resulting from this, it has been plausible to 
suggest that the responses to particular phenomena, such as aspects of computer interfaces, can be 
predetemiincd tlirough understanding the cognitive schema of a particular group of individuals. Researchers 
within the cognitive sciences and psychologies have gone to great lengths in attempting to understand how the 
cognitive model differs in later life and how this affects competencies on certain tasks. Within such studies, it 
appears to be widely agreed that cognitive systems related to the forming of abstract concepts, the holding of 
information in short term consciousness, and explicitly recalling certain long term memories reduce in 
flinctionality in later life [3, S], Studies from this area have also established that the cognitive systems that 
unconsciously recall and draw upon past experience and knowledge (particularly language and procedures) 
show little alteration in ability [3, 8]. Ncuroscientific research suggests that these changes observed through 
cognitive modehng may be mapped onto actual physiological alterations that occur in human neural circuitry in 
Iaterhfc[6]. 
HCI and interaction design research has drawn upon cognitive models of the mind previously in an attempt to 
form strategies for designers to implement when developing technological interfaces that are inclusive of older 
people [9]. When the cognitive model of older people is integrated into design research it commonly leads to the 
development of interfaces that avoid the need to use the less competent cognitive systems and/or exploiting the 
systems that do not alter. Essentially, this suggests that in order to be less cognilively demanding on an older 
person, technological objects are designed in a manner that draws upon past knowledge through an emphasis on 
interlace metaphors and analogies [9, 10]. Although logically implemented in design research, the application of 
the cognitive model of mind presents situations where dramatic neurophysiological alterations in a person are 
modeled in a mechanical and systematic manner; however, the strict predetermined nature of the cognitive 
model does not meet the requiremenis of a group of users in a state of rapid neurophysiological change. The 
application of this model in design research methodologies and practice is also problematic as a result of the 
reduced level of ability tlirough which the cognitive model claims older people experience the world. In design 
terms there appears to be a reliance on tlie construction of past events in human memory as the determining 
factor through which older people experience a new technology. This presents situations where the older 
participant is only ever engaging with a new technology based upon metaphors and analogies of past 
experiences, as identified by the designer, rather than being presented an opportunity to engage their own level 
of meaning creation, 
4. Research Goal and Methodology 
A broad review of literature identified the diverse and inter-disciplinary nature of research concerning the 
relationship between the design of new technologies and internalized changes lliat occur as people age. From 
this review it appears thai contemporary design research has not addressed discussions of neurophysiological 
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change beyond of ihc cognilive model of the mind. The thesis speculates that current methodologies and 
practices within interaction design are Itmiied in their response to this problem due to the rather mechanistic 
model of cognition and human experience they draw upon and apply. Resulting from this initial discussion, the 
thesis questions: Can a broadened understanding of human consciousness in relation lo the neurophysiological 
changes that are claimed to occur in later life provide a less restrictive account of technological interaction for 
older people? The aim of this research is to provide an account of human interactions with new technologies 
through the strategy of investigating the role of the changing neurophysiological capacities of older people as a 
technique In design. This aim requires die thesis to discuss ideas, concepts, models and language, which have 
rarely been cited in the design discourse. 
As a method, further review of literature and discourse analysis will be applied lo address this problem and 
examine the manner in which designers draw upon the claims from the fields of cognitive science and 
psychology in order to identify if they provide a suitable response. By approaching the problem in tliis manner 
avenues of dialogue are identified, as proposed below, thai have not being considered within discussions of the 
design of new technological objecls in relation to the changinj; neurophysiology of older people. These bodies 
of knowledge will be integrated into the argument of thi.s thesis along with an analysis of case studies, which 
together will provide a revised basis to critically engage with uurrent design interventions. Tlie thesis intends to 
provide a valuable contribution of knowledge for the product and interaction design community thai enables to 
establish a new perspective on understanding design responses lo the aging mind. 
5. Prcliminiiry Outcomes 
The thesis has identified how the cognitive sciences can provide an alternative modeling of how human mental 
abilities relate to interactions in the world by acknowledging change. In this area of research, often referred to as 
the embodied and/or enactive cognitive sciences, it is argued thni the neurophysiological and mental capabilities 
of an individual arc shaped by the sensorimotor capabilities of their whole body [11]. Tlie whole body iiself is 
situated within the context of an ecology [12], Arguably, this mode of thought differs from the dominant 
cognitive paradigm in its move away from relating human-technological interactions as being pre-deicrminable 
on the basis of an internal cognitive schema. Rather, ii is intended to understand the u-ansaclions between 
embodied organisms and their ecology. These transactions may be understood as relational affordances that are 
m a constant slate of flux [13], Approaches based upon this particular understanding of cognition have been 
studied within areas related to human-machine interactions, ofren within the context of robotics and artificial 
intelligence [14, 15] but not to such an extent within HCI and interaction design practice. Embodied and 
enactive research provides a more dynamic account in relation to the neurophysiological changes that occur in 
later life, which is not offered by applications of the mechanical cognitive model. Ralher than determining 
interaction based upon a predetermined and concrete cognitive schema, the human participator is portrayed as in 
a constant state of flux in their transactional relationship with the ecology. It is possible to speculate that new 
technological systems based upon this paradigm would be as open-ended and provisional rather than closed and 
concrete; this conception may be of particular benefit in the context of aging individuals whom are experiencing 
neurophysiological change but it may also have implications beyond this group of potential users. 
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6. Future Research 
The preliminary outcomes of this research suggests that the discussion of interaction design m the context of 
older people with differing neurophysiologies! capacities requires a similar paradigmatic shifl as has been 
identified within the cognitive sciences over ilie past two decades. This requires the thesis to reconsider the 
terminologies, methods and practices employed in this area of design research, from that of ihe cognitive to the 
embodied and enaclive. By identifying the terminologies and language of this alternative perspective and the 
uaefiilness of the associated approach the intervention must continue to be accessible to tlie design community. 
The ncxl stage of research includes the continued re-evaluation and coniextualizalion of this alternative body of 
knowledge in relation to both tlie established practices of designing for neurophysiological change in later life 
and the research goal of establishing new practices and research mcthods/lools for designers to apply. 
7. References 
[I] National Statistics. (2008) Ageing: More pensioners than under-i6'sfor firsi lime ever. Available at: 
http;//www.slalistics.gov.uk/cci/nuggel.asp?ID=949 [Accessed: 19th May 2009] 
[2] Schieber, F. (2003) Human factors and aging: Identifying and compensating for age-related deficits in 
sensory and cognitive function. In; Chame.ss, N. and Warner Schaie, K. (Eds). Impact of technology on 
successful aging. Springer, New York, pp 42-84. 
[3] Stuart-Hamilton, I. (2006) The psychology of ageing: An introduction. 4lh ed., Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 
London, 
[4] Zajicek, M. (2001) Special interface requirements for older adults. In WUAUC'OI, 2001 EC/NSF, PP 60-65. 
[5] Birren, J. E. and Warner Schaie, K. (Eds) (2001) Handbook of the psychology of aging. (5th ed) Academic 
Press. London. 
[6] Ballesleros, S., Nilsson, L. G. and Lemaire, P. (2009) Ageing, cognition, and neuroscience: An introduction. 
European Journal of Cognilive Psychology, vol. 21, no. 2/3, pp. 161-175. 
[7] Rosch, E. (1992) Cognitive psychology. In: Hayward, J.W. and Varela, F.J. (Eds). Gentle bridges: 
Conversations with the dalai lama on the sciences of mind. Shambala Publications, Boston. 
[8] Smith, A. D. and Earles, J. L. (1996) Memory changes in normal aging. In: Blanchard-Fields, F. and Hess, 
T.M, (Eds), Perspectives on cognitive change in adulthood and old age. McGraw-Hill, New Yoric. pp 192-220. 
[9] Docampo Rama, M. (2001) Technology generations handling complex user interfaces. Doctor of Philosophy 
Thesis, Tcchnische Universiteit Eindhoven. 
[10] Lewis, T (2007) Generational effects from users'previous experience. \t\ Proceeding of Include 2007: 
Designing with people. 
[II] Varcla, F. J., Thompson, E. and Rosch, E. (1991) The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human 
experience. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
[12] NoS, A. (2009) Out of our heads: Why you are not your brain, and other lessons from the biology of 
consciousness. Hill & Wang, New York. 
256 
[13] Stoflrcgen, T. A. (2003) Affordances as properties of the animal-environment system. Ecological 
Psychology, vol, 15, no. 2, pp. 115-134. 
[14] Brooks, R. (1999) Cambrian intelligence. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 




9.2.5. 'The Mind Cupola and Enactive Ecology: Designing technologically mediated 
experiences for the Aging Mind. 
Paper presented at Consciousness Rcframed X: Experiencing Design, Behaving Media, 
MHMK University of Applied Sciences, Munich, Germany, 19-21 November 2009. 
The Mind Cupola and Enaclive Ecology: Designing technologically 
mediated experiences for the Aging Mind 
Brigitla Zics'*^ and John Vines' 
' Transtechnology Research ^ University of Wales Newport 
RooniB321 Portland Square School of Art. Media and Design 
University of Plymouth, University of Wales Newport 
Drake Circus, Room J 14 Caerlcon Campus 
Plymouth, Lodge Road, Caerleon 
PW 8AA Newport 
NP18 3QT 
Keywords: Mind Cupola. Aging Mind, Human-Computer Interaction, Enactive Ecology. Inclusive Design, 
In visibility, Transparency 
This paper attends to research within the Human Computer Interaction (HCI) community that 
aims to make the learning of new technological interfaces more inclusive of older individuals. 
In particular, the paper unpacks the problematic nature of improving the manner in which the 
designers of such systems aim to provide an implicit learning process through remediation 
and metaphor. This paper speculates an alternative approach to conceptualising the learning 
process by making a distinction between designing for invisible usability and transparent 
creation of novel meaning. An example of a technological system that incorporates the 
concept of transparency is introduced in the fonn of The Mind Cupola (Zics 2008). It is 
argued that The Mind Cupola, which is described to be an affective technology-mediated 
environment, may provide human-technological relationships that highlight aspects of 
conscious reflection in the participant, supplementing the level of unconscious immersion 
that is normally the intent of the designer. It is suggested that in highlighting the dynamic and 
transformative aspect of such interactions, the Mind Cupola provides a perspective on 
Inclusive HCI that aligns itself with the idea ofmeaning being enacted by human beings in an 
emergent system of affordances between the participant, the technological system and the 
designer. 
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1. Contemporary Inclusive HCI and Invisible Learning 
An "Inclusive' philosophy to design is about making products, services and built 
environments accessible to as many people as possible (Coleman 2008). A key focus of 
Inclusivity research over the past decade has been the rapidly ageing population of many 
Western nations (Coleman 2008). In this paper, the authors deal with the specific problem of 
understanding how HCI designers may improve the Inclusivity of new technologies for older 
people. In particular, it appears that the Cognitive Modelling of older people has had a 
significant role upon the design and usability guidelines that surround the Inclusive HCI 
discourse. 
/. / Cognitive Modelling as Ptominenl Approach to Inclusive HCI 
Cognitive Modelling is an approach to understand the human mind popularised within the 
discipline of Cognitive Psychology in the later half of the twentieth century. It is founded 
upon the hypothesis that the processes of the mind can be separated from the perception of 
information in the world and resulting behaviours (Niesser 1967). This approach rationalises 
human behaviour, suggesting that if we are able to comprehend the Cognitive Model of a 
particular person then, given a certain sensory input, Ihe behavioural output could be 
somewhat predetermined (Winograd and Flores 1986). A Cognitive Modelling approach to 
HCI suggests that the designer can plan for how a user may act with the technological 
interface by understanding the various systems and sub-systems of their internal cognitive 
schema. Approaches to HCI that apply Cognitive Modelling of the user as a way of planning 
for how they will interact has been heavily criticised by various scholars in the past 
(Winograd and Flores 1986, Suchman 1987, Coyne 1995, Agre 1997). In regards to 
developing Inclusive HCI for the aging population, however, there appears to be a reluctance 
to move away from such a method for conceptualising interaction. 
A prominent feature of HCI historically has been the remediation of existing tools and 
practices as a way of communicating an objects use to the user. Early examples, such as 
Sketchpad (Sutherland 1963), oN-Line System (English, Engelbart and Herman 1967) and 
Dynabook (Kay 1968), have left a legacy in which the hardware and software followed a 
largely symbolic and metaphorical form of communication to the user. In more recent history 
there have been attempts to move the dependency in HCI on graphical and remediated 
metaphor, towards forms of computing focused more upon how meaning is generated 
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througli physical and social context (Dourish 2001). However, it appears that the continued 
application Cognitive Modelling within Inclusive HCI for older people has lead lo a 
dependency on using remediation of past technologies. 
Figure 1 Initial HCI inicrveniions, Skelchpad by Suiherland (1963) (un the leji) ami Uynabook 
by Kay (1968) (on ihe right), remediated (pen and the typewriter) the human-tool relationship 
in order to produce initial applications of human-computer relationship. 
Why might Cognitive Modelling, heavily criticised by HCI discourse, still be popular within 
the domain of HCI and ageing? It may be in part down to their being a broad consensus that 
the measurable cognitive changes that occur in later life have a significant relation to changes 
in human behaviour (Stuart-Hamilton 2006). The crux of what the Cognitive Modelling of 
older people suggests is that they will always struggle to make sense of the new once the 
normal ageing process moves beyond a certain point. Age-related usability expert Mary 
Zajicek (2001 p. 2) noted that the cognitive changes: '...fits precisely the type of exploratory 
learning required for computer use' and, as a result of this, there is 'not only a need for 
familiar technology but for a learning method which makes the user feels more confident in 
their own ability to leam'. Resonating on what has become a key area of research Zajicek 
explains the importance of learning methods that attempt to develop more familiar 
technological interactions for older people in light of the claims from the ageing Cognitive 
Model. Througli accounts such as Zajicek's it can be observed that Inclusive HCI designers 
appear to focus upon the role of remediating past technologies in order to provide 
metaphorical expressions of the new and create invisible learning processes and usable 
devices for older people. 
1.2 The Problematic Application of Cognitive Modelling in Aging 
Mill Docampo Rama (2001) provides an oft-cited example of such Inclusive HCI research, 
highlighting that the technological systems encountered between the ages of 10 and 25 years 
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are key to the learning strategies deployed in attempting to adapt to a novel computer-based 
graphic user interface once certain cognitive abilities decline through normal ageing. It was 
noted how for many current older people, the dominant 'software' approach to technological 
interfaces was incomparable to the 'electro-mechanical" generation of technologies they 
experienced at a younger age (Docampo Rama 2001), Docampo Rama (2001 p.lOS) 
suggested that: '...the re-introduction of electro-mechanical style concepts such as the one-to-
one relation between function and button' and '...understandable direct feedback about the 
state of the device' increase the straightforwardness of the older persons use of the 
technology and to '....reduce the load on a number of cognitive skills that arc known to 
decline with age'. Although Docampo Rama provided only a limited account on this, 
researchers working with the area of Inclusive HC! and product design have extended her 
research in developing technological interventions for the aged that rely more upon 
metaphors to past technologies in order to decrease complexity and improve the intuitive 
properties of the interface (Blacker, Popovic and Mahar 2003, Lewis 2007). This paper sees 
these approaches as problematic as they rely upon a learning process centred on a 
generalisation of past experience of technology, which appears to suppose that the personal 
histories of a few may be transferable to people of the same age. Through the deployment of 
this approach, the designer takes a central role in the creation of meaning by the user, 
restricting exploration and the agency of the older person as a creator of their own meaning 
through their relationship with the technology. 
2. Moving from Remediated Invisibility Towards Novel Transparency 
In order to move trom the limitations of the above approaches we might start thinking about 
developing technological systems inclusive of older users thai are adaptive to their particular 
contingencies, but do not restrict the meaning of interaction to a remediation predetermined 
by the designer. It appears from the above discussion that the HCl community, particularly in 
the context of designing to be inclusive of older people, are continually looking to achieve 
interactions affording continuous and immersive states where the technological object 
disappears from the conscious observation of the user. Some ftirther insight and conceptual 
diflerentiation on this matter is provided by Martin Heidegger's (1962) concept of the tool 
(or equipment). As discussed above, it could be suggested that there is a continuous by the 
Inclusive HCl designer to provide a 'ready-at-handiness' where the user is already a master 
of the tool they have been presented with. Heidegger used another definition of'present-at-
hand' to describe situations where a person attends directly to the object with conscious 
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intent. As such, Heidegger describes two different types of technological interaction where 
the technology of use is either visible or invisible to its beholder. 
2.1 Invisibility Versus Transparency 
Although the mastering of the tool - making it rcady-to-hand - is the optimal desire of the 
designer, in this paper we are attempting to move trom a typical sense of using a tool tor the 
purpose of a particular task towards facilitating situations where novel forms of meaning may 
be established. It could be suggested, therefore, that a distinction can be made between 
facilitating a stage between the purely invisible and visible stages of interaction, through 
understanding the interactive process as levels of transparency (Zics 2008). Transparency in 
the human - technology relationship could be considered as an oscillating process where the 
designer, through their organisation of the 'cnactive interface' or how here will be termed the 
Transparent Medium, allows interactions that are in a constant state of flux between 
reflection and pellucidity. This implies that these interfaces incorporates a reflection process 
(being visible) as a meaning creation into the interaction, favouring a learning process of the 
user to inhabit novel meaning, This approach, which also resolve the limitation of 
Heidegger's concept explaining only two possible states of Ihe tool user (Ihde 1991), suggests 
a great spectrum of states of the user accommodating dynamic evolving of new meaning. 
2.2 Tran.sparent Medium as Dynamic Seeing 
Although invisibility and transparency have been discussed in the HCI community it has 
remained a confiised concept. This may be a result of there been little phenomenological 
differentiation between the state of being pellucid (invisible) and being reflective (non-
invisible), However, it may be possible to gather insight from art communities, where 
scholars have argued that HCI should 'explore the meaning of the interface itself (Rokeby 
1995, p. 133) as opposed to adesignerly interest the illusion of invisibility. Tiffany Holmes 
(2002) provides a useful example in the notion of Dynamic Seeing. Dynamic Seeing refers to 
the design of one's experience through the oscillation between interface visibility and 
invisibility that occurs through the spectator's processes of mastering the tool and uses this 
ability to explore the content of the medium. Holmes argued: 
-..that the most engaging component of interactive works is not the actual action or 
gesture perfonned by the navigator but rather, the process of actively learning to self-
direct one's own passage through a piece. The interactive art experience is one that 
blends together two individualized narratives. The first is the story of mastering the 
interface and the second is about uncovering Ihe content that Ihe artist brings to the work. 
(Holmes 2002, p.90) 
262 
Whereas the contemporary Inclusive HCI community provide an invisible process of 
interaction and use, artists inventing interfaces argue lor a greater account of visibility. 
Holmes perspective is useful to understand what might constitute learning processes in a 
Transparent Medium, based upon the creation of meaning that enriches the transfer of content 
in the user experience. This move supports technological systems that enable a participant to 
enact their own meaning and experience as opposed to a reconstructed creation of meaning, 
as determined by the designer. In order to provide an example of these ideas, it is necessary 
to look beyond the examples provided by the HCI and interaction design communities. 
Rather, the paper draws from the example of the Mind Cupola, a large-scale interactive media 
artwork that applies the concept of Transparent Medium. In providing an intervention on the 
design of human - technology interactions formed from a theoretical and philosophical basis, 
the Mind Cupola emphasises the enacted nature of human experience that is provisional and 
speculative in comparison to traditional HCI and interaction design interventions. 
2.3 The Mind Cupola: A Transparent Medium and Orchestration of Enaction 
Kigure 2 Technological System Overview of the Mind Cupola (on the left) and The Representation of Ihe 
Technological Feedback System of the Mind Cupola (on the right) (® Zics 2008) 
The Mind Cupola interface is formed of three interconnected systems; a biofeedback 
perceptive system (face/eye capture system), a frequency-generating affective system, and a 
real-time visualisation. Although these systems are describable as separate, upon use the 
system becomes a dynamic whole that incorporates the biological responses of the 
participator. TTiis dynamic is formed through a continuously changing collection of feedback-
263 
loops between the technological system, the responses of the participant and the sensitivity of 
the couplings as determined by the designer. The dynamic and instantaneous feedback-loops 
are fundamental in considering the Mind Cupola a Transparent Medium. 
Upon encountering the Mind Cupola, users are invited to step into the immersive 
surroundings and relax. The interaction process fluctuates between the natural reactions of 
facial and eye movement and controlled responses through which the user learns to produce 
meaning. According to the user's responses and level of enaction, the system produces 
affections by altering certain environmental qualities (such as vibration, heating, cooling, 
sound affect) and challenging the user's attention (through affective visualisation, peripheral 
vision affect). The visualisation engages the user with perceptive affection that requires both 
instinctual and conscious control to form a relationship through interaction. Whilst the user 
might look for hidden messages on the display by using the gaze of their eyes as a control 
mechanism, at the same time they change their environment through the behavioural analysis 
of the system. During the mastering the interface process the user reaches immersive states 
that go beyond typical everyday experiences of technology, more alike to a process of self-
observation. This paper proposes thai these experiences that bridge the artist's anticipation of 
enaction and the user's interaction in the environment provide what may be described as an 
Enactive Ecology, where the dynamic conversation between the artist-environment-user 
results in meaningful experiences. 
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Figure 3 The Mind Cupola's Affective Environmenl willi its user (on the left) and the 
Conceptual Draft of the Cupola's Interface [on the right) (© Zics 2008) 
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Figure 4 Users in the Mind Cupola and Screenshols of ihe 
Affective Visualisation witli Corresponding Eye Positions 
(©Zics2008) 
2.4 From Cognitive Modelling to Cognitive Feedback Loop in the Mind Cupola 
The underlying framework of the Mind Cupola is still 'cognitive', in that the feedback-loop is 
based upon knowledge relating the specific physiological feedback to certain cognitive states 
of awareness and immersion. However, the manner in which the system is participated with 
aligns the Mind Cupola as an orchestrator of an enacted perspective on cognition (Varela et 
al. 1991) rather than Cognitive Modelling that removes the mental apparatus from perception 
and action where meaning is predetermined by the designer of the interface. Rather, in the 
Mind Cupola meaning is co-constructed relationally between what the capacities of the user 
affords the technological system, and what the capacities of the technological system affords 
a this particular user. The participant and the technological system absorb one another to 
form an integrative whole where the afforded relationships between one another emerge in a 
reciprocal conversation. In this evolving quality of the interaction process, in which human 
and machine are interdependently react on each other states, the biofeedback data serve not 
only to read bio/physiological changes in the user but also to enact new meaning. The 
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Transparent Medium is a result of self-reflective process when the user re-evaluates his/her 
knowledge of 'being-in the-world' attaching new meaning to it. This new meaning 
production fluctuates with the instinct and unconscious (including the newly embodied 
meaning) aclions of human enaction which helps to maintain the cognitive flow in the 
interaction. The result of such a fluctuation in the human cognition is termed here a Cognitive 
Feedback Loop. 
3. Future Research: Integrating Transparency into Inclusive HCI 
Interactive environments such as the Mind Cupola may provide insight into a new area of 
HCI research situated at the intersection of inclusive design, artificial intelligence and 
consciousness studies. In the context of HCI that is inclusive of the particular capacities of 
ageing users, it is suggested here that the Mind Cupola may provide a valid alternative to 
contemporary interventions in providing a learning process that evaluates and attends to the 
level of cognitive immersion and stress on the user and alters levels of affection accordingly. 
This move is founded upon centralising the role of the creation of meaning through levels of 
transparency as opposed to purely intuitive levels oUnvisibility. In making this conceptual 
turn a move is made Irom the designer predetennining the meaning of a new technology 
based upon traditional usability to the designer facilitating the orchestration of an enacted 
system of aftbrdances between the user and the technological interface. Environments that 
slowly unravel how a technology operates through states of immersion, meditation and 
reflection, may present the opportunity for meaning and knowledge to be constructed 
incrementally through technologically-mediated activity, rather than procedural input/output 
success/failure routines. In monitoring the effort of the user, environments such as the Mind 
Cupola present an opportunity to allow the user to appropriate meaning and learn a 
technology through an ongoing relationship, possibly minimising the perceived limitations of 
cognitive aging, whilst not relying upon a metaphorical and remediated process of learning. 
Although the Mind Cupola was formulated on the basis of being an artistic intervention as 
opposed to a 'designed' purpose, it may be possible to explore how Transparent Mediums 
and the concept of Cognitive Feedback Loop can translate into the quotidian. 
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